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The sensorimotor theory is an influential, non-mainstream account of perception and
perceptual consciousness intended to improve in various ways on orthodox theories. It is often
taken to be a variety of enactivism, and in common with enactivist cognitive science more
generally, it de-emphasises the theoretical role played by internal representation and other
purely neural processes, giving theoretical pride of place instead to interactive engagements
between the brain, non-neural body and outside environment.
In addition to offering a distinctive account of the processing that underlies perceptual
consciousness, the sensorimotor theory aims to offer a new and improved account the logical
and phenomenological character of perceptual experience, and the relation between physical
and phenomenal states. Since its inception in a 2001 paper by O’Regan and Noë, the theory
has prompted a good deal of increasingly prominent theoretical and practical work in
cognitive science, as well as a large body of secondary literature in philosophy of cognitive
science and philosophy of perception. In spite of its influential character, many of the theory’s
most basic tenets are incompletely or ambiguously defined, and it has attracted a number of
prominent objections.
This thesis aims to clarify the conceptual foundations of the sensorimotor theory,
including the key theoretical concepts of sensorimotor contingency, sensorimotor mastery,
and presence-as-access, and defends a particular understanding of the respective theoretical
roles of internal representation and behavioural capacities. In so doing, the thesis aims to
highlight the sensorimotor theory’s virtues and defend it from some leading criticisms, with
particular attention to a response by Clark which claims that perception and perceptual
experience plausibly depend on the activation of representations which are not intimately
involved in bodily engagements between the agent and environment. A final part of the thesis
offers a sensorimotor account of the experience of temporally extended events, and shows how
with reference to this we can better understand object experience.
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11 - The Sensorimotor Theory of Perceptual Experience
The sensorimotor theory is an influential, non-mainstream account of perception and
perceptual consciousness intended to offer an improvement on orthodox theories. It is often
taken to be a variety of ‘enactivism’, and in common with enactivist cognitive science more
generally, it de-emphasises the theoretical role played by internal representation and other
purely neural processes, giving theoretical pride of place instead to interactive engagements
between the brain, non-neural body and outside environment.
Although orthodox cognitive scientific accounts of vision vary in their details, they
commonly descend from the hugely influential work of Marr, brought together in his
posthumously published book Vision (1982). Marr’s contention was that vision is a form of
information processing, beginning with the retinal image and resulting in a detailed,
neurally-realised representation of the outside environment, the deployment of which is
sufficient for visual awareness. Allied to this general approach is a naive and, as we will see,
implausible conception of vision, in which this representation takes the form of an expansive
and richly-detailed topographic model of the outside world, the activation of which is
sufficient for a richly-detailed visual experience.
Although orthodox theories never explicitly endorse the naive conception, it is not
disowned by Marr’s basic claim that vision is a process of constructing a detailed internal
representation based on the more limited information available from the retinal image. This
has prompted sensorimotor theorists to suggest that research on vision is in many cases tacitly
motivated by the naive conception, causing it to generate faulty results. Part of the
sensorimotor theory’s ambition, in offering an alternative to Marr’s basic thesis, is to provide a
theoretical framework which avoids conceptual mistakes and enables more fruitful empirical
research. To this end, the theory claims that perception is not a process of representation, but
of skill-driven bodily exploration of the outside environment.
In addition to offering a distinctive account of the processing that underlies
perceptual consciousness, the sensorimotor theory aims to explain perceptual consciousness
itself, in particular its phenomenal character and the relation between phenomenal and
physical properties. Many people continue to be moved by anti-physicalist intuitions about
2‘qualia’, and the sensorimotor theory aims to respond to these by providing compelling and
principled reasons for thinking that there is nothing more to being in a given phenomenal
state than being engaged in a particular kind of embodied interaction with the environment.
As before, the theory is supposed to be an advance on accounts of consciousness that appeal
solely to facts about the brain, which sensorimotor theorists think lack the resources to defeat
anti-physicalist intuitions.
Besides responding to this issue, the sensorimotor theory provides a number of
distinctive insights into the logical and phenomenological character of perceptual experience.
The theory, interestingly, integrates its contribution to various non-empirically oriented
debates about perceptual experience with its account of the cognitive science of perception. In
addition to taking a critical stance toward internal representation in cognitive science, the
theory rejects representationalism in a number of other domains, including the attempt to
explain phenomenal qualities by appeal to representational content, and representational
realist accounts of the epistemology and metaphysics of perception. In place of representation,
the theory appeals in each case to a bodily relation the perceiver stands in to the outside
environment.
The theory was given its best known early statement in a paper by O’Regan and Noë,
titled ‘A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness’ (2001a) - in fact, it is an
account of perception more generally, although the focus is on vision. I will henceforth use the
abbreviation O&N to refer to that paper or the paper’s authors in cases where it is that
particular paper I am referring to. The other best known statement of the sensorimotor theory
is Noë’s (2004) book Action in Perception, which is joined by more recent book-length
accounts by O’Regan (2011) and Noë (2012), and a number of early papers on the theory,
frequently authored in collaboration with Myin (e.g., Myin and O’Regan, 2002; O’Regan,
Myin and Noë, 2004; 2005). Although O&N is the first official statement of the theory, it
bears strong similarities to an earlier account by Hurley (1998). O&N were not informed by it
when they first formulated the account, but Noë went on to collaborate with Hurley (Hurley
and Noë, 2003; 2007), suggesting a case can be made for considering Hurley’s book the
earliest work in the canon. Other important early work by the theory’s originators, although
non-canonical, includes O’Regan (1992), Pessoa, Thompson and Noë (1998), and Thompson
3and Noë (2004). The above accounts, and others by the theory’s instigators, are supplemented
by a large body of secondary work on the theory.
The theory has had an impact in a range of sometimes only loosely-related disciplines.
In particular, it has inspired a good deal of increasingly prominent theoretical and practical
work in cognitive science: widely-discussed glosses on the theory from the very recent past
include, for example, a dynamical systems model by Burhmann, Di Paolo and Barandiaran
(2013) and a predictive coding account by Seth (2014). The theory has attracted interest and
no little controversy among philosophers of cognitive science, prompting prominent lines of
criticism, for instance, by Clark (Clark and Toribio, 2001; Clark, 2006; 2008; 2009), Block
(2001; 2005; O’Regan and Block, 2012), Dennett (2001), Prinz (2006), and many others. It
has also attracted attention from philosophers of perception, a prominent example of which is
a published symposium featuring responses to the sensorimotor theory by Campbell (2008),
Martin (2008) and Kelly (2008).
1.1 - 4ECognitive Science and the Varieties of Enactivism
The sensorimotor theory is situated amongst a complex web of theoretical ancestors and close
cousins, and I will draw attention to some of these later in the thesis, in cases where it is
helpful to do so. For now, it will be useful to do just a little basic scene setting. Although the
theory has had an impact in non-empirically oriented debates about mind and perception, it is
primarily a philosophically-motivated entry into the cognitive science of perception and
perceptual consciousness. In particular, it enters the running alongside other 4E accounts, a
broad class of approaches that depart from the view, mainstream in recent decades, that
cognition is best explained by nothing more than the brain’s construction and deployment of
internal representations.
4E cognitive science claims that cognition is properly characterised using one or more
E-words: embedded, embodied, extended and/or enactive. Embedded cognition is cognition
that must be explained by appeal to non-trivial facts about the environment in which the
cognitive tasks are carried out. Embodied cognition is cognition whose architecture
4incorporates the non-neural body as well as the brain.1 Extended cognition is cognition
whose architecture also incorporates the external environment. Enactive accounts frequently
reject internal representation altogether, and claim that cognition is ‘enacted’ through a
process of interactive engagement between the brain, non-neural body and outside
environment. It is worth noting that the degree to which the competing 4E approaches can be
reconciled or, alternatively, constitute quite separate and incompatible traditions, is a matter
of debate: see, e.g., Ward and Stapleton (2012) for an argument that they can be brought
together, and Chemero (2009) andWheeler (2014) for arguments to the opposite effect.
As I have mentioned, the sensorimotor theory is often regarded as a kind of
enactivism. The best-established version of this approach is the ‘biological’ variant, notable
statements of which include Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991) and Thompson (2007).
Enactivists in this tradition combine insights from phenomenology (in particular,
Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2013) with work on the biological phenomenon of autopoiesis (e.g.,
Maturana and Varela, 1980). They claim that the interactive processes associated with
cognition are continuous with those associated with life. Thompson observes that a cell, for
example, produces its own material constituents through a metabolic interaction with the
outside environment. Through this process of self-creation, the cell establishes the significance
of certain environmental perturbations as either leaving the organism intact or resulting in its
disintegration, and in this sense creates its own environmental niche. Living organisms arise
out of self-organising biological processes like these in the way a tornado arises out of a
dynamical process: they are, as Thompson puts it, invariant patterns that subsist in a changing
physical substrate, implying they are not merely causally dependent on interactive processes,
but constituted by them. Biological enactivists claim that self-organising biological processes
of an appropriate kind are by nature minded, and that appealing to them helps close the
explanatory gap between consciousness and the physical. To count as minded, an organism
must be autonomous and answerable to norms. The appeal to biological self-organisation
helps explain this. Organisms are autonomous by virtue of self-organising, and answerable to
1 The label ‘embodied cognition’ is also sometimes adopted by quite different accounts, in
which cognition is wholly brain-bound but involves neurally-realised representations of bodily
states.
5norms because their existence is predicated on responding to the environment in an
appropriate way.
A recent entrant to the enactivist running is Hutto and Myin’s (2012) ‘radical
enactivism’. In common with most statements of the sensorimotor theory, the authors
exclude the biological apparatus distinctive of enactivism in its original form. Their distinctive
contribution is to emphatically reject any theoretical role for representation or content, i.e.
physical states bearing truth or correctness conditions about other physical states. In place of
content, the authors claim that ‘basic’ cognition, meaning any cognition that is not shaped by
natural language, consists of nothing more than interactive engagements between the brain,
body and the external objects to which the cognition is intentionally-directed, which the
authors propose can be explained by appeal to a nonrepresentational teleofunctionalist
theoretical framework.
Noë gave the label ‘enactive’ to his (2004) version of the sensorimotor approach, not
to declare a strict allegiance with biological enactivism, but to highlight its resemblance to it.
Like biological enactivism, the sensorimotor theory downplays internal representation, and
emphasises the role played by bodily interaction with the environment. In particular, it claims,
like biological enactivism, that perception depends on the perceiver’s mastering, in a bodily
way, the character of its own bodily relation to the environment, in particular the way its
orientation to objects in the environment would change given possible movements. Noë also
expresses some sympathy toward the enactivist claim that consciousness requires life.2 Thus
the sensorimotor theory is typically regarded, with some justification, as a variety of
enactivism. Hutto and Myin complain that the sensorimotor theory retains objectionable
orthodox commitments on the ground that it retains a commitment to content and
representation (although whether they are right about this is controversial, and Myin is
himself, we should note, one of the original proponents of the sensorimotor theory). Despite
criticising the sensorimotor theory for being insufficiently radical, the authors have, by
including it in their taxonomy of enactive theories, helped crystallise the consensus that the
sensorimotor theory deserves the ‘enactivist’ moniker.
2 This claim does not, however, feature elsewhere in the sensorimotor theory, and is rejected
by O’Regan, 2011.
61.2 - Structure of Thesis
In spite of its influential nature, the sensorimotor theory is formulated in differing and
sometimes inconsistent ways throughout its canonical statements as well as the secondary
literature, and in some cases its commitments have not been spelt out in sufficient detail at all.
For instance, it is not clear whether the theory should, broadly speaking, be regarded as partly
continuous with representationalist approaches in cognitive science, or allied with
anti-representationalist embodied or enactive approaches such as those endorsed, for example,
by Thompson (2008), Chemero (2009) and Hutto and Myin (2012). More narrowly, it is not
clear what the sensorimotor skills the theory appeals to actually are, nor what kind of physical
mechanism is implicated in them. Other examples of vaguely or inconsistently defined theses
will become evident as the thesis progresses, and part of my aim is to identify aspects of the
sensorimotor theory that are poorly defined and go some way toward clarifying them.
In chapter 2, I attempt a careful formulation of the negative claims that properly
motivate the sensorimotor theory, an aspect of the account which is easily misunderstood and
which I argue has been misunderstood, in one notable case, by Prinz (2006). Chapter 3 serves
the dual purpose of laying out the sensorimotor theory’s tenets in detail, and offering what I
take to be the most promising and internally consistent ways of understanding them. Chapter
4 identifies some key limitations with the theory’s notion of sensorimotor ‘understanding’,
and offers a new proposal about what we should take sensorimotor understanding to be.
A later part of the thesis addresses some of the key criticisms that have been levelled
against the theory, in particular by Clark (2008) and Block (O’Regan and Block, 2012).
Chapter 5 addresses a worst case scenario in which it has been established that perception does
in fact depend on nothing more than the activation of internal representations, which are not
themselves intimately involved in the agent’s sensorimotor engagements with the outside
environment. I argue that in this event, there is still good reason to endorse the sensorimotor
theory as an account of phenomenal qualities, and I offer some suggestions about how such an
account could work. Chapter 6 offers a more robust defence of the sensorimotor theory in
which I attempt to make it plausible that perceptual experience is constituted by the exercise
of capacities for skillful bodily behaviour, and argue that representations should at most be
7thought to play a heavily restricted theoretical role.
Chapter 7 moves beyond the core principles of the sensorimotor theory and begins to
address new contributions the sensorimotor theory can make to long-discussed perceptual
phenomena. Specifically, it addresses temporal extension. I argue that both the activity of
perceiving and the contents of perceptual experience are temporally extended. Thus I suggest
that object experience as well as event experience has a temporally-extended content, which
temporally tracks the process of perceiving.
The aims of this thesis can be expressed as a unified goal. By clarifying some of the
theory’s founding principles, I aim to show how it can address some of the most prominent
objections that have been levelled against it. By doing this, I hope to illustrate the novel
contribution the sensorimotor approach can make to resolving some longstanding puzzles.
Thus I hope to leave the sensorimotor theory in better shape than I found it.
82 -MakingConceptual Space
The sensorimotor approach makes a number of striking and relatively novel claims about
perceptual consciousness and the physical processes that underlie it. Because of the more or
less unorthodox nature of its positive claims, it is natural that the authors aim to motivate the
approach by highlighting, with some emphasis, the faults and limitations of older approaches,
and large early sections of O&N and Noë (2004) are devoted to this. The problem with this
negative aspect of the sensorimotor theory is that many of the claims under target are not
widely endorsed by contemporary theories, and in some cases merely reflect naive
misconceptions or defunct historical ideas. In its standard presentation, the sensorimotor
account is not pitched as a rejoinder just to mistakes of this sort, but also to the
well-established orthodox view of vision in cognitive science, which holds that perception is
realised by the construction and deployment, in the brain, of a detailed representation of the
outside world.
The main part of this chapter will examine the manner in which the objections
levelled in Noë and O’Regan’s original statements of the sensorimotor approach cast doubt on
the mature orthodox model. I will argue that they do not do enough by themselves to displace
the orthodox view’s core dogma that visual consciousness depends on internal representation,
but they do, at least, indicate that orthodox theories must be careful to avoid certain mistakes.
They may also intimate that the orthodox model is founded, implicitly, on a misplaced
ambition, namely the desire to repair an obsolete ‘inner movie’ idea of vision that would better
be replaced entirely. Because of the limited reach of the authors’ negative claims, the
sensorimotor account must be framed so that its appeal does not entirely depend on them.
2.1 - Kepler andDescartes: The Lessons fromHistory
In a passage titled ‘Fallacies Pictorial and Homuncular’, Noë (2004) addresses historical
accounts of vision, with a view to drawing morals for present day theory. Drawing on
Lindberg’s (1976) overview of pre-modern accounts, he calls attention, in particular, to
Kepler’s work on the optics of vision. Given what he knew about the eye’s anatomy and the
9principles that govern the refraction of light, Kepler was able to correctly identify that light
meeting the lens is inverted (from top to bottom) and reversed (from left to right) before
finally being projected onto the retina. This finding troubled Kepler. In addition to noting,
quite appropriately, that the retinal image plays an important role in conscious vision, he
thought that it did so by actually functioning as a picture. If the retinal image is inverted and
reversed relative to the outside environment, it does not bear a pictorial resemblance to the
environment as perceived. For this reason, Kepler ‘tortured’ himself attempting to identify a
mechanism by which the light is re-inverted and re-reversed before reaching the retina. Finally
abandoning this effort, he concluded that the disparity between visual experience and the
projected image had to be corrected by a visual faculty occurring beyond the retina - involving,
as he thought, spirits - and falling outside the scope of his own interest in vision, which was
limited to optics.
Noë notes that Kepler’s misconceived search for a mechanism to re-invert and
re-reverse the light was motivated by the more basic error, which Descartes later cautioned
against, of supposing that the retinal image requires a further perceiver, a homunculus, to look
at it. This is a faulty way of thinking, since it merely introduces the requirement for another
homunculus to explain how the first one sees, and, following this pattern, an infinite regress of
homunculi prevents explanatory closure. We should note that it is not obviously incoherent,
in principle, to imagine that an image functions as a picture even in the absence of an observer,
although claiming that a mere image constitutes a ‘picture’ requires some kind of explicit
justification. Consider that a naturally occurring and function-less image such as a reflection
of the sky in a lake does not merit being described as a picture in normal usage. Kepler, in any
case, did think a homunculus was needed to view the picture, and for this reason was guilty of
attempting to explain a psychological trait by introducing a homunculus that possesses the
very same psychological trait - the most elementary version of what Kenny (1971) has called
the ‘homunculus fallacy’.3 In spite of warning against the error, Descartes committed it
himself by implying that the immaterial soul, serving as a homunculus, registers images
presented to it at the pineal gland.
3 In section 2.1.3 I will address some different kinds of homuncularity, but this for now is the
kind of homunculus under consideration.
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2.1.1 - Pictures, Filling-In and the Bridge Locus
Noë (2004) claims that a confusion similar to the one that dogged Kepler persists into the
present day. He gives the example of filling-in, a process by which the brain is alleged to
compensate for information missing from the retinal image. Proponents of filling-in claim
that the brain makes inferences about environmental features obscured, for example, by the
retina’s blind spot, and uses this inference-making mechanism to reconstruct the missing
detail in an internal representation (e.g., Goodman, 1978).
On this topic, Noë, with reservations, endorses Dennett’s (1991; 1992) position.
Dennett is known for criticising the view that the brain’s visual processing is geared toward
the production of a Cartesian theatre, an end-product which occurs in a spatially
circumscribed area of the brain and constitutes the necessary and sufficient substrate of visual
consciousness. Dennett claims that this view, ‘Cartesian materialism’, is motivated by a tacit
commitment to the existence of a homunculus for whose benefit the visual processing takes
place. This is a problematic idea for the reason I have just noted, although Dennett is not
concerned with homuncular regress so much as with implausible theoretical views that follow
from positing a homunculus, the full details of which need not be rehearsed here. He observes
that Cartesian materialists are forced to presume that the brain fills-in data missing at the
blind spot because they imagine that the notional homunculus would otherwise notice that
the information is missing. Because he rejects this position, Dennett claims instead that the
brain simply ignores the lack of information at the blind spot. Noë (2004) enthusiastically
endorses Dennett’s rejection of Cartesian materialism, and in diluted form the scepticism
about filling-in. He makes the important proviso that filling-in is only a misguided posit if the
need for it is assumed a priori as a result of prior commitment to the existence of a
homunculus. This does not rule out the possibility that the existence of filling-in can be
established by appeal to relevant empirical work.
Visual stability is a further domain in which Noë suggests contemporary theories are
sometimes guilty of the homunculus fallacy. It is sometimes considered noteworthy that
despite continual saccadic eye movements and attendant changes to retinal input, the world is
presented in visual experience as being stable. There is a temptation to assume that the brain
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must deploy a special mechanism to compensate for this, as if there were a homunculus who
would otherwise confuse the resultant changes to the positions of objects in the retinal image
for changes in the spatial position of the objects themselves. Noë argues that a compensatory
mechanism is only a conceptual necessity if you think that perception consists of a pictorial
representation derived from the retinal image and offered up for the benefit of a homunculus.
If you do not think this, you need not imagine that visual experience is in the first place prone,
without a special compensatory mechanism, to mistaking eye movement-related changes in
retinal input for changes in the outside world. Thus, an a priori commitment to the existence
of the compensatory mechanisms only arises if you commit the homunculus fallacy. O&N and
O’Regan (1992) make a similar point concerning saccadic suppression. Saccadic eye
movements create a motion blur effect on the retinal image, and it is sometimes thought that
the brain inhibits informational input from the retina during saccades in order to prevent
perceivers from experiencing a blurred visual scene (Matin, 1974). O&N suggest that this is
likely to be motivated by a commitment to a homunculus, since the smear effect need not be
compensated for if the retinal image does not function as a picture.
These examples aside, Noë is imprecise about the intended scope of the historical
lesson. He claims that: “No contemporary theorist believes that we see by seeing internal
pictures” (2004, p. 46), but finishes the passage by stating: “The purpose of this section has
been to reveal the extent to which our thinking about perception, like that of Leonardo and
Kepler, is tied to a problematic conception of the need for pictures in the head” (p. 48). What
Noë means when he says that theories are tied to this problematic conception is ambiguous,
given that there are many ways a theory could be ‘tied’ to some conception which need not
involve explicitly endorsing it.
Prinz (2006), responding specifically to Action in Perception, takes it that Noë’s
intention is to draw a rough and ready parallel between Kepler and a contemporary version of
the ‘pictorial’ view, in which neural states yield visual awareness with a particular content by
virtue of their pictorial qualities. Prinz observes that: “We do not have color filled pixels in the
head, much less an inner observer to discern all the parts. But this view is not seriously
defended by anyone” (2006, p. 12). Appealing to Kosslyn (1994) as more representative
example of a contemporary pictorial theory, he states that Kosslyn takes care not to require an
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infinite regress of homunculi, and observes that pictorial views in general are not
pre-committed to the existence of filling-in at the blind spot, since they could instead endorse
Dennett’s suggestion that the subject simply ignores the absences of information.
Prinz continues by citing a study by Ramachandran and Gregory (1991) in which
subjects were presented with a television screen showing at first a ‘snow’ pattern and
subsequently switched to show a solid colour instead. Subjects reported undergoing a briefly
continued awareness of the snow pattern in an area of the visual field corresponding to the
blind spot, even after the stimulus had been changed. The study suggests that information
missing at the blind spot is not, in fact, simply ignored in visual processing, as if it were there
would be no way to explain the continued percept of the snow in this region of the visual field.
Prinz claims that the evidence that filling-in does take place counts as an embarrassment for
the sensorimotor theory.
Noë is admittedly vague about the lesson he intends us to take from Kepler and
Descartes, and a sceptic would be well-justified in observing that Noë does not
comprehensively address the numerous resources that orthodox, including pictorial, accounts
appear to have to avoid the homunculus fallacy. However, Prinz’s rebuttal falls wide of the
mark. Noë neither claims that pictorial accounts necessarily commit the homunculus fallacy
and therefore fail, nor denies the existence of neural filling-in. A better account of his position
can be found in an earlier paper by Pessoa, Thompson and Noë (1998). The paper rejects
Cartesian materialism and also a doctrine the authors call ‘analytic isomorphism’, the a priori
thesis that the substrate of perceptual consciousness must be a circumscribed area of the brain
- a ‘bridge locus’ (Teller and Pugh, 1983) - which bears a functional (including topological) or
topographical (i.e. map-like) isomorphic correspondence to the features represented by the
subject’s experience. Cartesian materialism and analytic isomorphism resemble one another in
that they are both committed to the existence of a bridge locus, although isomorphic
correspondence between the neural and the perceptual is in principle not essential to
Cartesian materialism, and proponents of analytic isomorphism could deny that their position
is motivated by any tacit or explicit commitment to the existence of a homunculus.
Pessoa et al. claim that if you endorse analytic isomorphism, you have a different
reason to assume a priori the existence of filling-in. To maintain the isomorphism between the
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bridge locus and the content of perceptual experience, there must be a neural state which is
isomorphic to features that the experience represents as occurring in the location obscured by
the blind spot, given that the subject does not experience the blind spot as an absence. The
authors take it that once we reject Cartesian materialism and analytic isomorphism, there is
no reason to aprioristically assume the existence of filling-in, although they actively argue for
the claim that filling-in does take place, appealing to empirical data which I will not rehearse
given that there is no disagreement on this point between the authors and Prinz.
A similar point holds with regard to pictures in the head. The pictorial view states that
image-like physical states help generate visual awareness by serving as pictures, and this implies
they are topographically or topologically isomorphic to the features represented in the
experience, regardless of whether or not there is supposed to be a homunculus to look at them.
Thus, pictorial theories could fall under the doctrine of analytic isomorphism, although they
need not. Pessoa et al. are explicit, however, that they are open, subject to empirical evidence,
to the claim that neural states help enable visual consciousness by virtue of bearing a pictorial
resemblance to the features represented in visual consciousness. The authors reject the
aprioristic commitment to isomorphism, along with the suggestion that where pictorial
representations do play a role, this takes place in a spatially localised neural region which serves
as a bridge locus. Noë (2004) says nothing to contradict any of the claims I have just
mentioned from the (1998) co-authored paper.
Notice that for each of the phenomena Noë (2004) and Pessoa et al. (1998) target -
pictorial representations, filling-in, compensatory mechanisms for visual stability, and
neural-perceptual isomorphisms - the claim is not that these phenomena do not exist. The
authors are careful to claim that the phenomena may exist, and in some cases probably do. A
better moral is that confusion arises when we make theoretical commitments to Cartesian
materialism or analytic isomorphism necessitating the existence of something that should be
an empirical posit, a diagnosis that at least holds true when we think of Kepler’s commitment
to pictorial representations and a homunculus. In one sense, then, the negative claims
motivating the sensorimotor theory are more modest than Prinz suggests. Noë should not be
taken to be attempting to actively disprove pictorial theories or other representational
theories that, like Kosslyn’s, take care not to commit the homunculus fallacy.
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Prinz’s other objection is that Noë is targeting a straw man, given that no one
seriously defends the claim that we have colour-filled pixels in the head or a perceiver to
discern them. Strictly, this may be true. Pessoa et al. observe, however, that in the
commentaries to their BBS paper, Lehar (1998) explicitly claims that spatial perception
logically requires the existence of a three-dimensional neural model. In his own widely-cited
BBS paper, Lehar (2003) claims that topographical or topological isomorphism is not a logical
requirement for perception, but that functional isomorphism is. Using the (2003) paper as a
guide, Lehar’s requirement can be reconstructed in the following way. Imagine that the brain
contains a 3D model in the shape of a cube and that this correlates with the conscious percept
of an identically-shaped cube. The model is thus topographically isomorphic to the perceived
cube. Now suppose that instead of being perfectly cube-shaped, the model has the shape of a
stretched-out cube, with some planes that are oblong rather than square. The model continues
to be topologically isomorphic to the perceived cube, because the model’s planes continue to
stand in appropriate spatial relations to one another. Informally, this is because a cube could
be distorted into a stretched-out cube shape without ripping or tearing.
Lehar claims that topological or topographical isomorphisms are likely to play a role in
perception, but are not required as a matter of logical necessity. Now, imagine that instead of
merely being stretched-out, the cube-shaped neural model is scrambled at random, such that it
no longer looks anything like a cube, even a distorted one. This means it is no longer
topologically or topographically isomorphic to the perceived cube. Think of the scrambling,
however, as a warping of the geometry of the space the shape inhabits, rather than merely a
warping of the shape itself. Suppose that the perceived cube is transformed in some way, for
example rotated. If the model is transformed in the way that a topographical model would
have been, allowing for the distorted geometry of the space it inhabits, a functional
isomorphism obtains between the model and the perceived cube.4
Lehar insists that functional isomorphism, at least, is logically necessary for perception.
This is a strikingly robust claim, and almost sufficient for the theory to constitute an instance
of analytic isomorphism, although the appeal to functional isomorphism avoids the logical
4 Pessoa et al. (1998) use the term ‘topological isomorphism’ to refer to topological or
functional isomorphism in Lehar’s usage. I am following Lehar’s usage.
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requirement for a localised bridge locus. Lehar suggests, however, that there is reason to think,
prior to empirical confirmation, that topographical and topological isomorphisms are
particularly likely to obtain, since they are more efficient than other functional isomorphisms
to implement. This is a demanding theoretical commitment, and it suggests that Lehar’s view
is biased toward the existence of a bridge locus, even if it does not require it, since these
allegedly more efficient forms of isomorphism cannot be distributed across the brain in the
way functional isomorphisms could be. This shows that analytic isomorphism is not far
removed from explicit claims found in recent and influential work.
Lehar’s view is not a mainstream position, however: A moral more widely applicable
to representationalist cognitive science is that we should be deliberate about rejecting any
aprioristic commitment to posits that are only needed if one does endorse analytic
isomorphism or Cartesian materialism. Notice that doing so opens up conceptual space for a
range of posits that, unlike pictorial representations and filling-in, are actively incompatible
with those commitments; and some of the alternative views thereby made available may prove
persuasive on positive rather than negative grounds. After rejecting Cartesian materialism,
Dennett claims that consciousness depends instead on representational processes that are
widely distributed across the brain. The sensorimotor theory does something similar, but
makes a bolder positive proposal by claiming that cognitive processes sometimes depend in a
non-trivial and frequently unacknowledged way on the subject’s embeddedness within the
outside environment and, on some formulations, that the substrate of perceptual experience
actually includes activity in the extra-neural body and outside environment.
I will elaborate on the sensorimotor theory’s positive claims in chapter 3, but will here
briefly highlight the sensorimotor theory’s alternative proposals with regard to filling-in.
Pessoa et al. observe that rejecting analytic isomorphism and Cartesian materialism allows for
a pluralistic explanation of perceptual completion, the visual phenomenology sometimes
accounted for by filling-in. They propose that in some cases this involves pictorial
representation, in other cases symbolic representation, and in others requires the absence of
information to be ignored in the way Dennett suggests. Their account also holds open the
possibility that perceptual completion might in some instances be explained by appeal to
O’Regan’s (1992) idea of the world as an ‘outside memory’. O’Regan’s idea is that perceptual
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experience depends on a temporally-extended, embodied process in which perceivers gain
access to missing detail by attending to different parts of the visual field, making use, in
particular, of eye movements to access missing detail as needed directly from the outside
environment without needing to ‘re’-present that information internally (see section 3.1).
2.1.2 - Neural Representation
I now want to offer another lesson we can learn from the historical discussion featured in Noë
(2004), in a similar spirit to arguments made by Noë (2004) and Pessoa et al. (1998) but more
unorthodox in its implications. Just as it would be wrong to assume, without good evidence,
that filling-in takes place, it would also be a prejudice to commit oneself in advance to the
claim that the neural processes involved in perception - including any inner processes that
compensate for information missing from the retina - must involve representation. Some
theorists (e.g., Wheeler, 2005) claim that internal representation requires homuncularity,
although not necessarily of a problematic kind. I endorse this claim in section 2.1.3. The
important point for now, however, is that to assume out of prejudice that the neural states
involved in perception involve representation is to betray a commitment to the kind of
homunculus which Descartes warned against. Descartes observed that retinal images play a
causal role in perception, but that you are likely to be in the grip of the homunculus fallacy if
you conceive of them as ‘pictures’. By the same token, the states and processes involved in
perception, including those involved in filling-in, might play a causal role without functioning
as representations. It would be a mistake to pre-theoretically commit oneself to the existence
of representation when the neural activity that helps enable perceptual experience might be
better conceptualised as a nonrepresentational causal process.
Deciding whether the neural states involved in perception, including filling-in, are
representations is in part an empirical enterprise. Indeed, it is possible that appeals to internal
representation could be justified on entirely empirical grounds. Suppose that there were a
unified structure in the brain that looks like an expansive and finely-detailed
three-dimensional model of the visual scene, and we could use this to accurately predict the
character of the subject’s reported perceptual state. Few theorists realistically entertain this,
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and even Lehar (2003) falls short of insisting on it, but it remains a conceptual possibility. If
this were the case, it would be reasonable to suppose that the neural structure is a ‘model’ or
‘representation’, even in the absence of a philosophically robust explanation of how the
structure comes not just to resemble the world but, strictly speaking, to ‘represent’ it.
A similar possibility holds true even if the purported neural representations are not
supposed to involve neural-perceptual isomorphisms. For instance, it might turn out that we
can accurately predict a subject’s perceptual state on the basis of the subject’s present neural
state in combination with a theory of vision that makes reference to representation purely
because appealing to representation is the most useful way to explain the neural activity. The
idea that a neural state can be legitimately described as a representation purely because it is
expedient to do so is widely endorsed, even by non-representational theorists like Chemero
(2009), although it is rejected by Hutto and Myin (2012) - more on which in section 6.4.
If we agree that there is filling-in, this does not licence the claim that there is
necessarily representation. There may be processes that complete visual information missing
from the retina and in so doing affect the character of visual consciousness. However, should
we abandon the view that there is a detailed inner world model (a kind of representation) to
begin with, we abandon another important motivation for insisting that these processes
necessarily constitute representation, even of a non-pictorial kind. The suggestion that there
are processes that resemble filling-in without representation should be no more controversial
than Descartes’ assertion that the retinal image plays an important causal role without
functioning as a picture. If we construe the import of the Kepler discussion for the
sensorimotor theory this way, we have another reason for thinking that Prinz’s (2006)
contention that empirical evidence for filling-in should embarrass the sensorimotor account is
wide of its mark.
It is an empirical bet, however, that neural states best understood as representations
do exist. If neural representations do exist, it is also an empirical bet that appealing to their
content or functional role is sufficient by itself to explain the target phenomena. For example,
we might find that some neural process plays a functional role equivalent to filling-in, but also
find that the process, taken together with other neural processes explicable in terms of
representation, are insufficient to show which features the perceiver is intentionally-directed
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toward at the agent level, or to account for the attendant phenomenal character (if the
intentional directedness and phenomenal character of an experience could come apart, a
possibility that may not be coherent). Pessoa et al. (1998) and Noë and Thompson (2004)
deny that subpersonal content can be used to predict personal level perceptual states in this
way, although they do not deny that subpersonal representation exists.5 If it proved
impossible, however, to explain or predict the intentional or phenomenal character of the
subject’s experience without pointing to non-neural features, including, for example,
variations in the agent’s behavioural capacities, this would deprive representationalists of a
significant reason for thinking that perception is realised by internal representations at all.
The point of this passage has not been to claim that perception does not involve
representation, but, as before, to make conceptual space for the possibility that internal
representation might play a reduced or eliminated explanatory role in a final account of
perception and phenomenal consciousness. Many who are open to representationalist
5 Personal-level mental states are those it is appropriate to attribute to a whole person, and are
generally thought to necessarily be conscious or at least consciously accessible. Subpersonal
states are those which it is appropriate to attribute to a person’s parts. For example, a neural
representation may bear content about some state of affairs, even though the conscious subject
herself does not entertain mental states with that content. Some states may be subpersonal
and personal, just in case they can be intelligibly attributed to a subpersonal subsystem but are
also consciously accessible. Noë (2004) expresses doubt about the value of the distinction on
the ground that certain activities, such as eye movements, sometimes come under rational
control by the person, and sometimes do not, and that both cases are likely to be similarly
important to perception. What he has in mind is McDowell’s (1994b) use of the distinction,
which Drayson (2014) implies is an attempt by the Pittsburgh school of philosophers to
hijack the distinction for their own idiosyncratic purposes. Personal level states on this
perspective are those occurring in the space of reasons, meaning they are properly considered
to be mental states, while subpersonal states are those occurring in the space of causes, the
latter category denoting states that are not genuinely mental states at all but non-minded
physical states. Note that on the non-Pittsburgh understanding, the fact that subpersonal
states are sometimes assimilated to the personal level is to be expected, meaning that Noë’s
point does not necessarily compromise the distinction in its original meaning. In any case,
Noë’s sole-author account is marked by notable shift from talking about brains and artifacts,
as O&N did, to talking about whole persons. Moreover, he endorses a distinction between the
‘constitutive’ and the merely ‘enabling’, which in McDowell’s paper tracks the distinction
between the personal and subpersonal, and which may have a significance analogous to the
personal/subpersonal distinction in Noë’s account. I explain this latter distinction and
examine its significance later in the thesis.
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accounts of cognition endorse the suggestion that the legitimacy of internal representation as
a theoretical posit cannot just be assumed, but must be justified relative to the particular
theory it is deployed in (see Ramsey, 2007, for a detailed defence of this point). However,
others who are critical of non-representational accounts are prone to claiming that cognition,
including perception, just is a representation-involving process.6
2.1.3 - Varieties ofHomuncularity
I have, up until now, been discussing the most elementary version of the homunculus fallacy,
identified by Descartes when he rejects the suggestion that retinal images function as pictures,
warning: “We must not think that it is by means of this resemblance that the picture makes us
aware of the objects - as though we had another pair of eyes to see it, inside the brain”
(1637/1985a, p. 167). Ironically, contemporary theories that make this kind of mistake are
described by Dennett (1991), pejoratively, as examples of Cartesian materialism, on the
ground that Descartes went on to make the same mistake by claiming that the immaterial soul
is presented with images at the pineal gland.
This elementary version of the fallacy is considered by some (although not Dennett)
to be just one instance of a wider fallacy, allegedly more pervasive than mere Cartesian
materialism in present day cognitive science. The error, sometimes known as the mereological
fallacy, can be defined, broadly, as the ascription to parts of things predicates that should
properly only be ascribed to wholes. Narrowly, it is the ascription of psychological predicates,
for example ‘seeing’ or ‘believing’, to parts of persons - in particular, brains - where they should
only be ascribed to persons, i.e. the complete living organism (Kenny, 1971; Bennett and
Hacker, 2003). In the basic version of the fallacy, applying a psychological predicate to the
brain is uncontroversially a mistake. If we try to explain the faculty of vision by positing the
existence of a homunculus (a part of the person) that possesses an identical faculty, we find an
infinite regress ensues of the kind discussed earlier. It is telling that the fault, in this instance,
6 For proof that many theorists take cognition to involve representation by definition, see
Hutto, Kirchhoff andMyin (2014), who offer textual evidence from Khalidi (2007) and
O'Brien and Opie (2009) to this effect.
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lies in the circularity of the proposed explanation.
A.O. Rorty (1971), replying to Kenny (1971), notes that circularity of this sort only
occurs if you try to explain a person’s psychological state by ascribing to their brain or parts
thereof exactly the same psychological state. The threat of circularity does not indicate the
existence of a more general problem with ascribing person-like psychological predicates such
as ‘believing’ to brains, since circularity is avoided so long as the explanandum and explanans
feature different psychological states. Dennett (1978) is mindful that a certain kind of
circularity may persist, however, even if the intentional predicates attributed to the part and
the whole are different, or attributed to different degrees. To account for individual faculties
like thought or vision, we need to explain, more generally, how intentionally-directed
psychological states can be realised by a physical system at all. To account for a psychological
attribute possessed by the person by reference to psychological attributes possessed by the
brain is to presuppose that something bears intentionality, even if the states or processes
featured at each end of the explanation are different. Dennett therefore proposes, like Rorty,
that a person with complex psychological attributes might subdivide or ‘decompose’ into parts
- i.e. homunculi or ‘subpersons’ - possessing simpler psychological attributes. Those
homunculi might, in turn, decompose into still simpler homunculi. To show how
psychological attributes might be realised in the first place, Dennett introduces the crucial
suggestion that the bottom layer of homunculi are so simple, they decompose or ‘discharge’
into physical processes that can easily be described using non-intentionalistic vocabulary.
For some, however, circularity of the sort I have been discussing is merely a symptom
of a more basic error, a variety of category mistake. Bennett and Hacker (2003) and Kenny
(1971) both quote, approvingly, Wittgenstein’s assertion that: “Only of a human and what
resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind;
hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious” (1953/2009, para 281). The moral, for Kenny, is
that since it is not obvious that brains resemble humans in the relevant way, we should
proceed with caution, rather than unthinkingly ascribing the properties actually possessed by
the whole person to parts thereof. Bennett and Hacker (2003) draw a more demanding
conclusion. They argue that it is evident from everyday linguistic convention that
psychological or otherwise intentionally-loaded vocabulary such as ‘representing’, ‘mapping’,
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‘understanding’ and ‘believing’ can only be meaningfully used in relation to persons rather
than brains. On this basis, and irrespective of any particular empirical facts about brains,
Bennett and Hacker claim that neuroscientists, psychologists and cognitive scientists are
guilty of conceptual incoherence when they apply these predicates to the operation of brains.
While homuncular decomposition offers, in principle, a means to avoid circularity, it
does not, in itself, address the more fundamental charge that brains and parts of brains simply
do not, in the relevant way, resemble or behave like humans. Dennett (2007), replying to
Bennett and Hacker, remarks that we cannot use ordinary linguistic practice alone as a guide
to the applicability of intentionalistic predicates to subpersons, since the claim that we can use
these predicates turns on the empirical thesis that subpersons do, indeed, behave like human
beings. Dennett is surely right that the admissibility of homuncular decomposition depends
not just on aprioristic conceptual analysis but also on empirical facts about brains. There is a
pressing uncertainty, however, about the sort of properties or behaviours that would need to
be identified through empirical enquiry to show that an object is sufficiently person-like to
licence the ascription of psychological predicates.
Dennett (1987) offers a specific proposal that could answer this. According to the
‘intentional stance’, we can legitimately attribute psychological predicates like beliefs and
desires to an object, including a person, creature or artifact, just in case ascribing them is a
useful way to explain and predict the object’s behaviour. The account is explicitly intended to
be liberal enough to allow us to ascribe intentionality not just to people but non-living
artifacts like thermostats and chess-playing computers.7 Dennett asserts not only that the
intentional stance is scientifically respectable, but also that it reflects everyday folk
7 Dennett (1987) does not actually claim that we should apply the intentional stance to
brains. He suggests that at this level we should apply the design stance, meaning we conceive
of them as being designed to achieve particular functions. However, the homuncular
decomposition strategy requires us to view brains and parts of brains as person-like, meaning
the design stance does not appear to do the job. The intentional stance actually undercuts one
of the roles homuncular decomposition might play, namely to resolve the fundamental
question - a sort of hard problem - about how mere physical states could be
intentionally-directed. The intentional stance solves this problem without requiring
homuncular decomposition. However, endorsers of the intentional stance may still usefully
make use of the homuncular decomposition strategy to show how intentionalistic
descriptions can finally be cashed out using non-intentional, physicalistic vocabulary.
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psychological practice, noting that in everyday conversation we frequently use belief and desire
talk, for example, to make sense of behaviour by machines. If this is correct, then it is not
implausible that brains, and parts of brains, can be ascribed intentionality in this way, too. In
this event, the mereological fallacy is no threat to homuncular decomposition, either by the
standard of everyday linguistic practice or the standard demanded by our theoretical account
of intentionality.
Bennett and Hacker (2003) are on highly contentious ground when they suggest that
everyday usage gives us a determinate guide to the correct ascription of intentional predicates,
since one might think that we do not necessarily know precisely which features make our
everyday ascriptions of psychological predicates true or false. It might be that in folk
psychological discourse, we are employing the intentional stance. In this event, Bennett and
Hacker are hoist with their own petard, for the reasons I have just suggested. Alternatively, it
may be that everyday use of intentionalistic language picks out, unbeknown to us, properties
unique to people or other complete living organisms, meaning the ascription to
intentionalistic predicates to brains or artifacts are homonymic, metaphorical8 or just false.
Bennett and Hacker’s argument is enough to show that endorsers of homuncular
decomposition have a positive need to endorse an account of intentionality that makes the
approach tenable.
Depending on the approach to intentionality you endorse, the empirical criteria
required to establish the existence of ‘homunculi’ may be more or less demanding. Adopting
the intentional stance, homuncular decomposition seems relatively unproblematic.
Alternatively, if you endorsed, for example, the autopoietic enactivist thesis that only a certain
kind of autonomous biological agent can manifest intentionality (e.g., Thompson, 2007),
homuncularity would appear much less tenable. Similarly, those representationalists that
suppose intentionality is best explained by robustly naturalised subpersonal content (e.g.,
Millikan, 1984; see section 6.4) must maintain that the homunculi endorsed as ‘top down’
8 McDowell (1994b), for instance, argues that content-talk at the subpersonal level is
metaphorical, but nonetheless legitimate. In chapter 7, I argue that metaphorical
representations and content is legitimate in principle, but may not be useful or appropriate in
practice.
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theoretical posits by Dennett’s approach find counterparts in evolved modular architecture
concretely implemented by the brain, a point made by Wheeler (2005). In either of the latter
two cases, the burden of empirical evidence required to justify ascribing psychological
predicates to parts of the brain will be strong.
I will not attempt to rule, now, on the correct account of intentionality. I will
conclude this section by noting, however, that while Bennett and Hacker’s automatic
dismissal of intentionalistic vocabulary at the subpersonal level is misplaced, endorsers of this
vocabulary must offer an account of intentionality that is amenable to the existence of
homuncular decomposition, naturalistically plausible, and, we might think, motivated by
considerations other than the desire to offer a post hoc justification for their use of
intentionalistic language. This is a heavy burden, and it may prove that a more promising
approach is to reformulate the vocabulary in question instead.
2.2 - Conservative andRadical Strands
As we have seen, the negative claims that properly motivate the sensorimotor theory are
geared toward unseating a number of prejudices rather than actively ruling out the suggestion
that perception depends on nothing more than the construction and deployment of internal
representations, even representations that are richly detailed, pictorial or realised by a
circumscribed area of the brain. However, the arguments are sufficient to create a legitimate
suspicion that conceptions of vision endorsing these representationalist posits are motivated,
at least in part, by a residual commitment to faulty historical assumptions, even if they have
resources to avoid the homunculus fallacy.
The fact that the negative claims are relatively modest means there is leeway in how
radical we take the theory’s positive account to be. I will continue by outlining two competing
versions of the sensorimotor approach, one conservative and one radical. Although they are
potentially in significant disagreement with one another, the competing accounts reflect, I will
argue, an uncertain attitude to representation present in the joint and sole-authored work of
both Noë and O’Regan. The conservative account embraces a moderate construal of the
authors’ negative claims, and consequently endorses the orthodox thesis that perceptual
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consciousness is realised solely by the brain (the claim known as vehicle internalism) through
the construction and deployment of internal representations (representationalism); by virtue
of this concession, the account can be thought of, essentially, as an attempt to progress the
orthodox model in a way that inoculates it against Cartesian materialism, rather than an
attempt to radically break from orthodoxy. This conflicts with the sensorimotor theory’s
frequently radical tenor. However, the conservative approach continues to make a number of
interesting claims, including the view that perceiving depends on active, goal-directed
interrogation of the outside environment.
Many of the theory’s claims place a distinctive emphasis on embodiment: Although
the conservative sensorimotor approach denies that perceptual consciousness supervenes on
extra-neural activity, it recognises that bodily exploration plays a non-trivial and generally
unacknowledged causal role in the construction of the neural states that do form the
supervenience base. On this basis, it asserts that bodily exploration must be mentioned in any
adequate account of vision. Further, the conservative approach endorses the particularly
distinctive thesis that phenomenal qualities, rendered mysterious on rival accounts, are best
explained by appeal to laws of sensorimotor contingency, as I will explain. This, again, means
our account of perception must refer to characteristics of the perceiver’s body, specifically its
morphology and the nature of the body-environment relation that attends. By virtue of the
body and environment’s essential explanatory role, the sensorimotor approach could, on this
construction, be described as a form of ‘embedded’ and conservatively ‘embodied’ cognition.
Given the limited scope of the theory’s negative claims, the relatively modest ambition of the
conservative approach is an advantage, since it only needs to upset that claim that perceptual
awareness depends on richly detailed, pictorial representations, and not the claim that
perceptual awareness supervenes on internal representations in general.
An alternative construction situates the sensorimotor theory near the radical end of a
continuum of ‘embodied’ and ‘enactive’ approaches to cognition. Accounts in this region
frequently deny that cognitive processing is realised solely by neural states. To this effect, they
sometimes suggest that the representational vehicles which realise cognition frequently
incorporate bodily or environmental activity (Clark and Chalmers, 1998; Rowlands, 2006).
Alternatively, they deny that there is representational content or anything else that would
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motivate a principled insistence that the boundaries between brain and body, or body and
world, are of theoretical relevance in determining the bounds of cognitive processing (Hutto
and Myin, 2012). Accounts at the radical end of the spectrum, especially those that adopt the
‘enactivist’ label, are also known for suggesting that there is no internal representation
whatsoever (e.g., Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 1991; Chemero, 2009; Hutto and Myin,
2012).
2.2.1 - TheTenets of Sensorimotor Theory: A BriefOutline
In this section I will proceed by outlining the main tenets of sensorimotor theory, categorising
them into claims endorsed by both conservative and radical variants of the approach, and
claims endorsed solely by one variant or another. I do not mean to claim that any version of
the sensorimotor account must endorse every one of the claims falling under either the
conservative or the radical strand. However, identifying these distinct variants offers a useful
way to examine differences in the explicit claims made by the canonical accounts of the
sensorimotor approach, different ways of reading those accounts, and disagreements in other
literature on sensorimotor theory, a number of which will be investigated as the thesis
progresses. The first four claims are endorsed by both variants of the theory and the claims
endorsed only by one or the other follow.
(1) The World as an Outside Memory. This claim draws on work by O’Regan (1992)
and ‘active vision’ approaches in computer vision (e.g., Ballard, Hayhoe, Pook and Rao, 1997).
Endorsing Brooks’s (1991) suggestion, in robotics, that the world serves as its ‘own best
model’, the outside memory thesis (O&N) denies that human visual systems make use of a
detailed inner world model, claiming instead that our visual systems access detail directly from
the environment as required in the course of bodily exploration. This claim is given weight by
empirical work on change blindness and inattentional blindness, where it has been found that
human subjects, with their attention drawn elsewhere, frequently fail apparently to notice
occurrences that take place seemingly in full view. The outside memory thesis entails that
visual processing is, at least, causally scaffolded by bodily exploration in an interesting and
frequently unacknowledged way. It does not necessarily imply the metaphysical thesis that
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perceptual consciousness actually supervenes on extra-neural activity, although the outside
memory thesis may be a key aspect of an account that does make this claim.
(2) The Sensorimotor Contingency Account of Phenomenal Qualities. Phenomenal
qualities (or ‘qualia’), for example the feel of a sponge, the look of red or the sound of a bell
(O’Regan, 2011), are not irreducible. They can be accounted for, exhaustively, by reference to
characteristics of the conscious perceiver’s bodily relation with the outside environment -
specifically, sensorimotor contingencies (SMCs). In O&N, SMCs characterise the law-like
patterns of dependence that hold between motor output signals and informational input from
the sense organs. That paper does not specify explicitly, but they might be counterfactual
dependences, expressible by statements of the form ‘if I moved like this, sense input would be
like this’. More restrictively, they might be patterns evident in the bodily interactions that the
subject is right now engaged in, for example the way a sponge they are presently squeezing
between their fingers yields easily to touch. Burhmann, Di Paolo and Barandiaran (2013) note
that the latter kind of SMCs depend not just on peripheral sense input and motor output
states, but on the internal states of the agent, since they depend on how the subject’s motor
responses vary in line with different sense inputs, and this depends on the brain. The account
of colour offered by many statements of the sensorimotor theory (O’Regan, 2011; Degenaar
and Myin, 2013) also appeals to patterns of counterfactual dependence outside the skin, since
an object’s experienced colour depends on the ways sense input changes with movement and
in line with changes to ambient lighting conditions. Finally, in Noë (2004), SMCs also
describe perspectival properties, the ways objects consciously appear when considered from a
subject’s own perspective (for example, the elliptical appearance of a plate when viewed at a
non-perpendicular angle) and the ways these change in line with movement.
(3) The Sensorimotor Mastery Account of Perception. Perceiving takes place when
the subject possesses or exercises ‘knowledge’, ‘mastery’ or ‘attunement’ to SMCs.
Sensorimotor ‘mastery’, as I use it throughout, is a generic term intended to incorporate a
number of loosely related notions found throughout the literature on sensorimotor theory,
and intended to be liberal enough to incorporate a ‘radical enactivist’ version of sensorimotor
theory. The proponents of radical enactivism, Hutto and Myin (2012), dislike the terms
sensorimotor ‘understanding’ and ‘knowledge’ on the ground that these notions appear to
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require representational content. Myin and Degenaar (2014) endorse, by way of developing a
positive radical enactive gloss, a notion of ‘attunement’ instead, which I include under the
umbrella of sensorimotor mastery (note, however, that their concept of sensorimotor
‘attunement’ is different to the one I develop in chapter 3). O&N and O’Regan (2011) refer
to a variety of mastery which appears, like attunement, to denote a capacity for skillful bodily
behaviour that does not necessarily call upon internal representation. The same accounts
suggest, however, that conscious perception requires sensorimotor ‘knowledge’, which might
be taken to denote a distinct kind of faculty.
(4) Perceptual Presence as Access. This idea, endorsed by Noë, is a natural counterpart
to the outside memory claim. It suggests that the environment, in all its detail and
expansiveness, has a felt phenomenological ‘presence’ to the conscious perceiver which
outstrips the information processed, at any one time, by the perceiver’s visual system. This is
explained by the perceiver’s possession of sensorimotor mastery, which in this case amounts to
knowledge of (or perhaps attunement to) the movements s/he must make to find out what is
present and, perhaps, an implicit expectation about what the sensory results of those
movements will be. The ‘presence-as-access’ (or ‘virtual presence’) the environment enjoys in
the perceiver’s conscious awareness is analogous to the presence to your computer of the web
edition of the New York Times. When you read an online newspaper, you generally download
just one article at a time. However, since you can access any of the day’s articles the moment
you require them, they are, practically speaking, just as ‘present’ as they would be if you
downloaded the day’s edition all at once (Noë, 2004).
The following claims are endorsed only by the radical sensorimotor approach:
(5) Virtuality All-The-Way-In. The presence-as-access thesis, above, could be
straightforwardly endorsed by most sensorimotor theorists as a natural phenomenological
counterpart to the outside memory thesis. Noë makes a more challenging proposal, however,
when he says that in a disanalogy with the computer case, perceptual presence in humans is
virtual “all the way in” (2004, p. 134). This means that there is no distinction to be found in
the phenomenal character of perceptual consciousness between detail that is now present
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‘simpliciter’ and detail that is present by virtue of being accessible in the manner described by
the presence-as-access and outside memory theses. Noë claims that this suggestion finds
confirmation in the introspectable phenomenal character of one’s own visual consciousness,
alleging that you can never take in, all at once, any complete or atomic visual feature, for
example, “that shade of red” (p. 134). If the virtuality all-the-way-in thesis is considered
primarily as an extension of the outside memory thesis, it might seem to amount to a denial
that perceptual consciousness exists or has any phenomenal character. As I will later argue,
this impression can be avoided if the claim is considered, instead, primarily as a counterpart to
the next thesis.
(6) Perception as Dynamical Entanglement. This claim is endorsed by Noë (2004)
and reflects, in particular, important work by Hurley (1998). It involves rejecting the
suggestion, endorsed by many classical accounts of cognition (see, e.g., Fodor, 1983), that
there are functionally distinct and informationally encapsulated ‘input’ and ‘output’ systems
where the activity of input systems has no tight causal link with the activity of output systems,
or vice versa. Endorsers of the dynamical entanglement thesis claim, instead, that there is an
intimate causal link, running in both directions, between neural activity in the sense input and
motor output areas of the brain. Further, the thesis claims that there is no theoretically
relevant distinction between activity in those areas and outside, in the extra-neural body and
environment. As a result, perception must be explained by reference to patterns of dynamic
activity occurring across the entire loop of interaction occurring between brain, extra-neural
body and world.
(7) The Extensive Conscious Mind. The dynamical entanglement thesis is one of the
key claims motivating the closely allied thesis, endorsed by Noë (2004) and Hurley (1998),
that the supervenience base of perceptual consciousness literally extends beyond the
boundaries of the brain, incorporating aspects of the extra-neural body and outside
environment. The argument, briefly put, is that since perceptual consciousness depends on a
dynamical system incorporating these extra-neural features, it may not be possible or
appropriate to distinguish between the contribution made by these features and the brain
when determining the substrate. This thesis is sometimes described as ‘vehicle externalism’
about consciousness or the ‘extended conscious mind’, although for reasons that will be
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explained in section 3.6, I settle on the more idiosyncratic term ‘extensive conscious mind’.
(8) Anti-Representationalism. Representation is a key concept in traditionally-styled
cognitive science and features prominently in the orthodox approach to perception following
Marr (1982). The sensorimotor theory is unequivocal in rejecting certain misplaced roles for
internal representation. These include, in particular, the suggestion that a human perceiver
possesses an inner model of the outside world sufficient to generate conscious awareness
comprising, all at once, a large, richly detailed or picture-like visual field.
It is unclear whether the sensorimotor theory’s originators intend us to think that
sensorimotor knowledge should be thought of as involving representational content. Noë
(2004) explicitly declines to take a stance on whether or not cognition in general, including
perception, involves or could involve neurally-realised representations. O&N and O’Regan
(2011) say they are happy with talk of ‘representation’ in neuroscience when it is used,
minimalistically, to describe nothing more than patterns of covariance between physical states.
However, they stop short of insisting that there are or could be any representations carrying
content, which must be evaluable by truth or success conditions, rather than just information,
which need not, and they stop short of insisting that sensorimotor knowledge necessarily
involves representation in any sense.
O’Regan (2011), after defending use of the term ‘representation’ in neuroscience,
strikes an ambivalent tone by declaring that representation-talk is best avoided. The strongest
sign that the sensorimotor approach may necessarily entail the presence of representational
content occurs when O’Regan claims that perceptual consciousness depends on sensorimotor
engagements plus higher-order thoughts about those sensorimotor engagements. O’Regan
states, uncertainly, that the approach might have something in common with classic Higher
Order Thought theories of consciousness which, we can note, do typically take it that
consciousness depends on higher-order representations of lower-order phenomena
(Carruthers, 2011). The sensorimotor theory’s uncertain attitude to internal representation
has allowed some commentators to argue, approvingly or disapprovingly, that internal
representation plays an essential role in sensorimotor theory as originally presented (Roberts,
2010; Hutto and Myin, 2012). I will later argue that the sensorimotor account, even in the
form offered by its progenitors, could in principle dispense with any role in perception for
30
internal representation.
The conservative variant of the sensorimotor approach consists, largely, in adopting
the core claims while rejecting the radical ones. It may also endorse, positively, the following
tenets. I will list them quite briefly as they comprise, in essence, the converse of the radical
claims:
(9) Representationalism. Exercise of sensorimotor knowledge is realised subpersonally
by the deployment of internal representations.
(10) Internalism. Although perceptual processing is causally scaffolded by bodily
exploration, perceptual consciousness is realised solely by the brain.
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3 - TheTenets of Sensorimotor Theory
In chapter 2, I identified a number of theoretical posits toward which the sensorimotor theory
takes a critical stance, including the bridge locus, pictorial representation, other forms of
representation and, more narrowly, phenomena such as filling-in and saccadic suppression.
Recall that the sensorimotor theory’s critique, properly understood, does not assert that these
phenomena could not or definitely do not exist. Indeed, proponents of the sensorimotor
theory in some places actively assert that representations and filling-in do play a restricted role
in perception. The ambition, as we saw, is to unseat the aprioristic commitment to the idea
that perception depends on a bridge locus consisting of a symbolic or pictorial representation,
or as O’Regan (1992) puts it, something like an ‘inner cinema screen’. The inner screen
conception is very close to a view explicitly proposed by Lehar (2003), but, more significantly,
is liable to tacitly inform even theorists that do not explicitly endorse it, in particular - as
O’Regan observes - those addressing specific phenomena such as filling-in and saccadic
suppression. The sensorimotor theory’s negative critique is thus similar in spirit to Dennett’s
(1991) earlier rejection of Cartesian materialism.
Notice that the sensorimotor theory’s negative claims do not actively disprove the
tenets of the orthodox approach to perception. This does not matter, as long as we appreciate
that their ambition is to open up conceptual space for the sensorimotor approach’s own theses.
As a positive programme, the account draws on a number of unorthodox, ambitious and
relatively detailed positive claims about perception and perceptual consciousness, although, as
will become apparent, they are frequently in need of a great deal of conceptual clarification.
Offering this clarification is my aim in the present chapter, which serves the dual purpose of
laying out the tenets of sensorimotor theory and arguing for what I suggest are the most
promising ways of understanding them. This will set things up for the remainder of the thesis,
in which I defend the sensorimotor theory against some (albeit not all) of the best-known
objections, and finish by outlining a contribution the sensorimotor approach could make to a
longstanding question concerning perceptual consciousness of temporally-extended events.
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3.1 - TheWorld as anOutsideMemory
We will see later in the chapter that the relation between Noë’s sole-authored version of the
sensorimotor theory and orthodox accounts in the tradition of Marr (1982) admits a specific
complexity. Although Noë rejects the orthodox subpersonal model, his own account
characterises perception primarily at the personal level. This means that a little care is required
to see what sort of subpersonal story is needed to do justice to Noë’s account, and which
subpersonal posits the account invites, rules out or is agnostic about. In its early presentation
(O&N), the sensorimotor theory focuses directly on the subpersonal processes that underlie
perceptual consciousness, and therefore stands in even more direct rivalry to orthodox
subpersonal accounts.
O’Regan (1992) observes that the human retina appears to have a disastrously poor
design for retrieving information from the environment. Photoreceptors are increasingly
limited in number the further they are from the centre of the retina, meaning that only a small
central portion of the retinal image is highly resolved, while the resolution gets increasingly
poor toward the outer perimeter. Moreover, the photoreceptors are, throughout the retina,
unevenly rather than uniformly dispersed, and are completely absent at the blind spot, an area
corresponding to a significant portion of the visual field. Visual perceivers do not ordinarily
notice any of these defects, of course, and take themselves to be in perceptual contact with a
richly detailed, high-definition visual scene. O’Regan claims that the disparity between the
apparent richness of visual experience and the sparse and uneven detail available from the
retinal image is a fundamental problem which has not traditionally been addressed with
sufficient care. The result, he suggests, is that orthodox theories are frequently under the thrall
of a caricatured view of vision in which the defects of the retina are compensated for by the
construction of a detailed 3D model of the outside world, the activation of which is necessary
and sufficient for perceptual consciousness. Almost no theorists explicitly endorse this
conception, but O’Regan claims that it tacitly informs work on a range of specific visual
phenomena, for instance saccadic suppression and filling-in. Notice that the conception is not
disowned by Marr’s very general claim that: “vision is the process of discovering from [retinal]
images what is present in the world, and where it is” (Marr, 1982, p. 2).
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The sensorimotor theory’s alternative conception is founded on the claim that
conscious visual experience does not comprise a richly detailed representation of the visual
scene. A later step will be to re-describe visual phenomenology and the processes that enable it
with attention to the fact that perceivers do not take visual experience to be sparsely furnished.
The starting point, however, is to establish that the visual system does not process large
amounts of detail all at once. O&N, pursuing this thesis, cite a range of empirical work,
including work on inattentional blindness (Wolfe, 1997), the best known example of which is
the ‘invisible gorilla’ test (Simons and Chabris, 1999). The experiment features a short video
of a basketball game with teams dressed respectively in black and white, each passing a separate
basketball amongst themselves. Participants are shown the clip and asked to count how many
times the players in white pass the ball, a task which requires close attention given the
fast-moving action and the distracting influence of the team in black. Midway through the
clip, a person in a gorilla costume enters the scene, walks casually through the middle of the
game and makes a chest-beating motion. When asked if they had noticed anything out of the
ordinary, around half the participants in Simons and Chabris’ study failed to report noticing
this take place. There are multiple ways to interpret this data, among which is the suggestion
that participants were visually aware of the gorilla but did not attend to it, and therefore failed
to remember it when questioned. However, the work supports the claim that perceivers do
not experience unattended detail from the visual scene.
O&N draw a similar lesson from change blindness, a related phenomenon in which
subjects fail to notice sudden changes to the visual scene. In an early study by McConkie and
Zola (1979), participants were asked to read a line of text displayed on a monitor in
alternating upper and lower case (aLtErNaTiNg CaSe). The experiment was set up so that
changes to the text were timed to coincide with saccadic eye movements. During saccades, the
text was modified so that the lower case letters became upper case and vice versa, although the
wording, typeface, and other features stayed the same. Participants were asked if they noticed
anything irregular, and universally failed to report noticing the changing case. This led the
experimenters to conclude that ‘visual information’, meaning information derived directly
from the retinal image, is not retained between fixations, although they note that the
participants would have had to retain information of a more abstract, non-visual kind given
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that they were able to comprehend the meaning of the text, which was read over multiple
fixations.
Early work on change blindness (see also, O’Regan, 1984) focused specifically on the
consequences of eye movements, and was not motivated by broader theses about the character
of vision. Later, O’Regan’s (1992) pre-cursor to the sensorimotor theory prompted O’Regan
and colleagues to pay renewed attention to the phenomenon (Rensink, O’Regan and Clark,
1997; O’Regan, Rensink and Clark, 1999). Study participants were shown colour
photographs on a computer display. Each photograph was alternated with a copy in which a
key feature had been modified, for example with an object added or removed, or with the
colour of the scenery changed. With the photos switched back and forth, participants could in
the ordinary condition easily identify the change. The researchers found that inserting a brief
flicker in-between the frames (Rensink et al, 1997) or superimposing an assortment of shapes
in a ‘mud splash’ pattern at the moment of transition (O’Regan et al., 1999) made participants
far less likely to identify the change. To explain this, they suggested that perceivers notice
visual changes by having their attention drawn to sudden changes in retinal input (known as
transients). This means that if the modified feature of the photograph, a local transient, is
replaced by a global transient, like the flicker, or supplemented by several competing local
transients, like the mud splash, this compromises perceivers’ ability to detect the change.
There are various ways this observation might be incorporated into a theory in which
vision also depends on the activation of an inner model. For example, the visual system may
require transients to update the inner model in line with the changes. Alternatively, the inner
model may be sensitive to changes in the visual scene whether or not they are signalled by
transients, while transients are required to draw perceivers’ attention to these changes.
However, the change blindness findings make a uniquely good fit with the claim that there is
no inner model, since the finding that transients are a necessary condition for detecting
change holds open the more straightforward possibility that transients are sufficient for
detecting change even in the absence of an inner model.
O’Regan (1992) offers an alternative framework for understanding vision, the idea of
the ‘world as an outside memory’. The conception is partly based on an analogy between
seeing and remembering. In his examples, you might be reminiscing about your grandmother,
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or attempting to remember what you had for breakfast. Long-term memories are not always
consciously in mind, but typically come to awareness after being deliberately sought out.
When you probe your long-term memory, past episodes do not arrive fully-formed in all their
detail. Instead, you engage in a process of asking yourself questions, and answering them, and
this way accessing facts about the past in a piecemeal way.
According to the outside memory view, vision works in a similar way, although the
role of the memory store is played by the outside world and not the brain. The perceiver
makes use of shifts in attention along with bodily movements, especially saccades, to probe the
visual environment. This probing involves accessing visual detail serially, a little at a time, and
in accordance with the perceiver’s or visual system’s present interests, i.e. the facts they want to
find out and the locations they want to explore. Rather than subserving the construction of an
inner model, this activity of temporally-extended probing simply takes the inner model’s
place.9
Another key analogy underlying the outside memory view of vision is touch. While
vision is prone to invite an intuitive commitment to the inner model conception, it is very
natural to think that perceiving the world by touch is a process of temporally-extended bodily
probing rather than model-building. Noë (2004) illustrates this point with the example of a
blind person who uses a cane to sample the environment one detail at a time, while making
use of an accompanying grasp of the movements required to access further detail. This is how
vision works on the outside memory view.
Return, briefly, to the empirical work on inattentional blindness and change blindness.
The outside memory thesis fits well with the suggestion, derived from work on inattentional
9 The outside memory thesis says that perception is constituted by temporally-extended
probing, and therefore might imply that the substrate of perceptual consciousness is wider
than usually thought, comprising for example activity by motor areas of the brain or even
activity by the extra-neural body and environment (see section 3.6 and Hurley, 1998).
O’Regan (1992) stops short of claiming this, and does not offer any explicit stance on the
metaphysical question of how far the substrate of consciousness extends. His early paper
actively endorses the view that internal representation plays a role in vision, which might
imply that the deployment of the internal representations is sufficient for perceptual
consciousness without calling on any strictly necessary extra-neural activity. O’Regan should
more realistically be taken as endorsing the milder claim that temporally-extended bodily
probing plays an essential role in any explanation of vision.
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blindness, that perceivers only experience those features that they attend to. It also predicts
that visual systems rely on transients to detect change. The thesis claims that a transient
occurring at the periphery of the retinal image causes the perceiver to make appropriate bodily
movements to bring the object from which the transient originated into better view. Notice
that the retinal image does not need to be highly or uniformly resolved to feature transients,
and using transients this way could allow the visual system to detect important events at the
periphery of the visual field without using an inner model. With this hypothesis, O’Regan
(1992) accurately predicted the outcome of the later work on change blindness, which
confirmed that change detection frequently depends on transients.
The outside memory view resonates with Brooks’ (1991) suggestion, from situated
robotics, that the world need not be internally modelled because it can serve as its own model.
In a changing environment, it makes good sense to access detail only when required, since a
notional inner model would either need to be constantly updated, which is inefficient, or risk
representing the environment inaccurately. The view also observes that the visual system need
not compensate for the instability of the retinal image by constructing a stable representation
of the outside world. Instead, the visual system simply assumes that the outside world is a
persistent and stable entity, and takes advantage of this by accessing detail directly from the
environment when required, in a piecemeal and discontinuous way.
Perceivers must, of course, somehow grasp how presently accessed detail forms part of
the larger visual scene. O’Regan (1992) claims that retinal stimulation is accompanied by a
“non-metric awareness” (p. 474) of the locations of specific objects in the visual scene, which
incorporates an understanding of the eye-movements or other bodily movements needed to
access more detailed information about them via the retina. O’Regan claims that you may
have this kind of awareness even of objects you have your back to, implying that the awareness
is neither pictorial in its phenomenal character, nor properly-speaking visual at all. He suggests
that it is enabled by neural representations which are symbolic rather than iconic, and sparse
in detail. The representations do not themselves realise visual awareness, but help enable the
temporally-extended probing that does.
The idea resembles the ‘deictic’ representation advocated by Ballard and colleagues
(Ballard, Hayhoe, Pook and Rao, 1997) in which the visual system does not represent a
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detailed environment, but represents sparse facts about the agent’s bodily relation to objects in
the visual scene. Note that the sensorimotor theory, as it emerges in later work (especially
O&N), endorses the idea that perception is a process of temporally-extended exploration
assisted by an implicit understanding of the movements required to bring objects into view,
but does not commit itself to a particular account of the subpersonal representations that
enable this, nor unequivocally to the existence of representations at all.
Return now to the apparent disparity between visual consciousness, which perceivers
tend to think presents a richly detailed visual scene, and visual processing, which evidence
suggests does not feature detailed representation. The apparent mismatch is captured by the
work on inattentional blindness. Subjects in inattentional blindness experiments like the
invisible gorilla test typically express surprise when they have the events they missed pointed
out to them, indicating that they have certain assumptions about the character of their own
experience (Dennett, 2001). This has led theorists like Blackmore (2002) and Dennett (2002)
to propose that visual perceivers are in the grip of a ‘Grand Illusion’ in which they believe that
they see a great deal more detail than they actually do. O’Regan (1992) claims that the
apparent experience of richness is explained, in part, by the expansiveness of the retinal image,
which in spite of its defects, incorporates a relatively large visual field.
This claim is not featured in the sensorimotor theory proper, but O&N endorse
O’Regan’s further point, which is that perceivers experience richness because they have access
to missing detail when required. O&N compare this to the fridge-door effect, in which the
refrigerator light seems like it is always on because it is always on when you open the door to
look. This is compatible with the claim that perceivers are indeed beset by the Grand Illusion.
We will see in section 3.4 that Noë makes a slightly different point, namely that the
experience of detail is not an illusion needing to be explained by the fact that perceivers have
access to missing detail, but a genuine experience of detail, constituted by perceivers’ knowing
that they have access to missing detail and implicitly knowing the precise movements that
would bring that detail into view.
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3.2 - Phenomenal Qualities: The Sensorimotor Contingency Account
A phenomenal quality, such as the look of yellow, the smell of a rose, or the sound of a bell, is a
property of perceptual consciousness. In particular, it characterises consciousness from the
first-person perspective of the conscious subject. Although we could, as a third party, describe
some properties of a person, or their brain, and say we have identified the locus of some
specific kind of consciousness, it is an open question whether we could ever thereby be
characterising the phenomenal qualities that comprise their conscious experience. Some
philosophers, most notably Jackson (1982) and Chalmers (1996), have argued that there is no
way, even in principle, to characterise phenomenal qualities using physicalistic vocabulary, and
hence that the qualities are not physical. Phenomenal qualities are often referred to as ‘qualia’,
frequently though not exclusively to denote the conception of them under which they are
irreducible and non-physical.
3.2.1 - The "Qualia" Problem
Jackson (1982) famously argued that qualia are non-physical using his ‘Mary’s room’ thought
experiment. The scenario features a scientist called Mary who is confined from birth to a
room where she is deprived of visual stimulation in any colour other than black and white.
Jackson asks us to imagine that from inside the room Mary comes to learn literally all the
physical facts there are to be known, among which are all the facts that obtain about the
physical events that occur when we experience colour. One day, Mary is released from the
room and becomes directly acquainted for the first time with a red object. Jackson’s position,
at the time he formulated the thought experiment, was that Mary now learns a new fact,
namely what it is like to see red, and that since she already knew all the physical facts she must
therefore have learnt a non-physical fact. From this, he concluded that qualia are not physical.
More recently, Chalmers (1996) has used a thought experiment to argue for the broader
conclusion that phenomenal consciousness in general is not physical. He suggests that there is
a conceivable and therefore, as he takes it, metaphysically possible world which is physically
identical in every respect to our own, containing creatures (’zombies’) that are physically
identical to ourselves but lack qualia entirely. He argues that since the physical properties
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instantiated in this world could be instantiated without any attendant phenomenal
consciousness, a physical property cannot be identical to a phenomenal quality.
Anti-physicalist arguments like these play quite an important background role even in
debates among proponents of physicalism about phenomenal character. Physicalists might
deny, for one reason or another, that the premises Jackson and Chalmers use to show that
qualia are non-physical are well supported in the first place. For example, some deny that there
is any reason to accept Chalmers’ premise that whatever is conceivable is possible (see,
Gendler and Hawthorne, 2002). Others argue that given the present state of physics, we have
no to way to tell whether Mary, who knows physical facts as yet unknown to people in the real
world, would acquire new knowledge after leaving the black and white room (Montero, 1999).
In spite of arguments like these, physicalism is strategically best placed to overcome the
intuitions underlying anti-physicalist thought experiments if it can provide compelling
positive reasons for thinking one physical property or another is associated, necessarily, with a
given phenomenal quality. For this reason, an account of phenomenal qualities has an
advantage if it shows better promise than its rivals at overcoming anti-physicalist intuitions,
even in a debate conducted exclusively between physicalists.
3.2.2 - Qualia andNeural-Correlates of Consciousness
The threat posed to naturalism by the suggestion that phenomenal qualities are mysterious or
even non-physical is a notable and sometimes explicit background presence in the
sensorimotor account. O&N begin their canonical early statement of the sensorimotor theory
by criticising, in particular, attempts that have been made in neuroscience to account for
consciousness by appeal to types of brain activity. They cite a number of neuroscientific
accounts that have attempted to explain the existence of consciousness by appeal to facts
about the neural activity it is correlated with (neural-correlates of consciousness or NCCs).
These facts include, for example, the quantum properties of microtubules (Penrose, 1994),
and in another case coherent oscillations within a 40 - 70 Hz frequency range, i.e. potential
energy that is repeatedly displaced and restored to its original state at a constant speed of 40 to
70 times per second (Llinás and Ribary, 1993). O&N also target attempts to account for the
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differences in phenomenal character between sense modalities, for example vision and
audition, by appeal to the distinct neural pathways and cortical regions that are active
respectively when we see and hear, a view for which they cite Müller (1838) as the historical
precedent, and which they claim most present day scientists continue to be satisfied with.
O&N object that all these approaches suffer from the same defect, namely that they fail to give
any principled account of why the entities, areas or types of activity are correlated with
consciousness in general, or with one phenomenal character rather than another. They argue
that as long as we persist in appealing to neural properties of this sort an explanatory gap will
persist, because there will always remain an unanswered ‘why?’ question.
Even if we set aside worries about anti-physicalism, accounts of the kinds described
above have the drawback that they explain less than do accounts that offer a more principled
explanation for why one variety of physical state rather than another yields consciousness.
O’Regan and Noë’s point is even more obviously fitting when it comes to explaining degrees
of difference and similarity of phenomenal character within and between sense modalities,
considering that even if you believed that the relation between consciousness in general and
the physical properties that instantiate it will never be intelligible to us (see, e.g., McGinn,
1991), it would still be reasonable to hope that a physicalistic account can be given which will
intelligibly and non-arbitrarily explain why specific kinds of experience have one phenomenal
quality rather that another. The explanatory limitations O&N identify are even more
pronounced in light of the threat posed by the anti-physicalist arguments offered by
philosophers like Jackson and Chalmers, since the less intelligible the proffered relation
between consciousness and the physical, the greater the motivation remaining to believe that
physicalism is false.
O&N do not address more promising variants of the NCCs approach. They observe
that we cannot read off the properties of consciousness from the topographical quality of
cortical maps that are organised in ways that replicate the retinal image, since the retinal
images, being dual in number, obscured at the blind spot, and defective in various other ways,
do not correlate with what we take to be the felt quality of visual consciousness. O&N do not
directly address the possibility that the character of consciousness could be explained by
appeal to other topological or topographical isomorphisms, nor the more promising
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possibility that phenomenal character could be explained purely by appeal to the content and
functional role of symbolic representations. Pessoa et al. (1998) and Noë and Thompson
(2004), however, give arguments against these proposals, as I discussed already in chapter 2.
3.2.3 - The Sensorimotor Contingency Account
O&N attempt to improve on these defective explanations of phenomenal character by
appealing to sensorimotor contingencies (SMCs), the systematic ways that stimulation
received to the brain from the sense organs varies in line with movement by the perceiver’s
body or the objects perceived. One explanatory task that SMCs carry out is accounting for the
differences in phenomenal character that hold between sense modalities, for example vision,
audition and touch. As an example, O&N propose that you are facing a horizontal straight
line. If you face the straight line head-on so that it is perfectly aligned with the equators of
your eyes, the image projected onto your retina when flattened appears as a straight line.
However, if you move your head or eyes so that the line meets your eyes above or below the
equator, the eyes’ curvature means that the image projected onto the retina will appear when
flattened as an arc. Moving your eyes horizontally, by contrast, leaves the projection of a
straight line intact. The appearance of an object also alters when projected at varying locations
on the retina in line with the varying character of the photoreceptor cells. The further
photoreceptors are from the centre of the retina, the greater their size, but the lower their
density. Light meeting different areas of the retina is also met by a differing selection of
photoreceptor types. Rods are more sensitive than cones. Cones require more light to become
active, and activate, depending on their type, in the presence of differing wavelengths of light.
In one part of the retina, the blind spot, there are no photoreceptors at all.
O&N call the patterns of sensorimotor contingency modulated by characteristics of
the sense organs apparatus-related SMCs. They contrast the apparatus-related SMCs
associated with the eyes with those associated with the ears, observing that sense input from
the ears is not affected by blinks or eye movements, but does obey its own distinctive patterns
of sensorimotor contingency. Tilting your head toward a sound source, in their example,
increases the amplitude of the signal but leaves the frequency unchanged. The crucial point
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these examples are supposed to illustrate is that vision and sound are not experienced as
distinct conscious modalities because of the intrinsic character of the sense input signals or the
intrinsic character of the brain regions associated with the respective senses, but solely on
account of the distinct apparatus-related SMCs associated with the respective sense organs.
O&N also use SMCs to account for differences in phenomenal character within sense
modalities. The range of phenomenal qualities that comprises a particular modality is
explained by SMCs determined this time by properties of the objects perceived, rather than
the sensory apparatus. These are object-related SMCs. Although it is intended to extend to
other modalities, the account focuses on vision. Within vision, the most straightforward
example of SMCs concerns shape. The sensory stimulation your brain receives from a
square-shaped object changes in line with movement by the perceiver or object in a systematic
way that differs from the movement-related dependence that holds when you look at a
circular object. Unlike colour, the conscious experience of shape does not have any appearance
of being irreducibly subjective; simply knowing that a square is a closed shape with exactly
four equal sides is in principle sufficient for knowing what a square looks like. The advantage
of the sensorimotor account, when it comes to shape, is that it shows how we come to
experience shapes as they are, even though they are distorted when they appear on the retina.
The account of shape experience is also important because it provides a partial analogue of
colour experience.
Colour experience is also accounted for by the systematic dependence between
movement and differing sensory stimulation, in particular the activation of differing sets of
retinal cones (O&N). The analogy with shape is complicated, however, by the need to account
for how the retinal stimulation you receive from an object does not just vary as your spatial
alignment with it changes, but also in line with changes in ambient lighting. This point is
made more explicit in the longer solo work by Noë (2004) and O’Regan (2011). We therefore
need to appeal to three-way patterns of counterfactual dependence between movement,
changes in ambient lighting conditions and the stimulation received by the retina. In line with
the observations made about colour by O’Regan (2011) - which he points out do not
constitute a final or definitive sensorimotor account of colour - this three way relation can be
reduced, essentially, to a two-way relation between changes in the character of the light that
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meets the object before being reflected onto the retina, and changes in the character of the
retinal stimulation that follows. Note, however, that the fact that the two-way relation
features fewer variables does not mean it is more appropriate than the three-way relation,
which characterises the effects of movement, when it comes to explaining how perceivers
actually come to be in states characterised by the relevant phenomenal qualities.
In this way, the sensorimotor account does not just appeal to properties of the light
hitting the retina, but to the object’s propensity in the presence of varying light sources to
reflect varying wavelengths of light, and therefore stimulate the retina in systemically differing
ways. O’Regan (2011) argues it is not surprising that this property of the object properly
enters into an explanation of colour experience, since we are evolved mainly to respond to
objects, and only occasionally interact directly with sources of light. To provide further
support for the sensorimotor perspective, he cites some interesting work conducted at his lab.
Philipona and O’Regan (2006) looked at changes in how photoreceptors are stimulated in the
presence of a range of surfaces and lighting conditions. There are three kinds of cone
photoreceptor, responding respectively to light of short, medium and long wavelengths, and
each kind can be activated independently of the other two. This means that to describe cone
activation in the presence of a given surface, in a given lighting condition, you need to specify a
value for each of the three photoreceptors. On this basis, to specify how these change in
different lighting conditions, you usually have to specify a value for three variables in each
lighting condition.
The study found, however, that for surfaces with certain reflectance profiles, the
explanation can be simplified, since the activations of the three photoreceptors do not vary
independently in line with changes to lighting. In the case of red, yellow, blue and green
surfaces, it was possible to account for changes in retinal stimulation across varied lighting
conditions by specifying values in each lighting condition for only one or two variables.
Philipona and O’Regan observe that this correlates with anthropological data showing that
red, yellow, blue and green are the four most universally adopted colour classifications (Berlin
and Kay, 1969). This provides further support, they suggest, for the idea that colour
experience does not just depend on how the retina responds to reflected light of different
wavelengths, but on how that responsiveness varies given changes to lighting; notice that by
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just attending to the way that light of given wavelengths stimulates the retina, we would lack
this explanation for the anthropological data. Since the ambient light reflected from the object
to the retina varies in line with movements by the perceiver or object, the colour experience
depends on a relation between movement and sense input, although to make this relation
intelligible we have to also understand how lighting conditions change in line with these
movements.
There is some promise, then, that the sensorimotor account of phenomenal quality
can account for the experienced feel associated with distinct modalities, and within the visual
modality for experienced colour and shape, solely by describing extra-neural characteristics of
the perceiver’s relation to the environment. This has a methodological benefit, since outward
interactions are easier to observe than neural states. More importantly, it provides a more
principled explanation than appealing to brain states alone. In part, this is because it appeals to
patterns that are self-evidently and necessarily present in the activity of embodied perceivers.
It is also because of the systematic framework it provides for explaining degrees of similarity
and difference between phenomenal qualities. Noë (2004) argues that the account therefore
counts as an improvement on those that suggest qualia amount to an unexplained ‘residue’
remaining even after we have accounted for an agent’s perceptual engagement with the
environment.
3.2.4 - SMCs asCounterfactual Conditionals
SMCs, as we have seen, offer a principled way to account for the varying phenomenal
character associated with distinct modalities and different percepts within a modality. In
particular, they also offer in principle a way to quantify degrees of difference and similarity
between qualities. More has to be said, however, about what it is for a perceiver to be in a
conscious state characterised by SMCs, and about the role played by the perceiver’s internal
states in enabling perceptual consciousness. Most versions of the sensorimotor theory
complete this part of the story by reference to attunement or practical knowledge pertaining
to SMCs. I will examine this notion in detail in section 3.3 and further in chapter 4, but it is
worth signposting now the fact that how we understand sensorimotor knowledge or
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attunement will be affected by how we resolve a key ambiguity in the notion of sensorimotor
contingency.
As they are usually characterised, SMCs are appropriately described by counterfactual
conditionals of the form ‘if the subject moved like this, their sense input would change like
this’ and ‘if objects in the environment moved like this, the perceiver’s sense input would
change like this’. This construction is offered by Noë (2004) and is also frequently in evidence
throughout O&N, for example where the authors say: “Seeing an object consists in precisely
the knowledge of the relevant sensorimotor contingencies - that is, in being able to exercise
one’s mastery of the fact that if, among other things, you make an eye movement, the stimulus
will change in the particular way typical of what happens when you move your eyes” (p. 968).
On another construction, SMCs comprise the patterns of dependence between sense input
and motor output that actually, rather than counterfactually, characterise the perceiver’s
ongoing sensorimotor interactions. This alternative notion is found in the summary of the
sensorimotor approach offered by Burhmann, Di Paolo and Barandiaran, who claim that:
“According to the sensorimotor approach, perception is a form of embodied know-how,
constituted by [emphasis added] lawful regularities in the sensorimotor flow or in
sensorimotor contingencies in an active and situated agent” (2013). Here, the know-how is
not knowledge about SMCs, it is knowledge which when exercised helps constitute the SMCs.
This notion is sometimes evident in O&N, where the authors claim that exercising
sensorimotor mastery consists, in the case of a guided missile, in its exercising “action recipes”
(p. 945), which map certain sensory stimuli to certain motor outputs. The action recipes, the
authors at one point claim, allow the missile to “make [emphasis added] lawful changes in
sensory stimulation” (p. 945). The apparent role of the action recipes, in this case, is not to
constitute knowledge about SMCs, but to allow patterns of sensorimotor contingency to be
instantiated.
Burhmann et al. offer an explicit account of some distinct notions of SMCs in play in
sensorimotor theory, which they propose can be modelled as dynamical systems. The
sensorimotor environment, as they call it, comprises the complete set of counterfactual
conditional-styled SMCs governing a perceiver’s bodily relation to its environment. This is to
say that it describes the changes in sense input that would occur if the perceiver made
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particular movements. Characterising the sensorimotor environment therefore only depends
on the outward characteristics of the perceiver’s body and the environment and not on the
perceiver’s brain. The authors characterise the perceiver’s repertoire of actual bodily
engagements within a given sensorimotor environment through what they call a sensorimotor
habitat, which comprises the movements the perceiver makes in line with given sense inputs,
and the changes in sense input that follow. As the authors note, the sensorimotor habitat is
not just determined by characteristics of the extra-neural body and environment, but also by
the agent’s internal states.
As we have seen, the original statements of the sensorimotor theory are explicit,
although only some of the time, that they mean SMCs to characterise the sensorimotor
environment rather than the sensorimotor habitat. This understanding is also evident in the
‘radical enactivist’ versions of the sensorimotor account offered by Hutto and Myin (2012)
and Myin and Degenaar (2014), which reject O&N’s appeal to ‘knowledge’ but agree that
perceivers must be ‘attuned’ to SMCs that exist, presumably, prior to the perceiver acquiring a
sensitivity to them. The sensorimotor habitat is likely to prove useful as a way of
characterising the perceiver’s perceptual attunement to some subset of the SMCs in the
sensorimotor environment. However, the sensorimotor habitat conception of SMCs also
obscures some of the insights offered by the original statements of the sensorimotor theory.
One thing it does is obscure a distinction between distinct directions of fit. SMCs, in their
original formulation, describe the changes in sense input that follow changes in motor output,
and never the changes in motor output that follow changes in sense input, and we could
therefore think of them as having a motor output to sense input direction of fit. Even if we
suppose, as if plausible, that the only SMCs relevant to an account of perceptual consciousness
are those sometimes instantiated by the perceiver’s actual sensorimotor engagements, it would
still be true, on the original statements of the sensorimotor theory (O&N; Noë, 2004;
O’Regan, 2011) that SMCs by definition have just one direction of fit, while the sensorimotor
habitat describes a systematic dependence running bidirectionally between motor output and
sense input.
It may turn out that the purported distinction between ‘input’ and ‘output’ is
arbitrary rather than reflecting a genuine functional distinction, and therefore that the
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distinction between directions of fit does not finally matter either. Nonetheless, the
sensorimotor theory in its original form is explicit in individuating phenomenal qualities by
appeal to SMCs with a motor output to sense input direction of fit. This is compatible with a
view where inputs and outputs are instrumentally useful but dispensable parameters for
modelling the workings of the wider loop of activity comprising brain, body and environment.
It is also compatible with a view under which the input-output distinction is genuine. So as
not to pre-judge this question, and others concerning the role played by internal states in the
sensorimotor account, I restrict ‘sensorimotor contingencies’ (SMCs) to describing aspects of
the sensorimotor environment. This of course entails that SMCs fail to explain anything
about perceptual consciousness unless we say more about the role played by the perceiver and
their internal states, and I examine the existing proposals about this later in the chapter. For
now, I will continue by outlining the different, perhaps compatible, characterisation of
sensorimotor contingency offered by Noë’s (2004) solo account.
3.2.5 - Perspectival Properties andObjective Properties
Noë (2004) supplements the SMCs described by O&N with two further kinds of property,
which can be thought of as new kinds of SMCs. Instead of focusing on how neural inputs
from the sense organs change in line with movement, he focuses on the varying ways that
objects appear to conscious perceivers. In particular, he introduces the notion of P-property
(short for perspectival-property), an idea which is most straightforwardly explained by means
of an example. A dinner plate has the ‘objective’ property of being circular. Viewed at an angle,
however, it has the appearance of an ellipse, which gets wider or narrower as the subject faces
it at different angles. The elliptical aspect is a P-property, in this case a P-shape. To experience
the plate as being objectively circular, the perceiver must be sensitive to the ways that the
P-shape would vary in line with movements by the object or perceiver. Thus objective
properties can be characterised by reference to an amended notion of sensorimotor
contingencies (SMCs). To experience the P-shape, the perceiver must understand their spatial
alignment to the object in an egocentric, bodily way. Noë gives examples like knowing which
bodily movements would result in your facing the object head-on, and having the ability to
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indicate, using a thumb and forefinger, the shape and size of the space taken up by an object in
your visual field. Thus P-property experience depends, too, on appreciating the results of
possible movements, and therefore, in a way, on sensitivity to a further variety of SMCs. Noë
does not say how this account relates to the account of shape perception found in O&N. We
can legitimately take it that the accounts run in parallel, however, given that conscious
perceivers must somehow be sensitive to SMCs styled along the lines of the earlier account in
order to experience P-shapes and objective shapes.
Colour also admits a distinction between P-property and objective property. In Noë’s
example, you have a wall painted in a solid white. Its being a particular shade of white is an
objective property. However, at a given time of day, the wall might be dappled with sunlight in
one area, making parts of it appear an especially bright white, and heavily shaded in others,
making it appear dark grey. This merely apparent colour is a P-property. To characterise a
P-colour, we do not need to explain how retinal stimulation varies with changes to
illumination, merely how the light reflected from the object stimulates the retina, and how
that stimulation would change if the light met with a differing selection of photoreceptors.
Here, Noë does say something explicit about the connection between his present approach
and O&N. He suggests that the experience of apparent colour depends on a subpersonal
process and that the sensorimotor contingencies involved in apparent colour are inscrutable
to conscious perceivers, implying they are SMCs of the sort described by the earlier account
rather than conscious SMCs. We experience objective colour - for instance, the colour the
wall is actually painted in - by consciously exercising our practical understanding of how the
apparent colour would change given changes, amongst other things, in illumination.
This parallels the suggestion given by Philipona and O’Regan (2006), although it is
interesting that Noë’s account of colour supplements this account by introducing this
distinction between conscious and subdoxastic components of colour experience, which track
the distinction between P-colour and objective colour. Noë, like O’Regan (2011), admits a
final sensorimotor account of colour experience will involve further considerations still. He
introduces one further proposal, namely that the objective colour we experience an object to
have depends on the objective colour we take objects in its background to have. Experienced
objective colour is determined, therefore, by various relations that objects stand in to each
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other as well as the relation they stand in to the perceiver. Although the sensorimotor theory
does not claim to offer a complete or final account of colour experience, both Noë and
O’Regan make explicit their commitment to the view that colour experience is explained by
patterns of movement-dependence, whether those patterns apply only to the perceiver and the
object, or between the object and other features of the outside environment. Noë claims,
moreover, that the capacities we use to discriminate the properties are themselves
sensorimotor, a point I return to in section 3.3 and again in chapter 4.
Since the SMCs featured in Noë’s account are relations between movement and, for
the most part, features of conscious experience, Noë’s account is committed to a distinctively
controversial claim about visual phenomenology. Martin (2008) objects that the account
misdescribes visual phenomenology, since we rarely experience P-properties, such as the
elliptical aspect of the plate. He argues that experiencing a P-property involves adopting the
‘painterly attitude’, a deliberate effort of the sort a painter makes when attempting to
faithfully render a scene with the correct perspective; and it is striking that doing this is
actually quite difficult. In response, Noë (2008) clarifies his position by noting that you must
experience P-properties even when you do not adopt the painterly attitude on account of the
fact that you can only be visually aware of an object from some vantage point. Since you
cannot view an object without viewing it from a particular perspective, experiencing its
objective properties requires you to understand how your present perspective is contingent on
your present spatial alignment to the object, and recognising this entails implicitly
appreciating the ways the P-property would vary if you or the object moved. Noë claims in the
same piece that you can only perceive P-properties themselves if you also experience the
relevant objective properties, since you could not experience a P-property as a P-property if
you did not understand the way it varies systematically in line with movement. This means
that rather than being ‘primitive’, the ability to experience P-properties arises simultaneously
with the ability to experience objective properties.
Noë (2008) also addresses an important point concerning the metaphysical status of
P-properties. In at least one respect, P-properties are subject-dependent, since you cannot
describe them without reference to a perceiver. Moreover, descriptions of P-properties can be
used to describe the character of a subject’s perceptual experience. Nonetheless, Noë (2008;
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2012) emphasises that they should not be thought of as being akin to sensations, which are
commonly understood as properties of consciousness and not properties of the outside world.
He claims instead that P-properties inhere in the outside environment as relational properties
borne by objects. As he puts it: “looks [...] are not 'mental intermediaries.' They are, rather,
aspects of the things we see” (2008, p. 691) and a little later in the same piece: “I am realist
about looks. My view is that the elliptical look of the plate from here, no less than its
circularity, is a feature of the visible scene before me, a feature of the world itself” (2008, p.
693). It is worth exploring this claim in a little more detail. The claim that looks are properties
of the world implies that they exist prior to and independently of the subject’s capacity to
experience them. This seems odd, considering that the word ‘look’, applied adjectivally to a
feature of the environment, implies the existence of a subject who sees it.
My suggestion is that we reconcile the idea that P-properties are in some important
sense dependent on the subject’s perceptual abilities with the idea that they are properties of
the world, and not the subject’s mind, by taking it that prior to featuring in a subject’s
conscious awareness the P-properties exist as what Shoemaker (1980), following Geach
(1969), calls mere-Cambridge properties. These are properties that can change without their
object’s causal powers changing, and which therefore are trivial. To update an example offered
by Shoemaker, we could, for instance, note that everything now existing has the property of
being ‘such that Barack Obama is president of the USA’, while noting that this property could
for most objects - a piece of fruit, say - change without the object’s causal powers changing.
Shoemaker contrasts mere-Cambridge properties with genuine properties in order to denote
that mere-Cambridge properties, although they exist, are uninteresting. We could contrast the
mere-Cambridge cases with a scenario in which Barack Obama makes it the law that for as
long as he is President of the USA, it will be a criminal offence to possess apples. In this event,
the property of being ‘such that Barack Obama is president of the USA’ will mean that an
apple has a causal power, namely the power to cause you to be arrested, where we take it that
an object has a causal power to make X happen if its existence increases the probability of X
taking place. In this scenario, the property goes from being a mere-Cambridge property to a
being genuine property. Let us take it that P-properties are like this. An object might bear
some P-colour or P-shape to a person who does not experience it, for example because they are
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not looking at it or they cannot see. P-properties might even inhere in objects in relation to
possible but non-existent perceivers. The properties would nonetheless exist, and inhere in the
world, where this is contrasted with in the mind of some perceiver. But the properties only
have causal powers, and therefore become genuine properties, if there is a conscious perceiver
who experiences them.
3.2.6 - Bodiliness, Insubordinateness, Richness andGrabbiness
Sensorimotor contingencies are a cornerstone of the sensorimotor theory. As we have seen,
their role is to explain why one sensory modality is qualitatively different from another and,
similarly, why perceptual experiences qualitatively differ from one another within sense
modalities. However, they do not address the broader question of why we have experiences
that feel, qualitatively, like they are world-presenting rather than feeling like some other kind
of experience or lacking an experiential quality altogether. The sensorimotor theory answers
this question by appeal to four key notions: bodiliness, grabbiness (O’Regan, Myin and Noë,
2004; O&N), and, in later accounts, partial insubordinateness and richness (O’Regan, 2011).
The properties, like SMCs, govern perceivers’ sensorimotor activity in a structured
environment, which is to say they help characterise the sensorimotor habitat. From a
theoretical perspective, as well as from the perspective of the perceiver herself, they offer a
principled way to distinguish neural signals related to perception from other kinds of signal.
Bodiliness is the tendency of body movements instigated by the perceiver to bring
about changes to the input received from the sense organs. For instance, blinks and eye
movements bring about radical changes to the nature of retinal input, head movements bring
about changes to the amplitude of the auditory signal received from each ear, and so forth.
The fact that the conscious perceiver has a degree of agential control over the character of the
sensory stimulation received is supposed to help explain the sense of ‘mineness’ that
accompanies a conscious perceptual experience. It is a necessary component of perceptual
experience.
Insubordinateness is the opposite. It describes the tendency for perceivers only to have
partial control over the quality of the sensory stimulation they receive. If they had full control,
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the perceiver or their visual system would have no reason to think that the sensory stimulation
originates from outside themselves. Thus, insubordinateness is also a necessary feature of
perception, and helps distinguish neural activity involved in perception from other sorts of
neural activity.
Richness is another feature that differentiates perceiving from thinking and imagining.
The amount of information accessed in the course of a temporally-extended act of perception
is much greater than the information available to thought or imagination. In O’Regan’s (2011)
example, you might consciously reconstruct, in an act of imagination, the appearance of your
grandmother’s face. But without seeing her, there are likely to be numerous small details about
her appearance, e.g. the width of her eyebrows or the appearance of her hair line, that you
cannot reconstruct. O’Regan observes that richness is not sufficient to distinguish perception
from every other kind of bodily activity, since autonomic functions such as digestion and
respiration also involve rich information about blood sugar levels, oxygen levels, and so forth.
However, richness distinguishes sensory information from information playing a similar role
in acts of thought or imagination.
Grabbiness refers to the tendency of perceivers to shift their attention and bodily
alignment in response to transients, sudden changes to sensory stimulation. The fact that
perceivers detect change this way makes a vital contribution to the phenomenology of
perception, namely the experience of being reliably in touch with a rich and
dynamically-changing environment. Grabbiness is a key feature of the idea of the world as an
outside memory.
The above four properties, for the most part, characterise a perceiver’s sensorimotor
interactions in a way that can be observed from the outside. For instance, we do not need to
know anything about brains or the subjective character of conscious experience to know that
retinal stimulation is governed by bodiliness and insubordinateness. We can tell that richness
exists purely by virtue of the rich detail available in the environment for pick-up by the retina.
Grabbiness is supposed to consist largely of bodily movements, in particular eye movements
directed toward the source of the transients. This is complicated a little by the fact that
grabbiness is also supposed to be signalled by shifts in attention, which may not require
eye-movements, and may instead depend solely on some kind of neural activity. With this
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small complication aside, the four properties, alongside SMCs, help make the phenomenal
character of perceptual experience naturalistically explicable without reference to apparently
mysterious neural-correlates of consciousness.
However, perceptual experience depends on something more than SMCs and the four
other principles, since it is easy to imagine objects standing in relations to the environment
governed by these or similar laws without being conscious and even without demonstrating
the kind of sensitivity that might justify the suggestion that they are unconscious perceivers.
Perception requires that subjects are, somehow, skillfully sensitive to the fact that their
relation to the environment is governed by the relevant laws. This is the purpose of
sensorimotor mastery, which I discuss next.
3.3 - SensorimotorMastery
SMCs, on the usual understanding, are properties that could be described by counterfactual
conditionals, and which pre-exist any bodily engagement with the environment, or any
capacity for the same. On this basis, it is evident that to explain how a subject comes to
perceive and thereby undergo consciousness characterised by the relevant phenomenal
qualities, the sensorimotor account needs to show how the subject is, in a relevant way,
sensitive to those SMCs. The sensitivity in question is said, in various places, to involve
sensorimotor ‘skill’; ‘attunement’ to SMCs; or ‘practical knowledge’, ‘understanding’ or
‘tracking’ of SMCs. Some of the time, the variation in terminology is purely stylistic, but at
other times the choice of term reflects some quite different ways of understanding the
capacities in question. To keep things as clear as possible, I am going to introduce my own
convention and use ‘sensorimotor mastery’ as a broad label to describe any variety of
sensitivity to SMCs of alleged interest in sensorimotor theory. Under this broad heading, I
will group the capacities in question under three apparently distinct types, which I will call (i)
Sensorimotor Attunement, (ii) Sensorimotor Tracking and (iii) Sensorimotor Understanding.
In appealing to these three categories I am not prejudging whether there are capacities that fall
under more than one of these categories, nor whether all three deserve to make an appearance
in the account.
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3.3.1 - Sensorimotor Attunement
O&N suggest that over the course of your life, you are exposed to numerous SMCs, and that
your brain stores information about them, categorising them under laws of sensorimotor
contingency corresponding to various types of property, for example specific colours and
shapes. When you are confronted with a red object, for example, your brain deploys
information about the SMCs associated with red objects derived from the previous
encounters. O&N do not explain what causes the brain, at a particular moment, to deploy
stored information about one sensorimotor law rather than another. We can plausibly
suppose that the brain does not just make use of present sense input state to detect which
SMCs obtain, but also efferent copy from the motor regions, and the way both have changed
in the last few moments.10 This is to suggest that the brain responds to information about the
restricted set of SMCs evident in the bodily interactions that are taking place right now, and
associates these SMCs with stored information about the fuller set of SMCs that usually apply
in similar situations. I think it plausible that this picture, or something close to it, is what
O&N have in mind, although they do not say so explicitly.
The authors are emphatic that neither the availability of the stored information nor
its mere ‘activation’ is sufficient for perception. Instead, they argue that perception is a kind of
embodied exploration of the outside environment analogous to a dance, an activity that can
never consist of an inner state alone, but also requires a variety of temporally-extended
interaction with the outside environment. They say: “Seeing is not constituted by the
activation of neural representations. Exactly the same neural state can underlie different
experiences, just as the same body position can be part of different dances” (O&N, p. 966).
This invites an understanding of sensorimotor mastery as a capacity for making a variety of
systematic, goal-directed bodily movements. This capacity, which I call Sensorimotor
Attunement, can also be found in Burhmann, Di Paolo and Barandiaran’s (2013) model,
which invites us to model a perceiver’s repertoire of bodily engagements in a structured
10 It is not a logical necessity, however, that the neural system which enables conscious vision
is always sensitive to ongoing efferent copy. It might only be sensitive to efferent copy during
learning phases, as Clark (2008) suggests, after which it uses sense inputs alone to recognise
patterns of sensorimotor contingency.
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environment as a sensorimotor habitat.
Although O&N and Noë (2004) on one or two occasions deny that vision is
exhaustively accounted for by a set of behavioural capacities, the idea that vision depends on
being poised to act is recurrent throughout their accounts, for example their claim that:
“Under the present theory, visual experience does not arise because an internal representation
of the world is activated in some brain area. On the contrary, visual experience is a mode of
activity involving practical knowledge about currently possible behaviors and associated
sensory consequences. Visual experience rests on know-how, the possession of skills” (O&N, p.
846), and in Noë’s account: “It is my possession of basic sensorimotor skills (which include
the abilities to move and point and the dispositions to respond by turning and ducking, and
the like) that enables my experience to acquire visual content” (Noë, 2004, p. 90).
The idea of Sensorimotor Attunement as a behavioural capacity is evident, in
particular, in the main example given by O&N, which features a guided missile. The missile’s
goal is to hit its target and, while following the target, to try to avoid enemy fire by zig-zagging
left and right. The missile’s relation to the target is characterised by various SMCs. When the
missile turns left (on its yaw axis), the target, if it appears in its sensors, will appear further to
the right-hand side, and vice versa. If the missile gets closer to the target, the target will occupy
more space in its sensors. To achieve its goal, the missile’s behaviour must exhibit sensitivity to
SMCs like these. O&N, who are emphatic that they do not wish to underplay the
contribution made by the brain to perception, propose that the missile, like a human, makes
use of stored information, which in the missile’s case comprises “action recipes” (O&N, p. 945)
corresponding to various sorts of target. They emphasise, however, that the internal states do
nothing until they are deployed for some practical end. In the case of the missile, they observe
that the action recipes are “latent” (O&N, p. 945) until the missile begins following a relevant
target.
The authors do not say exactly what an action recipe is, but evidently it comprises
instructions about how to move. Presumably, it does this by mapping sense inputs to motor
outputs, for example specifying that the missile should turn right if the target appears on the
right hand side of its sensors. Attending to the contrasting descriptions of the stored
information deployed by humans and the guided-missile when exercising Sensorimotor
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Attunement, we might notice that direction of fit, which has already been an important
notion in understanding SMCs, is an issue again here, although in a different form. The stored
information about sensorimotor laws that O&N allege to be involved in human perception
appears to have a belief-like direction of fit - it specifies how sense input would change given
particular movements, and it must therefore correspond to pre-existing facts about the
sensorimotor environment. Action recipes, on the other hand, appear to have a desire-like
direction of fit - they specify which movements will take place given particular sense inputs,
suggesting that if they are effective it is the missile’s behaviour that will appropriately
correspond. The fact that O&N refer interchangeably to mastery of SMCs and the possession
of ‘action recipes’ has the potential to be puzzling if we do not unpack the notion of
Sensorimotor Attunement with care, since it is not clear straight away why we should think of
the belief-like and desire-like capacities as being identical. To this end, we must attend
carefully to O&N’s claim that the exercise of Sensorimotor Attunement is never solely a
matter of stored information being activated by the presence of relevant stimuli, but a matter
of the stored information being activated in the course of the agent’s goal-directed behaviour.
O&N insist that the attunement, is “a practical, not a propositional form of
knowledge” (p. 944). Given their characterisation of sensorimotor knowledge as knowledge
that particular SMCs obtain, we might be drawn to suppose that despite not being
propositional, it nonetheless has a belief-like direction of fit. On this basis, their insistence
that it must be exercised might reflect nothing more than the commonplace distinction
between possession and exercise that applies to any kind of knowledge. For example, your
knowledge that Edinburgh is the capital of Scotland only features in your awareness if you are
exercising it, perhaps because you are presently thinking about travelling to the capital of
Scotland. This offers one reason for thinking sensorimotor knowledge or attunement must be
exercised. O&N endorse a stronger claim, however, when they say: “the notion of being tuned,
or having [sensorimotor] mastery, only makes sense [emphasis added] within the context of
the behaviour and purpose of the system or individual in its habitual setting […] if exactly the
same system was being used for a different purpose […] it might well be necessary for the
system to have a different behavior [in order to exercise sensorimotor mastery]” (p. 943).
O&N cannot simply be claiming here that a system ought to behave differently if its purpose
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is different, since this would be trivial. Instead, the passage suggests that the attunement to
SMCs is only something that exists by virtue of the agent’s purpose and behavioural
repertoire.
If Sensorimotor Attunement can only be made intelligible by appeal to a capacity for
goal-directed behaviour, as the above quote appears to suggest, it depends on the existence of a
capacity with a desire-like direction of fit. In this case, it is reasonable to ask where the
belief-like attunement to SMCs comes from. One way to unpack O&N’s point is by
supposing that we specify which SMCs the perceiver is attuned to by interpreting its
behaviour in light of the SMCs that now obtain, along with what we take to be the perceiver’s
goal state. This might involve something analogous to Dennett’s (1987) proposal that we
properly ascribe beliefs and desires to a subject on the basis of their explanatory value in
making sense of the behaviour. In the case of Sensorimotor Attunement, we first might notice
that the missile is disposed to yaw to the right when target appears in the right hand side of its
sensors. Next, we might suppose that the missile’s purpose is to keep the target aligned in the
middle of its sensors; this ascription of purpose could either be a theoretically useful
assumption, as with Dennett’s model, or we might actually know that this is its purpose
because we know what the missile’s designer intended. With this purpose in mind, we can
make sense of the missile’s behaviour by ascribing to the missile attunement to the relevant
SMCs, in this case the fact that turning right will result in the target appearing in the middle
of its sensors. The ‘action recipes’ may work by mapping possible sense inputs to appropriate
motor outputs, while the action recipe selected may co-vary with different sets of SMCs. It is
the interpretive stance, however, that on this proposal admits the dual directions of fit.
O&N do not go so far as to overtly insist that ‘purpose’ is necessary to specify which
SMCs the perceiver is attuned to, either by using the interpretive strategy sketched above or
any other strategy. Indeed, neither teleology nor having a proximal goal are given a prominent
theoretical role either in the remainder of the paper or in other statements of the
sensorimotor account. It is probable, then, that O&N merely mean to suggest that having a
purpose is necessary for Sensorimotor Attunement to exist in general. On this basis, their view
can be taken as the more austere claim that the perceiver is attuned to a set of SMCs if it is
able to respond with a distinctive set of movements when those SMCs obtain, and different
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movements when other SMCs obtain, with the added condition that for this sensitivity to
constitute attunement (or knowledge, skill, etc.) it must somehow help the perceiver fulfil a
purpose or achieve a goal. This latter proviso seems right, considering, for example, that when
a lake reflects the night sky it demonstrates a sensitivity to the night sky, but does not thereby
manifest any skill.
It seems viable, then, that Sensorimotor Attunement could be regarded as nothing
more than a behavioural capacity of the sort I have just described. O&N appear to disavow
such a view, however, when they make an effort to rebut charges that their theory amounts to
a form of behaviourism. In particular, they say: “[I]t is not the case that mental states
(experiential states) are logical constructions of actual and possible behaviour states” (2001b,
p. 1014), and later: “Knowledge of the laws of sensorimotor contingency themselves must
surely be represented” (2001b, p. 1017). We could attempt to do justice to this with a
representationalist gloss in which Sensorimotor Attunement involves the deployment of
representations with both belief-like and desire-like directions of fit, i.e. representations of the
SMCs that now obtain and the behaviour that should follow. The notion of a neural
representation with both directions of fit is found in the literature on action-oriented
representation (e.g., Wheeler, 2005; Clark, 1997), and if we wanted to give explanatory pride
of place to the neural state that realises the behavioural capacity, it would on this view be the
content of the representations that determines the SMCs to which the perceiver is now
attuned. However, it is not clear that this fits with O&N’s claim that: “Seeing is not
constituted by the activation of neural representations. Exactly the same neural state can
underlie different experiences, just as the same body position can be part of different dances”
(p. 966).
I think the best way to understand Sensorimotor Attunement is to suppose that while
other varieties of sensorimotor mastery involved in perceptual consciousness may draw on
something other than a behavioural capacity, Sensorimotor Attunement is, in fact, a logical
construction of actual and possible behaviour states. We can do justice to O&N’s resistance to
appealing to nothing but behaviour by adding a couple of provisos to the present notion of
Sensorimotor Attunement. A first is that a full explanation of the faculty must also explain, by
appeal to stored information, representation, or something else, how the behavioural capacity
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is realised. The present notion of Sensorimotor Attunement denies that these internal states
can be explanatorily relevant if they do not explain the behavioural capacity, and further
denies that the perceptual state can change without the behavioural capacities changing.
Whether or not the notion amounts on this view to a form of behaviourism is open to debate,
but it certainly has the resources to refute the suggestion that because it is a form of
behaviourism it ignores or denies the important role played by the brain.
The second proviso is that the behavioural capacities constituting Sensorimotor
Attunement cannot be accounted for by a simple mapping from varieties of sense input to
varieties of motor output, but only by a mapping from laws of sensorimotor contingency to
varieties of motor output. O&N suggest this entails that because sensorimotor laws vary in
line with differences in the body’s morphology, minute differences in embodiment between
one perceiver and another entails that the two perceivers must be discriminating a different
range of sensorimotor laws. I will argue later that the sensorimotor theory need not be
committed to the view that perceptual states are maximally sensitive to the details of
embodiment, although it ought to say that differences in embodiment between two perceivers
necessitates that they are making a different range of perceptual discriminations when the
differences are big enough.
Going further beyond the explicit claims made by O&N, I am going to add one
further criterion for establishing that a perceiver exhibits a belief-like attunement to SMCs of
the sort we require. Wheeler (2005) describes work by Harvey, Husbands and Cliff (1994)
featuring a robot, designed using artificial evolution, which was able to achieve a practical end
by following an identical behavioural repertoire for all sense input states other than the target
state. Placed in an environment containing a triangle and a rectangle affixed to a wall, the
robot’s task was to locate the triangle and move toward it. Its strategy was to do nothing but
rotate until its sensors were stimulated in a way characteristic of the triangle, and then move
forward. Faced at an angle, the rectangle’s edge would appear in the robot’s sensors as a
diagonal line, and in cases where the rectangle’s perspectival shape was sufficiently similar to
the triangle’s perspectival shape when faced head-on, the robot would ‘mistake’ the rectangle
for the triangle and begin to move forward. However, once the robot had moved some way
toward the shape, the rectangle would stop presenting the triangle-like aspect, causing the
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robot to resume rotating and eventually head toward the triangle, which would continue to
present the appropriate perspectival shape as the robot got closer.
We can observe that the robot certainly possessed a rudimentary degree of
Sensorimotor Attunement. It was implicitly attuned to the fact that continuing to rotate
while it had the triangle in its sights would result in its losing sight of the triangle, and to the
fact that proceeding straight on toward the triangle would allow it to keep the triangle in view.
More interestingly, its behaviour over a short time period also manifested a sensitivity to the
fact that although the rectangle had the propensity to appear like the triangle when faced from
certain positions, it did not from others. This latter sensitivity is not explained by stored
information or historical facts about the SMCs that the robot had been exposed to, but by
properties of the rectangle itself. Wheeler (2005), following Wheeler and Clark (1999),
describes this sort of environmental contribution as non-trivial causal spread, denoting that
the environment itself plays some explanatorily interesting causal role in the production of the
behaviour.
O&N do not say anything explicit to indicate whether temporally-extended
engagements demonstrating sensitivity to SMCs, where that sensitivity is accounted for by
non-trivial causal spread, should be counted as instances in which the agent exercises
Sensorimotor Attunement to the same SMCs. The most cohesive way to understand the
sensorimotor account is to suppose that they should not. This reflects the fact that O&N
actively emphasise the role played by internally stored information derived from previous
encounters with the environment. Indeed, sensitivity to SMCs accounted for by non-trivial
causal spread cannot make any contribution to O&N’s view that when we exercise the right
kind of sensorimotor mastery we are conscious of SMCs that are not capturable by the
patterns of output-input dependence manifest in our present movements. For example, you
can be conscious of a wall’s objective colour without any changes in illumination taking place;
and you can feel embedded within a richly detailed visual environment without taking in all
that detail, even in the course of a temporally-extended sensorimotor engagement, a point I
will discuss in more detail later in the chapter.
Since non-trivial causal spread cannot account for many of the key phenomena the
sensorimotor theory is supposed to account for, I think it best to consider the non-trivial
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causal spread case to demonstrate that relatively basic Sensorimotor Attunement plus
non-trivial causal spread can result in surprisingly sophisticated patterns of sensorimotor
engagement, but avoid attributing those patterns to Sensorimotor Attunement alone.
Another way to put the same point is to stipulate that possession of Sensorimotor
Attunement cannot depend on anything temporally-extended, even if it is exercised in the
course of temporally-extended behaviour. To be in the relevant way attuned to SMCs that
now obtain, a perceiver must have the ability to make an immediate change to its motor
outputs demonstrating its sensitivity to those SMCs.
Sensorimotor Attunement, the way I have characterised it, reflects a notion found at
least sometimes in the main statements of the sensorimotor theory. It is also, in principle,
compatible with Myin and Degenaar’s (2014) notion of ‘attunement’ to SMCs, although it is
worth noting that their notion is distinct. Sensorimotor Attunement, as I have presented it
here, implies a capacity for outwardly observable behaviour, with representation playing no
more than an instrumental role in enabling this behaviour. Myin and Degenaar also describe
attunement to SMCs as an embodied capacity, but say: “in the sense of ‘embodied’ at stake
here, ‘embodied’ is used in contrast with ‘representational’” (p. 1). By this, they mean to
contrast their preferred account with those accounts that mention embodiment and
representation. However, Myin and Degenaar’s preferred understanding of ‘embodiment’ also
stands in contrast with accounts that make explicit appeal to capacities for outward behaviour.
They stop short of making any such appeal to any such capacities, referring only to the
agent’s historical sensorimotor interactions. They say: “Attunement to sensorimotor
contingencies then means that an organism has acquired, on the basis of a history of
interactions, a sensitivity in its perception and action for the ways stimuli change with
movement” (p. 5). But other than denying that it involves representation, they do not say
anything about what a sensitivity to SMCs in perception is constituted by right now. Note,
then, that although Sensorimotor Attunement as I have presented it does not rule out
representation, it provides a positive non-representational account of what it is to possess the
relevant capacity, namely the disposition to manifest different behaviour when different
SMCs obtain. This means the notion I outline now has an explanatory advantage compared to
Myin and Degenaar’s, which is limited in that it only tells us what caused the organism to be
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in its current state, and not what it is about the organism’s current state that results in it being
in a perceptual state.
3.3.2 - Sensorimotor Tracking
O&N note the existence of an apparently key limitation with the notion of Sensorimotor
Attunement as I characterised it in the last section - namely that since the guided missile, for
example, is not conscious, Sensorimotor Attunement is not sufficient for perceptual
consciousness. To account for visual awareness, O&N introduce the further criterion that you
must be exercising your attunement to SMCs for the purpose of “thought and planning” (p.
944). To illustrate, they give the example of driving a car while talking to a friend. While
driving, you must navigate a range of obstacles while modulating your driving behaviour
appropriately, yet you are not necessarily aware of everything you are doing. In this respect,
you are equivalent to the autopilot of a plane. Only when you attend, for example, to the
colour of the car in front, and think or talk about it, or make plans in accordance with it, do
you become aware of the colour. One way to understand this requirement is to suppose that
the Sensorimotor Attunement only yields perceptual consciousness when it is deployed in
certain kinds of bodily movement. Another possibility is that it depends on a certain kind of
neural representation; O&N do not give a particularly detailed proposal about what happens
physically when thought and planning takes place. I will call sensorimotor mastery in this
context Sensorimotor Tracking.
In his book Why Red Doesn’t Sound Like a Bell, O’Regan (2011) builds on the
account offered by O&N. The book explains in greater detail the relation between
Sensorimotor Attunement, which by itself does not necessarily involve consciousness, and the
thought and planning needed for conscious perceptual awareness. The key faculties described
in O’Regan’s model of perception and perceptual consciousness comprise four
hierarchically-organised tiers. The bottom tier - call this Tier 1 - comprises the agent’s
skill-driven sensorimotor coupling with the outside environment. This type of coupling could
be instantiated by a human, but also by an unconscious artifact like the guided missile.
O’Regan’s account of sensorimotor mastery and SMCs at Tier 1 at times appears to
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adopt the notion of SMCs in which they are constituted by patterns present in the agent’s
repertoire of skillful behaviour (its sensorimotor habitat), rather than the notion in which the
skillful behaviour involves a behavioural sensitivity to counterfactual conditional-styled SMCs
that pre-exist in its sensorimotor environment. As I have already argued, it is better to
explicitly reject this understanding of SMCs, for reasons of expediency. The understanding
obscures the distinction (which may be theoretically useful) between patterns of dependence
between sense input and motor output, and those between motor output and sense input. It
also obscures the distinction between SMCs which are merely manifest in this behaviour, and
those to which the agent’s behaviour demonstrates a skillful sensitivity. Finally, it muddies our
understanding of SMCs in light of the contradictory conception on them found in Noë
(2004), throughout much of O&N, and at times in O’Regan (2011), in which they are the
ways that sense input would change given particular movements, regardless of whether those
movements take place. Fortunately, it is also consistent with O’Regan’s (2011) account if we
regard Tier 1 as involving unconscious sensorimotor coupling drawing on Sensorimotor
Attunement to SMCs as I have characterised the concepts in the last sections.
The next tier in O’Regan’s hierarchy - call this Tier 2 - involves a higher-order
cognitive access to SMCs governing activity at Tier 1. This is Sensorimotor Tracking, and is
exercised when the subject is poised to exhibit sensitivity to sensorimotor laws in the course of
“planning, decisions, or other rational behaviour” (O’Regan, 2011, p. 121). The behaviour in
question falls short of self-conscious behaviour or discursive thought and appears to be quite
intimately connected, still, with bodily behaviour; O’Regan offers as an example of behaviour
at this tier the state of being poised to press on a brake pedal when a red traffic light is visible.
It is not clear whether or not we should suppose that the only SMCs you can be sensitive to in
Tier 2 activity are those you already exhibit Sensorimotor Attunement toward in your
unconscious activity. However, O’Regan’s account does not make this an obvious
requirement. So it is more straightforward to suppose that Sensorimotor Tracking at Tier 2
involves exhibiting sensitivity to SMCs, in general, for the purpose of behaviour which is
planned and answerable to rational norms. This depends on tracking or being sensitive to the
SMCs governing your unconscious activity at Tier 1. But it may involve being sensitive to
SMCs beyond those featured in your Tier 1 Sensorimotor Attunement, considering that some
64
of the patterns manifest in your sensorimotor activity at Tier 1 may not be SMCs to which
this activity is itself Attuned, considering, to take one example, the proviso I made in the last
section that Sensorimotor Attunement does not encompass skillful sensitivity to SMCs when
this is accounted for by non-trivial causal spread.
O’Regan suggests that Tier 2 activity involves the sort of cognitive access to some
feature that Block (1990a) would describe as having ‘access consciousness’, since it involves
being poised to make use of that feature for reasoning and planning. O’Regan denies that
having this first order of cognitive access is sufficient to constitute being conscious, however.
To be conscious, O’Regan suggests we must have a further order of cognitive access to activity
at Tier 2. This further higher-order tracking, call it Tier 3, constitutes another level of
Sensorimotor Tracking. Perceptual consciousness occurs when the perceiver thinks
reflectively about features of the perceptual environment corresponding to SMCs which it
already tracks at Tier 2. The subject does not have access, when engaging in this kind of
thought, to the individual SMCs that correspond to a particular property, but merely to
categories or descriptors corresponding to sensorimotor laws, e.g. ‘that shade of red’. This kind
of thought is not intimately connected with bodily activity. However, in common with the
activity described by the tiers below, it is always practically focused, involving active,
goal-directed interrogation of the visual scene. In O’Regan’s example, this involves asking and
answering questions like: “’Is it an ‘A’?’; ‘Is it Times New Roman?’; ‘Is it black on white?’”
(2011, p. 28).
In spite of the more fully-developed character of O’Regan’s (2011) account, it lacks a
detailed characterisation of the neural (or neurally-realised, functional) processes that enable
activity at Tiers 2 and 3. At one point O’Regan suggests his account may bear an affinity to
Higher Order Thought (HOT) theories of consciousness, although he is explicit about not
being firmly committed to this suggestion. HOT theories explain consciousness by appeal to
higher-order access to lower order states in a manner similar to O’Regan’s model. Notably,
they almost always cash this suggestion out by appeal to a subpersonal explanatory level in
which one part of the cognitive systems bears higher-order representations of activity in
another system. If the tiered sensorimotor theory adopted a view like this, it would be
committed to explaining Tier 3 by reference to a subpersonal representation of Tier 2 activity,
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and Tier 2 by reference to subpersonal representations of SMCs. This sort of proposal will be
particularly relevant in chapters 5 and 6, where I discuss the relation between sensorimotor
theory and the dual systems model of vision.
O’Regan (2012) later asserts that the tracking carried out by Tiers 2 and 3 involves
neural states that ‘track’ or ‘register’ the appropriate lower-order activity, but do not
constitute representations. The neural states register the appropriate interactions by virtue of
being the sorts of physical states that ordinarily occur when the appropriate interactions are
taking place. O’Regan denies that these states thereby count as representations, although it is
notable that some accounts of representation (e.g., Tye, 2000, or Rupert, 2011) appeal to no
more than simple covariance relations of this sort to constitute representation, as I will discuss
in chapter 5. As it is, O’Regan’s (2012) notion of tracking appears to correspond to Myin and
Degenaar’s (2014) notion of attunement to sensorimotor contingencies (not to be confused
with ‘Sensorimotor Attunement’ as I use it here) in which the agent is attuned to
sensorimotor contingencies by virtue of being in some unspecified physical state while having
the relevant history of sensorimotor interactions.
The notion of tracking or registering just described appears to be inadequate by itself
to do justice to O’Regan’s (2011) multi-tiered account, however, inasmuch as it does not
explicitly specify the role these physical states perform when deployed in reasoned behaviour
(at Tier 2) or reflective thought (at Tier 3). Considering these activities are supposed to be
essential for enabling perceptual consciousness, it is reasonable to desire a better developed,
naturalistically-respectable account of what these higher order capacities involve. One
possibility is that Tier 2 and perhaps even Tier 3 capacities depend only on capacities for
behaviour, for example behaviour that is suitably sophisticated, or answers to appropriate
rational norms. O’Regan does not say much about this, but suggests possible sympathy toward
the suggestion that we ascribe these capacities to an agent through a Dennett-style interpretive
stance similar to the one I discussed in Section 3.3.1. O’Regan hints at a position of this nature
in a footnote, where he declares: “The implication is that conscious access is not something in
the agent. It is a way that an outside person (and consequently the agent itself) can describe
the state of the agent” (2011, p. 125n1).
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3.3.3 - Sensorimotor Understanding
Sensorimotor Understanding is the variety of sensorimotor mastery featured in Noë’s (2004;
2012) sole-author versions of the sensorimotor account. I examine the capacity in greater
detail in the next chapter, so for now I will restrict myself to a brief outline of its key features.
In contrast with the other varieties of sensorimotor mastery, Sensorimotor Understanding
pre-supposes consciousness. For this reason, Noë does not present his version of the
sensorimotor account as an attempt to dissolve the hard problem of consciousness (cf., O&N;
O’Regan, 2011) and Sensorimotor Understanding is instead merely intended to help
characterise perception and perceptual consciousness in an already conscious perceiver. Noë
(2004) describes the capacity as an implicit understanding of P-properties, the understanding
of which requires an appreciation of your egocentrically specified alignment to objects in the
environment, and objective properties, the understanding of which requires an appreciation
of how P-properties would change in line with movement. Although he downplays the
importance of the personal/subpersonal distinction, Noë’s (2004) characterisation of
Sensorimotor Understanding presents it primarily as a personal-level phenomenon. However,
he suggests that for some kinds of experience, including P-colour experience, we do not have
conscious access to our exercise of sensorimotor mastery, thereby implying that in limited
cases it is firmly subpersonal.
Noë and O’Regan’s respective sole-author accounts offer quite different treatments of
sensorimotor mastery and there is little to suggest that Sensorimotor Tracking and
Sensorimotor Understanding should necessarily be regarded as different descriptions of the
same notional faculty. However, given that they both originate from the early O’Regan and
Noë paper, they could, with a little finessing, be thought of as different treatments of the same
phenomenon. If so, Sensorimotor Understanding could be regarded as a more philosophical
exposition of Sensorimotor Tracking. The main obstacle to such a reconciliation is the
difference between the properties the respective accounts claim are the objects of
sensorimotor mastery, namely subdoxastic sense inputs (O&N; O’Regan, 2011) and
P-properties and objective properties (Noë, 2004; 2012). Noë’s (2004) account does make
reference to the patterns of movement-related change governing input from the sense organs,
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claiming we must master them to experience P-colour. This indicates that Noë does not
intend his sole-author account to entirely supersede the early statement of the sensorimotor
theory, and thereby makes a reconciliation between his and O’Regan’s later solo accounts look
more promising. Sensorimotor Tracking and Sensorimotor Understanding notably both lack
a proper account of the physical or subpersonal mechanisms they are realised or constituted
by.
Sensorimotor Understanding is uncertainly defined in a couple of key respects. One,
as I just suggested, concerns the capacity’s place in a scientific account of perception, in
particular whether or not it depends on internal representation, and more narrowly the
precise representational or non-representational mechanism that enables it. Another concerns
Noë’s (2004) claim that it is a kind of knowing-how, and not a kind of knowing-that, which is
in tension with his firm insistence, elsewhere in the book, that Sensorimotor Understanding is
not knowing how to act but knowing what would happen if you did act. I make some
suggestions about how we should resolve these issues in chapter 4.
3.4 - Perceptual Presence: As-Access and In-Absence
As we have seen, the sensorimotor theory frequently criticises the idea that vision is enabled
subpersonally by the neural activation of a detailed or, in particular, pictorial representation of
the outside world. The outside memory thesis says that the brain does not internally model
the outside environment but instead accesses information directly from the outside world.
This entails that perception, considered subpersonally, depends non-trivially on bodily
interaction with the outside environment, and therefore does not depend solely or primarily
on internal representation.
In his sole-authored versions of the sensorimotor theory, Noë turns his attention to a
personal-level analogue of the subpersonal views targeted by O&N. The ‘snapshot conception’
(Noë, 2004) endorses a pictorial understanding of the phenomenology or what-it-is-likeness
of visual experience, suggesting that visual experience presents in pictorial fashion a large and
uniformly detailed visual field. Noë (2012) draws a connection between this
phenomenological claim and the logical claim that perception at the personal level involves
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representing the outside world. Declaring an allegiance with relational realism (e.g.,
McDowell, 1994a; Campbell, 2002), he denies that conscious perception involves
personal-level representation, and claims instead that it involves standing in a specific kind of
relation to the outside world itself. This point is reflected by the word he uses to label the
objects and properties to which we are intentionally-directed in conscious perception, which
he describes as being ‘present’ rather than ‘represented’.
Noë claims that objects and properties in the outside environment become
perceptually present when we stand in a particular kind of bodily relation to them. As we have
seen, that bodily relation can be specified by counterfactual conditionals describing the effects
of possible movements, with the relevant counterfactual conditionals being ones the perceiver
implicitly understands. Noë’s (2012) relational view of intentionality generalises to
encompass non-perceptual forms of thought, with perceptual presence being distinguished
from other forms of presence by the fact that the perceptual relation belongs to this particular
type. Crucially, the presence perceivers achieve by standing in this relation is not the simple
kind of presence characteristic of the snapshot conception, but a special kind of presence
which Noë calls presence-as-access.
The idea of presence-as-access is best illustrated by how it accounts for a feature of
visual phenomenology called presence-in-absence. Noë’s favourite example features a tomato
(2004; 2012). As with any opaque, three-dimensional object, you can never see every side of a
tomato at once - you see one side, while another side remains out of view. However, Noë
claims that when you look at a tomato, the rear side is nonetheless perceptually present ‘as
absent’. This is motivated by attention to visual phenomenology. Noë takes it as a primitive
that the back of the tomato has perceptual presence even though it is not visible in the way
that the front of the tomato is, a claim he justifies in part by noting that it does not seem as if
you are merely looking at a two-dimensional cut-out of a tomato. The perceptual presence of
the back of the tomato is enabled, he suggests, by your understanding of the movements that
would bring the rear of the tomato into view.
The perceptual presence of objects and properties that are out of view is a pervasive
feature of perceptual experience, and Noë emphasises the distinctive ability of
presence-as-access to account for it. Another central case is the perceptual presence of
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occluded parts of an object, for example a cat sitting behind a fence (Noë, 2002; 2004).
Although parts of the cat are occluded by the fence posts, a true characterisation of visual
phenomenology will observe that a visual experience of the cat is not an experience of a cat’s
parts, but of a whole cat. This is accounted for, as before, by the perceiver’s understanding of
the movements they or the cat would have to make to bring the occluded parts into view.
Presence-as-access is also intended to account more generally for the perceptual
presence of a richly detailed visual environment. Although the visual system does not process a
lot of environmental detail all at once, as evidenced by the experiments on change blindness
and inattentional blindness, Noë (2002) suggests that visual perceivers experience the
environment’s rich detail as present thanks to their implicit understanding of the movements,
such as eye movements, that would bring relevant detail into view. Interestingly, he denies
that perceivers ordinarily suffer from any delusion about the character of their access to
environmental detail (cf., Dennett, 2001). He suggests that the surprise participants in
Simons and Chabris’ (1999) inattentional blindness experiment reported on finding out that
they failed to notice the gorilla walking through the scene is explained by the implicit
expectation that their attention would be directed toward the gorilla, rather than the belief
that visual experience presents rich detail all at once.
Noë (2012) claims that there is no firm dividing line between objects that are
perceptually present and objects that are not. He claims that a perceiver may even have
quasi-perceptual experience of an object in the very distant environment, such as a friend
living in a distant city. If you know where that friend lives, your thoughts about him are
characterised, in part, by an understanding of the fact he is far away and an understanding of
the movements you could make to reach him, such as getting on a plane. For this reason, the
thought takes on, in part, a quasi-perceptual character, although Noë does not claim this
counts as a proper instance of perceptual presence. He contrasts this with the case of a friend
with whom you have lost touch. Because you do not know where the friend lives, or whether
he is alive or dead, the phenomenology of thoughts about this friend is quite different, a
difference explained at least in part by the fact that thoughts in the latter case do not draw on
an understanding of your sensorimotor relation to the friend.
The most striking feature of presence-in-absence (the phenomenology) taken together
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with presence-as-access (the logical claim that accompanies it) is that all perceptual experience
is supposed to belong to this type. This means presence-in-absence and -as-access incorporates
experiences we might be tempted to think feature a simpler kind of presence, for instance the
experience of the front side of the tomato. This is a counter-intuitive and, on a certain reading,
highly problematic claim, so it is worth noting that Noë is explicit on this point. He says: “all
perceptual presence is presence as absence […] perceptual presence is availability; the world
shows up for us as accessible” (Noë, 2012, pp. 95-96). Instead of imagining that the tomato’s
facing side has presence simpliciter while the non-visible parts are presented as absent but
accessible, Noë is explicit that the perceptual presence of the facing and the rear side both
belong to the latter kind. This is supposed to be evident from introspectable features of visual
phenomenology. In a description duplicated with slight modification from a passage originally
found in his earlier book, he says:
[S]top and look again, for example, at the face of the tomato. You can’t comprehend the whole of
it all at once in your visual consciousness. You focus on the color now, but in doing so, you fail to
pay attention to the shape, or to the variations in brightness across the surface, but only at the
price of ignoring the rest of it. You can no more achieve perceptual consciousness of the whole
aspect of the tomato’s front side all at once than you can see the tomato from every side all at once
[…] In a way, for perception, everything is hidden. Nothing is given. (Noë, 2012, p. 19)
The observation that we cannot fixate on atomic features of the visual environment is
compelling, but the suggestion that everything is hidden is more obscure and can be glossed in
a number of different ways, as we will see.
In his earlier account, Noë (2004) gives a similar description of visual phenomenology
and suggests it falls out of a particular understanding of the physical process that underlies
perceptual consciousness. To this effect, he offers an analogy between visual perception and a
computer accessing an online version of a newspaper via the World Wide Web. Rather than
downloading the entire issue at once, the computer downloads the articles one at a time,
accessing them only when called upon by the user. Downloading the issue in a piecemeal way
has certain advantages. It limits the burden placed on the computer’s bandwidth and
processing power, and it means that if an article is amended, the user can rely on seeing the
most up-to-date version. Notice that this is similar to perception, understood in accordance
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with the ‘outside memory’ thesis that perceivers use eye movements to access missing detail,
when required, directly from the outside world. Importantly, it makes no practical difference
to the person reading the newspaper that the computer downloads the articles one-by-one
rather than all at once, since they have immediate access to the articles as they request them.
As Noë puts it, the computer and its user therefore have ‘virtual’ access to the entire
newspaper. This is comparable to conscious vision, in which he alleges not only that perceivers
access detail in the way suggested by the outside memory thesis, but also that they have a
phenomenological sense of that detail’s presence by virtue of knowing how to access it when
required. Foreshadowing the claim that all perceptual presence is presence-as-access, Noë
claims that conscious vision is in part disanalogous to the computer case, because rather than
factoring into an offline and online component, perceptual presence is “virtual all the way in”
(2004, p. 134).
The computer analogy may invite a problematic understanding of the claim that in
perception, everything is hidden. While the computer ‘knows’ how to access the New York
Times, it does not anticipate, in advance, what the contents of the articles will be. Noë’s
descriptions of presence-as-access frequently imply that conscious accessibility works in a
similar way. On a certain reading, this suggests that subjects never consciously perceive the
environment, and that all they are conscious of is a disposition to make exploratory bodily
movements. The claim that perceptual consciousness consists of no more than this is
suggestive of an outright denial of perceptual consciousness. Noë (2004) explicitly disavows
the suggestion that denying perceptual consciousness is a consequence of the account. If it was
a consequence, it would be difficult to accept, since it is not clear that there is good reason to
think that conscious perception encompasses knowing how to access missing detail but does
not encompass the detail itself. Moreover, if the theory deflates qualia so much that
phenomenal consciousness is no longer supposed to exist at all, the sensorimotor account loses
much of its explanatory advantage when compared with accounts of neural-correlates of
consciousness, which themselves invite the suggestion that there is nothing more to
phenomenal consciousness than being in a particular neural state. Although it is a conceptual
possibility that we are radically deceived about the existence of perceptual consciousness, the
claim is not a good fit with the sensorimotor theory.
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There are, however, more promising ways to make sense of the claim that everything is
hidden. At times, in particular in his description of P-property experience, Noë (2004) implies
that understanding which movements will bring an object (or part of an object) into view is
more than merely knowing how to access missing detail. It is equivalent to knowing what that
object is actually like. As we saw earlier, knowing what movements to make to face an object
involves knowing the object’s relative location, and having the ability to reach out and grasp it,
for instance, implies knowing something about its perspectival shape. With this in mind,
presence-as-access could entail, in a disanalogy with the online newspaper case, that perceivers
have somewhat detailed prior expectations about what the results of their bodily engagements
with the environment will be. These expectations may be enough to explain the
presence-in-absence (rather than mere absence) of determinate features of the visual
environment. Moreover, there could be nothing more to perceptual experience than these
expectations.
The claim is plausible when we consider the analogy with touch, favoured especially
by O’Regan (1992; 2011). You close your eyes and pick up an object, for instance a bottle.
Your feeling of holding a whole bottle, despite only being in sensory contact with a small part
of it, is explained by expectations about the results of possible movements. At the same time,
you have a less specific expectation that reaching out to touch other parts of the environment
will reveal the presence of an assortment of further objects. The presence of the bottle, and the
more general presence of a detailed environment, are genuine examples of conscious presence
and are each accounted for by sensorimotor mastery, even though they are slightly different
phenomena. It might seem that there is also a narrower kind of presence which does not
consist of sensorimotor expectations but merely of a conscious sensation caused by parts of the
environment you are in sensory contact with, for example, the feeling of pressure on your
fingertips where they are in contact with the bottle. There is certainly a difference between
your awareness of the parts of the bottle that are in contact with your skin and those that are
not - I will examine Noë’s explanation of this in a moment. What is in question, however, is
that the experience of pressure on your fingertips is anything other than the expectation that
given certain movements the input to your sense organs (O&N, O’Regan, 2011) or your
alignment to the object (Noë, 2004; 2011) would vary in systematic ways. The sensorimotor
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account contends that once we discount these expectations, there is no raw feel - as Noë
would put it, no qualitative residue - remaining.
One might be tempted to think that perceptual consciousness divides into a
sensational component, which might be generated by inputs from the eyes and other sense
organs, and a separate intentional component that gives sensations their world-directed
content. Noë denies that sensations account for phenomenal character. He says: “We can’t
explain the qualitative features of experiential states (veridical or nonveridical) by supposing
that they depend on the instantiation of sensations in consciousness” (2012, p. 63), and
elsewhere: “Where there is an object, but no [sensorimotor] understanding, there is nothing
that even rises to the level of being misleadingly like perceptual consciousness; there is only, in
effect, blindness” (2012, p. 25). This might be taken to allow that perceptual experience does
factor into distinct components, namely sensation and sensorimotor mastery, but that
sensorimotor mastery is a necessary condition for perceptual experience.
This would be one way of explaining why your experience of the parts of the bottle
that are in contact with your skin seems different from your experience of the parts of the
bottle that are not. However, given that sensations cannot explain the phenomenology or
intentionality of perceptual experience without sensorimotor mastery, it is hard to see why
they should play a role once sensorimotor mastery has entered the story. Thus we should take
it that the feel of the parts of the bottle in contact with your fingertips is explained by your
grasp of how your relation to the bottle would change in line with movement, and does not
depend on anything distinct from Sensorimotor Understanding. The present story makes a
good fit with the claim that Sensorimotor Understanding is realised by the deployment,
subpersonally, of representations of SMCs (a claim found, for instance, in a proposal by Seth,
2014, more on which in chapter 4). It is also compatible, in principle, with the suggestion that
perceptual consciousness is enabled by nothing more than a non-representational dynamical
system.
There is a slightly different way to understand the claim that all presence is
presence-in-absence, which suggests that conscious perception does not just depend on
possessing practical knowledge about the movements you could make to bring missing detail
into view, but also, in an ineliminable way, on the way that the knowledge is exercised in the
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course of a perceiver’s temporally-extended engagement with the environment. Noë does not
unequivocally endorse this suggestion, but hints at this view by observing that perception is a
temporally-extended process (2004; 2012). As Clark (2009) comments, the way the process
unfolds over time may be essential to the character of perceptual awareness, meaning that
there may be nothing about a perceiver’s physical state considered at a fixed moment in time
that would yield perceptual awareness with a determinate content or phenomenal character. If
this were true, it would be possible to say, with reference to the perceiver’s bodily dispositions,
which aspects of the environment the perceiver, at a given moment, has the possibility of
accessing. However, we would have to refer to the perceiver’s temporally-extended
engagements with the environment, which might incorporate the exercise of those
dispositions, to fully account for the character of her perceptual experience. I make a
suggestion along these lines in chapter 7.
I have one final point to discuss before concluding this section. Noë (2012) observes
that there is a need to distinguish the kinds of perceptual presence enjoyed respectively by the
front of the tomato, the back of the tomato, and objects in another room. He claims that
perceptual presence admits of degrees, such that the front of the tomato has more presence
than the back of the tomato, while objects in the next room are not, in a strict sense,
perceptually present at all. To account for this, he appeals to quantifiable properties called
movement-dependence and object-dependence, each of which are necessary for full-blown
perceptual presence to occur. The former is the degree to which movements by the perceiver
‘manifestly’ change the perceiver’s sensorimotor relation to a feature of the outside
environment, while the latter is the degree to which movements by the object do the same.
Assume, for the time being, that a ‘manifest’ change in the sensorimotor relation is
one that coincides with a change in retinal stimulation. I will return to this point in a moment.
Noë observes that small movements by the eyes or the tomato are enough to manifestly
change the sensorimotor relation between the perceiver and the front of the tomato, meaning
this relation bears a high degree both of movement-dependence and object-dependence. A
small rotation by the tomato is enough to manifestly change the perceiver’s sensorimotor
relation with the back of the tomato, but something greater than an eye movement is required
by the perceiver to effect a manifest change in this case - for instance, she might have to stand
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up and walk to the opposite side of the table. This means that the subject’s sensorimotor
relation to the back of the tomato bears a high degree of object-dependence and a more
limited degree of movement-dependence. This accounts for the lesser perceptual presence of
the back of the tomato. The perceiver’s sensorimotor relations to objects in other rooms, or
other cities (etc.), bear only negligible degrees of object-dependence and
movement-dependence, since dramatic movements by the perceiver or object are required to
effect changes in the retinal stimulation the subject receives from those objects. The degree of
object- and movement- dependence in these cases is sufficiently low to entail that the objects
are not perceptually present at all, although they may, as we have seen, bear a kind of
quasi-perceptual presence.
It is apparent that Noë has to stipulate that the movements in question cause
‘manifest’ changes in the character of the sensorimotor relation, since a perceiver stands in a
sensorimotor relation to every object in the world, each of which is equally prone to changing
as the object or perceiver moves. However, he does not explain what it takes for a change in
the relation to be manifest in the appropriate sense. Notice that in some cases, we might
understand the way movements cause sensorimotor relations to change even when they are
relations with unperceived objects. For example, you could be in Europe walking due north
and reflecting on the fact that every step forward takes you an equal distance closer to the
North Pole. In the event that the position of the North Pole suddenly changes, a compass
needle will be enough to show you how your sensorimotor relation with the North Pole has
changed. This means your relation with the North Pole satisfies the criteria for
object-dependence and movement-dependence, somehow construed. This would not, of
course, count as a case in which the North Pole is perceptually present. This is not intended as
a counterexample to Noë’s claims, but simply to underline that an explanation must be given
of what it takes for a change in a sensorimotor relation to be manifest in a distinctively
perceptual sense.
This is important, because the invocation of a perceptually manifest change to the
sensorimotor relation invites a misunderstanding of the sensorimotor theory. Specifically, it
invites the faulty view that the changes to the sensorimotor relation become manifest first,
and that this subsequently causes the perceiver to revise their understanding of the
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sensorimotor relation. One understanding might be that objects cause us to have conscious
sensations, and that the sensations come to be intentionally-directed when we understand
how they change in line with movement. As I have noted, Noë rejects this understanding of
the sensorimotor account: rightly so, as it would undermine the insight that phenomenal
character can be accounted for naturalistically by nothing more than a skill-driven
sensorimotor relation to the outside world. An alternative understanding of the sensorimotor
theory might say that the world is, in fact, represented pictorially in perceptual consciousness,
and that changes to this pictorial representation enable you to revise your understanding of
the sensorimotor relations you stand in. This is no good, because sensorimotor understanding
is required for perception to be intentionally-directed in the first place, and we could not
therefore appeal to the world-directed content of pictorial representations to account for
sensorimotor understanding.
The proper understanding of ‘manifest’, I suggest, instead specifies that the perceiver
does not consciously access whatever change in input causes the change in the sensorimotor
relation to be manifest. On this basis, we should take it that the relevant input is a subdoxastic
sense input. The upshot, given that movement-dependence and object-dependence are
necessary conditions for the perceptual presence of P-properties and objective properties, is
that a necessary condition for perceptual presence, at the personal level, is that subdoxastic
sense inputs originating from the objects and properties consciously perceived must currently
be prone to exhibiting patterns of movement-related change.
Notice that the claim that perceptual experience does not factor into an occurrent and
a merely potential part is, on the present understanding, compatible with the outside memory
thesis (O’Regan, 1992), which claims that visual processing involves an occurrent part, namely
the retinal image, and a potential part, namely expectations - represented, or
physically-constituted in a non-representational way - about the consequences of possible
movements. The current personal level account can be taken to imply that this distinction
between the occurrent and the merely potential does not manifest itself in a straightforward
way to the conscious agent. This makes sense when we consider that appeals to the character
of retinal stimulation are not sufficient to explain the phenomenal character or intentionality
of perceptual consciousness. In light of this limitation, Sensorimotor Understanding is all
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there is to go on. Noë’s notion of presence-as-access is in principle compatible, unlike the
outside memory thesis, with the existence subpersonally of filling-in and pictorial
representation, since it does not need to claim that there is a one-to-one mapping between
perceptual experience and the physical processes that enable it. Indeed, Pessoa et al. (1998)
and Noë and Thompson (2004) actively deny that there is such a mapping between
subpersonal content and the contents of visual experience. Notice, all the same, that
presence-as-access does not do anything to invite the view that filling-in or pictorial
representation take place subpersonally, and makes a very good fit with the outside memory
thesis.
3.5 - Perception andDynamical Entanglement
According to one current within sensorimotor theory, associated in particular with Hurley
(1998), perception should not be understood subpersonally as a matter of information
processing, but as a dynamic process comprising a messy entanglement between different parts
of the brain, non-neural body and outside environment. Hurley contrasts her view of
perception and action with an orthodox conception she calls the ‘classical sandwich’, which
claims that the mind decomposes into discrete subpersonal systems responsible, respectively,
for perception, thought, and action. Perception and action are the respective top and bottom
layers of the sandwich, and thought makes up the filling. Thus perceptually-guided action, on
the classical sandwich conception, takes the form of a ‘sense-represent-plan-move’ cycle
(Wheeler, 2005). The visual system uses retinal inputs to construct a representation of the
outside world, in a manner broadly in line with the approach offered by Marr (1982). This
representation serves as an input to an informationally encapsulated and functionally distinct
central cognitive system. The central system chooses a course of action and sends instructions
to a separate motor action system, which is responsible for generating the appropriate motor
movements. Fodor’s (1983) account is a good example of this kind of framework.
One’s preferred conception of the causal processes involved in action and perception
can be laid out diagrammatically with sense inputs at the top and motor outputs at the
bottom. Hurley suggests that the classical conception endorses ‘vertical’ modularity, since the
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modular layers responsible respectively for perception, cognition and action are stacked
vertically on top of one another, with perception at the sense input end and action at the
motor output end. Hurley agrees that the mind decomposes into a number of informationally
encapsulated systems geared toward differing tasks, for example different kinds of
perceptually-guided action. The layers in her conception, however, are stacked side-by-side,
meaning the boundaries between sense inputs, motor outputs and central cognition are
non-existent or at least considerably more porous than conceived by the classical sandwich
view. Thus one distinctive feature of perception in Hurley’s account is that it depends
constitutively on fluidly integrated causal processes running between sense inputs and motor
outputs.11
Hurley suggests that the causal flow runs from sense input to motor output and,
importantly, loops back to sense input again, as body movements alter the character of the
sensory stimulation received from the environment. In addition, she claims that the causal
flow runs in the opposite direction too, as efferent copy from the motor outputs makes a
causal impact upstream. She states that these points distinguish her account from
behaviourism, which conceives of cognition as depending solely on unidirectional relations
between sense inputs and motor outputs. Thus Hurley claims perception and action depend
constitutively on messy dynamical processes, carried out without internal representations12,
and involving a complex entanglement between different parts of the brain, extra-neural body
and environment. In addition to claiming that the substrate of perceptual consciousness is
wider than sometimes thought, incorporating motor regions of the brain and perhaps the
non-neural body and environment, Hurley claims that perceptual experience depends
constitutively on the way the interactive process unfolds over time. Thus she rejects temporal
11 Chemero and Cordeiro (2000) object to Hurley’s continued use of the words ‘input’ and
‘output’ on the ground that on the dynamical conception, which they and Hurley endorse,
there is no principled reason for conceiving of them as inputs and outputs. Still, we can
describe them as inputs and outputs for heuristic purposes while acknowledging that this may
not reflect a genuine functional distinction.
12 As with ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’, Hurley retains an apparently orthodox commitment by
endorsing the vehicle/content distinction, implying that the entire processing loop could be
considered one big representation. This is nonetheless quite different from the wholly internal
representations endorsed by the classical sandwich conception.
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atomism, the claim that the processing can for explanatory purposes be broken down into
temporally discrete chunks.
With the points in mind, perception (and action) are held by Hurley’s account to be
best interpreted as dynamical systems. As such, they have the potential to be modelled using
dynamical systems theory, which uses difference or differential equations to describe the ways
a mechanistic system evolves over time. Hurley’s account is just one example of a broader
‘dynamicist’ approach to cognitive science, associated in particular with van Gelder (Port and
van Gelder, 1995; van Gelder, 1998) and Thelen and Smith (1994) and encompassing work
in biological enactivism (e.g., Thompson and Varela, 2001) and ecological perception
(Chemero, 2009). All endorse the suggestion that cognitive activities can be best understood,
and in particular formally modelled, as temporally-evolving, dynamical processes, usually
without reference to representation.
Aside from Hurley’s account, canonical work on the sensorimotor theory is by and
large non-committal about the dynamical approach. O’Regan (2011) makes no mention of
dynamical systems, appearing, in spite of his account’s emphasis on interactive engagements
with the outside environment, to prefer an information processing stance. Noë (2004) only
claims that perception might depend constitutively on dynamic input-output-input loops.
The dynamical view is given a fuller endorsement, however, by other work on the
sensorimotor theory, including Hurley and Noë (2003), Gangopadhyay and Kiverstein (2009)
and Burhmann, Di Paolo and Barandiaran (2013).
There are numerous available motivations for endorsing the claim that perception
depends constitutively on an embodied dynamical process. One such motivation is evidence
that the phenomenal character of perceptual consciousness is partly determined by motor
output activity. Standard representationalist models do not expect perceptual experience to be
non-instrumentally dependent on activity by the brain’s motor regions. If perceptual
experience depends constitutively on motor activity, it plausibly depends on entire loops of
interaction between brain, body and outside environment. Hurley (1998) appeals to an
experiment by Kohler (1962) featuring goggles in which the left half of each lens was tinted
yellow and the right half tinted blue. After wearing the goggles for several weeks, the subjects
adapted to the coloured lenses, meaning that the visual scene came to appear normal and
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untinted. After removing the glasses, the subjects reported that moving their eyes to the left
caused objects to appear with a yellow tint, while moving their eyes to the right produced a
blue tint. Hurley claims that this supports the view that motor output states partly drive visual
experience and determine its phenomenal character.
The dynamical approach can also be motivated by the idea of the world as an outside
memory. Although O’Regan does not pursue the outside memory idea to this conclusion, the
idea that perception is best characterised as a dynamical system is a natural extension of the
claim that perception depends on embodied interactions and not solely or primarily on
internal information processing. Thus the arguments provided by O’Regan and others in
favour of the outside memory view, for example the empirical work on change blindness and
inattentional blindness, give some evidential support for a dynamical systems version of the
sensorimotor theory.
Elsewhere, the dynamicist approach is strongly associated with accounts that claim
internal representations do not exist at all or cannot do the explanatory work required to
bridge the explanatory gap between consciousness and the physical. As Chemero (2009)
comments, dynamical systems models can frequently be given a representationalist gloss, but
such a gloss is not necessarily required for the models to do the explanatory work they do. This
contrasts with orthodox information processing accounts, which typically make
representation an essential posit. Hutto and Myin’s account (2012), which claims on
conceptual grounds that subpersonal representational content probably does not exist, thus
provides support for the dynamical systems perspective. Biological enactivists (Varela,
Thompson and Rosch, 1991; Thompson, 2007) have a further reason to endorse dynamical
systems, namely the view that cognition is continuous with the self-organising dynamical
systems they hold are constitutive of life.
Chemero (2009) claims that the merits of a nonrepresentational dynamical systems
approach must be judged by its explanatory success in making sense of empirical data rather
than by metaphysical considerations about content of the kind endorsed by Hutto and Myin.
However, Silberstein and Chemero (2012) offer a metaphysical-motivation of sorts for
adopting a dynamical systems perspective, claiming that it helps motivate a direct realist
account of phenomenal qualities, which in turn means it promises to do a better job than
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competing accounts of explaining phenomenal qualities physicalistically. I will return to this
point in the next section.
3.6 - The Extensive ConsciousMind
The sensorimotor account, in some variants, advocates one of the more extreme departures
offered recently from the mainstream view that the mind is located purely ‘in the head’ and
does not need to be explained by appeal to the body or outside environment. The orthodox
position, to which the sensorimotor theory sets itself in opposition, is sometimes traced back
to Descartes, who claimed that the mind was an immaterial entity distinct from the body,
with which it interacted via a prescribed channel at the pineal gland. Since the mind, on the
Cartesian view, is not even physical, it is in this sense more disengaged from the body and
physical environment than it ever is in contemporary cognitive science. However, orthodox
physicalist accounts of mind continue to subscribe to what Wheeler (2005) describes as
Cartesian psychology, an approach which implies, amongst other things, an analogous
separation between the neurally-realised mind and the extra-neural body. Descartes was, in
fairness, careful to claim that the mind is intimately joined with the body and not detached, as
he put it, in the way a pilot is from their ship (1647/1985b). Wheeler, attempting to do justice
to the position, suggests this claim can be reconciled with Descartes’ dualism if we regard it as
a principle of Cartesian psychology that the mind makes use of informational content
specifying the body’s state, but that the way it uses this information to generate intelligent
action can be fully characterised without reference to the body. This principle, drawn from a
nuanced version of Cartesian psychology, is explicitly endorsed by a number of recent, largely
orthodox accounts of cognition, which hold that the mind supervenes purely on the brain but
frequently trades in representations of bodily states (e.g., Goldman and de Vignemont, 2009;
Rupert, 2011).
Drawing a less kind parallel between Descartes and contemporary accounts, Dennett
(1991) issued a well-known warning against being tacitly committed to Cartesian materialism,
the view that the mind is unitary and its physical substrate confined to a circumscribed area of
the brain - an outlook that must be avoided on pain of committing the homunculus fallacy.
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Present day theories often maintain an orthodox position while appearing to avoid this
mistake. Rupert (2011) is again a good example, since it is the central thesis of his ‘massively
representational mind’ that representations are manifold throughout the brain, although he
maintains that cognition is overwhelmingly brain-bound. Noë (2004) argues that
brain-bound accounts cannot avoid the Cartesian mistake altogether, since they continue to
endorse a conception of the brain itself as a homunculus subsisting within the wider confines
of the person as a whole. This need not be a viewed as a mistake, so long as you are happy to
endorse the view that in an important sense, you are your brain. This is nonetheless strikingly
similar to Descartes’ claim, with reference to his immaterial mind, that “I am in the strict sense
only a thing that thinks, that is, I am a mind or intelligence or intellect or reason”
(1647/1985b, p. 18). The moral is that although orthodox theories are often deliberate in
avoiding the extremes of Cartesianism in a crude rendition, they retain Cartesian
commitments.
One point of departure from the Cartesian orthodoxy occurs with the thesis known as
vehicle externalism. To explain the generic position, it will help to compare it with content
externalism (Putnam, 1975; Burge, 1979). This longer-established position holds that mental
content is not fixed solely by things in the head. In Putnam’s classic thought experiment,
Oscar, who lives on Earth, has an exact physical duplicate, Twin Oscar - who lives on Twin
Earth. Twin Earth is identical to Earth in every respect, except the clear liquid which fills
rivers, lakes, and has all the other surface features we associate with water, has the chemical
composition XYZ rather than H2O as it does on Earth. Oscar and Twin Oscar live in
medieval times and are ignorant of the microstructural properties of water. But when Oscar
and Twin Oscar each utter the word ‘water’, the differing properties of the natural kinds they
are in causal contact with entails that they express different thoughts.13 The moral is that
identical vehicles can bear non-identical contents, because content is fixed in part by
properties of the outside environment. Vehicle externalism bears comparison with content
externalism, although it is a quite different position. Importantly, content externalism is not
13 When Putnam (1975) formulated the view, he intended it to apply to linguistic rather than
mental content, but the thesis came later to be widely applied by Burge (1982) and others to
the thoughts underlying the utterance and not just the words themselves
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generally thought to threaten the view that the vehicle of thought and experience is wholly
neural. Vehicle externalism, by contrast, contends that the physical substrate of contentful
mental states is sometimes outside the head.
Vehicle externalism, generically, decomposes into a number of quite distinct and,
indeed, frequently incompatible strands. One such position is the extended mind thesis
(Clark and Chalmers, 1998; Clark, 2008). Proponents of the extended mind frequently
endorse functionalism (Clark, 2008; Wheeler, 2010), and hold that although cognition
frequently involves the construction and deployment of representations, typically in the brain,
it sometimes makes use of representational vehicles outside the skin. The most famous
example, from Clark and Chalmers (1998), uses a ‘parity’-based heuristic to lend support to
the extended mind. Two protagonists, Otto and Inga, go about their daily business. But Otto,
unlike Inga, suffers from mild dementia, meaning that unaided he suffers from severely
impaired short term memory. To compensate, he makes use of a notebook which he keeps
with him at all times, frequently noting down relevant facts and occurrences from his daily life,
and calling upon the notes automatically and non-critically as needed. By interacting with the
pen and notebook, Otto is able in a relatively smooth way to replicate the mental function for
which Inga relies on her neurally-encoded short term memories. Clark and Chalmers suggest
that because representations in the notebook, in Otto’s case, function in an appropriately
similar way to the relevant neural representations for Inga - hence the parity - the pen and
notebook can be regarded as forming part of an extended cognitive system.
The extended mind thesis is one way of breaking from the tradition which says that
the physical substrate of cognition is purely internal. However, the thesis is conservative in
several key respects. It maintains a commitment to internal representation, and indeed uses
the idea that cognition frequently depends on internal representation to motivate the
parity-based claim that Otto’s cognition extends, given that he uses representations in the
notebook in the way other cognisers use internal representations. Moreover, it is committed
only to the claim that unconscious mental processes sometimes extend beyond the skin, and
proponents of the extended mind are sometimes explicit in denying that the substrate of
consciousness extends (e.g., Clark, 2009).
The extended mind contrasts with a quite different vehicle externalist approach
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associated with sensorimotor theory and other dynamical-systems oriented accounts of
perception, which claim that the substrate of perceptual consciousness incorporates the
extra-neural body and environment in addition to the brain (Hurley, 1998; Noë, 2004;
Rowlands, 2010; Silberstein and Chemero, 2012). This approach, which I focus on for the
remainder of the section, is sometimes called the ‘extended conscious mind’, a label intended
to capture its resemblance to the extended mind. In fact, this label may not have the
appropriate resonance, since it suggests a continuity with the extended mind thesis that does
not reflect its quite different motivation. Vehicle externalism, strictly speaking, is a
problematic label too, since some of the views falling under the present approach reject the
claim that cognition, and specifically perception, involves content at all, and hence that there
is a vehicle/content distinction to be made in this case. After Rowlands (2010), we could
recast the distinction between vehicles and contents as a distinction between vehicles of
consciousness and the conscious states that supervene on them.
A better label is perhaps suggested by Hutto and Myin (2012), who describe their
approach to cognition as the extensive mind to underline their view that because there is no
content there is, in the first place, no theoretically relevant inner-outer boundary between the
brain and its surroundings from which cognition might extend. Hutto and Myin are
sympathetic but not fully signed-up to the claim that perceptual consciousness supervenes on
extra-neural activity. To make sure it has all the correct resonances, let us call the present view
the extensive conscious mind (ECM). The core principle underlying ECM is the claim that
perception is best explained by appeal to dynamical systems rather than computation.
Although this claim is motivated in varying ways, and in turn supposed to justify ECM on the
basis of varying further premises, adherents of ECM consistently endorse the principle that
perception is best understood as a dynamical system, in principle describable using differential
equations, incorporating features of the brain, body and outside environment.
A large part of ECM’s appeal is its distinctive way of accounting naturalistically for
consciousness and phenomenal qualities. Because the objects of perception are themselves
constituents of perception, phenomenal qualities can be accounted for non-mysteriously by
appeal to physical properties the objects bear in relation to the perceiver’s body - for example,
SMCs. One place ECM is endorsed is in Silberstein and Chemero (2012, henceforth S&C),
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who advocate a version of the ecological approach to perception. The approach differs from
sensorimotor theory by claiming that the features we are responsive to in perception are not
SMCs but affordances. Like SMCs, affordances are relations between a perceiver and their
environment, and can be straightforwardly specified from a third-person perspective. Unlike
SMCs, they describe possibilities for bodily movement rather than sensory consequences of
possible movement. Notwithstanding this difference, S&C’s arguments in favour of ECM are
compatible with the sensorimotor theory.
S&C emphasise that ECM can dissolve the hard problem of consciousness, by which
they mean the problem of accounting naturalistically for specific phenomenal qualities and
the more general question of why there is consciousness at all. They take inspiration from a
point made by Ryle (1979), who identified a dilemma faced by theories of discursive thought.
Ryle claimed the theories were prone to pivot between two unsatisfactory positions, either
casting thought as ‘nothing but’ inner speech, or casting it as ‘something else as well’. He
illustrated the problem by analogy with a coin. It would be wrong to claim that a coin is
‘nothing but’ a metal disc, but wrong to claim it consists of a metal disc plus some other entity
as well. S&C argue that the problem facing theories of consciousness takes a similar shape.
Proponents of orthodox approaches to cognition sometimes claim that phenomenal
consciousness is ‘nothing but’ a certain kind of neural activity - an unsatisfying position which
also comes under target in O&N, as I discussed in section 3.2.2. Alternatively, they accede to a
dualist impulse and claim, like Chalmers (1996), that consciousness is a non-physical
‘something else as well’.
S&C blame computationalists for the apparent dilemma, offering the following
diagnosis: Computationalism, which as S&C take it entails the representational theory of
mind, states that computation is sufficient for cognition. Computationalists remain loath,
however, to accept that metal and plastic artifacts could be conscious merely by virtue of
performing appropriate computations. They are therefore forced to separate consciousness
from cognition, and for this reason account for consciousness separately, either deflating it to
brain state or inflating it to something non-physical. To avoid the dilemma, S&C reject the
representational theory of mind and instead propose that the properties to which we are
intentionally-directed in perceptual consciousness are themselves constituents of perception.
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The fact that the properties we perceive, affordances, are specified with egocentric reference to
the perceiver is supposed to account for perception’s intrinsic subjectivity, and therefore
consciousness in general.
Although S&C’s solution is appealing, it is worth taking note of a limitation they
share with O&N. It is true that the representational theory of mind is not necessarily
committed to the claim that consciousness, like cognition, is best explained by appeal to
representation. However, there are also representationalist proposals which take seriously the
claim that contentful states, meeting certain other functional criteria, are sufficient to account
for phenomenal consciousness (e.g., Lycan, 1987; Dretske, 1995; Tye, 2000). Accounts in this
category accord with S&C’s demand that consciousness is neither ‘nothing more’ than brain
state nor ‘something else as well’, and like S&C they attempt to avoid the dilemma by
identifying consciousness with cognition. However, they do not use ECM to make this work.
ECM has one key advantage compared to representationalism about phenomenal qualities,
namely that it avoids much of the latter’s explanatory burden. ECM does not have to offer (or
hold out for) a naturalistic account of content, a project which faces serious conceptual
obstacles (Hutto and Myin, 2012; see section 6.4). Notice that reducing phenomenal
character to content only helps naturalise phenomenal character if the content can itself be
naturalised. Moreover, the success of representationalist accounts of phenomenal character is
in part dependent on the sort of content involved. For instance, externalistically individuated
content faces a distinctive challenge in light of Twin Earth-style cases, as we will see shortly.
Hurley (1998), offering a different argument for ECM, endorses the vehicle/content
distinction, arguing that the vehicle of conscious content extends beyond the brain. She claims
that vehicles of content play an essential theoretical role in explaining the relation between the
mental and the physical. Drawing a distinction between type-explanations and
token-explanations, she claims the former explain why there is mentality at all. For example, in
line with Millikan’s (1984) biosemantics, facts about natural selection and the ancestral
environment might explain how certain types of physical state bear content. To explain a
subject’s present mental state, we must also appeal to presently occurring states and processes.
We are now offering a token explanation, because we are specifying which physical states and
processes token the relevant type. Thus Hurley claims that when we talk about a vehicle of
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content, we are attempting to offer a token-explanation.
If one wanted to deny that perceptual experience is contentful or depends on
content-bearing vehicles, the vehicle/content distinction could be recast as a relatively
harmless vehicle/experience distinction. This avoids the need to stipulate that experience
involves truth or correctness conditions. However, maintaining the reformulated distinction
is only valuable if phenomenal states are multiply realisable, meaning that non-identical
physical processes can yield phenomenologically indistinguishable experiences. S&C maintain
that the dynamical systems which constitute perception are ‘soft assembled’ from varying
physical components, sometimes wholly internal and at other times incorporating varying
parts of the outside environment. This implies that perception, in general, is in one sense
multiply realisable. However, the point here is that the vehicle of perceptual experience in
general can vary, bringing with it attendant differences in perceptual phenomenology, and not
that an identical experience could supervene on a range of different vehicles. The
sensorimotor theory, on the gloss I argue for later in the thesis, allows that perceptual
experiences may in a weak sense be multiply realisable, given that phenomenal character could
stay the same across perceivers with limited differences in body morphology. However, the
multiple realisability that applies in this case is too constrained to make a vehicle/experience
distinction particularly useful, especially when contrasted with the functionalist thesis that
phenomenology could stay the same despite radical differences in embodiment.
Hurley’s arguments in favour of vehicle externalism are equally applicable to other
versions of ECM. Conceding that neural processes are likely to be sufficient for consciousness,
she challenges the assumption that suitable attendant outer states are not themselves necessary
for the neural processes in question to occur. The ‘duplication assumption’, as she calls it, is a
standard background assumption underlying the twin test for content externalism. Recall the
Twin Earth thought experiment from Putnam (1975). Block (1990b) offers a similar thought
experiment intended to test representationalist accounts of phenomenal character (see
chapter 5). Suppose there is a planet called Inverted Earth, which is like Earth except the
colours of objects are all inverted. A subject travels from Earth to Twin Earth and puts on
colour-inverting goggles. As a result, the subject’s phenomenal states remain as they were on
Earth, even though, according to content externalist accounts, the content of the subject’s
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perceptual states must differ. According to Block, this demonstrates that content externalist
variants of representationalism about phenomenal qualities fail. His own view is that we
should appeal to some non-representational property of the brain to explain phenomenal
character. Hurley’s argument undercuts this debate by casting doubt on the claim that twin
tests are possible. If successful, it challenges Block’s view that we must only appeal to the brain,
since it sheds doubt on the claim that phenomenal states can stay the same while the
environment radically changes. It challenges the content externalist proposal, since it denies
that the vehicle can stay the same while the content changes. Notice that it thereby offers a
response to representationalism about phenomenal qualities absent from S&C’s more recent
piece.
Hurley observed that the duplication assumption becomes problematic when we
apply it to realistic rather than toy cases. In Consciousness in Action, she offers a series of
Twin Earth-style scenarios which challenge the assumption in progressively demanding ways.
A first concerns a case of colour inversion in which all objects that are red on Earth are green
on Twin Earth but not vice versa. Because the transformation between Earth and Twin Earth
is not information preserving, the subject on Twin Earth is unable to make the same range of
discriminations as the subject on Earth, therefore their neural states are not duplicated and
the duplication assumption fails. This shows that even for cases where the differences between
the Earths are limited to colour and not shape, the duplication assumption only holds for a
heavily restricted set of cases.
A further scenario features a planet called Mirror Earth in which everything is
reversed from left to right, so that everything is flipped on a vertical axis. The Mirror Earth
subject wears left-right inverting goggles, meaning their retinal input, right now, is identical to
the state it would be in on Earth. However, when the twin moves their right hand, the visual
feedback they receive duplicates the visual feedback they would receive from moving their left
hand, not their right, on Earth, and therefore duplication fails. To correct for this, we could
imagine that a device is attached to the twin’s peripheral nervous system, intervening in their
motor outputs and proprioceptive inputs, such that the same instruction causes the subject to
move their left hand, and hence receive the necessary visual feedback, while receiving the
proprioceptive input they previously received after moving their right hand. This saves the
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duplication assumption, for the time being, although it depends on confining duplication to
the central rather than peripheral nervous system.
Lastly, there is El Greco Earth, in which everything is vertically elongated compared to
Earth, such that the counterparts of spheres are egg-shaped. This leads to a challenging
asymmetry between the respective Earths. When an Earth subject nudges a sphere, its
orientation stays the same - perhaps it rolls a little to the left or right. The same action on El
Greco Earth causes the egg-shaped object to fall over. Because of the asymmetry between the
effects of motor movements on visual input in subjects on the two worlds, duplicating the
Earth subject’s internal states on El Greco Earth would require a vastly complicated device to
correct the visual inputs in different situations. On a similar theme, Hurley remarks that real
life Virtual Reality simulations depend on heavily restricting the range of possible movements
afforded to the perceiver. The more freedom of movement the subject has, the greater their
ability to disambiguate visual inputs by moving around, which means, claimed Hurley, that
creating a fully realistic virtual reality simulation pushes toward the limit of what is, even in
principle, physically possible. Noë (2004) makes a similar point, asserting that a completely
realistic virtual reality simulation cannot be much less complex than the world itself.
The upshot, for Hurley, is that once it is established that the duplicationist must go to
byzantine lengths, at the bounds of physical possibility, to preserve duplication with regard to
a restricted area of the brain, the vehicle internalist thesis comes under threat. For one thing,
there is no guarantee that the same area of the brain will be duplicated in each Twin Earth
scenario. For another, even if some part of the brain can be consistently duplicated, without
some strong motivation, the insistence that this region of the brain alone is the vehicle of
consciousness appears arbitrary rather than principled. An important feature of this
discussion is that it sets out to challenge duplication for a range of realistic cases. This does not
mean denying that duplication is possible, even straightforward, in some cases. Establishing it
in some cases is insufficient to show that perception in general supervenes only on neural
activity. Hurley observes that in cases that are restricted enough to make duplication
straightforward, for example because we imagine the subject’s sensorimotor capacities are
highly constrained, it is doubtful whether the subject enjoys perceptual experience in the first
place.
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She also pre-empts a number of more sophisticated objections that might be offered
by a vehicle internalist. One such objection is that the laws of physics might vary between
Earth and Twin Earth, such that complicated devices for altering the nervous system are not
required to achieve duplication. Hurley counters that the twins cannot be considered
duplicates if the laws of physics vary between the cases. Another objection is that a mad
scientist could duplicate a subject’s neural states in a different environment by intervening to
alter them frame-by-frame. Hurley rejects this, because she rejects temporal atomism, the view
that perception depends on a succession of moment by moment states rather than a smoothly
continuous process.
The success of Hurley’s argument, it should be noted, depends in part on endorsing a
dynamical systems approach to perception. Indeed, Clark (2009) observes that it depends on
more than just the claim that perception involves a temporally-extended, dynamical process.
Such a process may merely be instrumental in causing the activation of a brain state which
itself generates a perceptual experience in an instant, without requiring temporal extension.
Alternatively, the brain state may need to persist through time, but it may not itself need to
dynamically evolve through time in a way that would make the contribution of extra-neural
states essential. Thus Clark suggests that Hurley’s view must endorse a conception he calls
Deep Dynamic Entanglement + Unique Temporal Signature, or ‘DEUTS’ (p. 980), which
holds not only that perceptual consciousness is enabled by a temporally-extended, dynamic
process, but also that the conscious experience is constitutively dependent on the precise way
the neural as well as extra-neural states involved evolve over time.
If there are satisfactory independent grounds for thinking that perception depends on
a specific functionally distinct, informationally encapsulated area of the brain, then it is no
longer a prejudice to think that the same area of the brain can be duplicated in all the Twin
Earth scenarios (notwithstanding the technical challenge) and that the area of the brain so
duplicated is genuinely the area responsible for visual awareness. Of course, were the
commitment to this view of perception motivated by a prejudice (recall the discussions of
Cartesian materialism and analytic isomorphism) it would not be a suitable independent
ground. Importantly, although a well-motivated version of vehicle internalism might support
the duplication assumption, the duplicationist hypothesis cannot be used to motivate vehicle
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internalism, as this would be getting things the wrong way round. Conversely, Hurley’s
argument shows that if perception depends constitutively on a dynamic, interactive process
with a unique temporal signature, there is also a strong motivation for endorsing ECM.
Clark argues that if deep dynamic entanglement and a unique temporal signature are
indeed essential to consciousness, this threatens a stalemate between ECM and its opponents.
He argues that DEUTS cannot establish ECM, but it can expose the rejection of ECM as a
prejudice. To show that ECM fails, the opponent has to identify a special property that the
neural component of the processing possesses and that the extra-neural activity lacks, and
show that this difference is a principled rather than arbitrary ground for thinking that
perceptual consciousness supervenes solely on the neural activity. Clark claims that such a
difference can be established in light of DEUTS’ own appeal to a unique temporal signature.
One aspect of the temporal signature that consciousness is likely to depend on is
informational processing at very high speed. This, in turn, depends on the high-bandwidth
available in the neural portion of the wider interaction between brain, body and environment.
The interface between the brain and extra-neural body has a much lower bandwidth,
suggesting it cannot do the work required to generate consciousness, and therefore serves as
mere causal scaffolding (Clark, 2009). Importantly, Clark does not reject Hurley’s insight that
the neural processes involved in a particular conscious experience are likely to require that the
subject is embedded in a specific type of environment, and hence her rejection of the
possibility of duplication as illustrated by the Twin Earth-style cases.
I am not going to consider any further whether ECM finally goes through, as ECM is
a mere nicety in the context of the sensorimotor theory as a whole. Equally important are the
insights that lead up to ECM, including, on a dynamical version of the sensorimotor account,
the claim that architecture of perception involves a dynamic, interactive process with a unique
temporal signature, and the fact that the neural duplication is likely to fail. Silberstein and
Chemero associate ECM’s claim that the objects of perceptual awareness are constitutive
features of perceptual processing with direct realism. However, it is not obvious that ECM is
needed for direct realism to go through. Direct realism, including the relational realism
endorsed by Noë (2012), could be motivated by the fact that perception is an interactive
process in which duplication scenarios are impossible, without needing ECM too. Thus the
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arguments that lead up to ECM are enough to get a dynamical version of the sensorimotor
theory what it really needs.
93
4 -Mastering Sensorimotor Understanding
The sensorimotor theory’s most crucial tenet is also the one least well-defined by the theory’s
flagship statements. Expanding on the work done in the previous chapter, I will in this chapter
address in further detail the claim that perception depends on sensorimotor ‘mastery’.
Specifically, I will focus on the variety of sensorimotor mastery found in Noë’s (2004) account,
which I have officially labelled Sensorimotor Understanding, reflecting the terminology
sometimes used by Noë. Many of the important things Noë says about Sensorimotor
Understanding concern the ‘presence’ that arises when we exercise it (see section 3.4), and the
nature of the properties it puts us in touch with, P-properties and objective properties (see
section 3.2.5). In this chapter, I focus on Sensorimotor Understanding itself, with a view to
addressing a lack of clarity about what it is, and how it fits into a scientific account of
perception and perceptual consciousness.
Although the faculty featured in O’Regan (2011), which I label Sensorimotor
Tracking, is characterised in somewhat different terms to Sensorimotor Understanding, the
respective varieties of sensorimotor mastery are each loosely enough defined in the original
work to leave open the possibility that they are one and the same faculty. Although my
discussion will focus on Sensorimotor Understanding, the characterisation I end up with
could also, therefore, describe Sensorimotor Tracking. I will continue this chapter by
identifying what I regard as a key limitation with the concept presented by Noë, namely a lack
of clarity about how to account for Sensorimotor Understanding physicalistically, particularly
in the domain of cognitive science. In section 4.2, I address a specific ambiguity concerning
the explanandum, and suggest two alternative ways of resolving it. In sections 4.3 and 4.4, I
return to the scientific tractability issue by explaining the impact that the respective views of
Sensorimotor Understanding should have on our understanding of sensorimotor theory as an
account in cognitive science.
4.1 - 'Action in Perception' in Action in Perception
One of the most important differences between the early sensorimotor account (O&N) and
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Noë’s (2004) version is the leap from what we could think of as a ‘bottom up’ type of
explanation to a ‘top down’ one. By bottom-up, I mean an explanation that starts by
describing low-level physical states and processes that could be possessed by an unconscious
machine, and expands to encompass consciousness and the personal level. By top-down, I
mean an account that takes consciousness as its starting point and saves the question of how
consciousness arises until later.
It will be useful if I explain Noë’s motivation for this shift in emphasis. In the (2004)
book, he notes that the early account focuses on how sense input signals, rather than conscious
sensations, change in line with movement, observing that it therefore has no need to
pre-suppose consciousness and is well-positioned to give a physicalistic account of how
perceptual consciousness arises. The drawback with this strategy, Noë says, is that it comes at a
cost to what he calls “phenomenological aptness” (Noë, 2004, p. 228). Expanding on this
point, we might say something like this. The sense inputs featured in O&N are subdoxastic, i.e.
inaccessible to the conscious agent. Even when the agent’s mastery of the SMCs associated
with those sense inputs is integrated with the appropriate capacities for thought and planning,
the subject does not become aware of the sense inputs themselves, but of the relevant features
of the outside environment. Since sensorimotor mastery, in the early account, is mastery of
how sense inputs change with movement, there remains a question of which features of the
outside world we consciously perceive, and how they show up for us.
The O&N account does answer these questions in part. The environmental features
we perceive are those that cause the sense inputs whose patterns of movement-related change
we, or our bodies and brains, have mastery over. The account also makes some observations
about the phenomenal character of perceptual experience, and attempts in particular to
resolve the problem of supposedly irreducible qualia by suggesting that there is nothing more
to experiencing the redness of red, for example, than exercising one’s mastery of the
sensorimotor laws associated with redness for the purpose of thought and planning. However,
this solution is in danger of failing to unseat the intuitions of someone who thinks that qualia
are irreducible, because it invites them to ask why exercising mastery of a particular set of
SMCs has one phenomenal feel and not another - this is another of the unresolved ‘why’
questions about the relation between consciousness and the physical that O&N make it their
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project to avoid.
The problem arises because the O&N version of the sensorimotor theory cannot
convincingly claim that perception feels like exercising sensorimotor mastery, given that the
sense inputs which are the targets of the mastery remain subdoxastic. If perception does not
feel like the exercise of sensorimotor mastery, the endorser of irreducible qualia will continue
to hold that the relation between sensorimotor mastery and conscious feel is only contingent,
meaning that the conscious feel is therefore nonidentical to the associated sensorimotor
mastery. The sensorimotor theorist could respond that perceiving does feel like exercising
sensorimotor mastery - necessarily, because perceiving just is exercising sensorimotor mastery -
even though perceivers typically lack the ability to recognise that this is what perception feels
like. However, if the sensorimotor theory concedes that conscious perception does not feel
recognisably like the exercise of sensorimotor mastery from the subjective point of view of the
perceiver, it finds itself deprived of powerful reason for thinking the sensorimotor theory is
true, namely that the theory makes it impossible to conceive of a given act of perceiving feeling
other than the way it feels. In any case, the early sensorimotor account simply does not go into
as much detail about visual phenomenology as it could.
Like the original version of the theory, Noë (2004) claims that conscious perception is
identical to the exercise of sensorimotor mastery. In a progression from the earlier account,
however, he implies that introspection reveals that exercising sensorimotor mastery is
recognisably what conscious perceiving feels like. This is useful because it provides a further
reason for thinking that the act of consciously perceiving, with its distinctive qualitative feel,
just is the exercise of a variety of sensorimotor mastery and nothing more. As we saw in the
last chapter, the account claims that absent features like the back of a tomato are experientially
present, in absence, because we know which movements would bring them into view. It also
claims that objective properties, like the circularity of a plate, show up in visual experience as
being mediated by the perspectival properties that presently obtain, which we implicitly
understand will change in specific ways in line with possible movements.
In order to introduce these elements, Noë has to present sensorimotor mastery as a
feature of perceptual consciousness rather than a faculty that enables perceptual consciousness.
Because P-properties and objective properties are consciously accessible, it is natural to think
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the faculty we use to access them is conscious, even though the understanding in question is
implicit. Although Noë downplays the importance of the personal/subpersonal distinction, it
is plausibly a requirement of Noë’s account that the faculty we use to master P-properties and
objective properties is itself a personal level faculty, since he explicitly intends the account to
do justice to McDowell’s (1994a) conceptualism about perceptual experience and Kant’s
famous maxim that “thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are
blind” (CPR A51/B75), which in each case require that the person brings some capacities for
thought to bear in experience. Noë does not say so, but it follows from this that Sensorimotor
Understanding must also be amenable to a kind of self-reflexivity; not only do you consciously
exercise Sensorimotor Understanding, but you have the capacity to be conscious of exercising
it. This point notwithstanding, Sensorimotor Understanding is characterised by Noë most of
the time as a conscious faculty possessed by the person rather than their brain or body, and
Noë explicitly concedes that the account presupposes consciousness.
This reflects an important difference between Noë’s sole-authored version of the
sensorimotor theory and the others. As we have seen, the approaches to perception detailed in
O&N and O’Regan (2011) focus, in particular, on processes that could be instantiated by an
unconscious machine rather than a human perceiver. The accounts begin by describing a
process of sensorimotor coupling sufficient for a certain kind of unconscious perceptual
activity, and widen the explanation in a bottom-up fashion by introducing additional
processes, the contributions of which they allege enable perceptual consciousness. Specifically,
these are the integration of the lower-level process with thought and planning, and, in
O’Regan’s (2011) model, an additional faculty corresponding to the ‘self’. Although the
accounts do not give detailed proposals about how these higher faculties are physically realised,
the authors intend us to suppose that the relevant faculties are things we could readily account
for by appeal to appropriate physically-realisable states and processes. O&N at times suggest
an information processing-style account is needed, while O’Regan (2011) explicitly endorses
functionalism of a sort that means a robot could in principle possess the relevant
functionally-defined faculties. Thus an important difference between these accounts and the
version of the sensorimotor theory offered by Noë (2004; 2012) is that the latter pre-supposes
consciousness and does not make any claim to explain it. The Sensorimotor Understanding
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Noë appeals to is intended to explain something about perception and the character of
perceptual consciousness, but is not thereby supposed to account for the existence of
consciousness in the first place.
Neglecting to explain how consciousness in general arises is not an unreasonable
limitation, as long as we think of the account as an account of perceptual consciousness rather
than consciousness in general. More troubling is the fact that the account fails in great respect
to commit itself to clearly defined theses about the physical processes implicated in
Sensorimotor Understanding, something the sensorimotor theory could be expected to offer
even in the absence of an account of how consciousness in general occurs. The omission would
not be problematic if we took the account solely as an entry into philosophy of perception,
which is not necessarily concerned with the physical states and processes that realise conscious
perception. However, it becomes more of a problem when we consider that Noë continues to
present the sensorimotor account as a rival to orthodox scientific accounts of vision. In
response to Marr (1982), Noë says that: “Vision shouldn’t be thought of as a computation
performed by the brain on inputs provided by the retina. What is vision? How should it be
characterised computationally? This book suggests the outlines of an answer. Vision is a mode
of exploration of the environment drawing on implicit understanding of sensorimotor
regularities” (Noë, 2004, pp. 29-30). One of his points is that Marr presents the subpersonal
processes that enable perception as if they were identical to the higher-level processes that
perception is constituted by. This is not only meant to be a logical error, however. His
objection is that the error causes Marr to get his account of the lower-level processes wrong.
Indeed, Noë casts doubt on many of the principles needed to make a computational account
stand up, claiming for example that perceptual consciousness depends in part of having the
right kind of body (p. 25), a claim by which he intends something stronger than the mere
suggestion that you need a body capable of implementing the appropriate computations.
We could simply take the sensorimotor theory as a rebuttal of orthodox scientific
accounts like Marr’s without expecting it to provide an alternative account of the subpersonal
processes involved in perception. It would be better, however, if the theory gave an account of
the physical or physically-realised functional states implicated in Sensorimotor Understanding.
Offering such an account involves answering some very abstract questions, for example
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whether functionalism and representationalism are conceptually viable approaches for
reducing the mental to the physical, and slightly more concrete questions, for example
whether information theoretic or dynamical systems frameworks have the most theoretical
utility for explaining what is going on in human brains and bodies. Even more concretely, it
would be nice to know the precise mechanism involved in human Sensorimotor
Understanding. For instance, if we concluded that the best way to physicalistically account for
Sensorimotor Understanding is to suppose that it supervenes on the construction and
deployment of neural representations, perhaps of some relatively novel kind, we would still
need to know what kind of content they bear and what functional role they play.
Ward (2009), for example, has argued that the representations in question might
specify possibilities for highly planned agent-level action. Elsewhere, Seth (2014) has proposed
that aspects of the sensorimotor approach can be allied with predictive coding approaches to
cognition, which I will explain below. In contrast with representationalist proposals like these,
Hutto and Myin (2012) suggest that Sensorimotor Understanding must be explained by
appeal to the agent’s history of sensorimotor interactions rather than by representational
content, although it remains to be properly explained how we should characterise the physical
processes that underlie the exercise of sensorimotor mastery right now if we endorse this view.
Burhmann, Di Paolo and Barandiaran (2013) have offered a way to model sensorimotor
perception using a dynamic systems framework. The dynamical systems approach was also
endorsed by Hurley (1998), whose account can be considered part of the sensorimotor
approach, and Chemero (2009; see also, Silberstein and Chemero, 2012), who endorses a
Gibsonian account of perception, but whose appeal to sensorimotor abilities offers a proposal
that may usefully help do justice to the sensorimotor approach.
The founding statements of sensorimotor theory can be forgiven for not arriving with
a prefabricated and fully-developed account of the physical processes involved in
Sensorimotor Understanding, but if it is to convince as a serious rival to orthodox scientific
accounts of vision, we need a direction of travel toward answering them. A good place to start
is to have a clear working proposal about what the explanandum, Sensorimotor
Understanding, actually is. In fact, even this so far is ambiguous.
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4.2 -WhichDirection of Fit?
In the sections that follow, I will further discuss the physical or functional processes involved
in Sensorimotor Understanding, but in this section I will first address a significant ambiguity
about what Sensorimotor Understanding is, namely the fact that it is sometimes pitched as
Being Able to Act and sometimes as Knowing WhatWould Happen if You Did Act.
The former, Being Able to Act, could be understood in various ways. In a position
approximating behaviourism, it could be taken to mean having a disposition or ability to act.
Alternatively, in a position resembling Gibsonian ecological psychology (e.g., Chemero, 2009)
or the literature on action-oriented representation (e.g., Clark, 1997; Wheeler, 2005; Ward,
2009; Ward, Roberts and Clark, 2011), it could be taken to mean knowing what actions and
behaviours are open to you. Although Noë (2004) sometimes disowns these possibilities, there
is much evidence that even his version of the sensorimotor theory is committed to a view of
Sensorimotor Understanding as Being Able To Act. If Sensorimotor Understanding is like
this, it has a desire-like direction of fit, because it is the state of the world, specifically the
agent’s behaviour (which for this purpose counts as a state of the world) that must fit with the
agent’s mental state, and not the other way round. Contrast this with Knowing What Would
Happen if You Did Act. This calls upon (perhaps implicit) knowledge about counterfactual
conditionals, and to be effective, the agent’s mental state in this case must be sensitive to the
state the world is in rather than vice-versa - hence it has a belief-like direction of fit.
Noë, as we will see, is sometimes explicit that Sensorimotor Understanding is not
desire-like but belief-like. But to begin, let’s review the textual evidence that Noë’s account is
committed to the idea that Sensorimotor Understanding is desire-like. Although he
insistently denies charges of ‘behaviourism’, he endorses the desire-like direction of fit option
at the very beginning of his book, where he says: “Perceptual experience acquires content
thanks to our possession of bodily skills. What we perceive is determined by what we do (or
what we know how to do); it is determined by what we are ready to do” (2004, p. 1).
Throughout the book, he makes the recurrent claim that perception is constituted by the
exercise of ‘sensorimotor skills’ (e.g., Noë, 2004, p. 90), a phrase which without some
gymnastics is hard to think of as referring to anything other than capacities of one kind or
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another for skillful bodily behaviour. Noë also equates sensorimotor skills with ‘practical
knowledge’, and this, he makes a point of arguing, conforms to Ryle’s (1949) view of
knowing-how, which Noë suggests means it is an ability and does not reduce to a variety of
knowing-that.
Replying to Stanley and Williamson’s (2001) argument that knowing-how cannot be
an ability because you can know how to do something without having the ability to do it, Noë
argues that it is in keeping with ordinary language, which he takes Stanley and Williamson to
be motivated by, that a ski-instructor who cannot perform the moves they teach, or a pianist
who loses the use of their hands, does not in fact know how to perform the relevant tasks.
Again, if Sensorimotor Understanding is a practical ability and not a form of knowing-that -
and if it resembles the pianist and ski-instructor examples - then we must think of it as an
ability to make skillful bodily movements. It is therefore desire-like; consider the incoherence
of saying that Sensorimotor Understanding involves ‘knowing-how what would happen if you
did act’.
Noë goes on to contrast Sensorimotor Understanding - which does not necessarily
draw on propositional knowledge - with linguistic ability, which does. He claims that a better
analogue for Sensorimotor Understanding than linguistic ability is the ability to communicate
using bodily gestures (2004, p. 90), although he does not make it explicit what one should take
from this analogy. Taken in a minimalistic way, the lesson is merely that neither sensorimotor
knowledge nor the ability to gesture call upon a capacity for propositionally-structured
thought like linguistic ability does. Noë draws a more direct connection between
Sensorimotor Understanding and gesture elsewhere in the book, however, when he suggests
that sensorimotor knowledge is actually constituted, at least sometimes, by an ability to
gesture. Gesture makes an appearance, in particular, in Noë’s account of the skills that
underlie the perceptual experience of P-properties. He claims that the ability to experience
P-size - the apparent size on an object in your visual field - is equivalent to the ability, for
example, to hold out an arm and represent the perspectival size using thumb and forefinger.
Endorsing an explicit appeal to capacities for bodily movement made by Pettit (2003), he
suggests that experiencing the motion of a ball as it flies through the air involves being able to
make bodily movements that manifest a discrimination of its speed, for example by catching
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the ball.
Following Evans (1982), Noë suggests that experiencing an object’s location in
egocentric space, for example its being ‘off to the left’, is identical to practically understanding
the movements you would have to make to face the object head-on. Evans (1985) pointed out
that it will not do to specify the relevant movements solely in terms of muscle movements,
because the appropriate behaviours could include, for example walking, crawling, swimming
and indefinitely many others. Evans concluded from this that we cannot derive the notion of
space by specifying appropriate behavioural capacities, but must presuppose space in order to
specify what the relevant behavioural capacities are, thus endorsing a notion of ‘behavioural
space’. In contrast, Noë endorses a notion of “egocentric, sensorimotor space” (2004, p. 89).
The concepts of behavioural space and sensorimotor space appear to be the same, or closely
related: both characterise the environment spatially and in egocentric reference to the
subject’s body. Noë does not explain what difference there is, if any between the concepts, and
what he probably intends is merely to underline his difference with Evans on the subject of
how perceivers master that space.
Here Noë distances himself from the idea that sensorimotor mastery is Being Able To
Act. He says:
Evans (1982) sometimes seems to offer such a behaviorist account, suggesting that the experience
of something as off to the left consists, as it were by definition, precisely in the possession of
certain dispositions to move with respect to the thing. My claim is not behaviorist in the way
Evans’s appear to be. When we see a flicker on the right we know - in a practical, implicit way -
that movements of the eyes to the right bring (or would bring) the flicker better into view (Noë,
2004, p. 89).
This implies that Sensorimotor Understanding is Knowing What Would Happen If You Did
Act, which is to say has a belief-like direction of fit. That Noë intends Sensorimotor
Understanding to have a belief-like direction of fit is underlined in an exchange between Noë
and Campbell concerning the experience of P-properties. Campbell (2008) observes that
Noë’s account lacks an explanation of how we locate objects in sensorimotor space to begin
with. Campbell’s point is that Sensorimotor Understanding, taken as an implicit, belief-like
mastery of how P-properties change in line with movement, is sufficient to explain the
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experience of objective properties, but that we must appeal to a distinct faculty to account for
the experience of P-properties. He complains that in Noë’s account: “there is no attempt at all
to explain what it is to perceive an aspect of an object” (p. 669). Campbell’s friendly
suggestion is that the sensorimotor account should explain P-property experience by appeal to
neurally-realised capacities for actions such as reaching out to grasp the object in front of you.
This suggestion does not appear to be very far removed from the spirit of Noë’s proposal. Noë
(2008) rejects this, however, on the ground that that perceptual experience is not for action.
He responds that experiencing P-properties implies knowing what movements one could
make to gesture to the object or to bring it into view, but emphasises that this knowledge does
not require an ability or disposition to make the relevant movements.
As an aside, Noë’s reply to Campbell is unconvincing. He implies that as long as we do
not stipulate that P-property experience happens prior to objective-property experience, we
need not be committed to the view that they are the result of separate faculties. But the
import of Campbell’s point, concerning the ‘to the left’ case for instance, is that in order to
know which movements would cause you to face the object head-on, you need some way to
recognise the state of affairs that obtains when you are facing the object head-on. You may
know that no movements are required to face the object head-on, and that you are therefore
facing the object head-on. But in this event, some account must be given to explain how you
know that no movements are required. Adopting Campbell’s proposal, we could propose that
you know this because you have the ability to carry out a practical task like picking the object
up, but Noë rejects this solution. I will examine shortly how this limitation in Noë’s account
might be redressed while maintaining that Sensorimotor Understanding has a belief-like and
not merely a desire-like direction of fit.
Elsewhere, Noë (2004) repeatedly disavows ‘behaviourism’ on various grounds. He
states that it is a mistake to suppose that “effects are logical constructions of their causes” (p.
118), i.e. that the behaviours that are the effects of Sensorimotor Understanding themselves
constitute Sensorimotor Understanding. He claims that Sensorimotor Understanding is not a
set of behavioural dispositions, but the ground of your dispositions (p. 88). Importantly, he
notes that you do not always need to move, or even have the ability to move, in order to
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perceive (p. 90).14 These are sound objections to certain positions that might be deemed
behaviourist, and I will later attempt to demonstrate that a position which does claim that
Sensorimotor Understanding depends on behavioural capacities can be finessed in a way that
defuses these worries (sections 4.4 and 6.2).
The uncertainty around direction of fit leaves us with two opposed possibilities. On a
belief-like account, Sensorimotor Understanding is a non-propositional belief-like
understanding of the sensory consequences of possible movements. This possibility is difficult
to square with Noë’s claims that the understanding is practical knowledge or a set of
sensorimotor skills, and with his claim that perceptual consciousness depends on what we are
able to do. But it does justice to Noë’s denial that Sensorimotor Understanding is for action,
or depends on movement or the ability to move. Accounting for the physical processes that
enable Sensorimotor Understanding, on this view, appears to require explaining how neural
states and processes yield belief-like states, and this may require endorsing one kind of internal
representation account or another, since it is not apparent what other kinds of subpersonal
state could do the necessary explanatory work.
Sensorimotor Understanding, on a desire-like account, could involve knowing what
movements to make to achieve various practical goals, and this knowledge might itself depend
on the deployment of action-oriented representations. Alternatively, Sensorimotor
Understanding may, on the desire-like account, consist of dispositions or capacities for various
behaviours which are not best accounted for by reference to representation or ‘knowledge’ at
all. Noë, at times, resists both these possibilities. In section 4.4, below, I will argue that one can
avoid the most important worries associated with behaviourism while nonetheless taking
behavioural capacities to be necessary and sufficient for the existence of Sensorimotor
Understanding. To this effect, I will attempt to establish that Sensorimotor Understanding
exists by virtue of the subject’s possessing an appropriate set of behavioural capacities, but that
it ‘grounds’ the capacities rather than being identical to them. This thesis, as will become
evident, is compatible with the further claim that representations are required to explain how
14 Noë’s other objection is that behaviourism denies the existence of phenomenal
consciousness (2004, p. 32). However, it is not obvious that explaining experience by appeal to
behavioural dispositions necessarily entails denying consciousness.
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the relevant behavioural capacities are realised, but also with the claim that
nonrepresentational explanations are more appropriate. Before I get to this, I will examine a
more straightforwardly representationalist option, involving the claim that Sensorimotor
Understanding is Knowing What Would Happen If You Did Act, and depends on the
deployment of a particular kind of internal representation.
4.3 - Sensorimotor Understanding as Subpersonal Representation
Suppose, in accordance with some of Noë’s (2004) claims, that possessing and exercising
Sensorimotor Understanding neither requires bodily movement nor an ability or disposition
to move. To adopt this position is, by definition, to reject a number of claims that could be
deemed behaviourist. In addition, suppose that action is not what Sensorimotor
Understanding is primarily for. Instead, let’s take it that Sensorimotor Understanding is a
kind of knowledge about the P-properties that presently obtain, and the P-properties that
would obtain given various possible movements. As I put it earlier, Sensorimotor
Understanding, on this view, has primarily a belief-like direction of fit. Sensorimotor
Understanding continues to have one non-trivial conceptual link with bodily behaviour,
namely that it incorporates knowledge about the consequences of possible bodily movements.
Noë (2010) continues to deny that conscious vision is primarily for action, but argues
that if action-guidance is one purpose of conscious vision, then conscious vision requires
Sensorimotor Understanding. He contrasts the sensorimotor approach, as usual, with the
claim that perception consists of the activation of an inner world model. On the inner model
conception, perceiving involves knowing what objects are out there, but not what bodily
relation you stand in to them. Lest one think that Noë is targeting only a pictorial theory
which no one endorses, notice that any representationalist theory is in this position by default
if the representational content it endorses does not somehow specify a bodily relation. Noë
claims that if your perceptual awareness did not represent your bodily relation to the world,
then the world would not seem phenomenally ‘present’ to you. Even if this is not true, it is not
apparent how your perceptual awareness in this event could help guide action. Noë observes
that it must be possible to integrate what you see with what you do, and argues that it is a
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virtue of the sensorimotor theory that it shows how this integration is possible.
An upshot of this point, we might think, is that Sensorimotor Understanding
necessarily involves an ability to make skillful bodily movements, so long as something else
does not block the ability - for example paralysis, or optic ataxia, an inability to co-ordinate
muscle movements. This is one way of weakly motivating the conceptual link between
perception and action implied by the title of Noë’s (2004) book. It also justifies the
description of Sensorimotor Understanding as practical, but only if we take ‘practical’ to mean
knowing-that and knowing-how, as Stanley andWilliamson do and Noë denies. Sensorimotor
Understanding, on the present view, is knowing what would happen if you moved, a
knowing-that, accompanied by a knowing-how to act, which depends on the knowing-that.
However, the present link between perception and action is less tight than the one expressed
by Noë’s claim that “What we perceive is determined by what we do (or what we know how to
do)” (2004, p. 1), since the present view is in essence only signed up to the more pedestrian
claim that what we do or know how to do is determined by what we perceive.
Contradicting Noë’s (2004) discussion of practical knowledge, Sensorimotor
Understanding on the present view is not merely a practical ability, but a belief-like
understanding of SMCs that enables behaviour. This means that the sensorimotor approach
owes an explanation of what Sensorimotor Understanding is and, in particular, how it is
physically constituted or realised. Since it is belief-like, it appears to require truth-evaluable
content. Despite asserting that we cannot usually express our understanding of SMCs using
propositions or bring it to bear in “explicit deliberative judgement” (p. 187), Noë asserts that
Sensorimotor Understanding is conceptual, on what he takes to be a legitimately unrestrictive
account of what conceptual thought requires. He changes this position in later work, asserting
instead that Sensorimotor Understanding involves a kind of nonconceptual content, but
maintaining that Sensorimotor Understanding occurs on a continuum with conceptual skills
rather than belonging to a radically different kind (Noë, 2012). This does better justice to the
suggestion that Sensorimotor Understanding involves content which the perceiver cannot
fully express using propositions, even, presumably, by pointing to an object and saying ‘that
sensorimotor law’. This raises the possibility that Sensorimotor Understanding supervenes on
the deployment of neural representations bearing nonconceptual content.
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Seth (2014) has recently offered a specific representationalist proposal intended to do
justice to some aspects of the sensorimotor theory. His account rejects the sensorimotor
theory’s explicitly enactivist apparatus, namely anti-representationalism, vehicle externalism
and the endorsement of dynamical systems explanations. However, he endorses the account’s
approach to naturalising phenomenal qualities, and, in particular, Noë’s (2004) insights into
visual phenomenology, including presence-in-absence. Seth combines these aspects of the
sensorimotor theory with predictive coding (see, Clark, 2013; Hohwy, 2013). Like the
orthodox approach, predictive coding accounts of perception hold that the brain constructs
internal representations designed to represent features present in the outside environment as
accurately as possible, based on the limited information available at one time via the sense
organs. Orthodox theories make sensory inputs the starting point, and propose that the brain
uses them to build up an inner model. By contrast, predictive coding accounts hold that the
brain constructs models of the environment which it ‘predicts’, using Bayesian inference, will
prove to be in keeping with the worldly state of affairs that really obtains.
The difference between this and the orthodox approach is that sensory inputs here
serve as error correction signals; instead of acting as precursors to the construction of an inner
model, the sense inputs function to tell the brain when the inner models it has already
deployed are wrong. Further, the predictive approach holds that the brain simultaneously
holds multiple inner models organised hierarchically into tiers at increasing levels of
abstraction. Only the lowest model in the hierarchy uses sense inputs themselves as error
correction signals. This model functions as an error correcting signal for the model above, and
so forth. An example of a substantive explanatory difference between orthodox and predictive
coding accounts occurs in the phenomenon of repetition suppression, a tendency of the brain
to respond less to a stimulus as it becomes more familiar. Seth cites work showing that
repetition suppression fails to occur when the subject does not expect the stimulus to be
repeated (Summerfield, Trittschuh, Monti, Mesulam and Egner, 2008). He observes that this
is intelligible within a predictive coding approach, since the approach makes expectations a
central feature, whereas there is no natural way to make this intelligible within an orthodox
framework, where sense inputs come before the models which make use of them.
Seth endorses some of the Noë’s (2004; 2012) insights about visual phenomenology.
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One example of this, which I have discussed already, concerns shape-related P-properties and
objective properties. You are confronted with a coin, tilted at an angle, which is therefore
elliptical in aspect. Thanks to your Sensorimotor Understanding, you appreciate both that it
has an elliptical aspect and that objectively it is circular. It is a key virtue of the sensorimotor
approach that it explains how you are sensitive to objective properties while at the same time,
necessarily, being sensitive to them from some perspective rather than from nowhere. Another
aspect of this phenomenon is ‘presence-in-absence’, the tendency of environmental features
which are strictly speaking out of view to show up in visual consciousness anyway. Noë’s
(2004) prototypic example concerns looking at a tomato. In one sense, you can never see the
whole tomato at once, but only one side of it, while the other side remains out of view.
According to Noë’s phenomenology, which Seth endorses, the back of the tomato nonetheless
has presence-in-absence, which is to say your visual experience is of a whole tomato rather
than something like a 2D cut-out.
Seth argues that a predictive coding account can do justice to this, proposing that the
predictive models employed by the brain in perception incorporate not only predictions about
the features of the present environment causally responsible for present sense inputs, but also
counterfactual predictions about the changes in sense input that would result from a range of
possible movements. Perceptual presence is explained by these counterfactual predictions, and
the more predictions there are about movement-related counterfactuals relating to some
feature, the greater the degree of felt phenomenal presence there is associated with that
feature.
For my present purpose, the crucial feature of Seth’s account is that it provides a
better developed explanation of the mechanism that underlies Sensorimotor Understanding
than found in the original statements of the sensorimotor approach, and does justice to the
‘belief-like’ construal of Sensorimotor Understanding I have been addressing in this section. It
is notable that adopting this view means adopting a very conservative rendering of the
sensorimotor account. It means endorsing representationalism, rejecting dynamical
entanglement and ECM, and by focusing on internal models, downplaying the role played by
embodied interaction even as causal scaffolding.
Sensorimotor mastery, and in particular Sensorimotor Understanding, one of the
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most important notions in the sensorimotor theory, is ambiguously defined by the theory’s
original statements. At times, it appears to be implicit knowledge of the SMCs that presently
obtain, and nothing more. In this case, the obvious way to explain Sensorimotor
Understanding is in keeping with orthodox cognitive science via a representationalist story.
Seth’s account has the virtue of doing justice to Noë’s (2004) insights about visual
phenomenology and perceptual presence, and of allying this aspect of the sensorimotor theory
with insights from the currently popular predictive coding approach. If nothing else, Seth’s
account also has the virtue of beginning to repair the sensorimotor theory’s serious
explanatory deficit by accounting for the precise mechanism that realises Sensorimotor
Understanding. However, this comes at a cost. For anyone who is motivated, on whatever
independent grounds, to endorse the enactivist theses of anti-representationalism, vehicle
externalism and dynamical systems, Seth’s account will not help, since it serves only to co-opt
insights from the sensorimotor theory into a much more conservative representationalist
framework. In particular, accounting naturalistically for representational content brings with
it a heavy and as yet unresolved explanatory burden (Hutto and Myin, 2012), as I discuss
further in chapter 6.
Moreover, the approach has costs for the sensorimotor theory itself. If we endorse
internalism and representationalism, then the sensorimotor theory no longer gets to make
distinctive use of the appealing proposition that the brain offloads the burden of modelling
onto the environment itself. Although any variety of representationalism can observe that the
amount represented at any one time is minimal, and that as active perceivers we move around
to acquire new information, the implication of Noë’s (2004) account is that Sensorimotor
Understanding is computationally more efficient than inner modelling, because we merely
need to be poised to interact with the environment, rather than modelling the environment
and then becoming poised to interact with it on the basis of this model.15 Seth’s proposal also
has the drawback, from the perspective of sensorimotor theory, of making the sensorimotor
account hostage to phenomenological fortune, hanging as it does in large part on Noë’s
15 Of course, whether the non-representationalist version of the sensorimotor account really
implies a more efficient process than a representationalist alternative depends on how the
representationalist and non-representationalist alternatives are precisely cashed out.
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description of visual phenomenology. Clark (2008), for instance, suggests that the feeling of
presence-in-absence could be well accounted for by the general feeling that there is more to be
seen, rather than any more explicit representation of or knowledge about the sensory
consequences of possible movements. For these reasons, I endorse a different view of
Sensorimotor Understanding, which I lay out in the next section.
4.4 - Sensorimotor Understanding in Bodily Capacities
Notwithstanding suggestions by various commentators that the sensorimotor account
requires representation, the theory is, in at least one sense, strongly anti-representationalist.
The idea is that there is no need to represent the world, because it is already present to you.
This is reflected by the outside memory thesis (O’Regan, 1992; O&N), and in Noë (2004;
2012) by the idea of presence-as-access, which implies that perception does not depend on
representing even a small part of the outside world. One way of thinking about the theory’s
anti-representationalism is to think of it as a constitutive claim about perception at the
personal level. On this proposal, we are not, as persons, in touch with representations of the
world, but stand in an unmediated relation to the world itself. This is not necessarily
incompatible with the claim that perception depends on internal representations
subpersonally, a point I return to later.
The sensorimotor account’s way of cashing out this (personal level) relation with the
outside world is to say that it involves possessing and exercising a set of bodily capacities;
specifically, capacities to skillfully interact with the outside environment in ways that draw on
an implicit understanding of the SMCs that obtain. Consider that on a representationalist
account, perception involves representing the world, and interacting with the environment in
a goal-directed way is a contingent consequence of the fact you perceive it. Since the role of
the ‘representation’ is played in the sensorimotor account by the world itself, it follows that
perceiving itself in the sensorimotor account is equivalent to possessing and exercising the
capacity to skillfully interact with the world in a goal-directed way. This provides a solid
motivation for the claim that perception depends on action and Being Able to Act, which, as I
said earlier, implies a desire-like direction of fit.
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The question remains, however, of how we account for Sensorimotor Understanding
in its guise as a belief-like faculty, a Knowing What Would Happen If You Did Act. The best
approach, I suggest, is to avoid reifying Sensorimotor Understanding. We should not think of
it as the sort of thing that depends, by definition, on a particular sort of concrete entity, for
example a conscious or purely subpersonal representation, which causally mediates behaviour.
Instead, we should think of it as a set of necessary conditions that our capacities for
practically-oriented, goal-directed behaviour must meet to implicate perception and
perceptual consciousness.
To understand the explanatory relation between Sensorimotor Understanding and
behaviour, it will help to distinguish between some different varieties of explanatory relation
theoretical entities can stand in to one another. Bermudez (2000) distinguishes between
‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ explanations in cognitive science (not to be confused with Hurley’s
1998 usage of the vertical/horizontal metaphor). Horizontal explanations exist at one level,
the personal or subpersonal, and describe temporally distributed events. So if we are offering a
horizontal explanation and we say that A causes B, we mean that A happens and this causes B
to happen a short time later, where A and B occur at the same explanatory level. On Seth’s
(2014) proposal, we might imagine that neural representations of the sensory results of
possible movements send information to motor output areas of the brain, and so generate
behaviour. This would be a horizontal explanation. Vertical explanations describe events that
happen simultaneously at different explanatory levels. In this case, A might be a subpersonal
computation, and B might be a psychological state possessed by the whole person. People
sometimes use the word ‘cause’ in vertical explanations too, although it is not causation of the
sort that implies temporal extension. We might also say, here, that A enables B. If we said that
the deployment of the subpersonal representations described by Seth enable perceptual
consciousness, this would be a vertical explanation.
The important thing, for the moment, is that the explanatory relation between
Sensorimotor Understanding and a capacity for skillful behaviour is neither a vertical nor a
horizontal one. Sensorimotor Understanding, I propose, is a logical condition that the
behaviour enabled by our behavioural capacities must meet in order to constitute perception
and perceptual consciousness. The identity between perception and skillful behaviour arises
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from the fact that to perceive is not to model the world and then use this model, but merely
use the world in the way traditional theories hold that we use an inner model. The fact that
the behaviour needs to manifest a belief-like Sensorimotor Understanding is an upshot of the
straightforward claim that it would be impossible to skillfully interact with the world in more
than a very basic way if you did not have the ability to anticipate, in at least some cases, the
sensory results of your movements. On this basis, behavioural capacities manifesting
Sensorimotor Understanding can be described as a condition of possibility for perception.
This is one way of understanding the claim that Sensorimotor Understanding grounds
perception-implicating behaviour.
The view I am advocating is neutral with regard to whether or not Sensorimotor
Understanding is enabled by the deployment of subpersonal representations. However, it does
not require internal representation as a matter of definition or logical necessity. Sensorimotor
Understanding should be thought of as a characteristic of behaviour; an adverb or adjective
used to describe behaviour or a behavioural capacity, and not a noun. Although there is no
adverb ‘understandingly’, we might say that a behaviour ‘shows understanding’, and mean that
the understanding is constituted by the behaviour rather than that the behaviour merely
demonstrates the existence of a pre-existing entity called understanding. Since Sensorimotor
Understanding is a logical condition for certain kinds of skillful behaviour, appropriate
behaviour is almost sufficient by itself to guarantee the truth of an ascription of Sensorimotor
Understanding. We should add to this an extra requirement that the brain makes an
intelligible contribution to the behaviour, since it is doubtful that a person in a metaphysically
possible world who exhibits appropriate behaviour but lacks internal states to enable the
behaviour could be conscious.
It may help to compare the current view of Sensorimotor Understanding with
Dennett’s (1987) intentional stance, which I discussed in chapter 2. According to the
intentional stance, mental states such as beliefs and desires exist just as long as ascribing them
to a person or other agent helps an outside observer explain the person’s behaviour. Like
Sensorimotor Understanding, this implies the existence of a set of necessary and sufficient
conditions that an agent’s behavioural repertoire must meet for the agent to possess a
particular mental state. Sensorimotor Understanding is correctly ascribed to any perceiver
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whose behavioural repertoire meets the appropriate conditions. In contrast with a certain
understanding of the intentional stance, however, Sensorimotor Understanding is, in a robust
sense, real, and not observer-relative. This is because certain kinds of skillful behaviour require,
as a matter of necessity, a sensitivity to certain presently obtaining SMCs.
If we can account physicalistically for the relevant behavioural capacities without
appeal to neural representations, this will be enough to account for perception, and the
belief-like Sensorimotor Understanding will come for free. The suggestion that it is possible to
explain the relevant behavioural capacities without appeal to representations is controversial,
of course, and nothing I have said so far shows this can be done. However, it is important that
Sensorimotor Understanding, on the view I propose, does not require subpersonal
representation by conceptual necessity. Moreover, the present view is compatible with the
possibility that perception does involve neural representations, but not neural representations
of SMCs. This holds open the possibility of a subpersonal representationalist explanation of
Sensorimotor Understanding quite different from Seth’s approach.
We need, of course, to know something about the behaviour required to justify
ascriptions of Sensorimotor Understanding. In the case of P-properties like relative location,
P-size and P-shape, Sensorimotor Understanding is manifest in the capacity to make
appropriate movements in sensorimotor space. For instance, an understanding that something
is to the left might be manifest in the capacities to walk, run, crawl (etc.) in a leftward
direction for the purpose of bringing the object into view. When we experience something as
being to the left, this usually implicates, as Evans (1985) says, a capacity to walk or run or
crawl, or perform any action from an indefinitely wide range of possible actions in order to
reach the object. If we know that someone intends to face the object head-on, and we see them
walking toward it, we could, in a manner reminiscent of the intentional stance, interpret them
as possessing an implicit understanding of the fact that this movement will bring the object
into view, hence as possessing Sensorimotor Understanding. However, ascribing a perceptual
state to a person or animal on the basis of this single behaviour would be ascribing too much.
The behaviour could be a reflexive response to a stimulus, where perception ought to enable
an ability to respond flexibly using a wide repertoire of behaviours. So the subject ought to
have the ability to run, crawl, etc., as well as walk in order to reach the stimulus; the capacity
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has, in this sense, to admit some degree of generalisability. We can do justice to Noë’s
contention that the experience of objective properties is grounded by the same faculty of
Sensorimotor Understanding as the experience of P-property if we cast the experience of
objective properties as involving the exercise of a behavioural capacity, too. In common with
Sensorimotor Attunement, appealing to this capacity differs from the behaviourist appeal to
input-output relations, because it does not specify which outputs should follow when
particular inputs obtain, but which outputs should follow when particular SMCs obtain.
There are various similarities and differences between Sensorimotor Understanding
and the notion of Sensorimotor Attunement, which I reconstructed from O&N in section
3.3.1. In Noë (2004), Sensorimotor Understanding is largely if not entirely framed as a
personal-level capacity, meaning that its operations are accessible to the conscious subject.
This reflects the fact that we are conscious of possessing and exercising the relevant
understanding, or at least we always have the possibility of becoming conscious of it, even if
there are cases in which we are not conscious of our behaviour because we are sufficiently
absorbed. Evans (1985) claims that to experience an object as occupying a particular spatial
location, the conscious subject must understand the movements required to get there. This
might be equivalent to nothing more than being aware of what your bodily dispositions are. If
you are aware of the movements you must make to reach an object that is to your left, for
instance, then you are aware of the SMCs associated with the object’s being on the left, i.e. the
movements that will result in your facing the object head-on. In this sense, the SMCs involved
in ‘being to the left’ are transparent to you (i.e. you know what they are). The experience of
P-colour, the colour a surface presents when viewed from a particular location and under a
particular lighting condition, is a different sort of case. From the perspective of a conscious
perceiver, there is no transparent connection between this aspect of colour phenomenology
and possibilities for bodily movement. Noë (2004) thus suggests that P-colour experience is
accounted for by a subpersonal (for which we can read subdoxastic) variety of sensorimotor
mastery (p. 140). Since I am attempting to offer a maximally coherent reconstruction of the
sensorimotor theory, I will take it that this is accounted for by Sensorimotor Attunement.
This brings to the fore an important difference between Sensorimotor Attunement
and Sensorimotor Understanding. When I attempted to do justice to O&N’s notion of
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Sensorimotor Attunement, I noted that there was more than one way the theory could
propose we identify the specific SMCs to which a perceiver is presently attuned when she
exercises the relevant behavioural capacity. I suggested that one option is to endorse a
Dennett-style interpretative stance and identify the SMCs by appeal to a combination of
teleology or proximal goal and present behaviour. I went on to endorse a more austere
alternative in which we suppose that a goal-directed agent masters a given set of SMCs if she
responds differentially to them in her behaviour, regardless of whether or not one could
identify what the SMCs are by running the interpretative stance.
In this event, the agent does not have to know or represent what the SMCs are, she
merely has to discriminate them. This is compatible with the suggestion that conscious
perceivers do not have cognitive access to the SMCs involved in P-colour. This contrasts,
however, with the conscious Sensorimotor Understanding that applies to P-shape, location
and movement. In this case, where we do have the option of running a behavioural test to see
if a subject possesses Sensorimotor Understanding, the subject in some sense consciously
knows what the SMCs are, because the SMCs themselves, and not just discrimination of the
SMCs, are identifiable from the subject’s behavioural repertoire - e.g., she is going to the left,
she wants to face the object head on, so she has mastered the fact that going to the left will
result in facing the object head on.
To conclude this section, I will attend to some interesting remarks by Glock (2008)
on the subject of animal thought. In the piece, Glock attempts to tread a middle path between
lingualism, which claims that non-human animals lack thought altogether because they lack
language, and the mentalist claim that animal thought differs from human thought only in
degree and not kind. Although this is a quite different topic to the one that concerns us here,
it chimes with Noë’s (2012) stated ambition of accounting for continuities between thought
in humans and other animals, and between non-linguistic thought and sensorimotor skills in
mature humans. Glock criticises Searle (1994), who claims that the best way to identify
whether or not an animal is conscious is to identify neurophysiological features correlated
with consciousness and check whether the animal possesses them or not. Glock points out
that this only works if you have a way to test outwardly observable behaviour for
consciousness in the first place. Even once you have identified the relevant features in one
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species, there is no guarantee that another species which also possesses those features is also
conscious purely because it also possesses them. Glock’s solution to the question of animal
minds is to focus on capacities that can be manifested in behaviour instead. The capacities in
question are not mere dispositions to discriminate one object from another, but more flexible
abilities, for example, to respond to distinct objects differently in one situation but not
another, and to correct mistakes. The idea is not that thoughts reduce to certain behavioural
dispositions, but that they ought only to be ascribed on the basis of them.
In the case of human perceptual consciousness, the problem is different. There is no
need to concern ourselves with the question of whether or not other humans enjoy perceptual
consciousness. But a question does arise with regard to what perception consists of. It is
possible that the only thing which would licence us to claim that a particular
neurophysiological state gives rise to perceptual consciousness is its being correlated with a
behaviour too. As I have suggested here, that is behaviour meeting a certain set of conditions
described as Sensorimotor Understanding. This is an epistemic motivation for ascribing
perceptual skills on the basis of behavioural capacities.
However, there is a deeper motivation, which is the possibility that perception just is a
capacity for skillful bodily interaction with the environment. There is no default reason for
thinking this claim fares any worse than the claim that perception is constituted by the
activation of an inner world model. If the capacity claim is true, we get the benefit of a direct
realist account of phenomenal qualities, which I mentioned in section 3.6 in the discussion of
ECM, as well as the epistemic benefit of a non-mysterious way to explain how physical states
and processes give rise to perceptual consciousness. In the next chapter, I claim that
sensorimotor theory can enjoy partial success as an account of phenomenal qualities even if
the present view fails. In chapter 6, I defend the claim that perception is constituted by the
possession and exercise of a set of behavioural capacities.
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5 - Phenomenal Character: A Sensorimotor-Representation Hybrid
The next two chapters address a response made by Clark (2008) to the sensorimotor account
in which he claims that perception plausibly consists of the construction and deployment of
representations standing in for types, categories and relative locations, and not the exercise of
sensorimotor skill. In chapter 6, I pursue some more radical claims arising from the view of
Sensorimotor Understanding as a set of conditions that behaviour must meet, and the
attendant possibility that perception does not involve representation at all. In this chapter,
however, I explore a response by the sensorimotor theory to a worst case scenario in which it is
established that perception does depend on representation, and not on behavioural capacities.
I argue that even in this event, the sensorimotor theory has the ability to provide a tenable,
compelling account of phenomenal qualities. This chapter is structured as follows. In the first
section, I outline a criticism levelled by Clark (2008) again the sensorimotor theory. In the
second section, I propose a line of response that could be adopted by a conservative rendering
of the sensorimotor approach. In the third section, I examine an apparent problem for this
response, and explain how it can be overcome. In the fourth section, I offer further reasons to
endorse the sensorimotor account of phenomenal qualities. In the fifth section, I examine the
relation between sensorimotor theory and Rupert’s (2011) model of the ‘massively
representational mind’.
5.1 - TheNon-Sensorimotor, Skill-Based Approach
In a critical response to the sensorimotor theory, Clark (2008) endorses, in broad outline, an
approach to perceptual consciousness which he suggests is both more plausible than the
sensorimotor account, and incompatible with its key claims. Clark’s preferred approach in
part comprises a philosophical approach to phenomenal qualities or ‘qualia’, which he argues
are properly accounted for by the perceiver’s exercise of ‘epistemic’ skills and not the
sensorimotor skills that Noë and O’Regan appeal to. The approach also comprises an
empirically-oriented account of the cognitive processing that underlies perceptual
consciousness. Drawing in particular on Milner and Goodale’s work on dorsal and ventral
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stream perception (e.g., Milner and Goodale, 1995), Clark suggests that the empirical
evidence demonstrates that conscious perception is not primarily the result of a sensorimotor
process. I will begin by outlining Clark’s preferred approach to phenomenal qualities, and
subsequently move on to his claims about cognitive processing.
Skill-based accounts of phenomenal quality propose a way to account naturalistically
for the phenomenal qualities featured in perceptual consciousness, for example the look of red.
On this approach, a given phenomenal quality is accounted for by nothing more or less than
the subject’s ability to skillfully discriminate, in some relevant way, a feature of the
environment associated with the quality from other features they have the ability to
consciously perceive. One such account is offered by Pettit (2003). As Pettit notes, traditional
accounts imply that a subject’s capacity to discriminate one property from another is merely
the contingent outcome of a difference in phenomenal look. Conversely, skill-based accounts
claim that there is nothing more to experiencing a given phenomenal look than exercising the
associated discriminatory capacity. In Pettit’s examples, you exercise these capacities in making
judgements, for instance that an object is red, or a brighter shade of red than some other
object, as well as in bodily behaviour, for example reaching out appropriately to catch a
fast-moving ball. An object looking a particular shade of red to you is, on this view, no more
than it looking to you like you can discriminate it in an appropriate way from other shades of
red, and other colours, and so forth. Presuming that there is no fundamental obstacle to
describing the exercise of these capacities for discrimination in physicalistic vocabulary, there
is no deep-seated obstacle on this approach to understanding phenomenal qualities
physicalistically.
Clark takes it that the sensorimotor theory is itself a skill-based approach. On most
ways of understanding the account this is true, although we must take care to be clear on why
this is so. The sensorimotor approach proposes that the look of red, like other phenomenal
qualities, is properly accounted for by a sensorimotor law, which is a systematic way that sense
input signals originating from a relevant object change in line with movements and varying
ambient lighting conditions (e.g., Noë, 2004). One way to understand the concept of
sensorimotor law, therefore, is to think of it as something that can be described solely by
reference to counterfactual conditionals of the form ‘if the subject moved like this, sense input
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would change like this’ (suggested by Noë, 2004). So understood, sensorimotor laws comprise
what Burhmann, Di Paolo and Barandiaran (2013) describe as the subject’s sensorimotor
environment. These laws have a motor output to sense input direction of fit, since they
characterise how sense input will change in line with given movements, but do not describe
how the subject will move given particular sense inputs. So understood, sensorimotor laws
may, in principle, be sufficient to explain degrees of similarity and difference between specific
phenomenal qualities where it is assumed that the subject is in some appropriate way sensitive
to those sensorimotor laws. But they could not explain how a perceiver can be in conscious
states characterised by those qualities, considering that the relevant counterfactual
conditionals might be true even if the perceiver was dead, or their brain were made of jelly
(etc.).
To explain how perceivers do come to be in the relevant conscious states, the
sensorimotor approach posits that in some way or another we master sensorimotor laws.
Depending on how we construe the notion, mastery of the sensorimotor environment could
include internal representations of counterfactual conditionals, perhaps even propositional
knowledge, without necessarily calling on any bodily skills whatsoever. As it happens, however,
most versions of the sensorimotor account individuate phenomenal qualities by reference only
to patterns of counterfactual dependence that the perceiver manifests a sensitivity to in their
bodily movements.16 Burhmann, Di Paolo and Barandiaran (2013) characterise the
perceiver’s repertoire of bodily responses in a given sensorimotor environment through what
they term a sensorimotor habitat, which this time comprises the movements the perceiver
makes in line with given sense inputs and the changes in sense input that follow. The need to
refer to a perceiver’s sensorimotor habitat and not just their sensorimotor environment is
evident in O&N and O’Regan (2011), regardless of their further appeal to higher-order
16 Noë (2010) actually denies that the sensorimotor theory is a skill-based approach, on the
ground that perception depends on understanding SMCs rather than merely being able to
skillfully discriminate them. However, the frequent invocation of sensorimotor ‘skill’ invites a
reading in which the sensorimotor theory is a skill-based approach. This reflects the tension
between competing directions of fit I discussed in section 4.2. Since I concluded that
Sensorimotor Understanding ought to be thought of as depending on knowing how to act as
well as knowing what would happen given possible movements, I think it appropriate to
consider the sensorimotor theory a skill-based approach.
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tracking of those bodily interactions. Noë (2004) does not say anything explicit to suggest that
a perceiver can only be conscious of sensorimotor laws featured in their sensorimotor habitat.
However, the claim is not explicitly retracted in Noë’s (2004) solo account. At times, Noë
attempts to avoid endorsing an unduly strong link between perception and action, and in
particular denies that you necessarily have to be moving your body right now in order to see.
This does not compromise the suggestion that you can only have perceptual experiences
characterised by SMCs featured in your sensorimotor habitat, so long as we take the
sensorimotor habitat only to characterise ways you are disposed to skillfully interact.
Clark agrees that phenomenal qualities should be explained by reference to the
exercise of skills. However, instead of appealing to bodily responsiveness to patterns of
sensorimotor dependence, his favoured account appeals to personal-level responsiveness in
reasoning and action planning to categories, types and locations. He takes it that ‘epistemic’
skills of this sort either do not call upon capacities for bodily movement, or at least do not do
solely call upon such capacities, and are distinct from the bodily skills appealed to by the
sensorimotor theory. To keep things unambiguous, I will describe epistemic skills, as Clark
understands them, as ‘non-sensorimotor’ skills, leaving the designator ‘epistemic’ neutral on
whether or not the skills in question are identical to capacities for bodily movement.
Importantly, Clark argues that sensorimotor and non-sensorimotor skill-based accounts of
phenomenal qualities share a common explanatory virtue when it comes to accounting for
phenomenal qualities non-mysteriously; indeed, nothing he says is intended to call into doubt
the view that the sensorimotor and non-sensorimotor skill-based accounts are, in principle,
equally well-suited for resisting the claim that phenomenal qualities cannot be accounted for
naturalistically. This makes it plausible that Clark thinks the appeal to skills is enough to solve
this problem without even getting into the question of whether they are sensorimotor or not.
His objection to sensorimotor theory, by contrast, is that it provides an implausible account of
the capacities that are, as a matter of fact, deployed in perceptual consciousness.
Clark’s objection partly reflects a complaint that the sensorimotor theory is untenably
committed to supposing that the range of phenomenal qualities featured in an agent’s
perceptual awareness is no less fine-grained than the discriminations evident in the agent’s
most finely sensitive bodily behaviour. This commitment is a consequence of the
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sensorimotor theory’s claim that two perceivers could only share identical perceptual
phenomenology if they are identically embodied. O&N, for example, say: “For two systems to
have the same knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies all the way down, they will have to
have bodies that are identical all the way down” (p. 1015), with a similar claim appearing in
Noë (2004).
In fact, it is not apparent that the sensorimotor theory has any essential need to make
the claim. Logically-speaking, the sensorimotor version of the skill-based view only needs to
say that for every difference in phenomenal quality there is a corresponding difference in the
bidirectional patterns of dependence between input and output featured in the perceiver’s
skill-driven bodily interactions. It need not make the inverse claim that every discrimination
manifest in an agent’s behaviour must be reflected in the phenomenal character of their
perceptual consciousness. The sensorimotor theory faces pressure to say that the input-output
patterns relevant to perceptual experience are very fine-grained in order to avoid an objection
levelled by Block (2001). Block’s charge is that the sensorimotor theory must claim that a
rudimentary machine, differently embodied but manifesting comparable input-output
relations, undergoes human-style perceptual experience. O&N’s reply is that sameness of
perceptual experience depends on sameness in fine-grained input-output relations, which
themselves depend on being embodied in a particular way. However, they need not have
claimed that sameness of embodiment is required all the way down. The sensorimotor theory
could respond to the charge just as well by claiming that two perceivers must be embodied in a
sufficiently similar way in order to enjoy identical perceptual experiences.
If Clark’s view were merely that we should account for qualia by appealing to
coarse-grained bodily skills, it would not be inconsistent with the most indispensable
commitments of the sensorimotor theory. More seriously, however, his comments imply that
the relevant capacities may not be bodily capacities at all. The capacity to reason, certainly,
does not on the face of it appear to be a bodily skill, and nor does the capacity to plan an
action if this is taken to mean choosing an action rather than actually performing it. Clark
bases his response largely on empirical work, which he alleges shows that perceptual
consciousness is not realised by sensorimotor coupling but a process involving the deployment
of internal representations that are in large part unaffected by occurrences at the sensorimotor
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periphery.
In particular, he cites Milner and Goodale’s (1995) dual systems account of vision.
According to the dual systems model, the brain’s dorsal stream is associated with a visual
system responsible for fine-grained sensorimotor coupling but not conscious visual awareness.
Clark does not raise any objection to describing this bodily behaviour as the exercise of
sensorimotor mastery, and we can plausibly take this activity to be identical to the activity
characterised as the lowest tier of sensorimotor mastery in O’Regan’s (2011) multi-tier
sensorimotor account. The other visual system is realised primarily by activity in the ventral
stream, and is alleged by Clark to enable coarser-grained “reasoning, choice and action
selection” (Clark, 2008, p. 190), a description which is strikingly akin to the “planning,
decisions, or other rational behaviour” (O’Regan, 2011, p. 121) featured in the second of
O’Regan’s four tiers. Clark argues that ventral stream activity is not sensorimotor mastery but
involves the deployment of representations that, in line with the epistemic skill-based
approach to qualia, stand-in for attributes such as “categories, types, and relative locations” (p.
192), optimised for the exercise of epistemic skills, i.e. to enable to person to “sift, sort, select,
identify, compare, recall, imagine and reason” (p. 192).
In this vein, Clark says: “[T]he best functional and architectural explanation,
according to Milner, Goodale, and others, is that conscious perceptual experience reflects the
activation of representations that have less to do with the fine details of world-engaging
sensorimotor loops and more to do with the need to assign inputs to categories, types, and
relative locations” (p. 192). The role of representation here needs to be treated with care.
O’Regan (2011) explicitly denies that conscious states can be adequately accounted for by
reference to the ‘activation’ of representations, a locution featured in the Clark quote above,
on the ground that accounts of this sort cannot adequately explain why the conscious states in
question have one phenomenal character rather than another. Clark appears to endorse
O’Regan’s view, at least insofar as he endorses a skill-based account of phenomenal qualities
and not, for instance, an account that says phenomenal qualities are accounted for directly by
the content of the purported representations (cf., Tye, 2000). Being mindful of this, Clark’s
view ought to agree that it is not just the ‘activation’ of a representation, but the contribution
the representation thereby makes to the exercise of the relevant personal-level skillful activities
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like sorting and sifting that contributes to an explanation of phenomenal qualities. At the
subpersonal explanatory level, it is an open question how a given ventral stream representation
contributes to the exercise of personal-level skill. An explanation here may appeal to some
combination of its content, its functional role within a given system, and that system’s
functional role in the wider cognitive economy. Whichever features an endorser of this
approach appeals to, they must explain what contribution these features make to the exercise
of a personal-level ability to skillfully discriminate aspects of the visual environment.
In the discussion that follows, I will describe the account of perception and
phenomenal qualities that Clark endorses as the non-sensorimotor, skill-based approach. The
approach is framed by Clark as a chapter-long response to the sensorimotor theory rather than
a developed account of perception, but in broad terms it advocates a number of positive claims
about visual processing and the phenomenal qualities that characterise visual consciousness.
The account’s claims can be summarised as follows: (i) There are two visual systems, which
operate in the way described above; (ii) Ventral stream vision deploys representations that
represent properties like type and location rather than sensorimotor law; (iii) The ventral
stream deploys these representations in the course of enabling the exercise of skillful capacities
like sorting, sifting, classifying, selecting and others, which for shorthand I will refer to just as
sorting and sifting; (iv) The properties sorted and sifted are not sensorimotor laws, but types,
categories and locations; (v) The appeal to sorting and sifting offers, in principle, a
non-mysterious, physicalistic account of the phenomenal qualities associated with conscious
perception; (vi) Sorting and sifting are not sensorimotor skills. They are realised by
subpersonal systems which are, to a significant degree, informationally encapsulated from the
operation of the dorsal stream and motor output systems. This enables them also to be largely
insensitive to the fine-grained morphological characteristics of the agent’s body.
5.2 - The Policy of Containment: AConservative Response
Clark (2008) suggests that the sensorimotor approach to phenomenal qualities enters the
running alongside competing skill-based accounts that share the explanatory benefit gained by
appealing to skills, but lack what he regards as the undue insistence that the skills in question
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are necessarily sensorimotor. His response to the sensorimotor account in that chapter is not
primarily concerned with phenomenal qualities, however, but with the character of the
cognitive processing that realises perceptual consciousness. He argues that the empirical
evidence concerning ventral stream perception challenges the sensorimotor account by
indicating that perceptual consciousness supervenes on internal states, in particular
representations, that stand-in for categories, types and locations rather than sensorimotor
contingencies.
To respond, the sensorimotor theory could adopt an approach I will call the Policy of
Containment. The response aims to contain Clark’s criticisms by restricting the explanatory
role played by law-governed sensorimotor interactions to one domain, while asserting that the
evidential force of the empirical work Clark cites is restricted to another. Specifically, it
contends that the appeal to sensorimotor coupling is not meant to characterise cognition in
humans, but solely to account for the phenomenal qualities that feature in perceptual
consciousness. As an account of qualia, the sensorimotor approach enters one classic debate,
prompted by philosophers like Jackson (1982) and Chalmers (1996), over whether
phenomenal qualities are an intelligible part of the physical world. Assuming that phenomenal
qualities are physical, it also enters mainstream debates over what sort of physical qualities
they are, included in which is the question of which characteristics make one phenomenal
quality different from another. On this latter set of questions, the approach enters the field
alongside the accounts offered, for example, by Tye (2000), who proposes that phenomenal
qualities reduce to representational content; Block (1996), who suggests they reduce to some
non-representational neural property; and Pettit (2003), who, in common with sensorimotor
theory, offers a skill-based account.
It is important to emphasise that it is not obvious, pretheoretically at least, that an
account can address the above topics simultaneous to characterising the cognitive processing
that underlies perceptual consciousness. Tye addresses cognition and phenomenal qualities at
once, since he proposes that phenomenal qualities are individuated and reduced to the
physical by reference to the content of neurally-realised representations, and thereby overtly
commits himself to the existence of internal representations in cognition. Clark’s account also
appears to suggest that there is a one-to-one mapping between the properties represented
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subpersonally by the ventral stream and the properties skillfully discriminated in conscious
perception. Despite this apparent mapping, however, Clark appeals to quite different things
respectively to explain phenomenal qualities and cognition. In the former case, it is the
exercise of personal-level skills; in the latter, the activation of representations. In this respect,
Clark’s account is quite different to Tye’s.
On the gloss endorsed by the Policy of Containment, the sensorimotor theory is open
to endorsing an account of cognition along the lines of the one advocated by Clark (2008), in
particular the claim that visual consciousness is realised by representations that stand in for
categories and types. In this respect, the theory endorses a traditional representational
approach, although it emphasises that cognitive processing is importantly scaffolded by bodily
exploration, a claim which does not conflict with Clark’s characterisation of ventral stream
vision. To account for phenomenal qualities, however, the sensorimotor theory suggests that
we need only focus on regularities in the agent’s skill-driven sensorimotor coupling, avoiding
altogether the more opaque territory of the brain. On this reading, the theory can be regarded
as a kind of sui generis hybrid between traditional and radically embodied accounts of mind.
The success of this approach depends on showing that there is no incompatibility between its
respective accounts of phenomenal qualities and cognitive processing, and, additionally, that
there are positive reasons to endorse its account of phenomenal qualities. I address these
considerations in turn in the next sections.
5.3 - AChallenge to the Policy of Containment
The dual visual systems account offers one lens through which to understand O’Regan’s
(2011) claim that conscious perception involves a second-order tracking of the regularities
manifest in the perceiver’s sensorimotor coupling. We can plausibly suppose that the
second-order tracking O’Regan describes is carried out by the ventral stream, which, as Clark
contends, fails to play a consistently fluid role in the perceiver’s ongoing sensorimotor
engagements. The object of the tracking is the bodily coupling that comprises the lowest of
O’Regan’s hierarchically-organised tiers, and this is plausibly modulated by the dorsal stream.
Although Noë (2004) fails to say much about perception at the descriptive level employed by
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cognitive science, the conscious sensorimotor understanding featured in his account could
itself conceivably be the outcome of the same second-order tracking. The Policy of
Containment endorses this picture, but proposes that phenomenal qualities are accounted for
by the sensorimotor coupling rather than the second-order tracking.
Notwithstanding its explanatory virtues, this account of phenomenal qualities may
fail to persuade if it is not tightly integrated into the sensorimotor account of visual processing.
In the next two sections, I examine different versions of the same problem and suggest ways
the sensorimotor approach can respond. The drawbacks all follow from the apparent role
played by the second-order tracking. As I observed in chapters 3 and 4, the variety of
sensorimotor mastery deployed in conscious perception - either Sensorimotor Tracking or
Sensorimotor Understanding - is not fully developed by the original statements of the
sensorimotor theory. The authors explain what the mastery is mastery of, namely SMCs, and
claim that it is practical and not propositional (O&N; Noë, 2004). Noë (2004; 2012) also
discusses its phenomenology at length. However, neither Noë nor O’Regan offer a clear
proposal about how this sensorimotor mastery is realised at the descriptive levels employed by
cognitive science or neuroscience. The absence of an explicit proposal about how
sensorimotor mastery is physically realised is problematic. Firstly, it entails, straightforwardly,
an explanatory limitation: the sensorimotor approach, on the present understanding, comes
with no clear naturalistic account of what it is for perceivers to be intentionally-directed
toward the objects of conscious perception. Moreover, it invites the view that the
sensorimotor account must appeal to internal representation, a reading endorsed by
commentators such as Roberts (2010) and Hutto and Myin (2012). From this, all sorts of
question follow about the nature of the representations and the explanatory work that they
properly do.
5.3.1 - TheWAYproblem
The suggestion that perception involves representation invites a broad threat to the Policy of
Containment, namely the charge that perceptual consciousness, in particular the phenomenal
qualities that characterise it, must be accounted for not by the law-like patterns of dependence
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that govern the perceiver’s sensorimotor engagements, but by properties of the representations
themselves. In dialogue with O’Regan, Block makes the following point:
In having a cognitive appreciation of a law involving inputs and outputs, one has to think of or
represent those inputs and outputs in some WAY. A machine or a creature from outer space
might be able to think of human inputs and outputs in WAYS that do not involve any conscious
experience. Alternatively, the WAY might itself be phenomenal—say if our cognitive
appreciation is coded in imagery. Given that cognition cannot grasp anything without grasping it
in some WAY, the appeal to COGNIZING in explaining sensory qualities smuggles in the very
notion that is supposed to be explained. (O’Regan and Block, 2012)
This is a fairly broad point, from which we might identify various specific problems. I will
discuss two of them in the remainder of this passage, and a third in the section that follows.
One of Block’s complaints is that there are ways of representing sensorimotor
contingencies that do not involve consciousness, meaning that an appeal to nothing more
than the representation of sensorimotor contingencies cannot be sufficient to account for the
existence of consciousness. This is a limitation that the sensorimotor theory can and should
accept, given that certain other conditions must be in place for an agent to be conscious at all.
O’Regan (2011) asserts that consciousness requires the functional realisation of a faculty
described as the self, while Noë (2004) expresses sympathy toward the view that consciousness
is connected somehow to life; and there may be distinct proposals about consciousness that
are equally compatible with the sensorimotor approach. While offering some such
background conditions for perceptual awareness is no small task, it is not obvious that an
account of perception and the phenomenal character of perceptual consciousness is
committed to offering a fully-developed answer to this broader question. With the
assumption that appropriate background conditions are in place, the sensorimotor theorist
can claim not just that sensorimotor contingencies explain differences and similarities in
phenomenal quality, but, more fundamentally, that it is by virtue of representations of
sensorimotor contingencies that there are, in general, such things as phenomenal qualities at
all.
More seriously, Block’s objection suggests that once you have accounted for the
presence of conscious qualities by appeal to the representation of some feature, the
127
explanatory weight is borne by some property of the representation other than what it
represents - making any proposal about the particular properties represented a dispensable
feature of the account. To assume this suggestion is correct without further argument would
be a prejudice. Developing the criticism, if it is not the representation’s extension that does the
explanatory work, it might be an intrinsic property of the neural vehicle that could inhere
even if that vehicle lacked other properties, in particular extrinsic ones, by virtue of which it
bears representational content.
Block pursues this line of argument elsewhere in an argument against
representationalism about phenomenal qualities. In a thought experiment similar to
Davidson’s Swampman (1987), Block (1998) imagines that an atom-for-atom duplicate of
himself appears, by pure chance, which lacks the causal history needed to possess
content-bearing inner states. The duplicate nonetheless undergoes the same phenomenal
states, suggesting it cannot be content that yields the phenomenal state. Transposing this
objection to the sensorimotor theory, Block imagines a neural duplicate of himself that lacks
the relevant ongoing or historical sensorimotor interactions but enjoys identical phenomenal
states (O’Regan and Block, 2012). Assuming that this is possible, the scenario appears to
suggest that ongoing or historical sensorimotor interactions themselves cannot explain
phenomenal qualities, because the neural duplicate does not have them. Similarly, the neural
duplicate’s brain cannot track or represent the appropriate sensorimotor laws, again because
there are no sensorimotor interactions to track or represent.
The sensorimotor theory, on a dynamical systems approach, could respond that
duplicating the necessary neural states depends on duplicating the appropriate sensorimotor
interactions, as we saw in chapter 3. However, the present aim is to defend a more
conservative version of the sensorimotor theory that cannot make use of this argument.
Another possible response is to endorse disjunctivism, the claim that veridical perceptual
experiences are a different kind of state to non-veridical experiences like hallucinations, even if
they are phenomenologically indistinguishable. The disjunctivist response would claim that
since the duplicates’ states differ in kind, with one undergoing a perceptual state and the other
something else, we are entitled to provide a distinct explanation for each. This response may
fail to convince, however, on the ground that the sensorimotor account of phenomenal
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qualities is not meant to explain perception itself, but the phenomenal character common to
both the perceptual and the non-perceptual states.
It is perhaps for this reason that O’Regan endorses a different kind of response. He
replies that the neural duplicates share a pertinent feature, but, contra Block, that this is not
some set of intrinsic neural properties. The pertinent feature is, instead, the fact that the
duplicates’ brains are each in the state they would ordinarily be in if they possessed the
relevant ongoing or historical sensorimotor interactions (O’Regan and Block, 2012). This line
of response is insufficient to defend the radical claim that the vehicle of perceptual
consciousness extends into the outside environment - notably, it is less robust than the
argument offered by Hurley (1998) for ECM, which I discussed in section 3.6. But O’Regan’s
argument is itself sufficient to defend the claim that a proper explanation of conscious
qualities must make reference to features of the outside environment.
5.3.2 - Sense and Sensorimotor Contingencies
On a more interesting reading of the WAY objection, phenomenal qualities are not explained
by the extension of the representations, but their intensional content, which the empirical
work on the ventral stream perception perhaps suggests is likely not to represent the relevant
properties as laws of sensorimotor contingency. In this section, with special attention to Tye
(2000), I will respond to this worry.
The clearest way to explain the distinction between intension and extension is by
reference to the appearance it makes in theories of linguistic meaning. In the standard Fregean
example, the terms ‘morning star’ and ‘evening star’ share an extension, because they both pick
out Venus. However, when we first learn that they pick out the same thing, we learn
something new. This is explained by the fact that they differ in intension, an attribute of
meaning sometimes described as a mode of presentation. A term’s intension is often
understood to be a set of truth conditions, although the intension could also be some other
feature that meets the requirement of explaining how statements of identity between
co-referential terms can be informative. The distinction between intension and extension can
also be applied to non-linguistic forms of representation, including internal representation at
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the explanatory level employed by cognitive science.
An opponent of the sensorimotor theory might concede that for every difference in
phenomenal quality there is a corresponding difference in the pattern of sensorimotor
dependence governing your bodily interactions with the object perceived. In so far as this
holds true, they might say, phenomenal qualities can be individuated by reference to
sensorimotor laws. Nonetheless, the objection continues, it is merely incidental that
differences in look are accompanied by differences in sensorimotor dependence. The feature
that truly explains a tomato’s looking red rather than blue, for instance, is not this
unextraordinary feature of the extension, but the intension under which the tomato is
represented. The intension may not specify that you stand in a particular relation of
sensorimotor dependence to the tomato, but instead that you are looking at an object with a
particular set of intrinsic properties, or that you are looking at some object which falls under
the descriptor ‘red’. To secure an absolute victory over the sensorimotor account, an endorser
of this line of response must show that the ventral stream, for instance, represents objects
under intensions that determinately do not specify patterns of sensorimotor dependence.
The force of this objection will depend on further technical details about the
representational content featured in our account of visual consciousness. As it happens, there
is at least one leading representationalist account of phenomenal quality pre-existing the
sensorimotor account under which intension poses no threat to sensorimotor theory.
Although the account offered by Tye (2000) is superficially quite different from the
sensorimotor theory, the variety of representational content he endorses makes a good fit, as it
will emerge, with the account of phenomenal qualities offered by the particular reading of
sensorimotor theory I am pursuing for the time being. In the remainder of this section, I will
focus on Tye’s account in order to explain how it defuses the threat posed by intension to the
sensorimotor account.
The accounts offered by Clark (2008) and Tye resemble each other inasmuch as they
both endorse an important role for internal representation in accounting for cognition and
phenomenal character. Tye, however, is not directly interested in the details of human
cognition, but in using representational content to account for the latter. Where Clark argues
that representations enable the exercise of epistemic skills, which themselves account for
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phenomenal character, Tye accounts for phenomenal character directly by appeal to the
content of the representations. In the apparent converse of Clark’s position, Tye ascribes an
enabling role to epistemic skills, suggesting that to feature in perceptual consciousness, the
representational content must be poised to impact on beliefs and desires. These positions
appear to come apart quite considerably, although I will argue later that Clark’s account lapses
into something close to Tye’s than appearances at first suggest.
Tye’s account of representational content is in some ways straightforward. His
account of content appeals to no more than a simple co-variance relation between aspects of
the brain and environment. He suggests that a neural structure bears content about some
feature of the environment just in case it is ordinarily present when and only when that
feature of the environment is present. Content in Tye’s account is individuated
externalistically. To understand this point, recall from earlier Putnam’s (1975) classic
distinction between internalism and externalism about content. The former denotes that
content is fixed entirely by features inside the subject’s skin. The latter denotes that it is fixed
by properties of the extension. To identify which account is correct, we use a thought
experiment featuring physically identical inhabitants of superficially identical planets, Earth
and Twin Earth. On Earth, the clear liquid that comes up of taps, fills lakes, and so forth, is
H2O. Twin Earth is identical in every respect, except the substance bearing the same
superficial features is a different chemical, XYZ. If physical duplicates living respectively on
Earth and Twin Earth mean different things when they say ‘water’, then externalism is true; if
they mean the same thing, then internalism is true. And the same distinction can be applied to
subpersonal content. On Tye’s account, then, a neural state represents water if it is ordinarily
present when and only when water is present, and it represents H2O rather than XYZ on
account of the properties that water happens to actually have.
Suppose that you see a red object, and your brain represents it as falling under the
designator ‘red’. Further suppose that being confronted by a red object is the same as standing
in a bodily relation to the environment where particular patterns of sensorimotor dependence
obtain. If externalism is true, then it may follow that the representational content includes
this pattern of sensorimotor dependence. However, this suggestion will not by itself serve well
enough as a defence of the sensorimotor theory. Even if intension is determined by properties
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of the extension, externalism in itself does not require that the intension is determined by
every property of the extension. Tye is motivated to endorse intensional content in the first
place in part by the need to account for the fact that we may be aware in perceptual experience
of some properties of the extension, but not all. In his example, we might see a vegetable as
purple, but not see it as poisonous, even in a possible world where all purple things are
poisonous. Intension is needed to account for this, since if all purple things were poisonous,
the expressions ‘purple object’ and ‘poisonous object’ would be coextensive.
To see how the sensorimotor account can be defended, we need to look further at
Tye’s account. Tye endorses a distinction between phenomenal and epistemic uses of the
word ‘looks’. He argues that the distinction is in evidence in everyday discourse about
perceptual states when we talk, at times, about an object ‘looking F to S’ and, at other times,
about an object ‘looking as if it is an F to S’. The former locution describes the phenomenal
character of a person’s perceptual awareness, while the latter describes the person’s epistemic
state. On this account, to say something like ‘the shape looks as if it is a trapezoid to Jim’
implies that Jim has the concept TRAPEZOID, and believes the object he is looking at falls
under that concept. Tye implies that this is neither necessary nor sufficient for us to truly say
‘the shape looks trapezoid to Jim’, a locution which implies, distinctly, that a trapezoid shape
is part of the phenomenal character of Jim’s perceptual consciousness. Endorsing this
distinction allows Tye to suggest that when we talk about looks we are at least sometimes
talking about phenomenal character and not epistemic situation. On Tye’s account, the shape
may look, phenomenally, trapezoid to Jim even if Jim does not possess the concept
TRAPEZOID, because the phenomenal look is accounted for by the non-conceptual content
of his perceptual representations. Tye’s motivation for focusing on what we say, or are entitled
to say, about the way things look to some third person is, presumably, intended as a way to (1)
make it plausible that there is such a thing as a phenomenal look which is not to be glossed in
terms of conceptual content and (2) discuss the alleged non-conceptual content of perceptual
consciousness without attributing the concepts in question to the subject.
Tye describes epistemic ‘looks’ ascriptions as requiring hyperintensionality. Where
regular intension allows coextensional expressions to have different contents, hyperintension
allows cointensional expressions to have different contents. Hyperintension is needed on the
132
ground that two terms have the same intension so long as they have the same extension by
metaphysical or logical necessity. Thus ‘H2O’ and ‘water’ share an intension, as do ‘552’ and
‘3025’. These cases are different to the ‘morning star’ and ‘evening star’ case, since the shared
extensions must be shared in every possible world, while there is a possible world in which
‘morning star’ and ‘evening star’ have the intensions they do on this world but are not
coextensional, entailing that you are finding out something particular about our world when
you learn that they share an identity. The same applies to ‘purple object’ and ‘poisonous
object’ in Tye’s possible world. Nothing turns on whether or not cases where hyperintension
is allegedly required cannot, in fact, more accurately be described as instances requiring a
variety of plain old intension. It will suffice if we agree that the supposed
hyperintension-involving cases are, at least, a distinctive subset of cases involving intension,
and I will therefore describe them as involving ‘hyperintension’ to designate that they belong
at a minimum to this special subset, and use ‘intension’ to describe cases that do not fall under
this subset.
Tye argues that the representational content that accounts for phenomenal character
is nonconceptual. This reflects the distinction about what we mean in epistemic and
phenomenal ‘looks’ contexts. Crediting Dretske for the example, Tye offers a case in which
you see a man in a police uniform, but fail to recognise that he is a policeman. Nothing is
strange, Tye observes, about the contention that the man could nonetheless be truly said to
look phenomenally to you the way a policeman looks. This lends apparent support to the
claim that epistemic and phenomenal looks attributions come apart, and suggests that in the
phenomenal case, you need not possess the concept POLICEMAN. If it is indeed appropriate
to explain phenomenal look by reference to representational content, then the content in
question must therefore be nonconceptual.
Importantly, Tye takes it that the nonconceptual content of perceptual experience
cannot be hyperintensional. His argument, which he puts briefly, is that this follows from the
fact that hyperintension depends on having “conceptual modes of presentation” (2000, p. 57)
which are lacking in the case of nonconceptual content. It is not straightforwardly evident
from Tye’s discussion why hyperintensional content must be conceptual, but the milder kind
of intension that Tye holds is characteristic of nonconceptual content need not be. However,
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the view is compelling in light of the following thought, which is perhaps what he has in mind.
In the scenario mentioned above, PURPLE OBJECT and POISONOUS OBJECT are
co-extensive, because on Earth it just so happens that all purple objects are poisonous, and all
poisonous objects are purple. Since the concepts are co-extensive, we cannot identify any
physical differences in the way a subject responds to a poisonous object and the way they
respond to a purple object. However, we can conceive of a counterfactual circumstance in
which the concepts are not co-extensive, and hypothesise that the subject’s brain would
continue to respond in the relevant way to purple objects that were not poisonous, while
failing to respond in the relevant way to poisonous objects that were not purple. The
intension is then fixed by the aspect of the extension that the subject’s brain reliably responds
to, not just now, but in other physically possible circumstances. We cannot, however, make
the same move for cases in which the identity is logically or metaphysically necessary, as with
water and H2O, since it is not coherent to hypothesise about how a subject would respond to
H2O that was not water, a scenario that is impossible and perhaps even inconceivable. In the
absence of any other readily apparent options for locating hyperintensional nonconceptual
content, the only means available to master hyperintensional ‘H2O’ and ‘water’ modes of
presentation appears to be by using concepts.
Tye notes therefore that on his account, an object’s looking phenomenally red is
identical to its looking like an object characterised by the physical properties which constitute
being red; as Tye supposes, looking “disposed to reflect such-and-such percentages of light of
so-and-so wavelengths” (2000, p. 55). This makes Tye’s representationalism quite compatible
with the sensorimotor theory’s present gloss. On this view, we can take it that second-order
tracking of sensorimotor laws involves the activation of representations of the sort described
by Tye. In supplement, we merely add that the physical properties represented are not
dispositions to reflect such-and-such percentages of light, but patterns of sensorimotor
contingency. Importantly, it makes no difference that the sensorimotor laws represented may
be more coarse-grained than those discriminated in dorsal stream vision. The sensorimotor
account of phenomenal qualities has several important virtues in comparison to Tye’s
suggestion about the physical properties that underlie colour. Being ‘disposed to reflect
such-and-such percentages of light’ implies that the object activates this disposition when
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certain conditions external to the object itself obtain. As such, the disposition is a relational
rather than intrinsic property. But Tye’s suggestion, which he would of course point out is not
intended as a developed proposal, gives no indication of what the other relata is. Sensorimotor
theory does offer a proposal on this score, suggesting that the relevant relations are those in
which the object stands with ambient lighting conditions and with the agent’s body. As a
consequence, sensorimotor theory is able to give a better-developed and therefore more
principled account of why particular physical states are associated with particular phenomenal
qualities, including, crucially, the degrees of similarity and difference between phenomenal
qualities. On this basis, there is good reason for an endorser of Tye-style representationalism
to adopt the sensorimotor account of phenomenal qualities.
On the present view, the sensorimotor theory emerges as a hybrid of skill-based and
representationalist approaches to qualia. The above discussion has shown we can claim,
without contradiction, that sensorimotor skill does the main explanatory work in accounting
for conscious feel, even though representation is a necessary condition, along with other
enabling conditions, for being in states characterised by the relevant phenomenal qualities. On
this proposal, the ventral stream plausibly groups together fine-grained patterns of
sensorimotor dependence under representations of coarser-grained categories and types,
which it deploys for the purposes both Clark and O’Regan recommend. Since the
representations lack the strong kind of intension required to represent the relevant features,
determinately, as categories and types and not patterns of sensorimotor dependence, the
option remains to individuate the associated phenomenal qualities by reference to
sensorimotor law. I have shown in brief that the sensorimotor account, on the present
understanding, brings explanatory benefits as an addendum to Tye’s representationalism, and
another such benefit will become evident in the next section when I discuss the Inverted Earth
thought experiment. Returning to the central focus of this chapter, it remains necessary to
show that the sensorimotor account is not just coherent but actively compelling when
considered alongside the alternative, non-sensorimotor, skill-based approach.
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5.4 -Mary and Inverted Earth: A Sensorimotor Response
The above discussion has illustrated that we could quite consistently hold that perceptual
experience is realised by the deployment of representations which themselves are not
intimately involved with bodily movement, while also holding that the phenomenal character
of the experience so-realised is best explained by the sensorimotor laws that govern the
perceiver’s bodily interactions. Nonetheless, it may seem more natural to suppose that
phenomenal character is accounted for by the personal-level skills the representations enable -
as Clark (2008) argues, the sorting and sifting of categories and types for the purpose of
judgement and action-planning. In this section I offer independent reasons for endorsing the
sensorimotor account of phenomenal qualities. Importantly, there is a range of conceptual
demands an account of phenomenal qualities must meet that turn on considerations
superficially distinct from the character of the representations we are supposing enable
perceptual consciousness; and it will become evident as I proceed that sensorimotor and
non-sensorimotor skill-based accounts are not equivalent in their ability to meet these
conceptual demands. Attention to some classic thought experiments will help show that there
is reason to think the sensorimotor approach to phenomenal qualities is more effective at
meeting these demands than its competitors.
Consider first the debate over the ‘inverted spectrum’ thought experiment.
Generically, inverted spectra thought experiments feature two perceivers, one whose colour
phenomenology is inverted relative to the other, but who exhibits an identical repertoire of
behaviour. Block (1990b) has used a version of the thought experiment in an attempt to
refute the view, endorsed by Tye (2000) and many others (e.g., Lycan, 1987; Dretske, 1995),
that phenomenal qualities reduce to representational content. Block and his opponents share
the background assumptions that phenomenal qualities are physical, and that there is no
deep-seated conceptual obstacle to accounting for representational content in physicalistic
language either. Block imagines a planet which is identical in all respects to our own apart
from the fact that the colours of objects are complementary to the colour they possess on
Earth, meaning the sky is orange, the grass red, and so forth. The inhabitants of Inverted Earth
correctly describe the sky as ‘blue’, and the grass as ‘green’, since the meanings of those words
136
on Inverted Earth differ appropriately from their meanings on Earth. Block asks us to imagine
that we put on a pair of colour-inverting glasses and travel to Inverted Earth. The inverting
effect of the glasses means that things appear phenomenally to us on Inverted Earth exactly as
they do on Earth without the glasses. Yet, at least on externalist accounts of representational
content, the content our experiences possess must now differ in line with the differing
properties of the objects we are now in causal contact with. This appears to show that
phenomenal qualities cannot be adequately accounted for by representational content, at least
so long as the content is individuated externalistically.
The sensorimotor approach (on the present gloss) agrees with the representationalists
that phenomenal qualities are necessarily individuated by properties represented when we
perceive. However, sensorimotor theory avoids the threat that the Inverted Earth case poses to
this view, since it is not committed to the suggestion that the intrinsic properties of the
objects we come into perceptual contact with could not vary while phenomenal character
stays the same. The approach instead holds that phenomenal character will stay the same
between Earth and Inverted Earth so long as the relevant patterns of dependence between
motor output and sense input are preserved. If this is correct, the inverting goggles could only
do the job they are supposed to do if they somehow preserve the patterns of output-input
dependence that obtain on Earth. In this event, the phenomenal character of your experience
on Inverted Earth is explained, amongst other things, by properties of the objects perceived
and properties of the goggles (although, as Myin, 2001, points out, inverting goggles that
preserve the relevant patterns of sensorimotor dependence may be a physical impossibility).
Suppose that objects with intrinsic property X are, in every possible world,
co-extensional with objects with which a perceiver embodied in a particular way stands in
sensorimotor relation S. This means that a neural representation, lacking hyperintension, does
not represent only X or only S, but represents both simultaneously. On Inverted Earth, the
equivalent object has intrinsic property Y instead of X. Because you are wearing appropriate
goggles, neural implants, etc., you stand in sensorimotor relation S2 to the object. S2 is, in one
respect, non-identical to S, because it is realised in part by an object with different intrinsic
properties. However, S and S2 correspond isomorphically in a way that X and Y do not,
entailing that there is a level of description at which S and S2 are identical. On Inverted Earth,
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there is no way to specify determinately whether the neural representation bears content
about Y or S2. However, by appealing to the resemblance between S and S2, we can explain
why the phenomenology is preserved in spite of the difference in representational content.
This response gives a representationalist like Tye further reason to incorporate the insights
provided by the sensorimotor account.
The non-sensorimotor skill-based approach offers a different kind of response to the
Inverted Earth case. The approach has no need in the first place to insist that phenomenal
qualities are individuated by properties of the objects we perceive. All that matters is that, for
whatever reason - whether because of the goggles, or some property of the environment - we
are able to make a suitable range of discriminations, which do not merely involve judgements
that one property is nonidentical to another, but graded judgements about similarity and
difference along various scales, for example hue, saturation and brightness. So far, both
skill-based accounts offer in principle an equal improvement on representationalism about
qualia, although I have established so far that they are not equivalent, since the sensorimotor
account appeals, in part, to properties of the outside environment, while the
non-sensorimotor skill-based account does not obviously do so.
Consider now a debate concerning the more general question of whether phenomenal
qualities are physical at all, and the vivid challenge posed to physicalism by Jackson’s Mary’s
room thought experiment. To recap, the story features Mary, a vision researcher, who is
locked in an entirely black and white room and never comes into direct visual contact with
any coloured objects. Via black and white TV screens, Mary studies vision science and comes
to know every fact that there is to be known about the physical world. Yet when she is finally
released from the room, and shown a red rose, Mary, it is alleged, learns a new fact; namely,
what it is like to see something red. Since Mary, by hypothesis, already knows every physical
fact, Jackson concludes that she learns a non-physical fact, and hence that physicalism about
qualia is false (Jackson, 1982). The sensorimotor theory does not come with an entirely
prefabricated response to the Mary scenario, but it does invite certain lines of response, and
precludes others. The theory says that the look of red can be characterised by reference to a
bodily relation the perceiver stands in to the world, which is itself a physical relation, meaning
the theory is committed to arguing somehow that phenomenal qualities are physical.
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More importantly, the theory is independently committed to the view that to stand in
this relation is to possess and deploy a certain kind of skill or practical knowledge. With this in
view, it is natural for it to endorse the suggestion (see, Lewis, 1983) that to ‘know what it is
like to see red’ is to possess a kind of practical rather than propositional knowledge. Mary’s
new knowledge, in this light, plausibly consists of the ability to deploy, at will, the same
sensorimotor mastery she deploys to perceive a red object even on occasions where there is no
red object present. This is an act of the imagination, and involves naturally extending the
sensorimotor theory to encompass imagination in addition to perception. The sensorimotor
account is able to make better use of the appeal to practical knowledge to account for the
Mary case than accounts appealing to practical knowledge in a more ad hoc way, because the
theory makes use of practical knowledge to account for perception anyway.
This response gives the sensorimotor account an advantage over the
non-sensorimotor skill-based account. In line with Clark’s proposal, that account is
committed to the suggestion that seeing something phenomenally as red consists in nothing
more or less than having the ability to judge that it is red, or plan one’s actions with sensitivity
to the fact that it is red. Mary, locked in the room, possesses all the propositional knowledge
about physical facts there is to be possessed. If deploying this propositional knowledge in
thought depends on possessing practical knowledge, as Ryle (1949) contended, there is no
reason to think she lacks this ability. With this in mind, she can discriminate in judgement the
same range of properties before leaving the room as she can after leaving it. If the epistemic
skill theorist thinks it is the capacity to make propositionally-structured judgements that
makes the difference, they are committed to the view that Mary knows what it is like to see
red before leaving the room, a position endorsed by Dennett (1991), but which would, at best,
add a substantial and perhaps unpalatable additional commitment to the epistemic skill-based
approach.
The non-sensorimotor skill theorist could instead suggest that the capacities involved
in ventral stream perception involve neither the deployment of propositional knowledge nor
the exercise of fine-grained sensorimotor skill, but a different kind of practical skill. Ward
(2009), for instance, suggests that the skill in question is the planning of agential action. If this
amounts only to an appeal to coarse-grained rather than fine-grained sensorimotor skill, this is
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the position I argued earlier is not, as Clark suggests, incompatible with the sensorimotor
theory. Alternatively, the skill might be a capacity for something other than bodily movement
or conceptual thought. It is not self-evident what we should take this capacity to be. The most
obvious possibility is that it is a capacity for nonconceptual thought. In line with the
understanding of nonconceptual content endorsed, for instance, by Tye (2000), a thought of
this kind is a conscious state featuring content only characterisable by concepts that the
subject does not possess.
However, the appeal to personal-level nonconceptual content is baseless unless some
independent considerations make it plausible and intelligible that we actually undergo states
of this kind. We cannot make the existence of such states intelligible by appeal to visual
phenomenology, as this would be circular: we are trying to make the visual phenomenology
intelligible by appeal to the content. The only remaining option is to appeal to the
subpersonal content borne by representations realised by the ventral stream or another part of
the brain. To explain what it is for a person to experience one patch of red as darker than
another, for instance, the present approach would have to say that the person’s ventral stream
represents it as darker. Notice that the epistemic skill-based account amounts, on this
proposal, to nothing more than representationalism in a different guise. Lacking the
modification that sensorimotor theory makes on its present representationalist construal, this
threatens a return to the Inverted Earth problem, namely the possibility that the
discriminations you make could vary while your experience’s phenomenal character remains
the same.
5.5 - Relation toRupert's 'Massively Representational Mind'
On its present gloss, the sensorimotor account endorses something similar to Rupert’s (2011)
notion of internal-externalist content. Typically, representational stories pitched at a
subpersonal explanatory level propose that the brain traffics in representations which stand-in
purely for outer features of the subject’s environment. This holds true in the account offered
by Tye (2000), and could correctly characterise Clark’s (2008) claim that the ventral stream
represents types, categories and locations. Rupert’s relatively novel suggestion is that parts of
140
the brain frequently represent other parts of the brain, and parts of the extra-neural body. In
one sense, this content is internalistically individuated, since it is individuated only by features
inside the skin of the subject. In a more interesting sense, however, the content is
externalistically individuated, because it is fixed entirely by properties of the extension and not
by properties internal to the neural state that does the representing. As presently construed,
the sensorimotor account suggests something similar. The contents borne by representations
in the ventral stream are fixed entirely by properties of the extension. The extension, in this
case, is not an external feature but a pattern of dependence governing the perceiver’s bodily
interaction with the environment. This is not, as with Rupert’s internal-externalist content, a
purely inner state, but is not wholly external either. Instead it is a relational property that
holds between the perceiver and their environment. As I explained in the last section, one
benefit of adopting this claim is its ability to overcome the Inverted Earth problem.
It is worth looking in more detail at Rupert’s model, the ‘massively representational
mind’, and considering its implications for the sensorimotor account. Rupert offers a very
austere account of representation and content, suggesting that X represents Y in the event
that it reliably co-occurs with Y. X here is some neural state, and Y is a feature of the outside
environment, body or brain. Where the thing represented is another part of the brain, it may
be the neural state itself, or it may be the content carried by that neural state. Content is in
every case individuated solely by the properties of its extension. Moreover, bearing content is
sufficient on Rupert’s model for constituting a representation. Rupert makes no demand that
the contents fulfil, for example, any particular functional role. In offering such a liberal
account of ‘representation’, Rupert finds that there are representations everywhere; the brain
is massively representational. One important feature of the model is that the brain employs a
great deal of ‘redundant’ content, which is content borne at once by multiple representations.
He addresses the dual visual systems to illustrate this feature, arguing that the systems carry
some content in common, albeit using different representational formats and in the service of
performing distinct functions. Rupert does not claim that the ventral stream bears
internal-externalist content; he merely suggests that the ventral and dorsal streams each
represent the same features of the subject’s external environment. However, it is worth
considering the dual visual systems in light of Rupert’s internal-externalist content and some
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of Clark’s claims.
One observation Clark makes is that the ventral stream is indeed sensitive to efferent
copy from motor output regions in addition to sense input, suggesting it is sensitive to the
relation between motor output and sense input, i.e. the patterns of dependence appealed to by
the sensorimotor account. His argument, however, is that the ventral stream is sensitive to
motor output states only during learning phases, when it is acquiring new information about
the significance of various kinds of sense input. In the normal course of perception, however,
he claims that the ventral stream is sensitive only to sense inputs. The representations it
constructs in the course of ordinary perception are, meanwhile, insensitive to fine-grained
patterns of sensorimotor dependence. Clark’s opposition here depends on what he describes
as “the best functional and architectural explanation” (2008, p. 192) for the available evidence.
This is important. The fact that the ventral stream is insensitive to fine-grained differences in
sensorimotor law does not mean that it is insensitive to sensorimotor laws. Moreover, the
distinction between learning and ongoing sensitivity is only important if we focus on neural
architecture. Focusing only on content, where we take this to be explained by co-variance,
there is no theoretical difference between a case where the ventral stream co-varies with
particular sensorimotor laws because it is responding in part to efferent copy from the motor
areas, and a case where it co-varies with sensorimotor laws even though it is responding
directly to sense inputs alone.
We could, on Rupert’s model, propose that the ventral stream groups the fine-grained
patterns of sensorimotor dependence governing dorsal stream activity into coarser-grained
representations corresponding to types, categories and relative locations - thereby altering the
representational format - and puts them to use for reasoning and action planning. Despite this
difference in format and function, the ventral stream represents or borrows content from the
dorsal stream. This proposal therefore assigns to the dorsal stream an explanatory role in
individuating the content borne by ventral stream representations, even if it is ventral stream
representations that serve as the primary vehicles of visual consciousness. If the content by
itself explains phenomenal character, then activity modulated by the dorsal stream plays a
relevant role in accounting for phenomenal character. And as I argued in the previous section,
Clark’s preferred variety of skill-based account in the end depends crucially on the content
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borne by the ventral stream representations to explain which properties have been skillfully
discriminated.
Simultaneous to co-varying systematically with the operations of the dorsal stream,
the ventral stream also co-varies with categories and types present in the outside environment.
This may lead an endorser of Clark’s view to repeat the claim that the ventral stream’s
co-varying with features of the dorsal stream is merely a contingent feature, while its directly
co-varying with features of the subject’s outside environment is the pertinent co-variance
relation when specifying the content borne by ventral stream representations, and so
accounting for the acts of discriminations that explain phenomenal character. In this event,
sensorimotor contingencies play no essential role. But nothing in co-variance based accounts
of content, like Rupert’s, shows that the content of ventral stream representations are not
sensorimotor contingencies. The claim that sensorimotor contingencies are the contents is
certainly not arbitrary or unmotivated, either, considering that, as Clark appears to allow, the
dorsal stream is appropriately described as enabling the perceiver to exercise skillful mastery of
sensorimotor laws, and further that the ventral stream, at least during learning phases, does
not just happen to co-vary with these patterns but is directly responsive to both to sense input
and efferent copy.
It is therefore possible, at least, to characterise ventral stream content as patterns of
sensorimotor contingency. There is at least some positive reason to do so in light of the need
to offer a coherent account of phenomenal qualities, which may appeal to different features
than any accompanying account of cognition. The ability of the sensorimotor model to
respond adequately to the Inverted Earth problem makes the sensorimotor perspective in one
respect more coherent. On Inverted Earth, the ventral stream begins to reliably co-vary with,
therefore represent, different features of the external environment, and therefore enables a
different set of epistemic discriminations, where these discriminations are held to involve
discriminating types and categories in the external environment. Yet phenomenal character
remains the same. However, the ventral stream continues to co-vary in the same way with
dorsal stream activity. This makes dorsal stream activity a better candidate for the content
borne by the ventral stream than the outside environment, at least when it comes to
explaining phenomenal qualities.
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5.6 - Chapter Conclusion
This chapter has observed that phenomenal qualities and cognition are separate topics,
comprising different sets of question and having the potential to demand distinct, or at least
partly distinct, lines of explanation. I have argued that the sensorimotor account of
phenomenal quality is not obviously opposed to a representationalist story about cognition,
and that the account comes with certain explanatory benefits when contrasted with other
available accounts of qualia. I further argued that the epistemic skill-based account of
phenomenal qualities, endorsed by Clark, collapses either into an appeal to sensorimotor skill
or into a more or less traditional representationalist story, albeit one lacking the explanatory
advantage that comes from claiming the properties so represented are patterns of
sensorimotor dependence.
Providing a watertight defence, insofar as this is possible, would require surveying
further accounts of representational content, in particular internalist accounts, and exploring
in more detail ways they can respond to issues arising in debates over phenomenal qualities, in
particular Block’s Inverted Earth case, which has been a key feature of my discussion in this
chapter. Within the scope of this chapter, I have shown, modestly, that the sensorimotor
account is not obviously misguided and has some advantages over Clark’s account as an
account of phenomenal qualities. In the next section, I offer a more robust defence. I will
continue to endorse the suggestion that the ventral stream plausibly tracks and perhaps
represents lower-level patterns of sensorimotor dependence. However, I will suggest that
conscious qualities are accounted for not by the purported contents carried by processes in the
ventral stream, but by the coarser-grained sensorimotor skills that this tracking enables.
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6 - Sorting, Sifting andOther Sensorimotor Skills
This chapter offers a more radical response on behalf of the sensorimotor theory to the
objection levelled by Clark (2008). In this chapter I will suggest that ventral stream
representations, if they exist, and whether or not they stand-in themselves for patterns of
sensorimotor dependence, enable perceptual consciousness by enabling the perceiver to
exercise varieties of sensorimotor skill, which subsume the epistemic skills appealed to by
Clark. It is the exercise of this sensorimotor skill that constitutes perception and accounts for
phenomenal character. The force of the defence will be based on the sensorimotor theory’s
ability to account for the intentional directedness and phenomenal character of visual
consciousness. This will involve subsuming a range of different skills under the heading of
sensorimotor skill, but rather than being an unwarranted instance of, as Clark puts it, the
“enactive framework wagging the empirical dog” (p. 192), I will suggest it is a soundly
motivated demand that subpersonal theories not mis-describe the relation between, on the
one hand, neural and bodily states, and on the other, the personal-level phenomenal states
they realise.
6.1 - Avoiding Zombie Intuitions
To begin, let’s consider yet another famous thought experiment. Chalmers (1996) is an
opponent of the sensorimotor and all other physicalistic approaches to phenomenal
consciousness, since he argues that phenomenal consciousness, in general, cannot be physical.
To motivate this claim, he argues that we can conceive of a world physically identical to our
own and containing creatures that are physically identical to ourselves but entirely devoid of
phenomenal consciousness. He call these creatures zombies. On the ground that we can
conceive of such a world, Chalmers claims that such a world is metaphysically possible. And if
the relevant physical states and processes could exist without the relevant phenomenal states,
then the phenomenal states cannot be identical to the physical states. We could attempt to
resist Chalmers’ argument from the outset by denying that all conceivable situations are
possible, or by denying that zombies are even conceivable. Whichever strategy we pick, it
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behooves the physicalist so far as possible to reply not just with negative claims but also with a
positive proposal about the sorts of physical states that do constitute phenomenal
consciousness. Clark (2008) is explicit that he approves of skill-based accounts because they
offer a conception of qualia in which we cannot conceive of a possible world of the sort
Chalmers describes: on a skill-based account, there is simply nothing more to undergoing a
particular phenomenal state than exercising the relevant skill.
Accounts of cognition, some of which comprise explanations of phenomenal
character, frequently advocate that certain relationships hold between entities at different
explanatory levels. For instance, they might say that representational content, at a subpersonal
explanatory level, supervenes on particular kinds of neural state. They may also, like Clark, say
that visual consciousness supervenes on the deployment of particular kinds of representation.
A supervenience relation implies that the thing doing the supervening cannot vary without
the supervenience base varying. At times, a supervenience relation might be metaphysically
necessary, meaning it holds in every possible world, or nomologically necessary, meaning it
cannot fail to hold in this world. However, there is no general obligation for a supervenience
relation to imply anything so strong. For instance, it would be informative and plausibly true
to claim that visual consciousness supervenes on ventral stream activity in presently living
humans, on the ground that visual consciousness in humans cannot vary without ventral
stream activity varying. However, it would be unjustified to claim, with confidence, that
future humans could not in principle use technological artifacts or a different brain areas to
realise the same kind of consciousness.
Accounts of phenomenal quality are also entitled, for some explanatory purposes, to
make supervenience claims without committing to their obtaining in every possible world. To
show that zombies are impossible, however, an account of qualia must offer something more
robust. At a minimum, it needs to show that a given physical property, or physically-realisable
functional property, is metaphysically sufficient for an appropriate phenomenal state to
obtain. Logically speaking, metaphysically sufficient conditions of this type are enough to
entail that there is no possible world containing zombies. However, metaphysically sufficient
conditions for phenomenal consciousness would not be enough to discount the inverse view
that that there is a possible world where phenomenal consciousness exists without any
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attendant physical state. There is also the question of how to convince present day dualists
subscribing to the zombie intuition that a given set of conditions is indeed metaphysically
sufficient for phenomenal consciousness, considering we cannot travel to other possible
worlds to find out. To offer a convincing reply to dualists, we must make it convincing that
the physical states under consideration are not just sufficient for, but identical to, the
appropriate phenomenal states. This will make it inconceivable that possible worlds exist
where the physical states in question are not metaphysically sufficient.
One view is that psycho-physical identities require metaphysically necessary as well as
sufficient physical states. To identify metaphysically necessary conditions, we must, of course,
be indifferent to facts that are merely contingent. Assuming, for example, that the ventral
stream itself only plays a contingent role in realising the cognitive processing that underlies
visual consciousness, the metaphysically necessary conditions will not include having a ventral
stream. An endorser of a Clark-style position would claim, more plausibly, that
physically-realisable functions are what count. Thus, human-style visual consciousness
depends by metaphysical necessity on representations carrying out the functional roles
performed in this world by the ventral stream. These include playing an appropriate
functional role in the wider cognitive economy, and bearing content that is systematically
insensitive to occurrences at the sensorimotor periphery. If Clark were indeed arguing that
these states are metaphysically necessary for visual consciousness of the sort undergone by
human perceivers, he would be making a strikingly strong commitment. On this basis, he
would have to claim that a subject undergoing the same functionally-defined inner activity but
altogether lacking the capacity to integrate this activity with skillful behaviour will still
experience all or most of the same visual states we do. He would also have to claim that a
subject lacking the functionally-defined inner states we possess, but reliably manifesting an
identical repertoire of skillful bodily behaviour, necessarily lacks the kind of visual
consciousness we enjoy. These claims might be correct, but they go significantly beyond claims
that can be straightforwardly justified by attending to the workings of the ventral stream.
To make the sensorimotor approach a more compelling alternative, we must be
careful how we frame it. The approach would be committing itself to something considerably
less palatable than the above proposal if it claimed that bodily activity is sufficient for visual
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consciousness even in a metaphysically possible world where the perceiver lacks a brain. It
would not be compelling, either, to insist that bodily activity or activity in motor areas of the
brain are necessary for visual consciousness in every possible world. What the sensorimotor
approach ought to say, instead, is that the metaphysically necessary and sufficient condition
for having visual consciousness characterised by the appropriate phenomenal qualities is the
deployment of inner states that make an intelligible contribution to enabling appropriate
bidirectional patterns of systematic dependence between sense inputs and motor outputs.
Nothing in Clark’s (2008) critique demonstrates that ventral stream activity could not be
made intelligible this way. If successful, the present approach falls short of establishing the
strong claim that the extra-neural body and environment play a metaphysically necessary role
in realising perceptual consciousness. But, crucially, it offers a way to resist Clark’s claim that
the skills which constitute visual consciousness are not sensorimotor skills. The present
picture has the advantage of allowing that perception could be sensorimotor, while the
Clark-style position must actively deny that a creature lacking the right internal states could
undergo the kind of visual consciousness humans do, even if they possess the appropriate
sensorimotor skills
If there is a need to choose whether sensorimotor or non-sensorimotor skills are more
plausible candidates as metaphysically necessary conditions for perceptual consciousness, the
sensorimotor account thence has an advantage. However, Clark could reject the need to make
this choice. Instead, he might claim that we should endorse pluralism about the skills that
comprise the metaphysically necessary conditions. On this understanding, the skills we must
appeal to in order to dissolve the zombie intuition are neither sensorimotor nor
non-sensorimotor, but non-specific capacities to make the appropriate discriminations. The
pluralistic perspective entails that the generic skills in question could in principle be
constituted, in different cases, by quite different capacities. In this light, Clark’s objection to
the sensorimotor account can be taken as targeting the claim that the skills in question are
constituted by sensorimotor skills in this world. This returns the advantage to Clark.
However, certain considerations blunt the force of this response. It is an open
question whether sensorimotor and non-sensorimotor skills belong to one broad kind. The
capacity to make skillful bodily movements and the capacity to represent types, categories and
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locations are, on the face of it, quite different kinds of capacity. The only thing they
necessarily have in common is that they involve responses that co-vary systematically with
aspects of the outside environment. But lots of things exhibit this kind of sensitivity and do
not justify ascriptions of ‘skill’. A skill-based account of qualia must therefore appeal to some
further criterion. In Clark’s account, this is the content and functional role of the
representations deployed by the ventral stream, however these notions are themselves glossed.
In the sensorimotor theory, the skill is ascribed by properties of the outward behaviour, a
claim I will elaborate on in the next chapter. Once these criteria are added, there is no
guarantee that the skills appealed to respectively by sensorimotor and non-sensorimotor
skill-based accounts have any common factor that would justify our thinking of them as two
different ways the same generic skills could be constituted. In offering psycho-physical
identities, it will not do, then, to claim that skills are the metaphysically necessary conditions
for perceptual consciousness without specifying in more precise terms what sort of skill we
have in mind. As I have argued, sensorimotor skills are a more compelling candidate, since
they accommodate the possibility that perceivers lacking our functionally defined inner states
may nevertheless enjoy similar types of experience.
Adopting a different tack, we might find that psycho-physical identities fall short of
demanding metaphysical necessity. We could instead make a case that there is simply nothing
more to undergoing a given phenomenal state than exercising a particular skill on the ground
that exercising the relevant epistemic skills is, in this world alone, even in one subject alone,
constitutive of undergoing the phenomenal state. The constitution claim is less strong than
the metaphysical necessity claim, since it allows that a given experience might alternatively be
constituted of quite different things. For example, there might be nothing more to your
travelling to work today than your cycling from A to B, but tomorrow there might be nothing
more to your travelling to work than your driving from A to B. Constitution claims go beyond
mere sufficient conditions, however, by showing that there is nothing more to consciousness
than exercising the appropriate skills, in this world at least. In this light, an endorser of the
non-sensorimotor, skill-based account might accede to what we could describe as a disjunctive
account of the skills that are metaphysically necessary for visual consciousness. This resembles
the pluralistic account of skill I considered above, but rather than claiming that sensorimotor
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and non-sensorimotor skills belong to a single broader class, it simply claims that the relevant
skills could either be sensorimotor skills OR non-sensorimotor epistemic skills. This avoids
the need to claim that a possible creature possessing sensorimotor skills like ours but lacking
the relevant inner representational states could not possibly share human-style visual
experience, but allows Clark to maintain that in human perceivers, in this world, the skills are
non-sensorimotor.
This view has more promise. However, it depends on the claim that there is a genuine
disjunction in this world between sensorimotor skills and the epistemic skills apparently
enabled by the ventral stream. To show that such a disjunction obtains, Clark would have to
show that there can be a difference in epistemic skill without a difference in sensorimotor skill,
and vice versa. To prove the sensorimotor account wrong, Clark would also have to show that
phenomenal qualities vary in line with the former and not the latter. Clark (2008) does not
establish this, only demonstrating that not every difference in sensorimotor skill comes with a
difference in phenomenology, an observation the sensorimotor account can accommodate.
If the sensorimotor perspective is correct, there is a constitutive link between
perceptual consciousness and certain bodily capacities. It might prove that the bodily
capacities in question are constituted in turn by processing involving that deployment of
representations that stand in for types, categories and relative locations. But it would, in this
eventuality, be the bodily capacities themselves that rightly overcome the zombie intuition. In
the next section, I will defend the conceptual claim that the epistemic activities described by
Clark, the sorting and sifting of types and categories, in fact constitute sensorimotor skills.
6.2 - Sorting and Sifting as Sensorimotor Skills
Clark (2008) argues that if conscious perception, as realised by the ventral stream, involves
sorting and sifting of types and categories in place of the fine-grained sensorimotor behaviour
enabled by the dorsal stream, then the sensorimotor approach is thrown into significant doubt.
This only follows, however, if sorting and sifting (and the other ‘epistemic’ activities
mentioned, like classifying, selecting and choosing) are not varieties of sensorimotor activity
themselves. If they are, then it is straightforward that they draw on mastery of the laws of
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sensorimotor contingency. Clark does not explicitly address this possibility, but his rejoinder
to the sensorimotor approach implies that sorting and sifting draw purely on internal
processes, in particular the activation of internal representations, and not sensorimotor
mastery. In this section, I am going to attempt a defence of the sensorimotor approach by
showing that sorting and sifting are themselves plausibly best understood as varieties of
agent-level sensorimotor activity.
Sorting and sifting make an interesting case study, since they are paradigmatically
cognitive activities, while at the same time being, ordinarily, activities carried out through
bodily engagement with the environment. This point dovetails with the main focus of Clark’s
(2008) book, which argues that many of the cognitive processes traditionally held by cognitive
scientists to depend solely on neural activity also depend on the agent’s bodily engagements
with the outside environment. Clark claims that in some cases, the substrate of cognition
actually extends into the outside environment. In other cases, he merely claims that to
correctly understand how a subject performs a given task, we must make explanatory reference
to the subject’s embeddedness within a specific environmental niche.
A reasonably paradigmatic example of the latter, offered by Clark, concerns a
technique employed by a practised bar tender (p. 62). Each drink on the menu is served in its
own distinctively shaped glass, and as the orders come in, the bar tender places appropriate
empty glasses in a spatial sequence corresponding to the order in which the drinks are to be
served. This saves the bar tender the trouble of trying to remember which drinks are to be
served and in which order. Clark stops short in this case of claiming that the bar tender’s
manipulation of external props actually constitutes part of the subject’s cognitive processing,
but claims that the trick contributes in an important way to the bar tender’s performance of
the task, while altering the character of the cognitive tasks that must be carried out by the
subject’s brain. It does not matter too much for my present point whether the bar tender’s
interaction with their niche is supposed to itself be cognitive. It suffices to notice that the
subject, here, is performing tasks of the kind allegedly carried out by ventral stream perception
- classifying, selecting, choosing, and so forth - by means of their sensorimotor coupling with
the outside environment. It is striking that from a commonsense perspective, this is no
surprise, since in everyday language, if not the language of cognitive science, activities like
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sifting and sorting are almost always activities carried out through the bodily manipulation of
external props.
By extension from the bar tender case, it is worth entertaining the possibility that the
sorting and sifting of types, categories and locations that Clark thinks underlies perceptual
consciousness are also constituted by bodily interaction with the environment. This proposal
is not altogether outré by the standard of the dual systems model. The model describes dorsal
stream activity, which is not supposed to come with any attendant consciousness, as a kind of
‘vision’, reserving the term ‘perception’ for cases associated with conscious awareness. If the
dual systems and sensorimotor theories are agreed that there is an unconscious kind of vision
best characterised as a sensorimotor process rather than by an orthodox representational
model, then relative to accounts that reserve ‘vision’ for states or activity realised solely by the
deployment of internal representations, it is a lesser step to contend that conscious perceptual
awareness is also constituted by the exercise of sensorimotor skill.
With the above points in mind, the sorting and sifting identified with perceptual
awareness is plausibly constituted - in some cases - by successful behaviour directed at a
practical goal. For example, your sorting red from green might involve nothing more than
your appropriately pulling your car to a stop in front of a red traffic light. It would be useful,
however, to give some account of how such behaviour is actually achieved. Such an
explanation can be given in part, by reference to bodily activity directed toward an epistemic
goal, for example angling your head upward to see the traffic light. This sort of ongoing
re-alignment of bodily posture for the purpose of gathering information also plausibly
constitutes part of the process of sorting and sifting. Although perceptual consciousness does
not usually involve active manipulation, with your hands, of external props, a core analogy
with the bar tender case is maintained by virtue of the fact that the perceiver, in line with
O’Regan’s idea of the world as an outside memory, makes persistent changes to their bodily
relation with the environment in order to achieve both epistemic and practical goals. The fact
that bodily movement plays an important role in perception does not, of course, prove that
the extra-neural activity actually constitutes, rather than merely assists, the exercise of the
epistemic skills Clark talks about. However, my proposal ought to make it at least conceivable
that identifying colours, shapes, locations and so forth is best characterised by reference to a
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bodily process.
This suggestion should not be confused with the implausible thesis that perceptual
consciousness is realised by nothing more than outwardly-observable bodily behaviour. The
proposal is that activities such as sorting and sifting are constituted by sensorimotor coupling
carried out by the whole organism, drawing on both neural and non-neural activity. Where
outward activity is present, this alone is sufficient, sometimes, to constitute an act of sorting or
sifting, provided it is enabled in some intelligible way by the subject’s inner activity. To
account for discriminations made in perceptual consciousness that go beyond those which can
be individuated by outward bodily activity, including documented experiments where subjects
have had their whole bodies, including eyes, completely paralysed while enjoying a restricted
degree of perceptual awareness anyway (Whitham et al., 2011) a different story must be given.
However, these cases could be accounted for by appeal to the agent’s preparedness to make
skillful bodily movements.
It is conceivable, of course, that in order to be prepared to act, the subject must deploy
internal representations, such as forward models or action-oriented representations like the
ones endorsed by Ward, Roberts and Clark (2011). This is not necessarily a problem for the
sensorimotor theory, which on some formulations accepts that subpersonal representations
play a role. In this event, perception can still be understood constitutively as a
temporally-extended process, which, aside from exceptional circumstances, incorporates
bodily movement, which forward models help enable. This is compatible, for instance, with
O’Regan’s (1992) original presentation of the outside memory idea, which suggests that
bodily exploration is assisted by sparse representations of objects and their
egocentrically-specified location in the subject’s environment.
However, recent work on preparatory activity in the motor cortex supports the
suggestion that neural representations are not necessarily involved in preparing for behaviour.
It is agreed that neural activity takes place in the motor cortex prior to movement which helps
enable the subject to move their eyes, limbs (etc.) the appropriate distance, direction and
speed. A popular view has it that certain neurons become weakly active in preparation for a
movement, and that the movement takes place when that neural activation reaches a certain
threshold, suggesting that the preparatory activity acts as a representation of the movement
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that is about to follow (e.g., Tanji and Evarts, 1976). However, this assumption is challenged
by recent empirical work. One study recorded neural activity in monkeys prior to and during
specific reaching tasks. The study found that the preparatory activity correlated with a given
movement was quite different to the neural activity that occurred while the same movement
took place. This does not establish that there is no representation going on, but it counts
against the representational view I just described. Moreover, it is expected by a mechanistic
account, in which the preparatory activity does not represent the movements that are about to
follow, but initiates a dynamical system in which the body movements takes place
(Churchland, Cunningham, Kaufman, Ryu and Shenoy, 2010). Given that the ventral stream
has the function of enabling coarse-grained sensorimotor behaviour, it is conceivable that its
activity could also be understood as non-representational preparatory activity for embodied
acts of sorting and sifting. Moreover, this shows that perceivers could be engaging the relevant
bodily capacities even where the capacities are not manifest in outwardly observable bodily
movements.
Sorting and sifting are, in general, naturally understood as agent-level sensorimotor
activities. In the domain of conscious perception, it is tenable, at least in some cases, that
sorting and sifting are constituted by agent-level sensorimotor coupling. This ought to defuse
the suggestion that where perceptual processing involves sorting and sifting, it does not
involve sensorimotor skill. My discussion has aimed to offer some positive motivation for the
view that sorting and sifting in perception is indeed always a sensorimotor process. It remains
for the non-sensorimotor skill-based approach to show that sorting, sifting, classifying and
selecting can be explained purely by reference to what the brain does without committing a
category mistake.
6.3 - Homunculi that Sort and Sift
In the last section, I noted that sorting and sifting are, on an everyday understanding, properly
thought of as whole-agent bodily interactions with the outside environment. Clark’s (2008)
account correctly acknowledges that the skills at play in a skill-based account of qualia are
personal-level capacities, meaning they are possessed by the perceiver as a whole, not parts of
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the perceiver. It is hard, however, to imagine what the personal-level capacities are if they are
not sensorimotor skills. Clark’s account is mainly pitched at the subpersonal level, and the
only way to make sense of sorting and sifting being wholly inner activities is to suppose that
they are carried out by some purely-inner parts of the agent, in particular the agent’s brain,
and become personal-level activities when the conditions are in place for these subpersonal
activities to enter into consciousness. The burden of proof is on the endorser of Clark’s
non-sensorimotor skill-based approach to show that there are or could be any purely internal
activities that can be legitimately described as sorting or sifting.
Drawing on Bennett and Hacker’s (2003) view, one might argue that everyday usage is
sufficient to show that ‘sorting’ and ‘sifting’ can only meaningfully describe behaviour by a
whole agent. In fact, ‘sorting’ and ‘sifting’ are, in everyday practice, meaningfully applied to
artifacts such as coin sorting machines and sieves, hence they fall under the limited category of
intentionalistic predicates that Bennett and Hacker (2003) allow can be applied both to
persons and other things. However, the Bennett and Hacker-derived point, if I were pushing
it, would nonetheless apply to many of the other activities I have been subsuming under the
phrase ‘sorting and sifting’, such as classifying, selecting, choosing and comparing. In fact, for
reasons I discussed earlier, the view that everyday linguistic practice offers a definitive guide to
the admissibility of applying intentionalistic or other vocabulary to a particular object is
contentious, and there are apparently strong reasons to think it is false. My present line of
argument does not pursue this view, but depends on the observation that sorting and sifting
are as a matter of fact, rather than a matter of linguistic practice, commonly carried out by
whole agents in interaction with the environment. All the same, any deviation from ordinary
linguistic practice requires, as I argued earlier, an accompanying justification for the
application of the relevant terms outside of their usual contexts.
To make a compelling case, the non-sensorimotor skill-based account must endorse
the suggestion, familiar from Dennett’s (1978) proposal concerning homuncular
decomposition, that sorting and sifting are practical activities carried out by subpersons (i.e.
homunculi). If this subpersonal account succeeds, subpersons could engage in their practical
tasks without typically having any attendant effect on, or conceptual connection with, the
whole agent’s bodily interaction with the environment. However, the account must offer
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compelling reasons to think these subpersons exist. Consider that when we observe the bar
tender, we can tell, unproblematically, that sorting and sifting is taking place. Typically,
agent-level, embodied cases like cocktail-making involve ongoing physical manipulation of the
objects being sorted and sifted. Crucially, such processes must have a meaningful outcome in
the sense that we can, if we like, evaluate the outcome relative to some success conditions, for
instance whether or not the bar tender has assembled the correct drinks. Perception is a little
different, since the perceiver need not move objects around in order to perceive. However, as
with the bar tender case, it should at least be uncontroversial that we are frequently licenced to
ascribe visual and/or perceptual states to agents by virtue of their outwardly observed skillful
bodily engagements, leaving open the possibility that the outward bodily engagements in
question constitute part of perceptual processing.
If we wanted to defend Clark’s position, one thing we would have to show is that the
subpersons I just mentioned can, in general, be ascribed functions, which might include
sorting and sifting. One feature of cocktail-making, and of the kind of skillful bodily
behaviour that allows us from the outside to ascribe perceptual states to subjects, is that it is
goal-directed. To maintain in a demanding way the link between the posited subpersonal
activity and the agent-level cases, the activity by the subpersons must be goal-directed too. To
establish this, we would have to show not only that the subpersons happen to sort and sift, but
that they have the proper functions of sorting and sifting, which is to say that they have
sorting or sifting as their purpose; and the theoretical feasibility of ascribing proper functions
to biological things, such as parts of the brain, is a matter of controversy. On this question, one
popular line of thought has it that Darwinian natural selection offers a way to naturalise
teleology, on the basis that a trait has a particular function just in case its having that function
explains the trait’s persistence or the organism’s biological fitness. The diametrically opposed
position is that natural selection - by contrast with divine creation, for example - entails that
there is, properly speaking, no function or design in biology at all (Allen, 2009). Even this
latter view does not, however, rule out the possibility, (i) that neural systems just so happen to
perform the tasks under consideration, even if they are not proper functions, and (ii) that
proper functions can be legitimately ascribed as metaphors, if not literally.
Perhaps the function issue is not of crucial importance in deciding whether or not the
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ventral stream could sort and sift. For the purpose of establishing that subpersonal systems
sort and sift in a way sufficiently analogous to the behaviour of whole agents, we may not
actually need to establish goal-directedness in a robust way, since it is not obvious that
goal-directedness is a necessary rather than contingent feature of agent-level sorting and sifting.
Even if one were sceptical about proper function, then, we could posit that the ventral stream
just so happens to sort and sift, with the addendum, if we wanted to endorse it, that sorting
and sifting are its proper functions metaphorically speaking.
Let’s take it that the aprioristic considerations allow that the idea of ascribing
functions like ‘sorting’ and ‘sifting’ to neural subpersons is uncontroversial. Even where this is
allowed, there persists a distinct obligation to show that there is something purely inner that
can be evaluated relative to success conditions. Consider that in the first place, the
homuncular subsystems require an input, i.e. something to sort or sift. These could be
representations, but they could also be raw sense input signals; this is unproblematic. However,
the systems must, more significantly, also have an output, some outcome by virtue of which
sorting and sifting can be said to have taken place. The internalist model denies that these
outputs are external to the agent as a whole, although to maintain a comparison with ‘sorting’
and ‘sifting’ in the ordinary senses of the words, the objects must be external to the
homunculus.
The output of an act of sorting or sifting could, in principle, be an alteration to the
same state that served as the input, as with the bar tender case, where the cocktail glasses, in
one arrangement or another, feature as both the objects and the outcomes of the sorting and
sifting. Since perception involves processing an ongoing stream of raw data, the homuncular
subsystems that receive this input more plausibly send outputs elsewhere, i.e. to other
subsystems. To licence the claim that there is sorting and sifting going on, there must be some
principled way of evaluating the outputs, and this entails that the outputs must have meaning.
A raw sense input signal is not intrinsically meaningful, but a representation is, by virtue being
intentionally directed toward something external. This means that the non-sensorimotor,
skill-based account must be accompanied by an account of representation that is both
plausible and robust enough to properly account for intentionality.
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6.4 - Radical Anti-Representationalism
On a ‘radical’ reading, the sensorimotor account is situated some way closer to the original
enactivist approach that originates with Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991), and closer still
to the dynamic account of Hurley (1998), the radical embodied cognition of Chemero (2009)
and the radical enactivism of Hutto and Myin (2012). The most important thing these
approaches have in common is that for one reason or another they propose that perception is
realised in part by extra-neural activity and takes place without internal representation. If this
perspective can be convincingly motivated, either by reference to specific empirical evidence
concerning perception or on broader theoretical grounds, then the sensorimotor theory can
respond head-on to Clark’s (2008) objection that the cognitive processing underlying
perceptual awareness does depend on internal representation and not bodily movement.
Enactivism, in its best established guise, originates with Varela, Thompson and
Rosch’s (1991) book The Embodied Mind, drawing also on phenomenology (e.g.,
Merleau-Ponty, 1945) and earlier work by Maturana and Varela (e.g., 1980) on the biological
phenomenon of autopoiesis, the process of active self-creation through which cells and larger
organisms maintain their own internal structure. This tradition denies that the world, as it
features in the subject’s perceptual experience, results from internal representations of an
objectively-specified pre-existing environment. It instead claims that the agent creates its own
environment and experiential world through the same process of bodily coupling with its
surroundings by which it generates and maintains its own existence. Perception, by this right,
is inextricably linked to action. Even more distinctively, cognition is on this variety of
enactivism inextricably linked with life (see, e.g., Thompson, 2007). The neighbouring
accounts I discuss are not committed to this tradition’s view that the organismic interactions
that constitute perception necessarily overlap with the processes by which the organism
constitutes a living thing. For this reason, they are not necessarily committed to the view that
perceivers must be alive at all. However, Hurley, Chemero, Hutto and Myin, and the
sensorimotor account on a ‘radical’ gloss, all concur that perceptual consciousness is realised
by sensorimotor engagements and not representations.
Hutto and Myin (2012) adopt the ‘enactive’ label for their own approach, which they
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call Radical Embodied or Enactive Cognition (REC). REC is motivated by the claim that
‘basic’ cognition, meaning any cognition not structured by natural language, ‘doesn’t need’
and ‘can’t have’ representational content. The authors argue that all attempts to account
naturalistically for content fail because they are unable to surmount the so-called Hard
Problem of Content, a deep-seated conceptual barrier to explaining how one physical state of
affairs can bear truth or success conditions relating to another. The root of the problem, the
authors claim, is expressed by their headline principle that Covariance Doesn’t Constitute
Content. This is to say that X co-varying with Y does not entail that X bears content about Y,
however we flesh out the precise details of the covariance relation. For instance, a tree’s rings
reliably co-vary with its age and therefore carry information about its age, where information
is understood as a kind of covariance. However, this does not entail that the tree trunk bears
content about the tree’s age, as content in this case requires truth conditions, and nothing
about mere covariance entails truth conditionality. An opponent could bluntly insist, of
course, that covariance does entail truth conditionality, to which Hutto and Myin would
reply that this violates explanatory naturalism by introducing an unexplained and ‘spooky’
new entity.
The introduction of additional theoretical apparatus, in particular biological function,
does nothing to overcome the problem so long as we continue to appeal to a covariance
relation to do some of the necessary explanatory work. If Hutto and Myin’s ‘Covariance
Doesn’t Constitute Content’ principle is correct, this at once undermines a large category of
accounts of cognition, among which are developed attempts to account naturalistically for
content (e.g., Dretske, 1981) and theories that appeal more or less in passing to the notion
that covariance does constitute content (a couple of examples, which I discuss elsewhere in the
thesis, include Tye, 2000; Rupert, 2011).
Hutto and Myin broaden their attack on content by targeting leading alternatives to
covariance-based accounts, in particular the producer-consumer model proposed by Millikan
(1984). Millikan’s account suggests that content obtains in informational transactions
between a ‘producer’ and a ‘consumer’, which might be different creatures or different parts of
the brain. This is a variety of homuncular view, which I discussed in the last section and,
earlier on, in chapter 2. Content is individuated, at least in large part, by appealing to the
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purposeful manner by which the consumer responds to given pieces of information. Purpose
can be accounted for naturalistically by reference to the consumer’s evolved biological
function. For instance, a frog’s motor output system might respond to a particular input by
causing the frog to dart out its tongue. If this response evolved because it allowed the frog’s
ancestors to eat food, then the input received by the frog’s motor system carries content about
food.
Hutto and Myin claim that the reference to a ‘consumer’ suggests that there is
pre-existing content to be consumed, a violation of the principle that Covariance Doesn’t
Constitute Content. Where biological function does all the explanatory work, they suggest
the ‘consumer’ would be better labelled a content ‘creator’. Assuming that Millikan does mean
biological function to do all the work necessary in individuating content, Hutto and Myin
argue the account fails anyway. The argument, which they attribute to Fodor (1990), notes
that content must involve intension as well as extension, since if there were only extension the
purported content could not be false, and if it cannot be false then we cannot ascribe to it any
specific set of conditions under which it is true. Natural selection, however, is only sensitive to
organismic dealings with the outside environment, i.e. the extensions of the purported
representations. It therefore provides no resources for explaining intension. Millikan (1993)
has responded that the truth-conditions are not specified by current properties of the
extension, but by properties of the extension that obtained in the historical environment
where the trait evolved. However, Hutto and Myin contend that this does not solve the
problem. They say: “Even if we can specify what is meant to be targeted that would give us
exactly no reason to think that the targeted item is represented in a truth-conditional,
referential, or otherwise semantic way - i.e. that it has intensional content” (2012, p. 80).
Their point, as I take it, is that Millikan’s appeal to teleology is sufficient to show that
a frog may dart out its tongue in response to a fly, or alternatively to some other object
resembling a fly, using a faculty that has the proper function of responding only to flies.
However, teleology is not sufficient to show that that any part of the frog is evolved to bear
intensional content, considering that natural selection could not be sensitive to the guise
under which flies are represented, so long as the frog successfully eats them. Without
intension, we could legitimately describe a frog’s darting out its tongue in response to an
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inedible object as an unsuccessful attempt to perform a proper function, namely to eat. But we
could not make the further claim that the frog or some part of the frog represents the inedible
object as food, because we have no way to specify whether it represents it as food, or as a fly, or
whatever.
I take it that Hutto and Myin make a compelling case that no attempt to naturalise
content has so far been given that will satisfy their metaphysical demands. One way to pursue
the debate is to examine these and other attempts in further detail, and to investigate further
attempts that could be made. Fruitful though this may be, a couple of striking facts undercut
this. One is the sheer number of contemporary accounts featuring representation and content
that appeal to nothing more than reliable covariance (e.g., Tye, 2000; Rupert, 2011). If some
different or more baroque attempt to naturalise content eventually proves correct, there is no
guarantee that these content-involving approaches will be able to straightforwardly substitute
the new account of content for the covariance-based account while leaving all their other key
claims intact. With this in mind, Hutto and Myin will have made substantial progress toward
making radical enactivist approach to cognition appealing if they can successfully unseat
covariance-based accounts of content.
Offsetting this argumentative advantage is the possibility that Hutto and Myin are
simply making unduly grand metaphysical demands of their opponents. Although Hutto and
Myin probe the specifics of individual attempts to naturalise content before arguing that they
fail, their position is not altogether different from Bennett and Hacker’s (2003). Hutto and
Myin, for their part, assume without much argument that the meaning of words including
‘represent’, ‘content’ and ‘truth condition’ are such as to place a demanding metaphysical
burden on anything that can be correctly said to fall under those terms, and go on to examine
specific proposals before finding that they are unable to meet this metaphysical demand.
Bennett and Hacker, by contrast, assume without much argument that there can be no
underlying feature shared by persons and parts of persons that might actually licence the
ascription to both of predicates like ‘representing’. Where Bennett and Hacker make a
linguistic demand, they appeal implicitly to a metaphysical assumption. Hutto and Myin
make a metaphysical demand, but appeal implicitly to similar linguistic assumptions. One
theorist who disputes this approach is Chemero (2009), whose ‘Radical Embodied Cognitive
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Science’ defends a similar positive programme to Hutto and Myin’s, but who sharply disagrees
with their negative claims.
Chemero argues that in line with the linguistic conventions employed by scientists,
the words ‘representation’ and ‘content’ make only modest metaphysical demands. By this
latter standard, certain kinds of covariance relation do, in fact, constitute content. Hence, we
could well say that a tree’s rings represent or bear content about its age. Defending
content-free cognition, Chemero more modestly insists that cognitive scientists should only
appeal to representation or representational content if doing so provides the best explanation
for a given phenomenon. This, he takes it, is an ‘epistemic’ rather than a ‘metaphysical’
demand. Hutto and Myin say something superficially similar when they concede that the
appeal to representational content would be legitimate if the explanatory success of perceptual
science depended on it. However, unlike Chemero, Hutto and Myin suggest that even where
the appeal to content is motivated by epistemic rather than metaphysical considerations, it
nonetheless entails a robust metaphysical commitment of the sort Chemero rejects.
In one way or another, each side justifies its stance by appeal to naturalism. For the
present purpose, we may take it that the naturalism in question is nothing more robust than
the minimal naturalism advocated by Wheeler (2005) and endorsed by Hutto and Myin. This
amounts to the claim that science and philosophy must be consistent, and that where their
respective claims conflict, philosophy must give way. Chemero argues in effect that where
scientific accounts find theoretical utility in positing ‘representations’, and apply the word in a
manner consistent with their own linguistic convention, philosophical considerations cannot
unseat them, since philosophy must give way to science. In this sense, Chemero is assuming
the mantle of explanatory naturalism.
Hutto and Myin deploy minimal naturalism to the opposite effect. They take it that
notwithstanding the apparently productive deployment of the terms ‘representation’ and
‘content’, especially in empirical work, no present theory shows how the physical states in
question genuinely represent or bear content in light of the metaphysical demands Hutto and
Myin think apply. Their point, to extrapolate a little, is this. Explanatory utility is insufficient
to licence the claim that some entity exists if there is otherwise no empirical or theoretical
evidence that the entity does, or even could, exist. If there is no reason to think that an entity
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exists, it is unscientific to claim it does exist. On this basis, the authors appear to have
naturalism on their side.
In Chemero’s favour, it is evident that scientists, especially neuroscientists, frequently
use ‘representation’ and even ‘content’ to denote nothing more demanding than covariance.
Moreover, it is true that people are entitled to use words in accordance with the linguistic
conventions in operation within their own discipline. In Hutto and Myin’s favour, the
problem is that ‘content’ is also frequently used to denote something metaphysically more
robust than mere covariance, even on accounts that appeal to nothing more than a covariance
relation to account for it (Tye, 2000, is a good example, since his account of phenomenal
qualities depends strongly on the idea that they reduce to representational content and not
mere co-variance relations). Where content is used to denote a covariance relation, it is, given
this equivocation between speakers, not always apparent whether the speaker means to make
an extravagant metaphysical claim about the covariance relation in question, or means to use
‘content’ in a deflationary way to denote something metaphysically austere.
To resolve this impasse, both sides ought to endorse McDowell’s (1994b) position
that where content is ascribed subpersonally, i.e. to parts of persons rather than persons, it
should be understood by default, and in all cases, as no more than a metaphorical ascription.
‘As if’ content, as he calls it, is not really content, but may be legitimately ascribed just in case
it proves useful or indeed indispensable as a theoretical posit to explain information
processing transactions between an agent’s parts, a possibility he happily endorses. By
adopting this as a permanent disclaimer, it is possible to accommodate Chemero’s position
that representation and content are legitimate posits when deployed in a metaphysically
austere way. At the same time, this ought to resolve any suggestion that ‘content’, deployed in
a superficially harmless way, actually disguises a more robust metaphysical commitment.
Although metaphorical content is admissible in principle, it is subject to certain
provisos. One is that if we aim to account for phenomenal qualities naturalistically in a way
that defeats anti-physicalist intuitions, we cannot do so by appealing to solely to metaphorical
content. Although a physical state that merits the metaphorical ascription of content may be
real, and the ascription of content genuinely useful for some purposes, the content itself, if
metaphorical, does not really exist; it is just a way of talking. So if you think that a ‘red’ quale is
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a non-physical state, you have no reason to change your mind on discovering that it is
correlated with metaphorical content. However, if perception is constituted by bodily
interactions with objects in the environment, we can appeal to the qualities of the interaction
to account for phenomenal qualities, and use metaphorical content, if appropriate, to explain
how those interactions take place. This brings us to the other proviso, however, which is that
content and representations may not be the most appropriate way to account for the physical
interactions involved in perception, as we will see in the next section.
6.5 - Representation Restricted
According to Marr’s (1982) theory, and accounts in the same tradition, conscious perception
is realised by the brain’s construction and deployment of representations. This processing is
properly understood as an enabling rather than constitutive feature of perception. A
constitutive account of perception says what perception is. An enabling account, in this
context, could be thought of as a variety of causal account, where we take ‘A causes B’ to imply
that A happens at the same time as B but at a lower explanatory level. Endorsers of the
personal/subpersonal distinction observe that the representations in Marr’s account must be
enabling rather than constitutive features of perception because they are subpersonal, and
perception is a personal-level faculty (McDowell, 1994b; Pessoa et al., 1998). Noë (2004)
denies that the personal/subpersonal distinction is important, which means he cannot so
straightforwardly establish that subpersonal representations are not constitutive features of
perception. However, like Pessoa et al, he makes use of Marr’s own distinction between the
task and representational levels of analysis. The former specifies which tasks perception aims
to perform, while the latter describes how the brain processes information, in the form of
representations, to enable these tasks to be performed. As Noë appreciates, the distinction
between the task and representational levels should be taken to track the
constitutive/enabling distinction, meaning representations are mere enabling features even if
the task level is not necessarily the personal level.
McDowell suggests that by appreciating the constitutive/enabling distinction, a
rapprochement can be achieved between Marr’s representationalism and ecological perception,
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which is non-representationalist. His claim is that a Marr-style representationalist account can
usefully be given of the subpersonal processes that enable perception even while we use the
ecological approach to characterise perception’s constitutive features at the personal level. As
Pessoa et al. and Noë (2004) bring to our attention, however, Marr has a faulty view of
representation that prevents this reconciliation from being achieved. The problem arises
because Marr depends too heavily on his representational level framework to inform his
constitutive or task level account of vision. Indeed, he appears to straightforwardly conflate
the enabling with the constitutive features when he claims that: “vision is the process of
discovering from [retinal] images what is present in the world, and where it is” (Marr, 1982, p.
2). The bluntest objection we could make to this is that it commits a straightforward category
mistake. As McDowell has argued, vision is personal level process in which we come into
contact with the world rather than the retinal image. Pessoa et al. are sympathetic to this point,
but their argument does not focus on the bare coherence of claiming that perception is
constituted by a subpersonal process. Their criticism is mainly directed at the danger that a
subpersonal constitutive account invites implausible commitments including, as we saw in
chapter 2, the undue commitment to a subperson, a homunculus, for whose benefit processes
like filling-in need to take place.
Noë (2004), having denied that the personal/subpersonal distinction is important,
has no call to insist that a constitutive account of vision must make reference to the whole
person (or more broadly, agent). His relatively nuanced criticism, reflecting a point originally
made by Nakayama (1994), is that Marr fails to appreciate the difficulty of giving an
appropriate task level (i.e. constitutive) account of vision. As I take it, the problem is that
Marr attempts to give an independently plausible account of perception’s representational (i.e.
enabling) features, and lets his view of the task level be unduly constrained by it, a bias implicit
in his claim that perception is a process in which we use the retinal image to find out about the
world. This is a mistaken order of priority, because our understanding of the processes that
enable perception ought in many cases to be substantially constrained by independently
motivated constitutive claims. Instead of only allowing one-way traffic from the enabling to
the constitutive, or for that matter in the other direction, there should be a two-way interplay
between our understanding of perception and our understanding of the processes that enable
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it (see, McDowell, 1994b; Wheeler, 2013).
The objection is not that Marr’s account, and Marr-style accounts, are framed as if no
possible evidence, in particular empirical evidence, could disprove them. The problem is that
their apparent plausibility as enabling accounts means that should they unduly inform or be
conflated with constitutive accounts, they close off the possibility of more carefully examining
perception’s constitutive features. Re-emphasising neural representation’s rightful place only
as an enabling feature has a useful dual effect. It opens up conceptual space for a better
constitutive account of perception. This, in turn, opens up the possibility that we must
re-evaluate our claims about the processes that enable perceptual consciousness. This could
have various effects, for instance constraining in previously unrecognised ways the kinds of
content or representational vehicle that plausibly enable conscious perception, and, in
principle, making it plausible that representation should be partially or even wholly dispensed
with in favour of appeals to dynamic bodily interaction with the outside environment.
A proper constitutive account of perception ought to draw on a number of distinct
methods and considerations. This includes empirical work. For example, the work on change
blindness and inattentional blindness referred to by O&N is enough to strongly indicate that
the brain does not represent, all at once, a large and richly detailed visual field. A constitutive
account should also pay careful attention to the phenomenology of visual experience, an
aspect of sensorimotor theory most prominent in Noë’s (2004; 2012) accounts. Noë claims
that visual experience does not feel picture-like. This is, as I think, a straightforward and
compelling aspect of Noë’s in some ways enigmatic description of visual experience,
exemplified by his claim that: “A perceptual experience doesn’t analyze or break down into the
experience of atomic elements, or simple features [.] the moment you stop and try to make a
specific feature the sole object of your consideration – this shade of red, for example – it slips
away from you in the sense that it exceeds what you can take in, in completeness, in an
instant” (2004, p. 135).17 The fact that visual phenomenology is not pictorial constrains the
shape that an enabling account ought to take. It offers one reason, for instance, to doubt that
the character of perceptual awareness should be explained by pictorial representations in the
17 I offer a more detailed take on this point in chapter 7.
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brain.
Noë suggests that attending to one’s own visual phenomenology is enough to
demonstrate that perceptual consciousness, instead of being pictorial, is constituted by the
exercise of Sensorimotor Understanding. This claim has some appeal, but is hard to make go
through purely on the basis of attention to one’s own experience. A further argument is made
by Noë (2010), who claims, as we saw earlier (section 4.3), that a perceiver would not be able
to integrate what they consciously see with what they do if conscious vision did not involve
Sensorimotor Understanding, or a similar egocentric understanding of their bodily alignment
with objects in the outside environment. This can be understood as a logical, constitutive
claim about vision, and places downward pressure on our understanding of the processing
carried out in particular by the ventral stream to realise visual awareness. Notice that the point
comes through even more sharply, however, when we think of it as an engineering question,
namely the question of how the ventral stream achieves its function of helping the dorsal
stream produce appropriate skillful bodily behaviour. The idea that the ventral stream must
trade in representations of SMCs is a low-level claim about the processing that enables
perceptual consciousness which we find, it turn, places upward pressure on a high level
account of conscious perception’s constitutive features. This is one case in which the
sensorimotor theory makes productive use of an interplay between explanatory levels.
On the view of Sensorimotor Understanding I endorse, in which it is a feature of the
perceiver’s behavioural capacities, the claim that Sensorimotor Understanding is a constitutive
feature of conscious perception could be supported by the need for ventral stream processing
to integrate with dorsal stream processing too, especially if we endorsed the view that the
ventral stream integrates with dorsal stream activity by representing possibilities for
coarse-grained action (Ward, Roberts and Clark, 2011). Sensorimotor Understanding, on the
behavioural capacity view, also makes a good fit with non-representationalist, dynamical
systems accounts of perception, considering that they already appeal to sensorimotor
capacities (Hurley, 1998; Noë, 2004; Chemero, 2009; Silberstein and Chemero, 2012;
Burhmann, Di Paolo and Barandiaran, 2013).
A constitutive account of vision should also take account, I argue, of philosophically
motivated worries about intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. Noë (2004) attempts
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to do justice to McDowell’s (1994a) claim that the content of perceptual experience is
necessarily conceptual by suggesting that the bodily capacities we draw on in conscious
perception are themselves conceptual. Noë (2012) retracts this claim and instead states that
sensorimotor skills involve a form of nonconceptual content, while occurring on a continuum
with conceptual skills rather than being radically distinct. I will not comment on the debate
between conceptualists like McDowell and his opponents (e.g., Dreyfus, 2013; Evans, 1982),
who claim that action and perception can be intentionally-directed without being fully
conceptual. However, it is important to do justice to the basic insight that perceptual
consciousness must be intentionally directed, and that this requires the perceiver to bring to
bear some kind of skillful, active engagement with the world. It will not do to assume that
content borne by neural representations can play this role, since it has not been convincingly
established that neural representations bear genuine rather than metaphorical content. For
this reason, appealing to neural states alone will not do at all. Accounts featuring
content-bearing neural representations plausibly provide, in some cases, a useful framework
for explaining the role the brain plays in producing behaviour, but it has not been established
that they can, except by reference to behaviour, help account for genuine intentionality.
We might be tempted to deny that a naturalistic account of cognition needs to answer
Hutto and Myin’s metaphysical worries about the ascription of ‘content’, or that it is the job
of a scientifically-oriented account of vision to explain how the capacities appealed to by
non-naturalistic accounts of perception can be accounted for in physicalistic vocabulary.
Consider, however, the purpose of the skill-based approach to phenomenal qualities, endorsed
by Clark (2008) and on Clark’s reading, with which I agree, by the sensorimotor account. The
skill-based approach is meant to avoid the intuition that phenomenal consciousness is
non-physical by identifying phenomenal consciousness with the exercise of skills. Its job is to
avoid the dilemma I mentioned earlier (adapted from Ryle, 1979, by Silberstein and Chemero,
2012) in which phenomenal consciousness is either ‘nothing but’ brain activity or ‘something
else as well’. As I have argued, if the skills appealed to by the skill-based account are not
sensorimotor skills, they depend on internal representation. If that representation is
metaphorical, or a useful fiction (Sprevak, 2013), or anything other than robustly real, it
cannot help answer metaphysically motivated, anti-physicalist intuitions about consciousness
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better than appeals to nothing but brain state. This, in my view, is the biggest problem with
attempts to defuse non-physicalist intuitions about qualia with appeal to representation.
One of the best reasons for taking Sensorimotor Understanding to be constituted by a
capacity for skillful behaviour - rather than merely by knowledge of the sensory consequences
of possible movement - is that it offers a promising way to account naturalistically for the
intentional directedness, and by virtue of this the phenomenal character, of perceptual
consciousness. Giving a proper account of the criteria a repertoire of behavioural capacities
must meet to count as constituting mindedness, and sensorimotor understanding in particular,
is not something I pursue here, and is something that would eventually need to be provided
for this point to be established. However, it is hard to view the outward behaviour of a human
perceiver and resist the intuition that they are intentionally-directed toward the features of
the environment they interact with. This provides one motivation for regarding behavioural
capacities as constitutive features of perceptual consciousness.
If we could be certain that neural representations cannot be genuinely contentful,
then appeal to sensorimotor skills would appear to be the only hope for finding a naturalistic
account of intentionality and so phenomenal character, and the case for regarding them as
constitutive features of perception would be secure. As we have seen, Hutto and Myin offer
strong reasons to doubt that subpersonal content is naturalisable by appeal to covariance or
teleology. A possibility Hutto and Myin endorse, which I also endorsed in section 2.1.2, is that
content could be adequately naturalised by appeal primarily to empirical evidence. In principle,
it might be possible to routinely provide full physicalistic descriptions of the neural processes
that underlie a conscious experience, and use a subpersonal theory that makes essential
explanatory appeal to representation to provide bridging principles which make the relation
between the neural processes and the conscious state intelligible. Without a conceptual
solution to the ‘hard problem’ of content, it would remain hard to robustly justify the claim
that neural states bear genuine rather than make-believe content, or in the language of
McDowell (1994a), to say that the brain is responding in a person-like way to reasons and not
just causes. However, the empirical success of the enterprise just described would provide
strong grounds for abandoning the requirement for a naturalistic theory of perceptual
consciousness to meet these strong metaphysical demands.
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That such an account could be provided is an empirical bet. Although it is possible to
provide representation or content-involving accounts of neural activity that provide an
explanatorily useful framework for understanding brain activity itself, there is no guarantee
that this subpersonal content can correspond reliably to the content or phenomenal character
of perceptual consciousness (Noë and Thompson, 2004). The problem is not the
epistemically-founded worry that it is difficult to intelligibly describe and explain the neural
processes that yield perceptual consciousness unless we make reference to the contribution
they make to sensorimotor coupling. The problem is that there may be no intelligible link
between purely inner processes and perceptual consciousness. This point is evident in
Hurley’s (1998) defence of vehicle externalism, although we could accept the modest
conclusion that an account of perceptual consciousness ought to make explanatory appeal to
sensorimotor coupling without necessarily insisting on ECM, the claim that the substrate of
perceptual consciousness actually includes the body and outside environment.
The question of whether perceptual consciousness depends on internal representation
or a non-representational dynamical system depends on how well the respective approaches
make sense of empirical work. However, there are aprioristically motivated reasons for not
being surprised if it turns out to be impossible to explain perception by attributing content to
brains or parts of brains, namely that intentionalistic vocabulary like ‘believing’ or
‘representing’ are words we apply in the first place to whole persons and not their brains. The
fact that strategies like homuncular decomposition make it conceptually viable to apply these
predicates to brains does not mean that we should expect these strategies to finally allow us to
explain conscious perception by appeal only to contentful states of the brain. A better bet is to
regard bodily capacities as perception’s constitutive features and use these as the starting point
to account for the physical processes that enable perceptual awareness.
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7 - Object Experience as Temporal Experience
This thesis has so far focused largely on defending and clarifying the basic tenets of the
sensorimotor theory. With these tenets shored up, there is as-yet untapped potential for the
sensorimotor theory to explain in much greater detail the distinctive contribution it can make
to accounting for specific perceptual phenomena. For instance, there is much work to be done
on identifying the sensorimotor contingencies involved in colour perception, and the theory
has not yet given much account of sense modalities other than vision. This present chapter
continues the work clarifying and defending the sensorimotor theory, but also sketches out a
novel contribution the sensorimotor theory can make to a long-discussed puzzle concerning
the experience of temporally-extended events. In addition to explaining how the sensorimotor
theory might make sense of event-experience, I will argue that object-experience may itself be a
variety of event-experience, and that this would help make sense of Noë’s appealing but
oblique account of visual phenomenology.
7.1 - The Puzzle of Temporal Experience
The puzzle of temporal experience (Kelly, 2005) concerns perceptual awareness of
temporally-extended phenomena like change, succession and constancy. To illustrate, Kelly
offers the example of an opera singer delivering a sustained note. When you hear it, your
experience incorporates not just the note’s immediate presence, but also, somehow, its
extended temporal duration:
There you are at the opera house. The soprano has just hit her high note – a glass shattering high
C that fills the hall – and she holds it. She holds it. She holds it. She holds it. She holds it. She
holds the note for such a long time that after a while a funny thing happens: you no longer seem
only to hear it, the note as it is currently sounding [...] in addition, you also seem to hear
something more [...] the note now sounds like it has been going on for a very long time [...] What
you hear no longer seems to be limited to the pitch, timbre, loudness and other strictly audible
qualities of the note. You seem in addition to experience, even to hear, something about its
temporal extent. (Kelly, 2005, p. 208)
Vision, too, sometimes comprises the experience of temporally-extended events. Grush (2007)
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offers an example of motion experience. Suppose you are looking at a clock. You could stare at
the hour hand all day, and although you may infer that it is moving, you never visually
experience its motion. When you look at the second hand, however, you seem to perceive its
motion directly as it moves around the clock face. Temporal experience is a puzzle, as Kelly
(2005) puts it, rather than a mere problem, because it involves an apparent paradox: What
you perceive now, at this moment, ought only to be what is present now. Motion, change and
duration are not momentary, but take place over extended periods. Solutions to the puzzle
will differ in their diagnosis of what is happening when you hear the opera singer, or look at
the second hand, but the examples clearly illustrate that there are data to be explained.
Dainton (2010) places proposed solutions into three distinct categories. The
‘cinematic’ approach is the view that perceptual experience is divided into static snapshots,
like a cinema reel. On this approach, what you perceive at a given instant is just what is present
at that instant, meaning you cannot right now literally experience a temporally-extended
event. Temporal experience, here, has to be explained some other way. Crick and Koch
(henceforth C&K) (2003), for example, suggest that you do not experience motion, but “a
series of static snapshots, with motion ‘painted’ on them” (p. 122); they suggest, by analogy,
that the experience of motion has something in common with the motion suggested by a
drawing of a person in mid-stride (p. 122, figure 1). The other two types of explanation, by
contrast, endorse the existence of what James (1890/1981) called the ‘specious present’, an
experiential ‘now’ that really does have duration.
The ‘retention-protention’ approach (Dainton, 2010), of which Husserl (1991) and,
under Husserl’s influence, Varela (1999) were notable exponents, says that the experience of
what is genuinely present at a given instant is accompanied by ‘retentions’ from the immediate
past and/or ‘protentions’ into the future; these can be understood, respectively, as special
perceptual sorts of memory and anticipation. Grush (2007) advocates a retention-protention
account he calls the Trajectory Estimation Model. In support of the approach, he cites
empirical work on a number of illusions, for example the 'cutaneous rabbit' illusion (Geldard
and Sherrick, 1972, cited by Grush, 2007). The study involved subjects being given a sequence
of taps on the arm, five at each position, in three successive positions along the arm. The
subjects reported that instead of feeling the taps in just three different positions, they
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experienced them as travelling in an even trajectory along the arm, ultimately extending
beyond the location of the final tap. Because this trajectory would not have been experienced
had the sequence been confined to the first five taps, Grush's suggestion is that an experience
at a given instant can feature as part of its content prior occurrences (see also the colour-phi
phenomenon, discussed, e.g., Dennett, 1991). Further, because the felt trajectory continued
onward, Grush concludes that protentions – anticipations of future events – also figure in
experiential content.
The ‘extensional’ approach (or ‘extensionalism’) – endorsed, for instance, by Dainton
(2000) – says that the content of the perception (the state of affairs represented by the
experience) temporally tracks the vehicle (the physical state that realises the experience).
Dainton (2010) observes that on this view, since “our episodes of experiencing are themselves
temporally extended, [they] are thus able to incorporate change and persistence in a quite
straightforward way”.
Clark (2006) uses temporal experience – in particular, Kelly’s opera singer example –
to expose what he regards as a general problem with the sensorimotor theory. His argument
asserts that temporal experience poses a problem, in particular, for Noë’s notion of
presence-as-access, the view that you fail to experience the objects of perception as
straightforwardly ‘present’, but instead experience them as ‘accessible’, thanks to your
possession of Sensorimotor Understanding. In targeting presence-as-access, Clark implicitly
targets the claims that perceptual experience depends on Sensorimotor Understanding and
the claim that phenomenal character can be characterised by reference to SMCs. Clark says we
cannot explain the experience of the opera singer’s note “by appeal to any sense of the
potential availability of the missing parts of the temporally-extended sound stream, nor can we
know (indeed, it is barely intelligible to ask) how those missing parts of the soundstream
would vary or come into focus as we move our head or body” (Clark, 2006, p. 23). Since the
past and future are not, in other words, mediated now by laws of sensorimotor contingency, it
cannot be Sensorimotor Understanding that explains the experience of the note’s duration.
Noë (2006) responds by agreeing that Sensorimotor Understanding only explains
object perception, arguing that this does not compromise the sensorimotor theory in general.
He suggests that since event perception is, in any case, a quite different species to object
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perception, the theory is not committed to giving a sensorimotor account of the opera singer
case. He justifies this by reference to the distinct qualitative character of the temporal
experience compared to the experience of an object: “it rides roughshod over the
phenomenology [...] to say that the past sounds [like objects] are now present or that they are
now accessible” (p. 28); instead, he claims, you hear the note “as having a certain trajectory or
arc, as unfolding in accordance with a definite law or pattern” (p. 29).
Noë’s positive account of the opera singer case posits that we have a
(non-sensorimotor) grasp of where the note is coming from, analogous to linguistic
understanding:
When you hear the singer’s sustained note, you do not experience the acoustical properties of the
sound, any more than you experience the acoustical properties of the words you hear when you
understand speech. In the linguistic case, you hear meanings themselves, you hear what is said. In
the case of the singer, what you actually hear is the singer herself, her voice, her vocal action –
what she is doing. It is the fact that the singer is doing something, performing an action, that fixes
the relevant temporal horizon and intentional arc (Noë, 2006, p. 29)
This offers a solution to the temporal experience puzzle akin, in important respect, to C&K’s
cinematic account. Where Noë claims that different kinds of knowledge are responsible for
object experience and temporal experience, C&K, similarly, ascribe these to separate
“mechanisms” (p. 122). Moreover, both C&K and Noë agree that you do not experience
temporally-extended phenomena directly: As with Noë’s invocation of an experienced
trajectory, C&K suggest motion is ‘‘‘painted’’ on" (p. 122) to static snapshots, resulting in
your experiencing moving objects as being in motion, while failing to directly experience that
motion.
However, Noë maintains that even temporal experience involves a coupling with the
environment rather than a representing:
[P]erception is an activity of sensorimotor coupling with the environment [...] experiences are not
acts [...]; they are not representations; they are activities, events themselves; they are temporally
extended patterns of skillful engagement. When you perceive an event unfolding, it is not as if you
occupy a dimensionless point of observation. You live through an event by coupling with it. (Noë,
2006, p. 31)
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This suggests a quite different line of response than the one endorsed by the analogy
with linguistic understanding. Extrapolating from Noë, the thought seems to be that the
physical substrate of the experience is a smoothly continuous activity rather than one which
breaks down into temporally discrete chunks: hence to explain the physical substrate of
perception, one must look at dynamically unfolding interactions, rather than ‘object’-like
structures in the brain. If we appended to this the extensionalist view that the content of an
experience temporally tracks the activity of experiencing, it would mean that the content of
experience is always, itself, temporally-extended. Notably, this does not need to entail that past
and future portions of the note should be experienced as now present. Rather, it suggests that
to experience the world is – as Noë claims – to experience being in the midst of some
trajectory.
7.2 - Coupling andKnowing inTemporal Experience
The argument over temporal experience speaks to a broader tension within the sensorimotor
account. As many commentators have noted, the approach sometimes appears to stipulate
that the temporally-extended bodily exercise of sensorimotor skill is required; at other times,
it apparently suffices that the perceiver possesses sensorimotor skill. Aizawa (2010) describes
these as ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ versions of the theory. Noë’s discussion of temporal experience
betrays a similar tension: while its main claim is that the experience of duration is explained by
your non-bodily understanding of what you are hearing, it indicates a quite different line of
response when it argues that hearing the note involves, in any case, a temporally-extended
coupling with the environment. The tension is particularly stark in the case of event
perception, because it is hard to see why temporal experience should be explained both by
understanding and sensorimotor coupling. In the original story about object perception,
sensorimotor knowledge is sometimes glossed as knowing how to act, for example when O&N
suggest sensorimotor knowledge is comprised of “action recipes” (p. 945) or when Noë says:
“[t]o experience [an object] as on the left is to experience it as necessitating [...] various
possibilities of sense-affecting movements” (2004, pp. 87–88). Here, we can readily grasp that
perception might involve, vitally, a temporally-extended process of bodily coupling, itself
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featuring Sensorimotor Understanding. By contrast, your knowledge of where the opera
singer’s note is coming from may be implicit, but there is no obvious way in which it is
practical, or geared toward action, as sensorimotor mastery might be. If it is not practical, but,
as Noë suggests, more like linguistic comprehension, then it is hard to see why possessing or
exercising this knowledge should entail, in any interesting sense, a coupling with the
environment rather than just a representing of the environment. The sensorimotor theorist,
in the temporal case, no longer has an obvious response to the theorist who maintains that
neural states or structures alone are the interesting, indeed constitutive, features underlying
conscious perceptual experience.
This threatens to undermine the sensorimotor theory, as it means the ‘weak’ variant,
on the current account of temporal experience, can no longer sustain any of the theory’s main
tenets. Vehicle externalism or ECM is ruled out, since bodily movement is not required for
perceptual experience. Sensorimotor Understanding, SMCs and presence-as-access only give
an incomplete account of perceptual experience because they account only for object
experience, not temporal experience. The sensorimotor theorist could respond that although
event perception is non-sensorimotor, it depends for its existence on object perception, which
is sensorimotor. Conceding this much, however, gives the opponent room to deny that
perception is intrinsically sensorimotor at all: Clark (2008), as we have seen, claims that
perception is a matter of sensorimotor summarising – the extraction of information about
sensorimotor contingencies, along with other information, for the construction of
representations that are not themselves finely sensitive to the sensory effects of possible
movements.
Moreover, the distinction made by Noë between events and objects seems tenuous.
Noë (2006) says “objects [unlike events] are timeless in that they exist whole and complete at
a moment in time” (p. 28). The implication is that it is therefore reasonable to suppose that
perception of objects and events are different matters. On this view, perception of a moving
object would seemingly be a matter of perceiving the object (sensorimotor) and perceiving its
trajectory, an event (non-sensorimotor). However, if you perceive an unmoving, unchanging
object, and perceive it to be constant, you expect that it existed moments before, and that it
will continue to exist moments into the future. As a result, it is not enough to tack on some
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kind of non-sensorimotor perception just for some instances. The non-sensorimotor element
would apply to all instances of perception.
The opera singer example is a little misleading in this respect, because the phenomenal
experience of the note's temporal duration seems like an optional extra, a side issue to the
perception of immediately audible qualities like pitch, loudness, and so forth. Temporal
aspects to perception are not usually like this. When you cross a busy road, or catch a ball, the
perception of objects as still or in motion is no side issue, but central to your engagement with
them. For this reason I think it is better to hold that object and event perception are not
different types. The fuzziness of the distinction between object and event perception provides
another reason to prefer a unified picture for objects and events, and conceding that events are
not perceived in sensorimotor fashion provides a reason to believe that objects are not
perceived in such a fashion either. This is one reason why I will argue presently that a unified
sensorimotor model can be offered for both.
The best solution, I suggest, is to drop Noë’s analogy with linguistic understanding
and stick, instead, to an extensionalist story, which says that event experience is explained by a
particular kind of temporally-extended coupling with the environment. This requires
adopting the ‘strong’ sensorimotor theory, in the sense defined above, and accords with my
suggestion in chapter 4 that Sensorimotor Understanding is a criterion that
temporally-extended engagements must meet, rather than an entity that enables the
appropriate engagements to take place. The mere possession of sensorimotor skill would not
be sufficient to explain the experience of duration, since duration is not a matter of
sensorimotor contingency. However, the bodily exercise of Sensorimotor Understanding
takes time anyway: so, if we assume the content of experience temporally tracks the vehicle,
the experience of duration comes for free. This suggestion is not merely a get out clause, but
fits the phenomenology – the experience of trajectory – aptly described by Noë. It explains
why your experience, now, of the opera singer’s note sounds like it is part of something
temporally-extended.
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7.3 - Object Experience and Skill-Based Access
I have suggested that the best response the sensorimotor theorist can make to Clark’s
objection from temporal experience is to argue that the experience of temporal duration
supervenes on a temporally-extended physical process, comprised of skill-driven bodily
coupling with the environment. This means that the exercise of Sensorimotor Understanding
must be temporally-extended in the case of event experience. The sensorimotor theory could,
conceivably, endorse this, but claim that object experience does not depend on
temporally-extended engagements, merely on the activation of representations of SMCs. In
this case, the debates over temporal experience and what Aizawa calls ‘weak’ and ‘strong’
variants of the sensorimotor theory come apart. My proposed version of extensionalism,
however, accounts for object perception as well as event perception. This results from what I
contend is the most productive way to understand presence-as-access, and it is this thesis I
turn to now.
As we saw earlier, Noë (2004) outlines his notion of skill-based access when he likens
perception to accessing a newspaper via the World Wide Web. He points out that when you
view the online version of the New York Times, your computer does not download the day’s
edition all at once, but downloads, on request, one article at a time. This is sensible, as it limits
the burden placed on your computer and internet connection, and means that should an
article be updated, you get the latest version. Importantly, accessing the paper in this
piecemeal fashion is, for all intents and purposes, just like having the whole issue there at once,
since every article is accessible as needed. The day’s edition is available, as Noë puts it, virtually.
Seeing, he suggests, works in a similar way. You do not experience, all at once, a richly
detailed visual field. Instead, you access, as required, detail available from the outside
environment. The presence of rich detail is also, in this sense, virtual (Noë, 2004, pp. 49–51).
However, in a crucial disanalogy with the computer case, Noë claims that perceptual presence
is “virtual all the way in” (2004, p. 134). The suggestion is apparently that no complete
property is ever present to experience in a local or offline manner: a claim Noë argues is
justified by attention to one’s own experience:
A perceptual experience doesn’t analyze or break down into the experience of atomic elements, or
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simple features [.] the moment you stop and try to make a specific feature the sole object of your
consideration – this shade of red, for example – it slips away from you in the sense that it exceeds
what you can take in, in completeness, in an instant. (2004, p. 135)
This is a puzzling sort of claim. There is (I think – and the reader might accept, at least for the
sake of argument) something in Noë ’s phenomenological claim that you cannot, in a
momentary act, get a visual grasp on any complete property, such as a shade of red. However,
there is certainly something it is like to see a red thing. Noë explains this by claiming that
properties are “present not as represented, but as accessible [...] [t]hanks to my possession of
sensorimotor skills” (2004, p. 215). As he puts it in a later piece, the environment:
[…] shows up as present, but out of view, in so far as I understand that I am now related to it by
familiar patterns of motor-sensory dependence. It is my basic understanding of the way my
movements produce sensory change given my situation that makes it the case, now, even before I
have moved an inch, [emphasis added] that elements outside focus and attention can be
perceptually present. (Noë, 2012, p. 19)
This view is a ‘weak’ position, since it stipulates that no movement or temporal extension is
required. As a result, the perceptual experience described must be the result of an internal
state, perhaps an internal representation specifying what movements the perceiver should
make to bring objects into view. It is not obvious, however, why this sort of Sensorimotor
Understanding should not allow a perceiver at some instant to take in an atomic visual feature,
given visual features are meant to be specifiable by reference to movement-related
contingencies. We could make sense of this by supposing that the sensorimotor mastery made
use of by the perceiver at a given moment fails to correspond, precisely, to any atomic feature,
such as a shade of red. If this were true, however, it would not be clear how we can explain the
fact that perceivers experience shades of red at all. As I result, I contend that the best way to
make sense of the computer metaphor, and the associated phenomenology, is to hold that
object experience, like event experience, depends on a temporally-extended physical process.
Indeed, the extensionalist proposal is useful as a way to characterise both event and object
perception. I elaborate on this in the next section.
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7.4 - ExtensionalismAbout Event andObject Experience
It is beyond my present scope to consider the advantages and disadvantages of various
approaches to temporal experience independent of their relation to sensorimotor theory. I
argue, however, that extensionalism is likely to provide the right conceptual foundation for a
sensorimotor account of temporal experience. Adopting this approach is useful for the
sensorimotor theory, because it allows the theory to respond convincingly to the specific
challenge set by Clark (2006), and thereby save the approach from the danger that it fails
altogether because it is unable to account for temporal experience. More significantly, there is
good reason to endorse the extensionalist claim that perceptual experience temporally tracks a
temporally-extended physical process anyway, since it has the added utility of offering a new
and better way of explicating some of the compelling claims featured in Noë’s account of
presence-as-access. On my proposal, event and object experience are not only explained the
same way, but are aspects of the same phenomenon.
An extensionalist sensorimotor account, in the first place, explains temporal
experience by claiming that perceptual awareness of a temporally-extended event supervenes
on a temporally-extended process of interaction between the perceiver and the environment,
in such a way that the content temporally tracks the vehicle. This is, in principle, compatible
with the view that object experience is explained by the mere activation of a representation
bearing content about SMCs. However, we could plausibly go further and suppose that the
characterisation of object experience found in Noë’s claims about presence-as-access can best
be explained by accounting for object experience in the same way as event experience.
An initial move is to reject any suggestion that knowing the movements you could
make to bring an object into view can amount, by itself, to entertaining perceptual content
about that object. Instead, knowing this might enable, more modestly, a nonspecific feeling
that there is detail available which can be accessed from the environment as needed (as
suggested by Clark, 2008, p. 194). To account for perceptual presence – of an opera singer’s
note, or a shade of red – I suggest we instead point to the perceiver’s skillful coupling with an
environment in which the relevant laws of sensorimotor contingency apply. Suppose, for the
sake of argument, that this is a correct account of object experience. Combined with the
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extensionalist claim that the content of perceptual experience temporally tracks the physical
substrate, it would follow that the content of object experience is itself temporally-extended.
This is counterintuitive, but compelling if you consider the presence-as-access in a particular
light. Recall two of the claims featured in this aspect of the sensorimotor account.
There is a phenomenological claim, concerning a perceiver’s inability to experience, in
a momentary act, any atomic visual features. There is also a claim about the material substrate
of experience, captured by Noë’s discussion of virtuality, which suggests that perception is
entirely beholden to the agent’s online interaction with the environment. Neither of these
claims is indisputable, but they are coherent accounts of how perception may work. If you
think there is something right about the theses, extensionalism about object experience offers
a way to make sense of it. On the view I recommend, one cannot, in a momentary act, take in a
shade of red for the very same reason that one does not experience, at this instant, the past and
future portions of the opera singer’s high C. Perceptual experience, both of objects and events,
supervenes on something that may, essentially, be understandable only by reference to a
temporally-extended, dynamical process.
Noë’s (2004) claim that experience is “virtual all the way in” (p. 134) could suggest
that the spatial size of the visual field is infinitesimally small or even non-existent. This makes
the sensorimotor account sound like it denies perceptual experience altogether. A better gloss
on the claim says that experience is virtual all the way in not, primarily, because the
information processed at one time by the visual system is minimal – although it may be
minimal – but because this information can only be processed in the course of
temporally-extended coupling with the outside environment. To revisit the World Wide Web
analogy: if your access to the online newspaper were virtual all the way in, a faulty
understanding of virtuality would suggest that your computer ‘knows’ how to access the
internet, but has no screen with which it can locally display a web page. According to my gloss,
however, the computer has a screen, but loses its ability to display any web page – even one
you already have open – the instant it loses its connection to the Internet. It is a commonplace
that perception, ordinarily, requires that there is an environment present to perceive.
However, the point of virtuality, as currently understood, is to show that ongoing dynamic
interaction with the environment is a conceptual necessity for perceptual experience.
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An upshot of this view is that perceptual experience can only supervene on a
temporally-extended process, and never on a momentary state. This goes part way to
accounting for the experiential quality that Noë observes accompanies presence-as-access,
namely the inability to fixate, at an instant, on any atomic visual feature. Note, however, that
the content of an experience need not temporally track the material realiser. If it does not, a
temporally-extended process could yield the experience of an instant in time in which you
take in a shade of red. The extensionalist view that the content does temporally track the
vehicle has the benefit of offering an apt way to reformulate the phenomenological account
offered by Noë . The inability to take in a shade of red in what you experience as a durationless
instant is explained by the fact that having an experience of red is, in part, having an
experience of duration. A visual feature never feels phenomenally present at this instant
because, before you have a chance to fixate on it, the relevant detail has lapsed from being
something that you are confronted with now, to something that you have been confronted
with a moment ago. Extensionalism, here, allows that you can experience a shade of red, but
stipulates that this takes place – and is experienced as taking place – over an interval of time.
The process is likely to be assisted if your movements during that time help you gain
information about the patterns of sensorimotor contingency that currently hold between your
body and the environment.
Returning now to the debate between Clark and Noë: Clark’s objection to
presence-as-access is that elapsed portions of the opera singer’s note are not accessible now,
hence your experience of them cannot be explained by means of their accessibility. Noë’s
response denies that object and event experience need to be explained in the same way, on the
grounds that they are different species of awareness: “objects are primary in our experience [...]
experience of events depends on a more basic sensitivity to the presence of objects” (Noë,
2006, p. 31). I earlier argued that Noë's line of response may be inadequate to defend the
central tenets of the sensorimotor theory. This drawback can be avoided, I suggest, precisely
by reversing Noë's claim, and contending that the experience of objects depends on the
ongoing conscious presence of events that have been occurring moments into the past.
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7.5 - Chapter Conclusion
It is a matter of some importance that the sensorimotor approach has the resources to provide
a plausible answer to the puzzle of temporal experience. Noë (2006) offers an ambivalent
response. He suggests, briefly, that it can be explained by temporally-extended ‘coupling’. As I
have argued, however, there are no obvious grounds to endorse this, given his main claim that
the experience of the opera singer’s note is explained by an understanding, akin to linguistic
comprehension, of where the note is coming from. While this latter claim provides an account
of temporal experience, it entails an abandonment of a number of the sensorimotor theory’s
central tenets, as far as event experience goes. In so doing, it renders the theory more
vulnerable to the objection that object perception is not fundamentally sensorimotor either,
expressed, for example, by Clark (2008), when he espouses sensorimotor summarising.
With the aim of defending sensorimotor theory, I have aimed to indicate the
conceptual foundation of a sensorimotor enactivist account of temporal experience. This
involves rejecting the comparison with linguistic understanding and emphasising
temporally-extended activity. Adopting extensionalism as a working hypothesis invites, in
turn, a particular understanding of object experience. This is worth endorsing in its own right
because of the useful gloss it places on Noë’s otherwise compelling ‘virtuality’ metaphor, and
the phenomenology of presence-as-access. This consideration gives the sensorimotor theory
even more reason to pursue extensionalism as an explanation of temporal experience.
Clark’s (2006) critique has the useful effect of forcing the endorser of sensorimotor
theory to evaluate carefully the respective roles of coupling and knowing in the approach. If
my suggestion is right, understanding only plays a role if it is directly implicated in bodily
coupling with the environment. If bodily interaction is key, then temporal extension is also
surely vital. The sensorimotor theory should, therefore, do more than pay lip service to
temporality, and take into serious account the temporally-extended nature both of perceptual
experience and its material substrate.
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8 -Thesis Conclusion
In spite of all the attention the sensorimotor theory has been given since its first official
statement, many of its tenets have continued to be incompletely or ambiguously defined, and
one of my goals in this thesis has been to go some way toward clarifying them. This
undertaking is closely related to the separate project of responding to some of the criticisms
that have been levelled against the theory. I have focused in particular on Clark’s argument
that perceptual experience is likely to depend on the activation of representations which are
not intimately involved in bodily movement and which stand-in for types, categories and
relative locations rather than laws of sensorimotor contingency. To the end both of
responding to Clark’s argument and arguing for a particular understanding of the
sensorimotor theory, I have suggested that there are good reasons to think that perceptual
experience depends on the exercise of behavioural capacities, which may be relatively
coarse-grained. In this final passage, I am going to tie together some key strands from the main
part of the thesis.
Sensorimotor contingency is perhaps the most important concept deployed by the
sensorimotor theory. However, there is sometimes equivocation about what SMCs actually
are. One potential tension, although I do not find it particularly problematic, is the shift of
emphasis in Noë’s sole-author accounts from SMCs governing subdoxastic sense inputs to the
SMCs that respectively define P-properties and objective properties, the latter being
characterised by the ways P-properties change with movement. More could be said about the
relation between these different kinds of property. However, there is nothing obvious to
suggest that a final version of the sensorimotor theory could not refer to a combination of all
these kinds of sensorimotor contingency.
More problematic is the slide many statements of the sensorimotor account make
between describing SMCs as counterfactual conditionals, i.e. the results of merely possible
movements, and as patterns of bidirectional output-input dependence manifest in the agent’s
sensorimotor engagements right now. This distinction is similar to the one suggested by
Burhmann, Di Paolo and Barandiaran’s concepts of ‘sensorimotor environment’ and
‘sensorimotor habitat’. For the sake of conceptual hygiene, I think SMCs should be
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understood only to describe the results of counterfactually possible movements, meaning it
need not be possible to identify them from the agent’s present bodily interactions. SMCs, on
this understanding, describe the properties a subject exhibits an appropriate kind of sensitivity
to if she perceives, but do not presuppose that the subject does perceive. The concept, so
construed, avoids prejudging the means by which subjects exhibit the appropriate sensitivity,
which could involve the activation of representations, the exercise of behavioural capacities, or
both.
Further, adopting the counterfactual conditional understanding of SMCs does justice
to the sensorimotor theory’s central suggestion that perceivers, by virtue of possessing
sensorimotor mastery, experience the presence (in absence) of parts of the environment even
when they are not presently interacting with those features in an outward bodily way. I have
sometimes heard people suggest that SMCs are properties a perceiver can ‘have’. This is
inaccurate. They could be properties a perceiver’s interactions with the environment have. On
the understanding I prefer, they are bodily relations a perceiver stands in to the outside
environment which we describe by specifying what would happen if the subject or objects in
question moved in particular ways. One reason it is important to clearly understand the
concept of sensorimotor contingency is that a next phase for the sensorimotor theory will be
to give detailed descriptions of the SMCs that comprise specific experiential properties, such
as shades of red. Moreover, how one understands the concept of sensorimotor contingency
will have a knock on effect on how one understands the concept of sensorimotor mastery as
well as the physical mechanism implicated in it.
As I suggested earlier in the thesis, sensorimotor mastery admits two possible
directions of fit. It is sometimes glossed as Being Able To Act, which implies a desire-like
direction of fit, and sometimes as Knowing What Would Happen If You Did Act, which
implies a belief-like direction of fit. One proposal is that sensorimotor mastery is essentially
belief-like, and that having an ability to act is merely a trivial consequence of possessing
sensorimotor mastery. Noë offers this interpretation at times, although not consistently. The
construal of sensorimotor mastery in which it is primarily belief-like invites the suggestion
that the exercise of sensorimotor mastery is constituted by the deployment of internal
representations bearing content about SMCs. The representations could take the form, for
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instance, of the predictive models proposed by Seth (2014). Although this sort of account
could turn out to be correct, I do not think endorsing it is the sensorimotor theorist’s best bet,
since the proposal entails abandoning many of the improvements the sensorimotor theory
otherwise makes on the orthodox approach.
One improvement the sensorimotor theory would otherwise make is to avoid placing
an unsustainable explanatory burden on the concept of internal representation. There are
significant limitations to the explanatory efficacy of appeals to internal representation. Hutto
and Myin (2012) have demonstrated that it is not clear that subpersonal content can ever be
accounted for in a naturalistically respectable way. Even if one were not moved by Hutto and
Myin’s contention that any and all content-talk should therefore be avoided, there are sensible
limits that should be placed on internal representation’s theoretical role. Since it has not been
established that neural states can bear metaphysically real content rather than content we
ascribe as a useful metaphor because it is explanatorily expedient to do so, we should not
appeal to content to account for phenomenal qualities, particularly if we, as physicalists, hope
to respond to those with metaphysically-motivated anti-physicalist intuitions about qualia.
Setting this point to one side, it is not certain, in any case, that appealing solely to the content
and functional role of neural representations will ever be sufficient by itself to make it
intelligible how personal level perceptual content or perceptual phenomenology is connected
to the physical.
These drawbacks also speak against the objection, from Clark (2008), that perceptual
experience depends on the activation in the ventral stream of internal representations geared
towards the exercise of epistemic skills like sorting, sifting and classifying, and that the
sensorimotor theory is therefore implausible. If these skills are not bodily skills, the view ends
up depending on the content of the internal representations to account for phenomenal
qualities and, as I have suggested, internal representations do not appear to be up to this job. If
sorting and sifting are varieties of sensorimotor skill, as is plausible, then Clark’s account of
ventral stream perception does not challenge the sensorimotor theory’s core claim that
perception is constituted by the exercise of sensorimotor skills, which we can allow are likely
to be coarse-grained rather than fine-grained.
Sensorimotor theorists also have a strategic reason not to endorse the claim that the
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exercise of sensorimotor understanding is constituted by the activation of representations,
since doing so makes the theory a hostage to fortune. If the phenomenology of
presence-in-absence and the logical relation between perception and action could be
compellingly accounted for in a way that no longer entails that perceivers master SMCs, then
few of the sensorimotor theory’s core tenets would remain secure. Having said that, if it were
established the perceptual experience does depend on nothing more than the activation of
internal representations, the sensorimotor theory would continue to have promise as an
account of phenomenal qualities. Internal representations, supposing that they do bear
genuine content, could not bear the hyperintensional content required to actively discount
the possibility that representations of types, categories and locations are also representations
of SMCs. Appealing to SMCs rather than types, categories and locations could, however, help
representationalists about phenomenal qualities respond to the Inverted Earth
counterexample.
Although there are problems with tying the sensorimotor theory too heavily to the
concept of internal representation, sensorimotor mastery must, at least in a loose sense,
involve Knowing What Would Happen If You Did Act, since SMCs describe the
consequences of merely possible movements, and perceivers must grasp them in some way. My
suggestion is that sensorimotor mastery nonetheless does not depend essentially on internal
representation, but on behavioural capacities. These capacities, I suggest, implicate Knowing
What Would Happen If You Did Act just in case they meet appropriate criteria. This
approach perhaps comes close to what Noë would say is the behaviourist mistake of conflating
effect (i.e. behaviour) with cause (i.e. knowledge). However, it avoids crude behaviourism.
First, the idea is not simply to abandon sensorimotor mastery as a belief-like capacity and
appeal to behavioural capacities instead. My suggestion is that the relevant behavioural
capacities logically implicate the appropriate understanding, meaning that the understanding
is a real entity even if it is not reified as something like a neural representation. Thus it does
not deny perceptual consciousness, but explains perceptual consciousness by appeal to
sensorimotor mastery. Further, the present view avoids the implausible suggestion that
perceivers must in every case move their bodies in order to perceive, since the behavioural
capacities may be active merely by virtue of a subject’s being prepared to behave. Preparedness
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to behave could, in principle, be ascribed on the basis of neural and bodily states without
appeal to representations or presently-occurring bodily movements.
Finally, the view I am recommending does not rule out the possibility of giving a
restricted theoretical role to internal representation. In fact, it endorses pluralism about how
the relevant behavioural capacities may be accounted for physicalistically. It is compatible with
an entirely nonrepresentational dynamical systems approach. It is also compatible with an
approach that appeals to information processing, including the deployment of internal
representations, should they prove the most effective way to explain how the appropriate
behavioural capacities are realised. This approach to representation avoids unduly conflating
the relatively innocent suggestion that representation is a useful metaphorical posit for
making sense of the physical processes implicated in perception with the faulty suggestion that
perception just is the activation of an internal representation.
A final thing is to see how the behavioural capacity view can make sense of the
phenomenology of object experience described by Noë, as well as provide a distinctive answer
to the puzzle of temporal experience, which present a specific challenge to the sensorimotor
theory as well as presenting a challenge to accounts of perception more generally. This is my
suggestion: Perception unfolds as a temporally-extended process involving the exercise of
capacities for bodily behaviour. This process frequently involves outwardly observable bodily
movement, although it need not, since behavioural capacities are often exercised merely in the
course of becoming prepared to move our bodies. This process cannot be broken down, in a
principled way, into discrete time slices. Considered at any particular instant, however, a
perceiver is poised to make certain bodily movements. This poise reflects the perceiver’s
understanding of certain SMCs, where SMCs are taken to be characterised by counterfactual
conditionals specifying the results of possible movements. The movements a perceiver is
poised to make at a particular instant are sufficient to account for the perceiver’s experiencing
the presence in absence of certain environmental detail. However the SMCs they are
exercising mastery of at this instant are insufficient to determinately specify any particular
environmental property, for example a shade of red.
The experience of a determinate feature, such as a shade of red, only happens in the
course of the temporally-extended exercise of that behavioural capacity. Over a period of time,
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a perceiver undergoes a continually evolving poise to make skillful bodily movements. Over
the course of this evolution, the perceiver may experience a shade of red, although they can
never fixate on the shade of red, since seeing the shade of red depends on this evolving,
temporally extended, non-atomic process. If it the content of the experience did not
temporally track the vehicle, there need not be any obstacle to seeing the shade of red all at
once, as a non-temporally extended content could supervene on a temporally-extended vehicle.
But we can make sense of Noë’s description of visual phenomenology, which I find compelling,
by supposing that the content temporally tracks the vehicle. This means the experience of the
shade of red is an experience of temporal extension. This is suggestive of a different response
to the opera singer case than the one given by Noë, namely a version of extensionalism rather
than the cinematic approach he endorses. This gives us a way to account for the
phenomenology associated both with event and object experience.
One thing I have not addressed in detail in this thesis is the precise mechanism
implicated in sensorimotor mastery, and this aspect of the sensorimotor theory continues to
be in need of significant development. Further, I have not examined in detail the precise
character of the behavioural capacities that would implicate different forms of sensorimotor
mastery; offering such an account has the potential to be a useful next step for the
sensorimotor theory. A final noteworthy limitation is that I have not resolved the more
general question of how to licence the claim that appropriate behaviours and behavioural
capacities are themselves intentionally-directed. Answering this question might involve
endorsing the biological enactivists’ appeal to autonomy and normativity, although we might
finally decide that notions like these are dispensable. This is a question that the sensorimotor
theory ought to take a stance on. However, I believe that with a clear understanding of the
fundamentals of the sensorimotor theory, and an appreciation of its significant merits, we
ought to be well placed to progress the theory further.
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The sensorimotor theory is an influential, non-mainstream account of perception and
perceptual consciousness intended to improve in various ways on orthodox theories. It is often
taken to be a variety of enactivism, and in common with enactivist cognitive science more
generally, it de-emphasises the theoretical role played by internal representation and other
purely neural processes, giving theoretical pride of place instead to interactive engagements
between the brain, non-neural body and outside environment.
In addition to offering a distinctive account of the processing that underlies perceptual
consciousness, the sensorimotor theory aims to offer a new and improved account the logical
and phenomenological character of perceptual experience, and the relation between physical
and phenomenal states. Since its inception in a 2001 paper by O’Regan and Noë, the theory
has prompted a good deal of increasingly prominent theoretical and practical work in
cognitive science, as well as a large body of secondary literature in philosophy of cognitive
science and philosophy of perception. In spite of its influential character, many of the theory’s
most basic tenets are incompletely or ambiguously defined, and it has attracted a number of
prominent objections.
This thesis aims to clarify the conceptual foundations of the sensorimotor theory,
including the key theoretical concepts of sensorimotor contingency, sensorimotor mastery,
and presence-as-access, and defends a particular understanding of the respective theoretical
roles of internal representation and behavioural capacities. In so doing, the thesis aims to
highlight the sensorimotor theory’s virtues and defend it from some leading criticisms, with
particular attention to a response by Clark which claims that perception and perceptual
experience plausibly depend on the activation of representations which are not intimately
involved in bodily engagements between the agent and environment. A final part of the thesis
offers a sensorimotor account of the experience of temporally extended events, and shows how
with reference to this we can better understand object experience.
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11 - The Sensorimotor Theory of Perceptual Experience
The sensorimotor theory is an influential, non-mainstream account of perception and
perceptual consciousness intended to offer an improvement on orthodox theories. It is often
taken to be a variety of ‘enactivism’, and in common with enactivist cognitive science more
generally, it de-emphasises the theoretical role played by internal representation and other
purely neural processes, giving theoretical pride of place instead to interactive engagements
between the brain, non-neural body and outside environment.
Although orthodox cognitive scientific accounts of vision vary in their details, they
commonly descend from the hugely influential work of Marr, brought together in his
posthumously published book Vision (1982). Marr’s contention was that vision is a form of
information processing, beginning with the retinal image and resulting in a detailed,
neurally-realised representation of the outside environment, the deployment of which is
sufficient for visual awareness. Allied to this general approach is a naive and, as we will see,
implausible conception of vision, in which this representation takes the form of an expansive
and richly-detailed topographic model of the outside world, the activation of which is
sufficient for a richly-detailed visual experience.
Although orthodox theories never explicitly endorse the naive conception, it is not
disowned by Marr’s basic claim that vision is a process of constructing a detailed internal
representation based on the more limited information available from the retinal image. This
has prompted sensorimotor theorists to suggest that research on vision is in many cases tacitly
motivated by the naive conception, causing it to generate faulty results. Part of the
sensorimotor theory’s ambition, in offering an alternative to Marr’s basic thesis, is to provide a
theoretical framework which avoids conceptual mistakes and enables more fruitful empirical
research. To this end, the theory claims that perception is not a process of representation, but
of skill-driven bodily exploration of the outside environment.
In addition to offering a distinctive account of the processing that underlies
perceptual consciousness, the sensorimotor theory aims to explain perceptual consciousness
itself, in particular its phenomenal character and the relation between phenomenal and
physical properties. Many people continue to be moved by anti-physicalist intuitions about
2‘qualia’, and the sensorimotor theory aims to respond to these by providing compelling and
principled reasons for thinking that there is nothing more to being in a given phenomenal
state than being engaged in a particular kind of embodied interaction with the environment.
As before, the theory is supposed to be an advance on accounts of consciousness that appeal
solely to facts about the brain, which sensorimotor theorists think lack the resources to defeat
anti-physicalist intuitions.
Besides responding to this issue, the sensorimotor theory provides a number of
distinctive insights into the logical and phenomenological character of perceptual experience.
The theory, interestingly, integrates its contribution to various non-empirically oriented
debates about perceptual experience with its account of the cognitive science of perception. In
addition to taking a critical stance toward internal representation in cognitive science, the
theory rejects representationalism in a number of other domains, including the attempt to
explain phenomenal qualities by appeal to representational content, and representational
realist accounts of the epistemology and metaphysics of perception. In place of representation,
the theory appeals in each case to a bodily relation the perceiver stands in to the outside
environment.
The theory was given its best known early statement in a paper by O’Regan and Noë,
titled ‘A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness’ (2001a) - in fact, it is an
account of perception more generally, although the focus is on vision. I will henceforth use the
abbreviation O&N to refer to that paper or the paper’s authors in cases where it is that
particular paper I am referring to. The other best known statement of the sensorimotor theory
is Noë’s (2004) book Action in Perception, which is joined by more recent book-length
accounts by O’Regan (2011) and Noë (2012), and a number of early papers on the theory,
frequently authored in collaboration with Myin (e.g., Myin and O’Regan, 2002; O’Regan,
Myin and Noë, 2004; 2005). Although O&N is the first official statement of the theory, it
bears strong similarities to an earlier account by Hurley (1998). O&N were not informed by it
when they first formulated the account, but Noë went on to collaborate with Hurley (Hurley
and Noë, 2003; 2007), suggesting a case can be made for considering Hurley’s book the
earliest work in the canon. Other important early work by the theory’s originators, although
non-canonical, includes O’Regan (1992), Pessoa, Thompson and Noë (1998), and Thompson
3and Noë (2004). The above accounts, and others by the theory’s instigators, are supplemented
by a large body of secondary work on the theory.
The theory has had an impact in a range of sometimes only loosely-related disciplines.
In particular, it has inspired a good deal of increasingly prominent theoretical and practical
work in cognitive science: widely-discussed glosses on the theory from the very recent past
include, for example, a dynamical systems model by Burhmann, Di Paolo and Barandiaran
(2013) and a predictive coding account by Seth (2014). The theory has attracted interest and
no little controversy among philosophers of cognitive science, prompting prominent lines of
criticism, for instance, by Clark (Clark and Toribio, 2001; Clark, 2006; 2008; 2009), Block
(2001; 2005; O’Regan and Block, 2012), Dennett (2001), Prinz (2006), and many others. It
has also attracted attention from philosophers of perception, a prominent example of which is
a published symposium featuring responses to the sensorimotor theory by Campbell (2008),
Martin (2008) and Kelly (2008).
1.1 - 4ECognitive Science and the Varieties of Enactivism
The sensorimotor theory is situated amongst a complex web of theoretical ancestors and close
cousins, and I will draw attention to some of these later in the thesis, in cases where it is
helpful to do so. For now, it will be useful to do just a little basic scene setting. Although the
theory has had an impact in non-empirically oriented debates about mind and perception, it is
primarily a philosophically-motivated entry into the cognitive science of perception and
perceptual consciousness. In particular, it enters the running alongside other 4E accounts, a
broad class of approaches that depart from the view, mainstream in recent decades, that
cognition is best explained by nothing more than the brain’s construction and deployment of
internal representations.
4E cognitive science claims that cognition is properly characterised using one or more
E-words: embedded, embodied, extended and/or enactive. Embedded cognition is cognition
that must be explained by appeal to non-trivial facts about the environment in which the
cognitive tasks are carried out. Embodied cognition is cognition whose architecture
4incorporates the non-neural body as well as the brain.1 Extended cognition is cognition
whose architecture also incorporates the external environment. Enactive accounts frequently
reject internal representation altogether, and claim that cognition is ‘enacted’ through a
process of interactive engagement between the brain, non-neural body and outside
environment. It is worth noting that the degree to which the competing 4E approaches can be
reconciled or, alternatively, constitute quite separate and incompatible traditions, is a matter
of debate: see, e.g., Ward and Stapleton (2012) for an argument that they can be brought
together, and Chemero (2009) andWheeler (2014) for arguments to the opposite effect.
As I have mentioned, the sensorimotor theory is often regarded as a kind of
enactivism. The best-established version of this approach is the ‘biological’ variant, notable
statements of which include Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991) and Thompson (2007).
Enactivists in this tradition combine insights from phenomenology (in particular,
Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2013) with work on the biological phenomenon of autopoiesis (e.g.,
Maturana and Varela, 1980). They claim that the interactive processes associated with
cognition are continuous with those associated with life. Thompson observes that a cell, for
example, produces its own material constituents through a metabolic interaction with the
outside environment. Through this process of self-creation, the cell establishes the significance
of certain environmental perturbations as either leaving the organism intact or resulting in its
disintegration, and in this sense creates its own environmental niche. Living organisms arise
out of self-organising biological processes like these in the way a tornado arises out of a
dynamical process: they are, as Thompson puts it, invariant patterns that subsist in a changing
physical substrate, implying they are not merely causally dependent on interactive processes,
but constituted by them. Biological enactivists claim that self-organising biological processes
of an appropriate kind are by nature minded, and that appealing to them helps close the
explanatory gap between consciousness and the physical. To count as minded, an organism
must be autonomous and answerable to norms. The appeal to biological self-organisation
helps explain this. Organisms are autonomous by virtue of self-organising, and answerable to
1 The label ‘embodied cognition’ is also sometimes adopted by quite different accounts, in
which cognition is wholly brain-bound but involves neurally-realised representations of bodily
states.
5norms because their existence is predicated on responding to the environment in an
appropriate way.
A recent entrant to the enactivist running is Hutto and Myin’s (2012) ‘radical
enactivism’. In common with most statements of the sensorimotor theory, the authors
exclude the biological apparatus distinctive of enactivism in its original form. Their distinctive
contribution is to emphatically reject any theoretical role for representation or content, i.e.
physical states bearing truth or correctness conditions about other physical states. In place of
content, the authors claim that ‘basic’ cognition, meaning any cognition that is not shaped by
natural language, consists of nothing more than interactive engagements between the brain,
body and the external objects to which the cognition is intentionally-directed, which the
authors propose can be explained by appeal to a nonrepresentational teleofunctionalist
theoretical framework.
Noë gave the label ‘enactive’ to his (2004) version of the sensorimotor approach, not
to declare a strict allegiance with biological enactivism, but to highlight its resemblance to it.
Like biological enactivism, the sensorimotor theory downplays internal representation, and
emphasises the role played by bodily interaction with the environment. In particular, it claims,
like biological enactivism, that perception depends on the perceiver’s mastering, in a bodily
way, the character of its own bodily relation to the environment, in particular the way its
orientation to objects in the environment would change given possible movements. Noë also
expresses some sympathy toward the enactivist claim that consciousness requires life.2 Thus
the sensorimotor theory is typically regarded, with some justification, as a variety of
enactivism. Hutto and Myin complain that the sensorimotor theory retains objectionable
orthodox commitments on the ground that it retains a commitment to content and
representation (although whether they are right about this is controversial, and Myin is
himself, we should note, one of the original proponents of the sensorimotor theory). Despite
criticising the sensorimotor theory for being insufficiently radical, the authors have, by
including it in their taxonomy of enactive theories, helped crystallise the consensus that the
sensorimotor theory deserves the ‘enactivist’ moniker.
2 This claim does not, however, feature elsewhere in the sensorimotor theory, and is rejected
by O’Regan, 2011.
61.2 - Structure of Thesis
In spite of its influential nature, the sensorimotor theory is formulated in differing and
sometimes inconsistent ways throughout its canonical statements as well as the secondary
literature, and in some cases its commitments have not been spelt out in sufficient detail at all.
For instance, it is not clear whether the theory should, broadly speaking, be regarded as partly
continuous with representationalist approaches in cognitive science, or allied with
anti-representationalist embodied or enactive approaches such as those endorsed, for example,
by Thompson (2008), Chemero (2009) and Hutto and Myin (2012). More narrowly, it is not
clear what the sensorimotor skills the theory appeals to actually are, nor what kind of physical
mechanism is implicated in them. Other examples of vaguely or inconsistently defined theses
will become evident as the thesis progresses, and part of my aim is to identify aspects of the
sensorimotor theory that are poorly defined and go some way toward clarifying them.
In chapter 2, I attempt a careful formulation of the negative claims that properly
motivate the sensorimotor theory, an aspect of the account which is easily misunderstood and
which I argue has been misunderstood, in one notable case, by Prinz (2006). Chapter 3 serves
the dual purpose of laying out the sensorimotor theory’s tenets in detail, and offering what I
take to be the most promising and internally consistent ways of understanding them. Chapter
4 identifies some key limitations with the theory’s notion of sensorimotor ‘understanding’,
and offers a new proposal about what we should take sensorimotor understanding to be.
A later part of the thesis addresses some of the key criticisms that have been levelled
against the theory, in particular by Clark (2008) and Block (O’Regan and Block, 2012).
Chapter 5 addresses a worst case scenario in which it has been established that perception does
in fact depend on nothing more than the activation of internal representations, which are not
themselves intimately involved in the agent’s sensorimotor engagements with the outside
environment. I argue that in this event, there is still good reason to endorse the sensorimotor
theory as an account of phenomenal qualities, and I offer some suggestions about how such an
account could work. Chapter 6 offers a more robust defence of the sensorimotor theory in
which I attempt to make it plausible that perceptual experience is constituted by the exercise
of capacities for skillful bodily behaviour, and argue that representations should at most be
7thought to play a heavily restricted theoretical role.
Chapter 7 moves beyond the core principles of the sensorimotor theory and begins to
address new contributions the sensorimotor theory can make to long-discussed perceptual
phenomena. Specifically, it addresses temporal extension. I argue that both the activity of
perceiving and the contents of perceptual experience are temporally extended. Thus I suggest
that object experience as well as event experience has a temporally-extended content, which
temporally tracks the process of perceiving.
The aims of this thesis can be expressed as a unified goal. By clarifying some of the
theory’s founding principles, I aim to show how it can address some of the most prominent
objections that have been levelled against it. By doing this, I hope to illustrate the novel
contribution the sensorimotor approach can make to resolving some longstanding puzzles.
Thus I hope to leave the sensorimotor theory in better shape than I found it.
82 -MakingConceptual Space
The sensorimotor approach makes a number of striking and relatively novel claims about
perceptual consciousness and the physical processes that underlie it. Because of the more or
less unorthodox nature of its positive claims, it is natural that the authors aim to motivate the
approach by highlighting, with some emphasis, the faults and limitations of older approaches,
and large early sections of O&N and Noë (2004) are devoted to this. The problem with this
negative aspect of the sensorimotor theory is that many of the claims under target are not
widely endorsed by contemporary theories, and in some cases merely reflect naive
misconceptions or defunct historical ideas. In its standard presentation, the sensorimotor
account is not pitched as a rejoinder just to mistakes of this sort, but also to the
well-established orthodox view of vision in cognitive science, which holds that perception is
realised by the construction and deployment, in the brain, of a detailed representation of the
outside world.
The main part of this chapter will examine the manner in which the objections
levelled in Noë and O’Regan’s original statements of the sensorimotor approach cast doubt on
the mature orthodox model. I will argue that they do not do enough by themselves to displace
the orthodox view’s core dogma that visual consciousness depends on internal representation,
but they do, at least, indicate that orthodox theories must be careful to avoid certain mistakes.
They may also intimate that the orthodox model is founded, implicitly, on a misplaced
ambition, namely the desire to repair an obsolete ‘inner movie’ idea of vision that would better
be replaced entirely. Because of the limited reach of the authors’ negative claims, the
sensorimotor account must be framed so that its appeal does not entirely depend on them.
2.1 - Kepler andDescartes: The Lessons fromHistory
In a passage titled ‘Fallacies Pictorial and Homuncular’, Noë (2004) addresses historical
accounts of vision, with a view to drawing morals for present day theory. Drawing on
Lindberg’s (1976) overview of pre-modern accounts, he calls attention, in particular, to
Kepler’s work on the optics of vision. Given what he knew about the eye’s anatomy and the
9principles that govern the refraction of light, Kepler was able to correctly identify that light
meeting the lens is inverted (from top to bottom) and reversed (from left to right) before
finally being projected onto the retina. This finding troubled Kepler. In addition to noting,
quite appropriately, that the retinal image plays an important role in conscious vision, he
thought that it did so by actually functioning as a picture. If the retinal image is inverted and
reversed relative to the outside environment, it does not bear a pictorial resemblance to the
environment as perceived. For this reason, Kepler ‘tortured’ himself attempting to identify a
mechanism by which the light is re-inverted and re-reversed before reaching the retina. Finally
abandoning this effort, he concluded that the disparity between visual experience and the
projected image had to be corrected by a visual faculty occurring beyond the retina - involving,
as he thought, spirits - and falling outside the scope of his own interest in vision, which was
limited to optics.
Noë notes that Kepler’s misconceived search for a mechanism to re-invert and
re-reverse the light was motivated by the more basic error, which Descartes later cautioned
against, of supposing that the retinal image requires a further perceiver, a homunculus, to look
at it. This is a faulty way of thinking, since it merely introduces the requirement for another
homunculus to explain how the first one sees, and, following this pattern, an infinite regress of
homunculi prevents explanatory closure. We should note that it is not obviously incoherent,
in principle, to imagine that an image functions as a picture even in the absence of an observer,
although claiming that a mere image constitutes a ‘picture’ requires some kind of explicit
justification. Consider that a naturally occurring and function-less image such as a reflection
of the sky in a lake does not merit being described as a picture in normal usage. Kepler, in any
case, did think a homunculus was needed to view the picture, and for this reason was guilty of
attempting to explain a psychological trait by introducing a homunculus that possesses the
very same psychological trait - the most elementary version of what Kenny (1971) has called
the ‘homunculus fallacy’.3 In spite of warning against the error, Descartes committed it
himself by implying that the immaterial soul, serving as a homunculus, registers images
presented to it at the pineal gland.
3 In section 2.1.3 I will address some different kinds of homuncularity, but this for now is the
kind of homunculus under consideration.
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2.1.1 - Pictures, Filling-In and the Bridge Locus
Noë (2004) claims that a confusion similar to the one that dogged Kepler persists into the
present day. He gives the example of filling-in, a process by which the brain is alleged to
compensate for information missing from the retinal image. Proponents of filling-in claim
that the brain makes inferences about environmental features obscured, for example, by the
retina’s blind spot, and uses this inference-making mechanism to reconstruct the missing
detail in an internal representation (e.g., Goodman, 1978).
On this topic, Noë, with reservations, endorses Dennett’s (1991; 1992) position.
Dennett is known for criticising the view that the brain’s visual processing is geared toward
the production of a Cartesian theatre, an end-product which occurs in a spatially
circumscribed area of the brain and constitutes the necessary and sufficient substrate of visual
consciousness. Dennett claims that this view, ‘Cartesian materialism’, is motivated by a tacit
commitment to the existence of a homunculus for whose benefit the visual processing takes
place. This is a problematic idea for the reason I have just noted, although Dennett is not
concerned with homuncular regress so much as with implausible theoretical views that follow
from positing a homunculus, the full details of which need not be rehearsed here. He observes
that Cartesian materialists are forced to presume that the brain fills-in data missing at the
blind spot because they imagine that the notional homunculus would otherwise notice that
the information is missing. Because he rejects this position, Dennett claims instead that the
brain simply ignores the lack of information at the blind spot. Noë (2004) enthusiastically
endorses Dennett’s rejection of Cartesian materialism, and in diluted form the scepticism
about filling-in. He makes the important proviso that filling-in is only a misguided posit if the
need for it is assumed a priori as a result of prior commitment to the existence of a
homunculus. This does not rule out the possibility that the existence of filling-in can be
established by appeal to relevant empirical work.
Visual stability is a further domain in which Noë suggests contemporary theories are
sometimes guilty of the homunculus fallacy. It is sometimes considered noteworthy that
despite continual saccadic eye movements and attendant changes to retinal input, the world is
presented in visual experience as being stable. There is a temptation to assume that the brain
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must deploy a special mechanism to compensate for this, as if there were a homunculus who
would otherwise confuse the resultant changes to the positions of objects in the retinal image
for changes in the spatial position of the objects themselves. Noë argues that a compensatory
mechanism is only a conceptual necessity if you think that perception consists of a pictorial
representation derived from the retinal image and offered up for the benefit of a homunculus.
If you do not think this, you need not imagine that visual experience is in the first place prone,
without a special compensatory mechanism, to mistaking eye movement-related changes in
retinal input for changes in the outside world. Thus, an a priori commitment to the existence
of the compensatory mechanisms only arises if you commit the homunculus fallacy. O&N and
O’Regan (1992) make a similar point concerning saccadic suppression. Saccadic eye
movements create a motion blur effect on the retinal image, and it is sometimes thought that
the brain inhibits informational input from the retina during saccades in order to prevent
perceivers from experiencing a blurred visual scene (Matin, 1974). O&N suggest that this is
likely to be motivated by a commitment to a homunculus, since the smear effect need not be
compensated for if the retinal image does not function as a picture.
These examples aside, Noë is imprecise about the intended scope of the historical
lesson. He claims that: “No contemporary theorist believes that we see by seeing internal
pictures” (2004, p. 46), but finishes the passage by stating: “The purpose of this section has
been to reveal the extent to which our thinking about perception, like that of Leonardo and
Kepler, is tied to a problematic conception of the need for pictures in the head” (p. 48). What
Noë means when he says that theories are tied to this problematic conception is ambiguous,
given that there are many ways a theory could be ‘tied’ to some conception which need not
involve explicitly endorsing it.
Prinz (2006), responding specifically to Action in Perception, takes it that Noë’s
intention is to draw a rough and ready parallel between Kepler and a contemporary version of
the ‘pictorial’ view, in which neural states yield visual awareness with a particular content by
virtue of their pictorial qualities. Prinz observes that: “We do not have color filled pixels in the
head, much less an inner observer to discern all the parts. But this view is not seriously
defended by anyone” (2006, p. 12). Appealing to Kosslyn (1994) as more representative
example of a contemporary pictorial theory, he states that Kosslyn takes care not to require an
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infinite regress of homunculi, and observes that pictorial views in general are not
pre-committed to the existence of filling-in at the blind spot, since they could instead endorse
Dennett’s suggestion that the subject simply ignores the absences of information.
Prinz continues by citing a study by Ramachandran and Gregory (1991) in which
subjects were presented with a television screen showing at first a ‘snow’ pattern and
subsequently switched to show a solid colour instead. Subjects reported undergoing a briefly
continued awareness of the snow pattern in an area of the visual field corresponding to the
blind spot, even after the stimulus had been changed. The study suggests that information
missing at the blind spot is not, in fact, simply ignored in visual processing, as if it were there
would be no way to explain the continued percept of the snow in this region of the visual field.
Prinz claims that the evidence that filling-in does take place counts as an embarrassment for
the sensorimotor theory.
Noë is admittedly vague about the lesson he intends us to take from Kepler and
Descartes, and a sceptic would be well-justified in observing that Noë does not
comprehensively address the numerous resources that orthodox, including pictorial, accounts
appear to have to avoid the homunculus fallacy. However, Prinz’s rebuttal falls wide of the
mark. Noë neither claims that pictorial accounts necessarily commit the homunculus fallacy
and therefore fail, nor denies the existence of neural filling-in. A better account of his position
can be found in an earlier paper by Pessoa, Thompson and Noë (1998). The paper rejects
Cartesian materialism and also a doctrine the authors call ‘analytic isomorphism’, the a priori
thesis that the substrate of perceptual consciousness must be a circumscribed area of the brain
- a ‘bridge locus’ (Teller and Pugh, 1983) - which bears a functional (including topological) or
topographical (i.e. map-like) isomorphic correspondence to the features represented by the
subject’s experience. Cartesian materialism and analytic isomorphism resemble one another in
that they are both committed to the existence of a bridge locus, although isomorphic
correspondence between the neural and the perceptual is in principle not essential to
Cartesian materialism, and proponents of analytic isomorphism could deny that their position
is motivated by any tacit or explicit commitment to the existence of a homunculus.
Pessoa et al. claim that if you endorse analytic isomorphism, you have a different
reason to assume a priori the existence of filling-in. To maintain the isomorphism between the
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bridge locus and the content of perceptual experience, there must be a neural state which is
isomorphic to features that the experience represents as occurring in the location obscured by
the blind spot, given that the subject does not experience the blind spot as an absence. The
authors take it that once we reject Cartesian materialism and analytic isomorphism, there is
no reason to aprioristically assume the existence of filling-in, although they actively argue for
the claim that filling-in does take place, appealing to empirical data which I will not rehearse
given that there is no disagreement on this point between the authors and Prinz.
A similar point holds with regard to pictures in the head. The pictorial view states that
image-like physical states help generate visual awareness by serving as pictures, and this implies
they are topographically or topologically isomorphic to the features represented in the
experience, regardless of whether or not there is supposed to be a homunculus to look at them.
Thus, pictorial theories could fall under the doctrine of analytic isomorphism, although they
need not. Pessoa et al. are explicit, however, that they are open, subject to empirical evidence,
to the claim that neural states help enable visual consciousness by virtue of bearing a pictorial
resemblance to the features represented in visual consciousness. The authors reject the
aprioristic commitment to isomorphism, along with the suggestion that where pictorial
representations do play a role, this takes place in a spatially localised neural region which serves
as a bridge locus. Noë (2004) says nothing to contradict any of the claims I have just
mentioned from the (1998) co-authored paper.
Notice that for each of the phenomena Noë (2004) and Pessoa et al. (1998) target -
pictorial representations, filling-in, compensatory mechanisms for visual stability, and
neural-perceptual isomorphisms - the claim is not that these phenomena do not exist. The
authors are careful to claim that the phenomena may exist, and in some cases probably do. A
better moral is that confusion arises when we make theoretical commitments to Cartesian
materialism or analytic isomorphism necessitating the existence of something that should be
an empirical posit, a diagnosis that at least holds true when we think of Kepler’s commitment
to pictorial representations and a homunculus. In one sense, then, the negative claims
motivating the sensorimotor theory are more modest than Prinz suggests. Noë should not be
taken to be attempting to actively disprove pictorial theories or other representational
theories that, like Kosslyn’s, take care not to commit the homunculus fallacy.
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Prinz’s other objection is that Noë is targeting a straw man, given that no one
seriously defends the claim that we have colour-filled pixels in the head or a perceiver to
discern them. Strictly, this may be true. Pessoa et al. observe, however, that in the
commentaries to their BBS paper, Lehar (1998) explicitly claims that spatial perception
logically requires the existence of a three-dimensional neural model. In his own widely-cited
BBS paper, Lehar (2003) claims that topographical or topological isomorphism is not a logical
requirement for perception, but that functional isomorphism is. Using the (2003) paper as a
guide, Lehar’s requirement can be reconstructed in the following way. Imagine that the brain
contains a 3D model in the shape of a cube and that this correlates with the conscious percept
of an identically-shaped cube. The model is thus topographically isomorphic to the perceived
cube. Now suppose that instead of being perfectly cube-shaped, the model has the shape of a
stretched-out cube, with some planes that are oblong rather than square. The model continues
to be topologically isomorphic to the perceived cube, because the model’s planes continue to
stand in appropriate spatial relations to one another. Informally, this is because a cube could
be distorted into a stretched-out cube shape without ripping or tearing.
Lehar claims that topological or topographical isomorphisms are likely to play a role in
perception, but are not required as a matter of logical necessity. Now, imagine that instead of
merely being stretched-out, the cube-shaped neural model is scrambled at random, such that it
no longer looks anything like a cube, even a distorted one. This means it is no longer
topologically or topographically isomorphic to the perceived cube. Think of the scrambling,
however, as a warping of the geometry of the space the shape inhabits, rather than merely a
warping of the shape itself. Suppose that the perceived cube is transformed in some way, for
example rotated. If the model is transformed in the way that a topographical model would
have been, allowing for the distorted geometry of the space it inhabits, a functional
isomorphism obtains between the model and the perceived cube.4
Lehar insists that functional isomorphism, at least, is logically necessary for perception.
This is a strikingly robust claim, and almost sufficient for the theory to constitute an instance
of analytic isomorphism, although the appeal to functional isomorphism avoids the logical
4 Pessoa et al. (1998) use the term ‘topological isomorphism’ to refer to topological or
functional isomorphism in Lehar’s usage. I am following Lehar’s usage.
15
requirement for a localised bridge locus. Lehar suggests, however, that there is reason to think,
prior to empirical confirmation, that topographical and topological isomorphisms are
particularly likely to obtain, since they are more efficient than other functional isomorphisms
to implement. This is a demanding theoretical commitment, and it suggests that Lehar’s view
is biased toward the existence of a bridge locus, even if it does not require it, since these
allegedly more efficient forms of isomorphism cannot be distributed across the brain in the
way functional isomorphisms could be. This shows that analytic isomorphism is not far
removed from explicit claims found in recent and influential work.
Lehar’s view is not a mainstream position, however: A moral more widely applicable
to representationalist cognitive science is that we should be deliberate about rejecting any
aprioristic commitment to posits that are only needed if one does endorse analytic
isomorphism or Cartesian materialism. Notice that doing so opens up conceptual space for a
range of posits that, unlike pictorial representations and filling-in, are actively incompatible
with those commitments; and some of the alternative views thereby made available may prove
persuasive on positive rather than negative grounds. After rejecting Cartesian materialism,
Dennett claims that consciousness depends instead on representational processes that are
widely distributed across the brain. The sensorimotor theory does something similar, but
makes a bolder positive proposal by claiming that cognitive processes sometimes depend in a
non-trivial and frequently unacknowledged way on the subject’s embeddedness within the
outside environment and, on some formulations, that the substrate of perceptual experience
actually includes activity in the extra-neural body and outside environment.
I will elaborate on the sensorimotor theory’s positive claims in chapter 3, but will here
briefly highlight the sensorimotor theory’s alternative proposals with regard to filling-in.
Pessoa et al. observe that rejecting analytic isomorphism and Cartesian materialism allows for
a pluralistic explanation of perceptual completion, the visual phenomenology sometimes
accounted for by filling-in. They propose that in some cases this involves pictorial
representation, in other cases symbolic representation, and in others requires the absence of
information to be ignored in the way Dennett suggests. Their account also holds open the
possibility that perceptual completion might in some instances be explained by appeal to
O’Regan’s (1992) idea of the world as an ‘outside memory’. O’Regan’s idea is that perceptual
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experience depends on a temporally-extended, embodied process in which perceivers gain
access to missing detail by attending to different parts of the visual field, making use, in
particular, of eye movements to access missing detail as needed directly from the outside
environment without needing to ‘re’-present that information internally (see section 3.1).
2.1.2 - Neural Representation
I now want to offer another lesson we can learn from the historical discussion featured in Noë
(2004), in a similar spirit to arguments made by Noë (2004) and Pessoa et al. (1998) but more
unorthodox in its implications. Just as it would be wrong to assume, without good evidence,
that filling-in takes place, it would also be a prejudice to commit oneself in advance to the
claim that the neural processes involved in perception - including any inner processes that
compensate for information missing from the retina - must involve representation. Some
theorists (e.g., Wheeler, 2005) claim that internal representation requires homuncularity,
although not necessarily of a problematic kind. I endorse this claim in section 2.1.3. The
important point for now, however, is that to assume out of prejudice that the neural states
involved in perception involve representation is to betray a commitment to the kind of
homunculus which Descartes warned against. Descartes observed that retinal images play a
causal role in perception, but that you are likely to be in the grip of the homunculus fallacy if
you conceive of them as ‘pictures’. By the same token, the states and processes involved in
perception, including those involved in filling-in, might play a causal role without functioning
as representations. It would be a mistake to pre-theoretically commit oneself to the existence
of representation when the neural activity that helps enable perceptual experience might be
better conceptualised as a nonrepresentational causal process.
Deciding whether the neural states involved in perception, including filling-in, are
representations is in part an empirical enterprise. Indeed, it is possible that appeals to internal
representation could be justified on entirely empirical grounds. Suppose that there were a
unified structure in the brain that looks like an expansive and finely-detailed
three-dimensional model of the visual scene, and we could use this to accurately predict the
character of the subject’s reported perceptual state. Few theorists realistically entertain this,
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and even Lehar (2003) falls short of insisting on it, but it remains a conceptual possibility. If
this were the case, it would be reasonable to suppose that the neural structure is a ‘model’ or
‘representation’, even in the absence of a philosophically robust explanation of how the
structure comes not just to resemble the world but, strictly speaking, to ‘represent’ it.
A similar possibility holds true even if the purported neural representations are not
supposed to involve neural-perceptual isomorphisms. For instance, it might turn out that we
can accurately predict a subject’s perceptual state on the basis of the subject’s present neural
state in combination with a theory of vision that makes reference to representation purely
because appealing to representation is the most useful way to explain the neural activity. The
idea that a neural state can be legitimately described as a representation purely because it is
expedient to do so is widely endorsed, even by non-representational theorists like Chemero
(2009), although it is rejected by Hutto and Myin (2012) - more on which in section 6.4.
If we agree that there is filling-in, this does not licence the claim that there is
necessarily representation. There may be processes that complete visual information missing
from the retina and in so doing affect the character of visual consciousness. However, should
we abandon the view that there is a detailed inner world model (a kind of representation) to
begin with, we abandon another important motivation for insisting that these processes
necessarily constitute representation, even of a non-pictorial kind. The suggestion that there
are processes that resemble filling-in without representation should be no more controversial
than Descartes’ assertion that the retinal image plays an important causal role without
functioning as a picture. If we construe the import of the Kepler discussion for the
sensorimotor theory this way, we have another reason for thinking that Prinz’s (2006)
contention that empirical evidence for filling-in should embarrass the sensorimotor account is
wide of its mark.
It is an empirical bet, however, that neural states best understood as representations
do exist. If neural representations do exist, it is also an empirical bet that appealing to their
content or functional role is sufficient by itself to explain the target phenomena. For example,
we might find that some neural process plays a functional role equivalent to filling-in, but also
find that the process, taken together with other neural processes explicable in terms of
representation, are insufficient to show which features the perceiver is intentionally-directed
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toward at the agent level, or to account for the attendant phenomenal character (if the
intentional directedness and phenomenal character of an experience could come apart, a
possibility that may not be coherent). Pessoa et al. (1998) and Noë and Thompson (2004)
deny that subpersonal content can be used to predict personal level perceptual states in this
way, although they do not deny that subpersonal representation exists.5 If it proved
impossible, however, to explain or predict the intentional or phenomenal character of the
subject’s experience without pointing to non-neural features, including, for example,
variations in the agent’s behavioural capacities, this would deprive representationalists of a
significant reason for thinking that perception is realised by internal representations at all.
The point of this passage has not been to claim that perception does not involve
representation, but, as before, to make conceptual space for the possibility that internal
representation might play a reduced or eliminated explanatory role in a final account of
perception and phenomenal consciousness. Many who are open to representationalist
5 Personal-level mental states are those it is appropriate to attribute to a whole person, and are
generally thought to necessarily be conscious or at least consciously accessible. Subpersonal
states are those which it is appropriate to attribute to a person’s parts. For example, a neural
representation may bear content about some state of affairs, even though the conscious subject
herself does not entertain mental states with that content. Some states may be subpersonal
and personal, just in case they can be intelligibly attributed to a subpersonal subsystem but are
also consciously accessible. Noë (2004) expresses doubt about the value of the distinction on
the ground that certain activities, such as eye movements, sometimes come under rational
control by the person, and sometimes do not, and that both cases are likely to be similarly
important to perception. What he has in mind is McDowell’s (1994b) use of the distinction,
which Drayson (2014) implies is an attempt by the Pittsburgh school of philosophers to
hijack the distinction for their own idiosyncratic purposes. Personal level states on this
perspective are those occurring in the space of reasons, meaning they are properly considered
to be mental states, while subpersonal states are those occurring in the space of causes, the
latter category denoting states that are not genuinely mental states at all but non-minded
physical states. Note that on the non-Pittsburgh understanding, the fact that subpersonal
states are sometimes assimilated to the personal level is to be expected, meaning that Noë’s
point does not necessarily compromise the distinction in its original meaning. In any case,
Noë’s sole-author account is marked by notable shift from talking about brains and artifacts,
as O&N did, to talking about whole persons. Moreover, he endorses a distinction between the
‘constitutive’ and the merely ‘enabling’, which in McDowell’s paper tracks the distinction
between the personal and subpersonal, and which may have a significance analogous to the
personal/subpersonal distinction in Noë’s account. I explain this latter distinction and
examine its significance later in the thesis.
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accounts of cognition endorse the suggestion that the legitimacy of internal representation as
a theoretical posit cannot just be assumed, but must be justified relative to the particular
theory it is deployed in (see Ramsey, 2007, for a detailed defence of this point). However,
others who are critical of non-representational accounts are prone to claiming that cognition,
including perception, just is a representation-involving process.6
2.1.3 - Varieties ofHomuncularity
I have, up until now, been discussing the most elementary version of the homunculus fallacy,
identified by Descartes when he rejects the suggestion that retinal images function as pictures,
warning: “We must not think that it is by means of this resemblance that the picture makes us
aware of the objects - as though we had another pair of eyes to see it, inside the brain”
(1637/1985a, p. 167). Ironically, contemporary theories that make this kind of mistake are
described by Dennett (1991), pejoratively, as examples of Cartesian materialism, on the
ground that Descartes went on to make the same mistake by claiming that the immaterial soul
is presented with images at the pineal gland.
This elementary version of the fallacy is considered by some (although not Dennett)
to be just one instance of a wider fallacy, allegedly more pervasive than mere Cartesian
materialism in present day cognitive science. The error, sometimes known as the mereological
fallacy, can be defined, broadly, as the ascription to parts of things predicates that should
properly only be ascribed to wholes. Narrowly, it is the ascription of psychological predicates,
for example ‘seeing’ or ‘believing’, to parts of persons - in particular, brains - where they should
only be ascribed to persons, i.e. the complete living organism (Kenny, 1971; Bennett and
Hacker, 2003). In the basic version of the fallacy, applying a psychological predicate to the
brain is uncontroversially a mistake. If we try to explain the faculty of vision by positing the
existence of a homunculus (a part of the person) that possesses an identical faculty, we find an
infinite regress ensues of the kind discussed earlier. It is telling that the fault, in this instance,
6 For proof that many theorists take cognition to involve representation by definition, see
Hutto, Kirchhoff andMyin (2014), who offer textual evidence from Khalidi (2007) and
O'Brien and Opie (2009) to this effect.
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lies in the circularity of the proposed explanation.
A.O. Rorty (1971), replying to Kenny (1971), notes that circularity of this sort only
occurs if you try to explain a person’s psychological state by ascribing to their brain or parts
thereof exactly the same psychological state. The threat of circularity does not indicate the
existence of a more general problem with ascribing person-like psychological predicates such
as ‘believing’ to brains, since circularity is avoided so long as the explanandum and explanans
feature different psychological states. Dennett (1978) is mindful that a certain kind of
circularity may persist, however, even if the intentional predicates attributed to the part and
the whole are different, or attributed to different degrees. To account for individual faculties
like thought or vision, we need to explain, more generally, how intentionally-directed
psychological states can be realised by a physical system at all. To account for a psychological
attribute possessed by the person by reference to psychological attributes possessed by the
brain is to presuppose that something bears intentionality, even if the states or processes
featured at each end of the explanation are different. Dennett therefore proposes, like Rorty,
that a person with complex psychological attributes might subdivide or ‘decompose’ into parts
- i.e. homunculi or ‘subpersons’ - possessing simpler psychological attributes. Those
homunculi might, in turn, decompose into still simpler homunculi. To show how
psychological attributes might be realised in the first place, Dennett introduces the crucial
suggestion that the bottom layer of homunculi are so simple, they decompose or ‘discharge’
into physical processes that can easily be described using non-intentionalistic vocabulary.
For some, however, circularity of the sort I have been discussing is merely a symptom
of a more basic error, a variety of category mistake. Bennett and Hacker (2003) and Kenny
(1971) both quote, approvingly, Wittgenstein’s assertion that: “Only of a human and what
resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind;
hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious” (1953/2009, para 281). The moral, for Kenny, is
that since it is not obvious that brains resemble humans in the relevant way, we should
proceed with caution, rather than unthinkingly ascribing the properties actually possessed by
the whole person to parts thereof. Bennett and Hacker (2003) draw a more demanding
conclusion. They argue that it is evident from everyday linguistic convention that
psychological or otherwise intentionally-loaded vocabulary such as ‘representing’, ‘mapping’,
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‘understanding’ and ‘believing’ can only be meaningfully used in relation to persons rather
than brains. On this basis, and irrespective of any particular empirical facts about brains,
Bennett and Hacker claim that neuroscientists, psychologists and cognitive scientists are
guilty of conceptual incoherence when they apply these predicates to the operation of brains.
While homuncular decomposition offers, in principle, a means to avoid circularity, it
does not, in itself, address the more fundamental charge that brains and parts of brains simply
do not, in the relevant way, resemble or behave like humans. Dennett (2007), replying to
Bennett and Hacker, remarks that we cannot use ordinary linguistic practice alone as a guide
to the applicability of intentionalistic predicates to subpersons, since the claim that we can use
these predicates turns on the empirical thesis that subpersons do, indeed, behave like human
beings. Dennett is surely right that the admissibility of homuncular decomposition depends
not just on aprioristic conceptual analysis but also on empirical facts about brains. There is a
pressing uncertainty, however, about the sort of properties or behaviours that would need to
be identified through empirical enquiry to show that an object is sufficiently person-like to
licence the ascription of psychological predicates.
Dennett (1987) offers a specific proposal that could answer this. According to the
‘intentional stance’, we can legitimately attribute psychological predicates like beliefs and
desires to an object, including a person, creature or artifact, just in case ascribing them is a
useful way to explain and predict the object’s behaviour. The account is explicitly intended to
be liberal enough to allow us to ascribe intentionality not just to people but non-living
artifacts like thermostats and chess-playing computers.7 Dennett asserts not only that the
intentional stance is scientifically respectable, but also that it reflects everyday folk
7 Dennett (1987) does not actually claim that we should apply the intentional stance to
brains. He suggests that at this level we should apply the design stance, meaning we conceive
of them as being designed to achieve particular functions. However, the homuncular
decomposition strategy requires us to view brains and parts of brains as person-like, meaning
the design stance does not appear to do the job. The intentional stance actually undercuts one
of the roles homuncular decomposition might play, namely to resolve the fundamental
question - a sort of hard problem - about how mere physical states could be
intentionally-directed. The intentional stance solves this problem without requiring
homuncular decomposition. However, endorsers of the intentional stance may still usefully
make use of the homuncular decomposition strategy to show how intentionalistic
descriptions can finally be cashed out using non-intentional, physicalistic vocabulary.
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psychological practice, noting that in everyday conversation we frequently use belief and desire
talk, for example, to make sense of behaviour by machines. If this is correct, then it is not
implausible that brains, and parts of brains, can be ascribed intentionality in this way, too. In
this event, the mereological fallacy is no threat to homuncular decomposition, either by the
standard of everyday linguistic practice or the standard demanded by our theoretical account
of intentionality.
Bennett and Hacker (2003) are on highly contentious ground when they suggest that
everyday usage gives us a determinate guide to the correct ascription of intentional predicates,
since one might think that we do not necessarily know precisely which features make our
everyday ascriptions of psychological predicates true or false. It might be that in folk
psychological discourse, we are employing the intentional stance. In this event, Bennett and
Hacker are hoist with their own petard, for the reasons I have just suggested. Alternatively, it
may be that everyday use of intentionalistic language picks out, unbeknown to us, properties
unique to people or other complete living organisms, meaning the ascription to
intentionalistic predicates to brains or artifacts are homonymic, metaphorical8 or just false.
Bennett and Hacker’s argument is enough to show that endorsers of homuncular
decomposition have a positive need to endorse an account of intentionality that makes the
approach tenable.
Depending on the approach to intentionality you endorse, the empirical criteria
required to establish the existence of ‘homunculi’ may be more or less demanding. Adopting
the intentional stance, homuncular decomposition seems relatively unproblematic.
Alternatively, if you endorsed, for example, the autopoietic enactivist thesis that only a certain
kind of autonomous biological agent can manifest intentionality (e.g., Thompson, 2007),
homuncularity would appear much less tenable. Similarly, those representationalists that
suppose intentionality is best explained by robustly naturalised subpersonal content (e.g.,
Millikan, 1984; see section 6.4) must maintain that the homunculi endorsed as ‘top down’
8 McDowell (1994b), for instance, argues that content-talk at the subpersonal level is
metaphorical, but nonetheless legitimate. In chapter 7, I argue that metaphorical
representations and content is legitimate in principle, but may not be useful or appropriate in
practice.
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theoretical posits by Dennett’s approach find counterparts in evolved modular architecture
concretely implemented by the brain, a point made by Wheeler (2005). In either of the latter
two cases, the burden of empirical evidence required to justify ascribing psychological
predicates to parts of the brain will be strong.
I will not attempt to rule, now, on the correct account of intentionality. I will
conclude this section by noting, however, that while Bennett and Hacker’s automatic
dismissal of intentionalistic vocabulary at the subpersonal level is misplaced, endorsers of this
vocabulary must offer an account of intentionality that is amenable to the existence of
homuncular decomposition, naturalistically plausible, and, we might think, motivated by
considerations other than the desire to offer a post hoc justification for their use of
intentionalistic language. This is a heavy burden, and it may prove that a more promising
approach is to reformulate the vocabulary in question instead.
2.2 - Conservative andRadical Strands
As we have seen, the negative claims that properly motivate the sensorimotor theory are
geared toward unseating a number of prejudices rather than actively ruling out the suggestion
that perception depends on nothing more than the construction and deployment of internal
representations, even representations that are richly detailed, pictorial or realised by a
circumscribed area of the brain. However, the arguments are sufficient to create a legitimate
suspicion that conceptions of vision endorsing these representationalist posits are motivated,
at least in part, by a residual commitment to faulty historical assumptions, even if they have
resources to avoid the homunculus fallacy.
The fact that the negative claims are relatively modest means there is leeway in how
radical we take the theory’s positive account to be. I will continue by outlining two competing
versions of the sensorimotor approach, one conservative and one radical. Although they are
potentially in significant disagreement with one another, the competing accounts reflect, I will
argue, an uncertain attitude to representation present in the joint and sole-authored work of
both Noë and O’Regan. The conservative account embraces a moderate construal of the
authors’ negative claims, and consequently endorses the orthodox thesis that perceptual
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consciousness is realised solely by the brain (the claim known as vehicle internalism) through
the construction and deployment of internal representations (representationalism); by virtue
of this concession, the account can be thought of, essentially, as an attempt to progress the
orthodox model in a way that inoculates it against Cartesian materialism, rather than an
attempt to radically break from orthodoxy. This conflicts with the sensorimotor theory’s
frequently radical tenor. However, the conservative approach continues to make a number of
interesting claims, including the view that perceiving depends on active, goal-directed
interrogation of the outside environment.
Many of the theory’s claims place a distinctive emphasis on embodiment: Although
the conservative sensorimotor approach denies that perceptual consciousness supervenes on
extra-neural activity, it recognises that bodily exploration plays a non-trivial and generally
unacknowledged causal role in the construction of the neural states that do form the
supervenience base. On this basis, it asserts that bodily exploration must be mentioned in any
adequate account of vision. Further, the conservative approach endorses the particularly
distinctive thesis that phenomenal qualities, rendered mysterious on rival accounts, are best
explained by appeal to laws of sensorimotor contingency, as I will explain. This, again, means
our account of perception must refer to characteristics of the perceiver’s body, specifically its
morphology and the nature of the body-environment relation that attends. By virtue of the
body and environment’s essential explanatory role, the sensorimotor approach could, on this
construction, be described as a form of ‘embedded’ and conservatively ‘embodied’ cognition.
Given the limited scope of the theory’s negative claims, the relatively modest ambition of the
conservative approach is an advantage, since it only needs to upset that claim that perceptual
awareness depends on richly detailed, pictorial representations, and not the claim that
perceptual awareness supervenes on internal representations in general.
An alternative construction situates the sensorimotor theory near the radical end of a
continuum of ‘embodied’ and ‘enactive’ approaches to cognition. Accounts in this region
frequently deny that cognitive processing is realised solely by neural states. To this effect, they
sometimes suggest that the representational vehicles which realise cognition frequently
incorporate bodily or environmental activity (Clark and Chalmers, 1998; Rowlands, 2006).
Alternatively, they deny that there is representational content or anything else that would
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motivate a principled insistence that the boundaries between brain and body, or body and
world, are of theoretical relevance in determining the bounds of cognitive processing (Hutto
and Myin, 2012). Accounts at the radical end of the spectrum, especially those that adopt the
‘enactivist’ label, are also known for suggesting that there is no internal representation
whatsoever (e.g., Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 1991; Chemero, 2009; Hutto and Myin,
2012).
2.2.1 - TheTenets of Sensorimotor Theory: A BriefOutline
In this section I will proceed by outlining the main tenets of sensorimotor theory, categorising
them into claims endorsed by both conservative and radical variants of the approach, and
claims endorsed solely by one variant or another. I do not mean to claim that any version of
the sensorimotor account must endorse every one of the claims falling under either the
conservative or the radical strand. However, identifying these distinct variants offers a useful
way to examine differences in the explicit claims made by the canonical accounts of the
sensorimotor approach, different ways of reading those accounts, and disagreements in other
literature on sensorimotor theory, a number of which will be investigated as the thesis
progresses. The first four claims are endorsed by both variants of the theory and the claims
endorsed only by one or the other follow.
(1) The World as an Outside Memory. This claim draws on work by O’Regan (1992)
and ‘active vision’ approaches in computer vision (e.g., Ballard, Hayhoe, Pook and Rao, 1997).
Endorsing Brooks’s (1991) suggestion, in robotics, that the world serves as its ‘own best
model’, the outside memory thesis (O&N) denies that human visual systems make use of a
detailed inner world model, claiming instead that our visual systems access detail directly from
the environment as required in the course of bodily exploration. This claim is given weight by
empirical work on change blindness and inattentional blindness, where it has been found that
human subjects, with their attention drawn elsewhere, frequently fail apparently to notice
occurrences that take place seemingly in full view. The outside memory thesis entails that
visual processing is, at least, causally scaffolded by bodily exploration in an interesting and
frequently unacknowledged way. It does not necessarily imply the metaphysical thesis that
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perceptual consciousness actually supervenes on extra-neural activity, although the outside
memory thesis may be a key aspect of an account that does make this claim.
(2) The Sensorimotor Contingency Account of Phenomenal Qualities. Phenomenal
qualities (or ‘qualia’), for example the feel of a sponge, the look of red or the sound of a bell
(O’Regan, 2011), are not irreducible. They can be accounted for, exhaustively, by reference to
characteristics of the conscious perceiver’s bodily relation with the outside environment -
specifically, sensorimotor contingencies (SMCs). In O&N, SMCs characterise the law-like
patterns of dependence that hold between motor output signals and informational input from
the sense organs. That paper does not specify explicitly, but they might be counterfactual
dependences, expressible by statements of the form ‘if I moved like this, sense input would be
like this’. More restrictively, they might be patterns evident in the bodily interactions that the
subject is right now engaged in, for example the way a sponge they are presently squeezing
between their fingers yields easily to touch. Burhmann, Di Paolo and Barandiaran (2013) note
that the latter kind of SMCs depend not just on peripheral sense input and motor output
states, but on the internal states of the agent, since they depend on how the subject’s motor
responses vary in line with different sense inputs, and this depends on the brain. The account
of colour offered by many statements of the sensorimotor theory (O’Regan, 2011; Degenaar
and Myin, 2013) also appeals to patterns of counterfactual dependence outside the skin, since
an object’s experienced colour depends on the ways sense input changes with movement and
in line with changes to ambient lighting conditions. Finally, in Noë (2004), SMCs also
describe perspectival properties, the ways objects consciously appear when considered from a
subject’s own perspective (for example, the elliptical appearance of a plate when viewed at a
non-perpendicular angle) and the ways these change in line with movement.
(3) The Sensorimotor Mastery Account of Perception. Perceiving takes place when
the subject possesses or exercises ‘knowledge’, ‘mastery’ or ‘attunement’ to SMCs.
Sensorimotor ‘mastery’, as I use it throughout, is a generic term intended to incorporate a
number of loosely related notions found throughout the literature on sensorimotor theory,
and intended to be liberal enough to incorporate a ‘radical enactivist’ version of sensorimotor
theory. The proponents of radical enactivism, Hutto and Myin (2012), dislike the terms
sensorimotor ‘understanding’ and ‘knowledge’ on the ground that these notions appear to
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require representational content. Myin and Degenaar (2014) endorse, by way of developing a
positive radical enactive gloss, a notion of ‘attunement’ instead, which I include under the
umbrella of sensorimotor mastery (note, however, that their concept of sensorimotor
‘attunement’ is different to the one I develop in chapter 3). O&N and O’Regan (2011) refer
to a variety of mastery which appears, like attunement, to denote a capacity for skillful bodily
behaviour that does not necessarily call upon internal representation. The same accounts
suggest, however, that conscious perception requires sensorimotor ‘knowledge’, which might
be taken to denote a distinct kind of faculty.
(4) Perceptual Presence as Access. This idea, endorsed by Noë, is a natural counterpart
to the outside memory claim. It suggests that the environment, in all its detail and
expansiveness, has a felt phenomenological ‘presence’ to the conscious perceiver which
outstrips the information processed, at any one time, by the perceiver’s visual system. This is
explained by the perceiver’s possession of sensorimotor mastery, which in this case amounts to
knowledge of (or perhaps attunement to) the movements s/he must make to find out what is
present and, perhaps, an implicit expectation about what the sensory results of those
movements will be. The ‘presence-as-access’ (or ‘virtual presence’) the environment enjoys in
the perceiver’s conscious awareness is analogous to the presence to your computer of the web
edition of the New York Times. When you read an online newspaper, you generally download
just one article at a time. However, since you can access any of the day’s articles the moment
you require them, they are, practically speaking, just as ‘present’ as they would be if you
downloaded the day’s edition all at once (Noë, 2004).
The following claims are endorsed only by the radical sensorimotor approach:
(5) Virtuality All-The-Way-In. The presence-as-access thesis, above, could be
straightforwardly endorsed by most sensorimotor theorists as a natural phenomenological
counterpart to the outside memory thesis. Noë makes a more challenging proposal, however,
when he says that in a disanalogy with the computer case, perceptual presence in humans is
virtual “all the way in” (2004, p. 134). This means that there is no distinction to be found in
the phenomenal character of perceptual consciousness between detail that is now present
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‘simpliciter’ and detail that is present by virtue of being accessible in the manner described by
the presence-as-access and outside memory theses. Noë claims that this suggestion finds
confirmation in the introspectable phenomenal character of one’s own visual consciousness,
alleging that you can never take in, all at once, any complete or atomic visual feature, for
example, “that shade of red” (p. 134). If the virtuality all-the-way-in thesis is considered
primarily as an extension of the outside memory thesis, it might seem to amount to a denial
that perceptual consciousness exists or has any phenomenal character. As I will later argue,
this impression can be avoided if the claim is considered, instead, primarily as a counterpart to
the next thesis.
(6) Perception as Dynamical Entanglement. This claim is endorsed by Noë (2004)
and reflects, in particular, important work by Hurley (1998). It involves rejecting the
suggestion, endorsed by many classical accounts of cognition (see, e.g., Fodor, 1983), that
there are functionally distinct and informationally encapsulated ‘input’ and ‘output’ systems
where the activity of input systems has no tight causal link with the activity of output systems,
or vice versa. Endorsers of the dynamical entanglement thesis claim, instead, that there is an
intimate causal link, running in both directions, between neural activity in the sense input and
motor output areas of the brain. Further, the thesis claims that there is no theoretically
relevant distinction between activity in those areas and outside, in the extra-neural body and
environment. As a result, perception must be explained by reference to patterns of dynamic
activity occurring across the entire loop of interaction occurring between brain, extra-neural
body and world.
(7) The Extensive Conscious Mind. The dynamical entanglement thesis is one of the
key claims motivating the closely allied thesis, endorsed by Noë (2004) and Hurley (1998),
that the supervenience base of perceptual consciousness literally extends beyond the
boundaries of the brain, incorporating aspects of the extra-neural body and outside
environment. The argument, briefly put, is that since perceptual consciousness depends on a
dynamical system incorporating these extra-neural features, it may not be possible or
appropriate to distinguish between the contribution made by these features and the brain
when determining the substrate. This thesis is sometimes described as ‘vehicle externalism’
about consciousness or the ‘extended conscious mind’, although for reasons that will be
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explained in section 3.6, I settle on the more idiosyncratic term ‘extensive conscious mind’.
(8) Anti-Representationalism. Representation is a key concept in traditionally-styled
cognitive science and features prominently in the orthodox approach to perception following
Marr (1982). The sensorimotor theory is unequivocal in rejecting certain misplaced roles for
internal representation. These include, in particular, the suggestion that a human perceiver
possesses an inner model of the outside world sufficient to generate conscious awareness
comprising, all at once, a large, richly detailed or picture-like visual field.
It is unclear whether the sensorimotor theory’s originators intend us to think that
sensorimotor knowledge should be thought of as involving representational content. Noë
(2004) explicitly declines to take a stance on whether or not cognition in general, including
perception, involves or could involve neurally-realised representations. O&N and O’Regan
(2011) say they are happy with talk of ‘representation’ in neuroscience when it is used,
minimalistically, to describe nothing more than patterns of covariance between physical states.
However, they stop short of insisting that there are or could be any representations carrying
content, which must be evaluable by truth or success conditions, rather than just information,
which need not, and they stop short of insisting that sensorimotor knowledge necessarily
involves representation in any sense.
O’Regan (2011), after defending use of the term ‘representation’ in neuroscience,
strikes an ambivalent tone by declaring that representation-talk is best avoided. The strongest
sign that the sensorimotor approach may necessarily entail the presence of representational
content occurs when O’Regan claims that perceptual consciousness depends on sensorimotor
engagements plus higher-order thoughts about those sensorimotor engagements. O’Regan
states, uncertainly, that the approach might have something in common with classic Higher
Order Thought theories of consciousness which, we can note, do typically take it that
consciousness depends on higher-order representations of lower-order phenomena
(Carruthers, 2011). The sensorimotor theory’s uncertain attitude to internal representation
has allowed some commentators to argue, approvingly or disapprovingly, that internal
representation plays an essential role in sensorimotor theory as originally presented (Roberts,
2010; Hutto and Myin, 2012). I will later argue that the sensorimotor account, even in the
form offered by its progenitors, could in principle dispense with any role in perception for
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internal representation.
The conservative variant of the sensorimotor approach consists, largely, in adopting
the core claims while rejecting the radical ones. It may also endorse, positively, the following
tenets. I will list them quite briefly as they comprise, in essence, the converse of the radical
claims:
(9) Representationalism. Exercise of sensorimotor knowledge is realised subpersonally
by the deployment of internal representations.
(10) Internalism. Although perceptual processing is causally scaffolded by bodily
exploration, perceptual consciousness is realised solely by the brain.
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3 - TheTenets of Sensorimotor Theory
In chapter 2, I identified a number of theoretical posits toward which the sensorimotor theory
takes a critical stance, including the bridge locus, pictorial representation, other forms of
representation and, more narrowly, phenomena such as filling-in and saccadic suppression.
Recall that the sensorimotor theory’s critique, properly understood, does not assert that these
phenomena could not or definitely do not exist. Indeed, proponents of the sensorimotor
theory in some places actively assert that representations and filling-in do play a restricted role
in perception. The ambition, as we saw, is to unseat the aprioristic commitment to the idea
that perception depends on a bridge locus consisting of a symbolic or pictorial representation,
or as O’Regan (1992) puts it, something like an ‘inner cinema screen’. The inner screen
conception is very close to a view explicitly proposed by Lehar (2003), but, more significantly,
is liable to tacitly inform even theorists that do not explicitly endorse it, in particular - as
O’Regan observes - those addressing specific phenomena such as filling-in and saccadic
suppression. The sensorimotor theory’s negative critique is thus similar in spirit to Dennett’s
(1991) earlier rejection of Cartesian materialism.
Notice that the sensorimotor theory’s negative claims do not actively disprove the
tenets of the orthodox approach to perception. This does not matter, as long as we appreciate
that their ambition is to open up conceptual space for the sensorimotor approach’s own theses.
As a positive programme, the account draws on a number of unorthodox, ambitious and
relatively detailed positive claims about perception and perceptual consciousness, although, as
will become apparent, they are frequently in need of a great deal of conceptual clarification.
Offering this clarification is my aim in the present chapter, which serves the dual purpose of
laying out the tenets of sensorimotor theory and arguing for what I suggest are the most
promising ways of understanding them. This will set things up for the remainder of the thesis,
in which I defend the sensorimotor theory against some (albeit not all) of the best-known
objections, and finish by outlining a contribution the sensorimotor approach could make to a
longstanding question concerning perceptual consciousness of temporally-extended events.
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3.1 - TheWorld as anOutsideMemory
We will see later in the chapter that the relation between Noë’s sole-authored version of the
sensorimotor theory and orthodox accounts in the tradition of Marr (1982) admits a specific
complexity. Although Noë rejects the orthodox subpersonal model, his own account
characterises perception primarily at the personal level. This means that a little care is required
to see what sort of subpersonal story is needed to do justice to Noë’s account, and which
subpersonal posits the account invites, rules out or is agnostic about. In its early presentation
(O&N), the sensorimotor theory focuses directly on the subpersonal processes that underlie
perceptual consciousness, and therefore stands in even more direct rivalry to orthodox
subpersonal accounts.
O’Regan (1992) observes that the human retina appears to have a disastrously poor
design for retrieving information from the environment. Photoreceptors are increasingly
limited in number the further they are from the centre of the retina, meaning that only a small
central portion of the retinal image is highly resolved, while the resolution gets increasingly
poor toward the outer perimeter. Moreover, the photoreceptors are, throughout the retina,
unevenly rather than uniformly dispersed, and are completely absent at the blind spot, an area
corresponding to a significant portion of the visual field. Visual perceivers do not ordinarily
notice any of these defects, of course, and take themselves to be in perceptual contact with a
richly detailed, high-definition visual scene. O’Regan claims that the disparity between the
apparent richness of visual experience and the sparse and uneven detail available from the
retinal image is a fundamental problem which has not traditionally been addressed with
sufficient care. The result, he suggests, is that orthodox theories are frequently under the thrall
of a caricatured view of vision in which the defects of the retina are compensated for by the
construction of a detailed 3D model of the outside world, the activation of which is necessary
and sufficient for perceptual consciousness. Almost no theorists explicitly endorse this
conception, but O’Regan claims that it tacitly informs work on a range of specific visual
phenomena, for instance saccadic suppression and filling-in. Notice that the conception is not
disowned by Marr’s very general claim that: “vision is the process of discovering from [retinal]
images what is present in the world, and where it is” (Marr, 1982, p. 2).
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The sensorimotor theory’s alternative conception is founded on the claim that
conscious visual experience does not comprise a richly detailed representation of the visual
scene. A later step will be to re-describe visual phenomenology and the processes that enable it
with attention to the fact that perceivers do not take visual experience to be sparsely furnished.
The starting point, however, is to establish that the visual system does not process large
amounts of detail all at once. O&N, pursuing this thesis, cite a range of empirical work,
including work on inattentional blindness (Wolfe, 1997), the best known example of which is
the ‘invisible gorilla’ test (Simons and Chabris, 1999). The experiment features a short video
of a basketball game with teams dressed respectively in black and white, each passing a separate
basketball amongst themselves. Participants are shown the clip and asked to count how many
times the players in white pass the ball, a task which requires close attention given the
fast-moving action and the distracting influence of the team in black. Midway through the
clip, a person in a gorilla costume enters the scene, walks casually through the middle of the
game and makes a chest-beating motion. When asked if they had noticed anything out of the
ordinary, around half the participants in Simons and Chabris’ study failed to report noticing
this take place. There are multiple ways to interpret this data, among which is the suggestion
that participants were visually aware of the gorilla but did not attend to it, and therefore failed
to remember it when questioned. However, the work supports the claim that perceivers do
not experience unattended detail from the visual scene.
O&N draw a similar lesson from change blindness, a related phenomenon in which
subjects fail to notice sudden changes to the visual scene. In an early study by McConkie and
Zola (1979), participants were asked to read a line of text displayed on a monitor in
alternating upper and lower case (aLtErNaTiNg CaSe). The experiment was set up so that
changes to the text were timed to coincide with saccadic eye movements. During saccades, the
text was modified so that the lower case letters became upper case and vice versa, although the
wording, typeface, and other features stayed the same. Participants were asked if they noticed
anything irregular, and universally failed to report noticing the changing case. This led the
experimenters to conclude that ‘visual information’, meaning information derived directly
from the retinal image, is not retained between fixations, although they note that the
participants would have had to retain information of a more abstract, non-visual kind given
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that they were able to comprehend the meaning of the text, which was read over multiple
fixations.
Early work on change blindness (see also, O’Regan, 1984) focused specifically on the
consequences of eye movements, and was not motivated by broader theses about the character
of vision. Later, O’Regan’s (1992) pre-cursor to the sensorimotor theory prompted O’Regan
and colleagues to pay renewed attention to the phenomenon (Rensink, O’Regan and Clark,
1997; O’Regan, Rensink and Clark, 1999). Study participants were shown colour
photographs on a computer display. Each photograph was alternated with a copy in which a
key feature had been modified, for example with an object added or removed, or with the
colour of the scenery changed. With the photos switched back and forth, participants could in
the ordinary condition easily identify the change. The researchers found that inserting a brief
flicker in-between the frames (Rensink et al, 1997) or superimposing an assortment of shapes
in a ‘mud splash’ pattern at the moment of transition (O’Regan et al., 1999) made participants
far less likely to identify the change. To explain this, they suggested that perceivers notice
visual changes by having their attention drawn to sudden changes in retinal input (known as
transients). This means that if the modified feature of the photograph, a local transient, is
replaced by a global transient, like the flicker, or supplemented by several competing local
transients, like the mud splash, this compromises perceivers’ ability to detect the change.
There are various ways this observation might be incorporated into a theory in which
vision also depends on the activation of an inner model. For example, the visual system may
require transients to update the inner model in line with the changes. Alternatively, the inner
model may be sensitive to changes in the visual scene whether or not they are signalled by
transients, while transients are required to draw perceivers’ attention to these changes.
However, the change blindness findings make a uniquely good fit with the claim that there is
no inner model, since the finding that transients are a necessary condition for detecting
change holds open the more straightforward possibility that transients are sufficient for
detecting change even in the absence of an inner model.
O’Regan (1992) offers an alternative framework for understanding vision, the idea of
the ‘world as an outside memory’. The conception is partly based on an analogy between
seeing and remembering. In his examples, you might be reminiscing about your grandmother,
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or attempting to remember what you had for breakfast. Long-term memories are not always
consciously in mind, but typically come to awareness after being deliberately sought out.
When you probe your long-term memory, past episodes do not arrive fully-formed in all their
detail. Instead, you engage in a process of asking yourself questions, and answering them, and
this way accessing facts about the past in a piecemeal way.
According to the outside memory view, vision works in a similar way, although the
role of the memory store is played by the outside world and not the brain. The perceiver
makes use of shifts in attention along with bodily movements, especially saccades, to probe the
visual environment. This probing involves accessing visual detail serially, a little at a time, and
in accordance with the perceiver’s or visual system’s present interests, i.e. the facts they want to
find out and the locations they want to explore. Rather than subserving the construction of an
inner model, this activity of temporally-extended probing simply takes the inner model’s
place.9
Another key analogy underlying the outside memory view of vision is touch. While
vision is prone to invite an intuitive commitment to the inner model conception, it is very
natural to think that perceiving the world by touch is a process of temporally-extended bodily
probing rather than model-building. Noë (2004) illustrates this point with the example of a
blind person who uses a cane to sample the environment one detail at a time, while making
use of an accompanying grasp of the movements required to access further detail. This is how
vision works on the outside memory view.
Return, briefly, to the empirical work on inattentional blindness and change blindness.
The outside memory thesis fits well with the suggestion, derived from work on inattentional
9 The outside memory thesis says that perception is constituted by temporally-extended
probing, and therefore might imply that the substrate of perceptual consciousness is wider
than usually thought, comprising for example activity by motor areas of the brain or even
activity by the extra-neural body and environment (see section 3.6 and Hurley, 1998).
O’Regan (1992) stops short of claiming this, and does not offer any explicit stance on the
metaphysical question of how far the substrate of consciousness extends. His early paper
actively endorses the view that internal representation plays a role in vision, which might
imply that the deployment of the internal representations is sufficient for perceptual
consciousness without calling on any strictly necessary extra-neural activity. O’Regan should
more realistically be taken as endorsing the milder claim that temporally-extended bodily
probing plays an essential role in any explanation of vision.
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blindness, that perceivers only experience those features that they attend to. It also predicts
that visual systems rely on transients to detect change. The thesis claims that a transient
occurring at the periphery of the retinal image causes the perceiver to make appropriate bodily
movements to bring the object from which the transient originated into better view. Notice
that the retinal image does not need to be highly or uniformly resolved to feature transients,
and using transients this way could allow the visual system to detect important events at the
periphery of the visual field without using an inner model. With this hypothesis, O’Regan
(1992) accurately predicted the outcome of the later work on change blindness, which
confirmed that change detection frequently depends on transients.
The outside memory view resonates with Brooks’ (1991) suggestion, from situated
robotics, that the world need not be internally modelled because it can serve as its own model.
In a changing environment, it makes good sense to access detail only when required, since a
notional inner model would either need to be constantly updated, which is inefficient, or risk
representing the environment inaccurately. The view also observes that the visual system need
not compensate for the instability of the retinal image by constructing a stable representation
of the outside world. Instead, the visual system simply assumes that the outside world is a
persistent and stable entity, and takes advantage of this by accessing detail directly from the
environment when required, in a piecemeal and discontinuous way.
Perceivers must, of course, somehow grasp how presently accessed detail forms part of
the larger visual scene. O’Regan (1992) claims that retinal stimulation is accompanied by a
“non-metric awareness” (p. 474) of the locations of specific objects in the visual scene, which
incorporates an understanding of the eye-movements or other bodily movements needed to
access more detailed information about them via the retina. O’Regan claims that you may
have this kind of awareness even of objects you have your back to, implying that the awareness
is neither pictorial in its phenomenal character, nor properly-speaking visual at all. He suggests
that it is enabled by neural representations which are symbolic rather than iconic, and sparse
in detail. The representations do not themselves realise visual awareness, but help enable the
temporally-extended probing that does.
The idea resembles the ‘deictic’ representation advocated by Ballard and colleagues
(Ballard, Hayhoe, Pook and Rao, 1997) in which the visual system does not represent a
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detailed environment, but represents sparse facts about the agent’s bodily relation to objects in
the visual scene. Note that the sensorimotor theory, as it emerges in later work (especially
O&N), endorses the idea that perception is a process of temporally-extended exploration
assisted by an implicit understanding of the movements required to bring objects into view,
but does not commit itself to a particular account of the subpersonal representations that
enable this, nor unequivocally to the existence of representations at all.
Return now to the apparent disparity between visual consciousness, which perceivers
tend to think presents a richly detailed visual scene, and visual processing, which evidence
suggests does not feature detailed representation. The apparent mismatch is captured by the
work on inattentional blindness. Subjects in inattentional blindness experiments like the
invisible gorilla test typically express surprise when they have the events they missed pointed
out to them, indicating that they have certain assumptions about the character of their own
experience (Dennett, 2001). This has led theorists like Blackmore (2002) and Dennett (2002)
to propose that visual perceivers are in the grip of a ‘Grand Illusion’ in which they believe that
they see a great deal more detail than they actually do. O’Regan (1992) claims that the
apparent experience of richness is explained, in part, by the expansiveness of the retinal image,
which in spite of its defects, incorporates a relatively large visual field.
This claim is not featured in the sensorimotor theory proper, but O&N endorse
O’Regan’s further point, which is that perceivers experience richness because they have access
to missing detail when required. O&N compare this to the fridge-door effect, in which the
refrigerator light seems like it is always on because it is always on when you open the door to
look. This is compatible with the claim that perceivers are indeed beset by the Grand Illusion.
We will see in section 3.4 that Noë makes a slightly different point, namely that the
experience of detail is not an illusion needing to be explained by the fact that perceivers have
access to missing detail, but a genuine experience of detail, constituted by perceivers’ knowing
that they have access to missing detail and implicitly knowing the precise movements that
would bring that detail into view.
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3.2 - Phenomenal Qualities: The Sensorimotor Contingency Account
A phenomenal quality, such as the look of yellow, the smell of a rose, or the sound of a bell, is a
property of perceptual consciousness. In particular, it characterises consciousness from the
first-person perspective of the conscious subject. Although we could, as a third party, describe
some properties of a person, or their brain, and say we have identified the locus of some
specific kind of consciousness, it is an open question whether we could ever thereby be
characterising the phenomenal qualities that comprise their conscious experience. Some
philosophers, most notably Jackson (1982) and Chalmers (1996), have argued that there is no
way, even in principle, to characterise phenomenal qualities using physicalistic vocabulary, and
hence that the qualities are not physical. Phenomenal qualities are often referred to as ‘qualia’,
frequently though not exclusively to denote the conception of them under which they are
irreducible and non-physical.
3.2.1 - The "Qualia" Problem
Jackson (1982) famously argued that qualia are non-physical using his ‘Mary’s room’ thought
experiment. The scenario features a scientist called Mary who is confined from birth to a
room where she is deprived of visual stimulation in any colour other than black and white.
Jackson asks us to imagine that from inside the room Mary comes to learn literally all the
physical facts there are to be known, among which are all the facts that obtain about the
physical events that occur when we experience colour. One day, Mary is released from the
room and becomes directly acquainted for the first time with a red object. Jackson’s position,
at the time he formulated the thought experiment, was that Mary now learns a new fact,
namely what it is like to see red, and that since she already knew all the physical facts she must
therefore have learnt a non-physical fact. From this, he concluded that qualia are not physical.
More recently, Chalmers (1996) has used a thought experiment to argue for the broader
conclusion that phenomenal consciousness in general is not physical. He suggests that there is
a conceivable and therefore, as he takes it, metaphysically possible world which is physically
identical in every respect to our own, containing creatures (’zombies’) that are physically
identical to ourselves but lack qualia entirely. He argues that since the physical properties
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instantiated in this world could be instantiated without any attendant phenomenal
consciousness, a physical property cannot be identical to a phenomenal quality.
Anti-physicalist arguments like these play quite an important background role even in
debates among proponents of physicalism about phenomenal character. Physicalists might
deny, for one reason or another, that the premises Jackson and Chalmers use to show that
qualia are non-physical are well supported in the first place. For example, some deny that there
is any reason to accept Chalmers’ premise that whatever is conceivable is possible (see,
Gendler and Hawthorne, 2002). Others argue that given the present state of physics, we have
no to way to tell whether Mary, who knows physical facts as yet unknown to people in the real
world, would acquire new knowledge after leaving the black and white room (Montero, 1999).
In spite of arguments like these, physicalism is strategically best placed to overcome the
intuitions underlying anti-physicalist thought experiments if it can provide compelling
positive reasons for thinking one physical property or another is associated, necessarily, with a
given phenomenal quality. For this reason, an account of phenomenal qualities has an
advantage if it shows better promise than its rivals at overcoming anti-physicalist intuitions,
even in a debate conducted exclusively between physicalists.
3.2.2 - Qualia andNeural-Correlates of Consciousness
The threat posed to naturalism by the suggestion that phenomenal qualities are mysterious or
even non-physical is a notable and sometimes explicit background presence in the
sensorimotor account. O&N begin their canonical early statement of the sensorimotor theory
by criticising, in particular, attempts that have been made in neuroscience to account for
consciousness by appeal to types of brain activity. They cite a number of neuroscientific
accounts that have attempted to explain the existence of consciousness by appeal to facts
about the neural activity it is correlated with (neural-correlates of consciousness or NCCs).
These facts include, for example, the quantum properties of microtubules (Penrose, 1994),
and in another case coherent oscillations within a 40 - 70 Hz frequency range, i.e. potential
energy that is repeatedly displaced and restored to its original state at a constant speed of 40 to
70 times per second (Llinás and Ribary, 1993). O&N also target attempts to account for the
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differences in phenomenal character between sense modalities, for example vision and
audition, by appeal to the distinct neural pathways and cortical regions that are active
respectively when we see and hear, a view for which they cite Müller (1838) as the historical
precedent, and which they claim most present day scientists continue to be satisfied with.
O&N object that all these approaches suffer from the same defect, namely that they fail to give
any principled account of why the entities, areas or types of activity are correlated with
consciousness in general, or with one phenomenal character rather than another. They argue
that as long as we persist in appealing to neural properties of this sort an explanatory gap will
persist, because there will always remain an unanswered ‘why?’ question.
Even if we set aside worries about anti-physicalism, accounts of the kinds described
above have the drawback that they explain less than do accounts that offer a more principled
explanation for why one variety of physical state rather than another yields consciousness.
O’Regan and Noë’s point is even more obviously fitting when it comes to explaining degrees
of difference and similarity of phenomenal character within and between sense modalities,
considering that even if you believed that the relation between consciousness in general and
the physical properties that instantiate it will never be intelligible to us (see, e.g., McGinn,
1991), it would still be reasonable to hope that a physicalistic account can be given which will
intelligibly and non-arbitrarily explain why specific kinds of experience have one phenomenal
quality rather that another. The explanatory limitations O&N identify are even more
pronounced in light of the threat posed by the anti-physicalist arguments offered by
philosophers like Jackson and Chalmers, since the less intelligible the proffered relation
between consciousness and the physical, the greater the motivation remaining to believe that
physicalism is false.
O&N do not address more promising variants of the NCCs approach. They observe
that we cannot read off the properties of consciousness from the topographical quality of
cortical maps that are organised in ways that replicate the retinal image, since the retinal
images, being dual in number, obscured at the blind spot, and defective in various other ways,
do not correlate with what we take to be the felt quality of visual consciousness. O&N do not
directly address the possibility that the character of consciousness could be explained by
appeal to other topological or topographical isomorphisms, nor the more promising
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possibility that phenomenal character could be explained purely by appeal to the content and
functional role of symbolic representations. Pessoa et al. (1998) and Noë and Thompson
(2004), however, give arguments against these proposals, as I discussed already in chapter 2.
3.2.3 - The Sensorimotor Contingency Account
O&N attempt to improve on these defective explanations of phenomenal character by
appealing to sensorimotor contingencies (SMCs), the systematic ways that stimulation
received to the brain from the sense organs varies in line with movement by the perceiver’s
body or the objects perceived. One explanatory task that SMCs carry out is accounting for the
differences in phenomenal character that hold between sense modalities, for example vision,
audition and touch. As an example, O&N propose that you are facing a horizontal straight
line. If you face the straight line head-on so that it is perfectly aligned with the equators of
your eyes, the image projected onto your retina when flattened appears as a straight line.
However, if you move your head or eyes so that the line meets your eyes above or below the
equator, the eyes’ curvature means that the image projected onto the retina will appear when
flattened as an arc. Moving your eyes horizontally, by contrast, leaves the projection of a
straight line intact. The appearance of an object also alters when projected at varying locations
on the retina in line with the varying character of the photoreceptor cells. The further
photoreceptors are from the centre of the retina, the greater their size, but the lower their
density. Light meeting different areas of the retina is also met by a differing selection of
photoreceptor types. Rods are more sensitive than cones. Cones require more light to become
active, and activate, depending on their type, in the presence of differing wavelengths of light.
In one part of the retina, the blind spot, there are no photoreceptors at all.
O&N call the patterns of sensorimotor contingency modulated by characteristics of
the sense organs apparatus-related SMCs. They contrast the apparatus-related SMCs
associated with the eyes with those associated with the ears, observing that sense input from
the ears is not affected by blinks or eye movements, but does obey its own distinctive patterns
of sensorimotor contingency. Tilting your head toward a sound source, in their example,
increases the amplitude of the signal but leaves the frequency unchanged. The crucial point
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these examples are supposed to illustrate is that vision and sound are not experienced as
distinct conscious modalities because of the intrinsic character of the sense input signals or the
intrinsic character of the brain regions associated with the respective senses, but solely on
account of the distinct apparatus-related SMCs associated with the respective sense organs.
O&N also use SMCs to account for differences in phenomenal character within sense
modalities. The range of phenomenal qualities that comprises a particular modality is
explained by SMCs determined this time by properties of the objects perceived, rather than
the sensory apparatus. These are object-related SMCs. Although it is intended to extend to
other modalities, the account focuses on vision. Within vision, the most straightforward
example of SMCs concerns shape. The sensory stimulation your brain receives from a
square-shaped object changes in line with movement by the perceiver or object in a systematic
way that differs from the movement-related dependence that holds when you look at a
circular object. Unlike colour, the conscious experience of shape does not have any appearance
of being irreducibly subjective; simply knowing that a square is a closed shape with exactly
four equal sides is in principle sufficient for knowing what a square looks like. The advantage
of the sensorimotor account, when it comes to shape, is that it shows how we come to
experience shapes as they are, even though they are distorted when they appear on the retina.
The account of shape experience is also important because it provides a partial analogue of
colour experience.
Colour experience is also accounted for by the systematic dependence between
movement and differing sensory stimulation, in particular the activation of differing sets of
retinal cones (O&N). The analogy with shape is complicated, however, by the need to account
for how the retinal stimulation you receive from an object does not just vary as your spatial
alignment with it changes, but also in line with changes in ambient lighting. This point is
made more explicit in the longer solo work by Noë (2004) and O’Regan (2011). We therefore
need to appeal to three-way patterns of counterfactual dependence between movement,
changes in ambient lighting conditions and the stimulation received by the retina. In line with
the observations made about colour by O’Regan (2011) - which he points out do not
constitute a final or definitive sensorimotor account of colour - this three way relation can be
reduced, essentially, to a two-way relation between changes in the character of the light that
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meets the object before being reflected onto the retina, and changes in the character of the
retinal stimulation that follows. Note, however, that the fact that the two-way relation
features fewer variables does not mean it is more appropriate than the three-way relation,
which characterises the effects of movement, when it comes to explaining how perceivers
actually come to be in states characterised by the relevant phenomenal qualities.
In this way, the sensorimotor account does not just appeal to properties of the light
hitting the retina, but to the object’s propensity in the presence of varying light sources to
reflect varying wavelengths of light, and therefore stimulate the retina in systemically differing
ways. O’Regan (2011) argues it is not surprising that this property of the object properly
enters into an explanation of colour experience, since we are evolved mainly to respond to
objects, and only occasionally interact directly with sources of light. To provide further
support for the sensorimotor perspective, he cites some interesting work conducted at his lab.
Philipona and O’Regan (2006) looked at changes in how photoreceptors are stimulated in the
presence of a range of surfaces and lighting conditions. There are three kinds of cone
photoreceptor, responding respectively to light of short, medium and long wavelengths, and
each kind can be activated independently of the other two. This means that to describe cone
activation in the presence of a given surface, in a given lighting condition, you need to specify a
value for each of the three photoreceptors. On this basis, to specify how these change in
different lighting conditions, you usually have to specify a value for three variables in each
lighting condition.
The study found, however, that for surfaces with certain reflectance profiles, the
explanation can be simplified, since the activations of the three photoreceptors do not vary
independently in line with changes to lighting. In the case of red, yellow, blue and green
surfaces, it was possible to account for changes in retinal stimulation across varied lighting
conditions by specifying values in each lighting condition for only one or two variables.
Philipona and O’Regan observe that this correlates with anthropological data showing that
red, yellow, blue and green are the four most universally adopted colour classifications (Berlin
and Kay, 1969). This provides further support, they suggest, for the idea that colour
experience does not just depend on how the retina responds to reflected light of different
wavelengths, but on how that responsiveness varies given changes to lighting; notice that by
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just attending to the way that light of given wavelengths stimulates the retina, we would lack
this explanation for the anthropological data. Since the ambient light reflected from the object
to the retina varies in line with movements by the perceiver or object, the colour experience
depends on a relation between movement and sense input, although to make this relation
intelligible we have to also understand how lighting conditions change in line with these
movements.
There is some promise, then, that the sensorimotor account of phenomenal quality
can account for the experienced feel associated with distinct modalities, and within the visual
modality for experienced colour and shape, solely by describing extra-neural characteristics of
the perceiver’s relation to the environment. This has a methodological benefit, since outward
interactions are easier to observe than neural states. More importantly, it provides a more
principled explanation than appealing to brain states alone. In part, this is because it appeals to
patterns that are self-evidently and necessarily present in the activity of embodied perceivers.
It is also because of the systematic framework it provides for explaining degrees of similarity
and difference between phenomenal qualities. Noë (2004) argues that the account therefore
counts as an improvement on those that suggest qualia amount to an unexplained ‘residue’
remaining even after we have accounted for an agent’s perceptual engagement with the
environment.
3.2.4 - SMCs asCounterfactual Conditionals
SMCs, as we have seen, offer a principled way to account for the varying phenomenal
character associated with distinct modalities and different percepts within a modality. In
particular, they also offer in principle a way to quantify degrees of difference and similarity
between qualities. More has to be said, however, about what it is for a perceiver to be in a
conscious state characterised by SMCs, and about the role played by the perceiver’s internal
states in enabling perceptual consciousness. Most versions of the sensorimotor theory
complete this part of the story by reference to attunement or practical knowledge pertaining
to SMCs. I will examine this notion in detail in section 3.3 and further in chapter 4, but it is
worth signposting now the fact that how we understand sensorimotor knowledge or
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attunement will be affected by how we resolve a key ambiguity in the notion of sensorimotor
contingency.
As they are usually characterised, SMCs are appropriately described by counterfactual
conditionals of the form ‘if the subject moved like this, their sense input would change like
this’ and ‘if objects in the environment moved like this, the perceiver’s sense input would
change like this’. This construction is offered by Noë (2004) and is also frequently in evidence
throughout O&N, for example where the authors say: “Seeing an object consists in precisely
the knowledge of the relevant sensorimotor contingencies - that is, in being able to exercise
one’s mastery of the fact that if, among other things, you make an eye movement, the stimulus
will change in the particular way typical of what happens when you move your eyes” (p. 968).
On another construction, SMCs comprise the patterns of dependence between sense input
and motor output that actually, rather than counterfactually, characterise the perceiver’s
ongoing sensorimotor interactions. This alternative notion is found in the summary of the
sensorimotor approach offered by Burhmann, Di Paolo and Barandiaran, who claim that:
“According to the sensorimotor approach, perception is a form of embodied know-how,
constituted by [emphasis added] lawful regularities in the sensorimotor flow or in
sensorimotor contingencies in an active and situated agent” (2013). Here, the know-how is
not knowledge about SMCs, it is knowledge which when exercised helps constitute the SMCs.
This notion is sometimes evident in O&N, where the authors claim that exercising
sensorimotor mastery consists, in the case of a guided missile, in its exercising “action recipes”
(p. 945), which map certain sensory stimuli to certain motor outputs. The action recipes, the
authors at one point claim, allow the missile to “make [emphasis added] lawful changes in
sensory stimulation” (p. 945). The apparent role of the action recipes, in this case, is not to
constitute knowledge about SMCs, but to allow patterns of sensorimotor contingency to be
instantiated.
Burhmann et al. offer an explicit account of some distinct notions of SMCs in play in
sensorimotor theory, which they propose can be modelled as dynamical systems. The
sensorimotor environment, as they call it, comprises the complete set of counterfactual
conditional-styled SMCs governing a perceiver’s bodily relation to its environment. This is to
say that it describes the changes in sense input that would occur if the perceiver made
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particular movements. Characterising the sensorimotor environment therefore only depends
on the outward characteristics of the perceiver’s body and the environment and not on the
perceiver’s brain. The authors characterise the perceiver’s repertoire of actual bodily
engagements within a given sensorimotor environment through what they call a sensorimotor
habitat, which comprises the movements the perceiver makes in line with given sense inputs,
and the changes in sense input that follow. As the authors note, the sensorimotor habitat is
not just determined by characteristics of the extra-neural body and environment, but also by
the agent’s internal states.
As we have seen, the original statements of the sensorimotor theory are explicit,
although only some of the time, that they mean SMCs to characterise the sensorimotor
environment rather than the sensorimotor habitat. This understanding is also evident in the
‘radical enactivist’ versions of the sensorimotor account offered by Hutto and Myin (2012)
and Myin and Degenaar (2014), which reject O&N’s appeal to ‘knowledge’ but agree that
perceivers must be ‘attuned’ to SMCs that exist, presumably, prior to the perceiver acquiring a
sensitivity to them. The sensorimotor habitat is likely to prove useful as a way of
characterising the perceiver’s perceptual attunement to some subset of the SMCs in the
sensorimotor environment. However, the sensorimotor habitat conception of SMCs also
obscures some of the insights offered by the original statements of the sensorimotor theory.
One thing it does is obscure a distinction between distinct directions of fit. SMCs, in their
original formulation, describe the changes in sense input that follow changes in motor output,
and never the changes in motor output that follow changes in sense input, and we could
therefore think of them as having a motor output to sense input direction of fit. Even if we
suppose, as if plausible, that the only SMCs relevant to an account of perceptual consciousness
are those sometimes instantiated by the perceiver’s actual sensorimotor engagements, it would
still be true, on the original statements of the sensorimotor theory (O&N; Noë, 2004;
O’Regan, 2011) that SMCs by definition have just one direction of fit, while the sensorimotor
habitat describes a systematic dependence running bidirectionally between motor output and
sense input.
It may turn out that the purported distinction between ‘input’ and ‘output’ is
arbitrary rather than reflecting a genuine functional distinction, and therefore that the
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distinction between directions of fit does not finally matter either. Nonetheless, the
sensorimotor theory in its original form is explicit in individuating phenomenal qualities by
appeal to SMCs with a motor output to sense input direction of fit. This is compatible with a
view where inputs and outputs are instrumentally useful but dispensable parameters for
modelling the workings of the wider loop of activity comprising brain, body and environment.
It is also compatible with a view under which the input-output distinction is genuine. So as
not to pre-judge this question, and others concerning the role played by internal states in the
sensorimotor account, I restrict ‘sensorimotor contingencies’ (SMCs) to describing aspects of
the sensorimotor environment. This of course entails that SMCs fail to explain anything
about perceptual consciousness unless we say more about the role played by the perceiver and
their internal states, and I examine the existing proposals about this later in the chapter. For
now, I will continue by outlining the different, perhaps compatible, characterisation of
sensorimotor contingency offered by Noë’s (2004) solo account.
3.2.5 - Perspectival Properties andObjective Properties
Noë (2004) supplements the SMCs described by O&N with two further kinds of property,
which can be thought of as new kinds of SMCs. Instead of focusing on how neural inputs
from the sense organs change in line with movement, he focuses on the varying ways that
objects appear to conscious perceivers. In particular, he introduces the notion of P-property
(short for perspectival-property), an idea which is most straightforwardly explained by means
of an example. A dinner plate has the ‘objective’ property of being circular. Viewed at an angle,
however, it has the appearance of an ellipse, which gets wider or narrower as the subject faces
it at different angles. The elliptical aspect is a P-property, in this case a P-shape. To experience
the plate as being objectively circular, the perceiver must be sensitive to the ways that the
P-shape would vary in line with movements by the object or perceiver. Thus objective
properties can be characterised by reference to an amended notion of sensorimotor
contingencies (SMCs). To experience the P-shape, the perceiver must understand their spatial
alignment to the object in an egocentric, bodily way. Noë gives examples like knowing which
bodily movements would result in your facing the object head-on, and having the ability to
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indicate, using a thumb and forefinger, the shape and size of the space taken up by an object in
your visual field. Thus P-property experience depends, too, on appreciating the results of
possible movements, and therefore, in a way, on sensitivity to a further variety of SMCs. Noë
does not say how this account relates to the account of shape perception found in O&N. We
can legitimately take it that the accounts run in parallel, however, given that conscious
perceivers must somehow be sensitive to SMCs styled along the lines of the earlier account in
order to experience P-shapes and objective shapes.
Colour also admits a distinction between P-property and objective property. In Noë’s
example, you have a wall painted in a solid white. Its being a particular shade of white is an
objective property. However, at a given time of day, the wall might be dappled with sunlight in
one area, making parts of it appear an especially bright white, and heavily shaded in others,
making it appear dark grey. This merely apparent colour is a P-property. To characterise a
P-colour, we do not need to explain how retinal stimulation varies with changes to
illumination, merely how the light reflected from the object stimulates the retina, and how
that stimulation would change if the light met with a differing selection of photoreceptors.
Here, Noë does say something explicit about the connection between his present approach
and O&N. He suggests that the experience of apparent colour depends on a subpersonal
process and that the sensorimotor contingencies involved in apparent colour are inscrutable
to conscious perceivers, implying they are SMCs of the sort described by the earlier account
rather than conscious SMCs. We experience objective colour - for instance, the colour the
wall is actually painted in - by consciously exercising our practical understanding of how the
apparent colour would change given changes, amongst other things, in illumination.
This parallels the suggestion given by Philipona and O’Regan (2006), although it is
interesting that Noë’s account of colour supplements this account by introducing this
distinction between conscious and subdoxastic components of colour experience, which track
the distinction between P-colour and objective colour. Noë, like O’Regan (2011), admits a
final sensorimotor account of colour experience will involve further considerations still. He
introduces one further proposal, namely that the objective colour we experience an object to
have depends on the objective colour we take objects in its background to have. Experienced
objective colour is determined, therefore, by various relations that objects stand in to each
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other as well as the relation they stand in to the perceiver. Although the sensorimotor theory
does not claim to offer a complete or final account of colour experience, both Noë and
O’Regan make explicit their commitment to the view that colour experience is explained by
patterns of movement-dependence, whether those patterns apply only to the perceiver and the
object, or between the object and other features of the outside environment. Noë claims,
moreover, that the capacities we use to discriminate the properties are themselves
sensorimotor, a point I return to in section 3.3 and again in chapter 4.
Since the SMCs featured in Noë’s account are relations between movement and, for
the most part, features of conscious experience, Noë’s account is committed to a distinctively
controversial claim about visual phenomenology. Martin (2008) objects that the account
misdescribes visual phenomenology, since we rarely experience P-properties, such as the
elliptical aspect of the plate. He argues that experiencing a P-property involves adopting the
‘painterly attitude’, a deliberate effort of the sort a painter makes when attempting to
faithfully render a scene with the correct perspective; and it is striking that doing this is
actually quite difficult. In response, Noë (2008) clarifies his position by noting that you must
experience P-properties even when you do not adopt the painterly attitude on account of the
fact that you can only be visually aware of an object from some vantage point. Since you
cannot view an object without viewing it from a particular perspective, experiencing its
objective properties requires you to understand how your present perspective is contingent on
your present spatial alignment to the object, and recognising this entails implicitly
appreciating the ways the P-property would vary if you or the object moved. Noë claims in the
same piece that you can only perceive P-properties themselves if you also experience the
relevant objective properties, since you could not experience a P-property as a P-property if
you did not understand the way it varies systematically in line with movement. This means
that rather than being ‘primitive’, the ability to experience P-properties arises simultaneously
with the ability to experience objective properties.
Noë (2008) also addresses an important point concerning the metaphysical status of
P-properties. In at least one respect, P-properties are subject-dependent, since you cannot
describe them without reference to a perceiver. Moreover, descriptions of P-properties can be
used to describe the character of a subject’s perceptual experience. Nonetheless, Noë (2008;
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2012) emphasises that they should not be thought of as being akin to sensations, which are
commonly understood as properties of consciousness and not properties of the outside world.
He claims instead that P-properties inhere in the outside environment as relational properties
borne by objects. As he puts it: “looks [...] are not 'mental intermediaries.' They are, rather,
aspects of the things we see” (2008, p. 691) and a little later in the same piece: “I am realist
about looks. My view is that the elliptical look of the plate from here, no less than its
circularity, is a feature of the visible scene before me, a feature of the world itself” (2008, p.
693). It is worth exploring this claim in a little more detail. The claim that looks are properties
of the world implies that they exist prior to and independently of the subject’s capacity to
experience them. This seems odd, considering that the word ‘look’, applied adjectivally to a
feature of the environment, implies the existence of a subject who sees it.
My suggestion is that we reconcile the idea that P-properties are in some important
sense dependent on the subject’s perceptual abilities with the idea that they are properties of
the world, and not the subject’s mind, by taking it that prior to featuring in a subject’s
conscious awareness the P-properties exist as what Shoemaker (1980), following Geach
(1969), calls mere-Cambridge properties. These are properties that can change without their
object’s causal powers changing, and which therefore are trivial. To update an example offered
by Shoemaker, we could, for instance, note that everything now existing has the property of
being ‘such that Barack Obama is president of the USA’, while noting that this property could
for most objects - a piece of fruit, say - change without the object’s causal powers changing.
Shoemaker contrasts mere-Cambridge properties with genuine properties in order to denote
that mere-Cambridge properties, although they exist, are uninteresting. We could contrast the
mere-Cambridge cases with a scenario in which Barack Obama makes it the law that for as
long as he is President of the USA, it will be a criminal offence to possess apples. In this event,
the property of being ‘such that Barack Obama is president of the USA’ will mean that an
apple has a causal power, namely the power to cause you to be arrested, where we take it that
an object has a causal power to make X happen if its existence increases the probability of X
taking place. In this scenario, the property goes from being a mere-Cambridge property to a
being genuine property. Let us take it that P-properties are like this. An object might bear
some P-colour or P-shape to a person who does not experience it, for example because they are
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not looking at it or they cannot see. P-properties might even inhere in objects in relation to
possible but non-existent perceivers. The properties would nonetheless exist, and inhere in the
world, where this is contrasted with in the mind of some perceiver. But the properties only
have causal powers, and therefore become genuine properties, if there is a conscious perceiver
who experiences them.
3.2.6 - Bodiliness, Insubordinateness, Richness andGrabbiness
Sensorimotor contingencies are a cornerstone of the sensorimotor theory. As we have seen,
their role is to explain why one sensory modality is qualitatively different from another and,
similarly, why perceptual experiences qualitatively differ from one another within sense
modalities. However, they do not address the broader question of why we have experiences
that feel, qualitatively, like they are world-presenting rather than feeling like some other kind
of experience or lacking an experiential quality altogether. The sensorimotor theory answers
this question by appeal to four key notions: bodiliness, grabbiness (O’Regan, Myin and Noë,
2004; O&N), and, in later accounts, partial insubordinateness and richness (O’Regan, 2011).
The properties, like SMCs, govern perceivers’ sensorimotor activity in a structured
environment, which is to say they help characterise the sensorimotor habitat. From a
theoretical perspective, as well as from the perspective of the perceiver herself, they offer a
principled way to distinguish neural signals related to perception from other kinds of signal.
Bodiliness is the tendency of body movements instigated by the perceiver to bring
about changes to the input received from the sense organs. For instance, blinks and eye
movements bring about radical changes to the nature of retinal input, head movements bring
about changes to the amplitude of the auditory signal received from each ear, and so forth.
The fact that the conscious perceiver has a degree of agential control over the character of the
sensory stimulation received is supposed to help explain the sense of ‘mineness’ that
accompanies a conscious perceptual experience. It is a necessary component of perceptual
experience.
Insubordinateness is the opposite. It describes the tendency for perceivers only to have
partial control over the quality of the sensory stimulation they receive. If they had full control,
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the perceiver or their visual system would have no reason to think that the sensory stimulation
originates from outside themselves. Thus, insubordinateness is also a necessary feature of
perception, and helps distinguish neural activity involved in perception from other sorts of
neural activity.
Richness is another feature that differentiates perceiving from thinking and imagining.
The amount of information accessed in the course of a temporally-extended act of perception
is much greater than the information available to thought or imagination. In O’Regan’s (2011)
example, you might consciously reconstruct, in an act of imagination, the appearance of your
grandmother’s face. But without seeing her, there are likely to be numerous small details about
her appearance, e.g. the width of her eyebrows or the appearance of her hair line, that you
cannot reconstruct. O’Regan observes that richness is not sufficient to distinguish perception
from every other kind of bodily activity, since autonomic functions such as digestion and
respiration also involve rich information about blood sugar levels, oxygen levels, and so forth.
However, richness distinguishes sensory information from information playing a similar role
in acts of thought or imagination.
Grabbiness refers to the tendency of perceivers to shift their attention and bodily
alignment in response to transients, sudden changes to sensory stimulation. The fact that
perceivers detect change this way makes a vital contribution to the phenomenology of
perception, namely the experience of being reliably in touch with a rich and
dynamically-changing environment. Grabbiness is a key feature of the idea of the world as an
outside memory.
The above four properties, for the most part, characterise a perceiver’s sensorimotor
interactions in a way that can be observed from the outside. For instance, we do not need to
know anything about brains or the subjective character of conscious experience to know that
retinal stimulation is governed by bodiliness and insubordinateness. We can tell that richness
exists purely by virtue of the rich detail available in the environment for pick-up by the retina.
Grabbiness is supposed to consist largely of bodily movements, in particular eye movements
directed toward the source of the transients. This is complicated a little by the fact that
grabbiness is also supposed to be signalled by shifts in attention, which may not require
eye-movements, and may instead depend solely on some kind of neural activity. With this
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small complication aside, the four properties, alongside SMCs, help make the phenomenal
character of perceptual experience naturalistically explicable without reference to apparently
mysterious neural-correlates of consciousness.
However, perceptual experience depends on something more than SMCs and the four
other principles, since it is easy to imagine objects standing in relations to the environment
governed by these or similar laws without being conscious and even without demonstrating
the kind of sensitivity that might justify the suggestion that they are unconscious perceivers.
Perception requires that subjects are, somehow, skillfully sensitive to the fact that their
relation to the environment is governed by the relevant laws. This is the purpose of
sensorimotor mastery, which I discuss next.
3.3 - SensorimotorMastery
SMCs, on the usual understanding, are properties that could be described by counterfactual
conditionals, and which pre-exist any bodily engagement with the environment, or any
capacity for the same. On this basis, it is evident that to explain how a subject comes to
perceive and thereby undergo consciousness characterised by the relevant phenomenal
qualities, the sensorimotor account needs to show how the subject is, in a relevant way,
sensitive to those SMCs. The sensitivity in question is said, in various places, to involve
sensorimotor ‘skill’; ‘attunement’ to SMCs; or ‘practical knowledge’, ‘understanding’ or
‘tracking’ of SMCs. Some of the time, the variation in terminology is purely stylistic, but at
other times the choice of term reflects some quite different ways of understanding the
capacities in question. To keep things as clear as possible, I am going to introduce my own
convention and use ‘sensorimotor mastery’ as a broad label to describe any variety of
sensitivity to SMCs of alleged interest in sensorimotor theory. Under this broad heading, I
will group the capacities in question under three apparently distinct types, which I will call (i)
Sensorimotor Attunement, (ii) Sensorimotor Tracking and (iii) Sensorimotor Understanding.
In appealing to these three categories I am not prejudging whether there are capacities that fall
under more than one of these categories, nor whether all three deserve to make an appearance
in the account.
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3.3.1 - Sensorimotor Attunement
O&N suggest that over the course of your life, you are exposed to numerous SMCs, and that
your brain stores information about them, categorising them under laws of sensorimotor
contingency corresponding to various types of property, for example specific colours and
shapes. When you are confronted with a red object, for example, your brain deploys
information about the SMCs associated with red objects derived from the previous
encounters. O&N do not explain what causes the brain, at a particular moment, to deploy
stored information about one sensorimotor law rather than another. We can plausibly
suppose that the brain does not just make use of present sense input state to detect which
SMCs obtain, but also efferent copy from the motor regions, and the way both have changed
in the last few moments.10 This is to suggest that the brain responds to information about the
restricted set of SMCs evident in the bodily interactions that are taking place right now, and
associates these SMCs with stored information about the fuller set of SMCs that usually apply
in similar situations. I think it plausible that this picture, or something close to it, is what
O&N have in mind, although they do not say so explicitly.
The authors are emphatic that neither the availability of the stored information nor
its mere ‘activation’ is sufficient for perception. Instead, they argue that perception is a kind of
embodied exploration of the outside environment analogous to a dance, an activity that can
never consist of an inner state alone, but also requires a variety of temporally-extended
interaction with the outside environment. They say: “Seeing is not constituted by the
activation of neural representations. Exactly the same neural state can underlie different
experiences, just as the same body position can be part of different dances” (O&N, p. 966).
This invites an understanding of sensorimotor mastery as a capacity for making a variety of
systematic, goal-directed bodily movements. This capacity, which I call Sensorimotor
Attunement, can also be found in Burhmann, Di Paolo and Barandiaran’s (2013) model,
which invites us to model a perceiver’s repertoire of bodily engagements in a structured
10 It is not a logical necessity, however, that the neural system which enables conscious vision
is always sensitive to ongoing efferent copy. It might only be sensitive to efferent copy during
learning phases, as Clark (2008) suggests, after which it uses sense inputs alone to recognise
patterns of sensorimotor contingency.
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environment as a sensorimotor habitat.
Although O&N and Noë (2004) on one or two occasions deny that vision is
exhaustively accounted for by a set of behavioural capacities, the idea that vision depends on
being poised to act is recurrent throughout their accounts, for example their claim that:
“Under the present theory, visual experience does not arise because an internal representation
of the world is activated in some brain area. On the contrary, visual experience is a mode of
activity involving practical knowledge about currently possible behaviors and associated
sensory consequences. Visual experience rests on know-how, the possession of skills” (O&N, p.
846), and in Noë’s account: “It is my possession of basic sensorimotor skills (which include
the abilities to move and point and the dispositions to respond by turning and ducking, and
the like) that enables my experience to acquire visual content” (Noë, 2004, p. 90).
The idea of Sensorimotor Attunement as a behavioural capacity is evident, in
particular, in the main example given by O&N, which features a guided missile. The missile’s
goal is to hit its target and, while following the target, to try to avoid enemy fire by zig-zagging
left and right. The missile’s relation to the target is characterised by various SMCs. When the
missile turns left (on its yaw axis), the target, if it appears in its sensors, will appear further to
the right-hand side, and vice versa. If the missile gets closer to the target, the target will occupy
more space in its sensors. To achieve its goal, the missile’s behaviour must exhibit sensitivity to
SMCs like these. O&N, who are emphatic that they do not wish to underplay the
contribution made by the brain to perception, propose that the missile, like a human, makes
use of stored information, which in the missile’s case comprises “action recipes” (O&N, p. 945)
corresponding to various sorts of target. They emphasise, however, that the internal states do
nothing until they are deployed for some practical end. In the case of the missile, they observe
that the action recipes are “latent” (O&N, p. 945) until the missile begins following a relevant
target.
The authors do not say exactly what an action recipe is, but evidently it comprises
instructions about how to move. Presumably, it does this by mapping sense inputs to motor
outputs, for example specifying that the missile should turn right if the target appears on the
right hand side of its sensors. Attending to the contrasting descriptions of the stored
information deployed by humans and the guided-missile when exercising Sensorimotor
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Attunement, we might notice that direction of fit, which has already been an important
notion in understanding SMCs, is an issue again here, although in a different form. The stored
information about sensorimotor laws that O&N allege to be involved in human perception
appears to have a belief-like direction of fit - it specifies how sense input would change given
particular movements, and it must therefore correspond to pre-existing facts about the
sensorimotor environment. Action recipes, on the other hand, appear to have a desire-like
direction of fit - they specify which movements will take place given particular sense inputs,
suggesting that if they are effective it is the missile’s behaviour that will appropriately
correspond. The fact that O&N refer interchangeably to mastery of SMCs and the possession
of ‘action recipes’ has the potential to be puzzling if we do not unpack the notion of
Sensorimotor Attunement with care, since it is not clear straight away why we should think of
the belief-like and desire-like capacities as being identical. To this end, we must attend
carefully to O&N’s claim that the exercise of Sensorimotor Attunement is never solely a
matter of stored information being activated by the presence of relevant stimuli, but a matter
of the stored information being activated in the course of the agent’s goal-directed behaviour.
O&N insist that the attunement, is “a practical, not a propositional form of
knowledge” (p. 944). Given their characterisation of sensorimotor knowledge as knowledge
that particular SMCs obtain, we might be drawn to suppose that despite not being
propositional, it nonetheless has a belief-like direction of fit. On this basis, their insistence
that it must be exercised might reflect nothing more than the commonplace distinction
between possession and exercise that applies to any kind of knowledge. For example, your
knowledge that Edinburgh is the capital of Scotland only features in your awareness if you are
exercising it, perhaps because you are presently thinking about travelling to the capital of
Scotland. This offers one reason for thinking sensorimotor knowledge or attunement must be
exercised. O&N endorse a stronger claim, however, when they say: “the notion of being tuned,
or having [sensorimotor] mastery, only makes sense [emphasis added] within the context of
the behaviour and purpose of the system or individual in its habitual setting […] if exactly the
same system was being used for a different purpose […] it might well be necessary for the
system to have a different behavior [in order to exercise sensorimotor mastery]” (p. 943).
O&N cannot simply be claiming here that a system ought to behave differently if its purpose
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is different, since this would be trivial. Instead, the passage suggests that the attunement to
SMCs is only something that exists by virtue of the agent’s purpose and behavioural
repertoire.
If Sensorimotor Attunement can only be made intelligible by appeal to a capacity for
goal-directed behaviour, as the above quote appears to suggest, it depends on the existence of a
capacity with a desire-like direction of fit. In this case, it is reasonable to ask where the
belief-like attunement to SMCs comes from. One way to unpack O&N’s point is by
supposing that we specify which SMCs the perceiver is attuned to by interpreting its
behaviour in light of the SMCs that now obtain, along with what we take to be the perceiver’s
goal state. This might involve something analogous to Dennett’s (1987) proposal that we
properly ascribe beliefs and desires to a subject on the basis of their explanatory value in
making sense of the behaviour. In the case of Sensorimotor Attunement, we first might notice
that the missile is disposed to yaw to the right when target appears in the right hand side of its
sensors. Next, we might suppose that the missile’s purpose is to keep the target aligned in the
middle of its sensors; this ascription of purpose could either be a theoretically useful
assumption, as with Dennett’s model, or we might actually know that this is its purpose
because we know what the missile’s designer intended. With this purpose in mind, we can
make sense of the missile’s behaviour by ascribing to the missile attunement to the relevant
SMCs, in this case the fact that turning right will result in the target appearing in the middle
of its sensors. The ‘action recipes’ may work by mapping possible sense inputs to appropriate
motor outputs, while the action recipe selected may co-vary with different sets of SMCs. It is
the interpretive stance, however, that on this proposal admits the dual directions of fit.
O&N do not go so far as to overtly insist that ‘purpose’ is necessary to specify which
SMCs the perceiver is attuned to, either by using the interpretive strategy sketched above or
any other strategy. Indeed, neither teleology nor having a proximal goal are given a prominent
theoretical role either in the remainder of the paper or in other statements of the
sensorimotor account. It is probable, then, that O&N merely mean to suggest that having a
purpose is necessary for Sensorimotor Attunement to exist in general. On this basis, their view
can be taken as the more austere claim that the perceiver is attuned to a set of SMCs if it is
able to respond with a distinctive set of movements when those SMCs obtain, and different
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movements when other SMCs obtain, with the added condition that for this sensitivity to
constitute attunement (or knowledge, skill, etc.) it must somehow help the perceiver fulfil a
purpose or achieve a goal. This latter proviso seems right, considering, for example, that when
a lake reflects the night sky it demonstrates a sensitivity to the night sky, but does not thereby
manifest any skill.
It seems viable, then, that Sensorimotor Attunement could be regarded as nothing
more than a behavioural capacity of the sort I have just described. O&N appear to disavow
such a view, however, when they make an effort to rebut charges that their theory amounts to
a form of behaviourism. In particular, they say: “[I]t is not the case that mental states
(experiential states) are logical constructions of actual and possible behaviour states” (2001b,
p. 1014), and later: “Knowledge of the laws of sensorimotor contingency themselves must
surely be represented” (2001b, p. 1017). We could attempt to do justice to this with a
representationalist gloss in which Sensorimotor Attunement involves the deployment of
representations with both belief-like and desire-like directions of fit, i.e. representations of the
SMCs that now obtain and the behaviour that should follow. The notion of a neural
representation with both directions of fit is found in the literature on action-oriented
representation (e.g., Wheeler, 2005; Clark, 1997), and if we wanted to give explanatory pride
of place to the neural state that realises the behavioural capacity, it would on this view be the
content of the representations that determines the SMCs to which the perceiver is now
attuned. However, it is not clear that this fits with O&N’s claim that: “Seeing is not
constituted by the activation of neural representations. Exactly the same neural state can
underlie different experiences, just as the same body position can be part of different dances”
(p. 966).
I think the best way to understand Sensorimotor Attunement is to suppose that while
other varieties of sensorimotor mastery involved in perceptual consciousness may draw on
something other than a behavioural capacity, Sensorimotor Attunement is, in fact, a logical
construction of actual and possible behaviour states. We can do justice to O&N’s resistance to
appealing to nothing but behaviour by adding a couple of provisos to the present notion of
Sensorimotor Attunement. A first is that a full explanation of the faculty must also explain, by
appeal to stored information, representation, or something else, how the behavioural capacity
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is realised. The present notion of Sensorimotor Attunement denies that these internal states
can be explanatorily relevant if they do not explain the behavioural capacity, and further
denies that the perceptual state can change without the behavioural capacities changing.
Whether or not the notion amounts on this view to a form of behaviourism is open to debate,
but it certainly has the resources to refute the suggestion that because it is a form of
behaviourism it ignores or denies the important role played by the brain.
The second proviso is that the behavioural capacities constituting Sensorimotor
Attunement cannot be accounted for by a simple mapping from varieties of sense input to
varieties of motor output, but only by a mapping from laws of sensorimotor contingency to
varieties of motor output. O&N suggest this entails that because sensorimotor laws vary in
line with differences in the body’s morphology, minute differences in embodiment between
one perceiver and another entails that the two perceivers must be discriminating a different
range of sensorimotor laws. I will argue later that the sensorimotor theory need not be
committed to the view that perceptual states are maximally sensitive to the details of
embodiment, although it ought to say that differences in embodiment between two perceivers
necessitates that they are making a different range of perceptual discriminations when the
differences are big enough.
Going further beyond the explicit claims made by O&N, I am going to add one
further criterion for establishing that a perceiver exhibits a belief-like attunement to SMCs of
the sort we require. Wheeler (2005) describes work by Harvey, Husbands and Cliff (1994)
featuring a robot, designed using artificial evolution, which was able to achieve a practical end
by following an identical behavioural repertoire for all sense input states other than the target
state. Placed in an environment containing a triangle and a rectangle affixed to a wall, the
robot’s task was to locate the triangle and move toward it. Its strategy was to do nothing but
rotate until its sensors were stimulated in a way characteristic of the triangle, and then move
forward. Faced at an angle, the rectangle’s edge would appear in the robot’s sensors as a
diagonal line, and in cases where the rectangle’s perspectival shape was sufficiently similar to
the triangle’s perspectival shape when faced head-on, the robot would ‘mistake’ the rectangle
for the triangle and begin to move forward. However, once the robot had moved some way
toward the shape, the rectangle would stop presenting the triangle-like aspect, causing the
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robot to resume rotating and eventually head toward the triangle, which would continue to
present the appropriate perspectival shape as the robot got closer.
We can observe that the robot certainly possessed a rudimentary degree of
Sensorimotor Attunement. It was implicitly attuned to the fact that continuing to rotate
while it had the triangle in its sights would result in its losing sight of the triangle, and to the
fact that proceeding straight on toward the triangle would allow it to keep the triangle in view.
More interestingly, its behaviour over a short time period also manifested a sensitivity to the
fact that although the rectangle had the propensity to appear like the triangle when faced from
certain positions, it did not from others. This latter sensitivity is not explained by stored
information or historical facts about the SMCs that the robot had been exposed to, but by
properties of the rectangle itself. Wheeler (2005), following Wheeler and Clark (1999),
describes this sort of environmental contribution as non-trivial causal spread, denoting that
the environment itself plays some explanatorily interesting causal role in the production of the
behaviour.
O&N do not say anything explicit to indicate whether temporally-extended
engagements demonstrating sensitivity to SMCs, where that sensitivity is accounted for by
non-trivial causal spread, should be counted as instances in which the agent exercises
Sensorimotor Attunement to the same SMCs. The most cohesive way to understand the
sensorimotor account is to suppose that they should not. This reflects the fact that O&N
actively emphasise the role played by internally stored information derived from previous
encounters with the environment. Indeed, sensitivity to SMCs accounted for by non-trivial
causal spread cannot make any contribution to O&N’s view that when we exercise the right
kind of sensorimotor mastery we are conscious of SMCs that are not capturable by the
patterns of output-input dependence manifest in our present movements. For example, you
can be conscious of a wall’s objective colour without any changes in illumination taking place;
and you can feel embedded within a richly detailed visual environment without taking in all
that detail, even in the course of a temporally-extended sensorimotor engagement, a point I
will discuss in more detail later in the chapter.
Since non-trivial causal spread cannot account for many of the key phenomena the
sensorimotor theory is supposed to account for, I think it best to consider the non-trivial
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causal spread case to demonstrate that relatively basic Sensorimotor Attunement plus
non-trivial causal spread can result in surprisingly sophisticated patterns of sensorimotor
engagement, but avoid attributing those patterns to Sensorimotor Attunement alone.
Another way to put the same point is to stipulate that possession of Sensorimotor
Attunement cannot depend on anything temporally-extended, even if it is exercised in the
course of temporally-extended behaviour. To be in the relevant way attuned to SMCs that
now obtain, a perceiver must have the ability to make an immediate change to its motor
outputs demonstrating its sensitivity to those SMCs.
Sensorimotor Attunement, the way I have characterised it, reflects a notion found at
least sometimes in the main statements of the sensorimotor theory. It is also, in principle,
compatible with Myin and Degenaar’s (2014) notion of ‘attunement’ to SMCs, although it is
worth noting that their notion is distinct. Sensorimotor Attunement, as I have presented it
here, implies a capacity for outwardly observable behaviour, with representation playing no
more than an instrumental role in enabling this behaviour. Myin and Degenaar also describe
attunement to SMCs as an embodied capacity, but say: “in the sense of ‘embodied’ at stake
here, ‘embodied’ is used in contrast with ‘representational’” (p. 1). By this, they mean to
contrast their preferred account with those accounts that mention embodiment and
representation. However, Myin and Degenaar’s preferred understanding of ‘embodiment’ also
stands in contrast with accounts that make explicit appeal to capacities for outward behaviour.
They stop short of making any such appeal to any such capacities, referring only to the
agent’s historical sensorimotor interactions. They say: “Attunement to sensorimotor
contingencies then means that an organism has acquired, on the basis of a history of
interactions, a sensitivity in its perception and action for the ways stimuli change with
movement” (p. 5). But other than denying that it involves representation, they do not say
anything about what a sensitivity to SMCs in perception is constituted by right now. Note,
then, that although Sensorimotor Attunement as I have presented it does not rule out
representation, it provides a positive non-representational account of what it is to possess the
relevant capacity, namely the disposition to manifest different behaviour when different
SMCs obtain. This means the notion I outline now has an explanatory advantage compared to
Myin and Degenaar’s, which is limited in that it only tells us what caused the organism to be
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in its current state, and not what it is about the organism’s current state that results in it being
in a perceptual state.
3.3.2 - Sensorimotor Tracking
O&N note the existence of an apparently key limitation with the notion of Sensorimotor
Attunement as I characterised it in the last section - namely that since the guided missile, for
example, is not conscious, Sensorimotor Attunement is not sufficient for perceptual
consciousness. To account for visual awareness, O&N introduce the further criterion that you
must be exercising your attunement to SMCs for the purpose of “thought and planning” (p.
944). To illustrate, they give the example of driving a car while talking to a friend. While
driving, you must navigate a range of obstacles while modulating your driving behaviour
appropriately, yet you are not necessarily aware of everything you are doing. In this respect,
you are equivalent to the autopilot of a plane. Only when you attend, for example, to the
colour of the car in front, and think or talk about it, or make plans in accordance with it, do
you become aware of the colour. One way to understand this requirement is to suppose that
the Sensorimotor Attunement only yields perceptual consciousness when it is deployed in
certain kinds of bodily movement. Another possibility is that it depends on a certain kind of
neural representation; O&N do not give a particularly detailed proposal about what happens
physically when thought and planning takes place. I will call sensorimotor mastery in this
context Sensorimotor Tracking.
In his book Why Red Doesn’t Sound Like a Bell, O’Regan (2011) builds on the
account offered by O&N. The book explains in greater detail the relation between
Sensorimotor Attunement, which by itself does not necessarily involve consciousness, and the
thought and planning needed for conscious perceptual awareness. The key faculties described
in O’Regan’s model of perception and perceptual consciousness comprise four
hierarchically-organised tiers. The bottom tier - call this Tier 1 - comprises the agent’s
skill-driven sensorimotor coupling with the outside environment. This type of coupling could
be instantiated by a human, but also by an unconscious artifact like the guided missile.
O’Regan’s account of sensorimotor mastery and SMCs at Tier 1 at times appears to
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adopt the notion of SMCs in which they are constituted by patterns present in the agent’s
repertoire of skillful behaviour (its sensorimotor habitat), rather than the notion in which the
skillful behaviour involves a behavioural sensitivity to counterfactual conditional-styled SMCs
that pre-exist in its sensorimotor environment. As I have already argued, it is better to
explicitly reject this understanding of SMCs, for reasons of expediency. The understanding
obscures the distinction (which may be theoretically useful) between patterns of dependence
between sense input and motor output, and those between motor output and sense input. It
also obscures the distinction between SMCs which are merely manifest in this behaviour, and
those to which the agent’s behaviour demonstrates a skillful sensitivity. Finally, it muddies our
understanding of SMCs in light of the contradictory conception on them found in Noë
(2004), throughout much of O&N, and at times in O’Regan (2011), in which they are the
ways that sense input would change given particular movements, regardless of whether those
movements take place. Fortunately, it is also consistent with O’Regan’s (2011) account if we
regard Tier 1 as involving unconscious sensorimotor coupling drawing on Sensorimotor
Attunement to SMCs as I have characterised the concepts in the last sections.
The next tier in O’Regan’s hierarchy - call this Tier 2 - involves a higher-order
cognitive access to SMCs governing activity at Tier 1. This is Sensorimotor Tracking, and is
exercised when the subject is poised to exhibit sensitivity to sensorimotor laws in the course of
“planning, decisions, or other rational behaviour” (O’Regan, 2011, p. 121). The behaviour in
question falls short of self-conscious behaviour or discursive thought and appears to be quite
intimately connected, still, with bodily behaviour; O’Regan offers as an example of behaviour
at this tier the state of being poised to press on a brake pedal when a red traffic light is visible.
It is not clear whether or not we should suppose that the only SMCs you can be sensitive to in
Tier 2 activity are those you already exhibit Sensorimotor Attunement toward in your
unconscious activity. However, O’Regan’s account does not make this an obvious
requirement. So it is more straightforward to suppose that Sensorimotor Tracking at Tier 2
involves exhibiting sensitivity to SMCs, in general, for the purpose of behaviour which is
planned and answerable to rational norms. This depends on tracking or being sensitive to the
SMCs governing your unconscious activity at Tier 1. But it may involve being sensitive to
SMCs beyond those featured in your Tier 1 Sensorimotor Attunement, considering that some
64
of the patterns manifest in your sensorimotor activity at Tier 1 may not be SMCs to which
this activity is itself Attuned, considering, to take one example, the proviso I made in the last
section that Sensorimotor Attunement does not encompass skillful sensitivity to SMCs when
this is accounted for by non-trivial causal spread.
O’Regan suggests that Tier 2 activity involves the sort of cognitive access to some
feature that Block (1990a) would describe as having ‘access consciousness’, since it involves
being poised to make use of that feature for reasoning and planning. O’Regan denies that
having this first order of cognitive access is sufficient to constitute being conscious, however.
To be conscious, O’Regan suggests we must have a further order of cognitive access to activity
at Tier 2. This further higher-order tracking, call it Tier 3, constitutes another level of
Sensorimotor Tracking. Perceptual consciousness occurs when the perceiver thinks
reflectively about features of the perceptual environment corresponding to SMCs which it
already tracks at Tier 2. The subject does not have access, when engaging in this kind of
thought, to the individual SMCs that correspond to a particular property, but merely to
categories or descriptors corresponding to sensorimotor laws, e.g. ‘that shade of red’. This kind
of thought is not intimately connected with bodily activity. However, in common with the
activity described by the tiers below, it is always practically focused, involving active,
goal-directed interrogation of the visual scene. In O’Regan’s example, this involves asking and
answering questions like: “’Is it an ‘A’?’; ‘Is it Times New Roman?’; ‘Is it black on white?’”
(2011, p. 28).
In spite of the more fully-developed character of O’Regan’s (2011) account, it lacks a
detailed characterisation of the neural (or neurally-realised, functional) processes that enable
activity at Tiers 2 and 3. At one point O’Regan suggests his account may bear an affinity to
Higher Order Thought (HOT) theories of consciousness, although he is explicit about not
being firmly committed to this suggestion. HOT theories explain consciousness by appeal to
higher-order access to lower order states in a manner similar to O’Regan’s model. Notably,
they almost always cash this suggestion out by appeal to a subpersonal explanatory level in
which one part of the cognitive systems bears higher-order representations of activity in
another system. If the tiered sensorimotor theory adopted a view like this, it would be
committed to explaining Tier 3 by reference to a subpersonal representation of Tier 2 activity,
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and Tier 2 by reference to subpersonal representations of SMCs. This sort of proposal will be
particularly relevant in chapters 5 and 6, where I discuss the relation between sensorimotor
theory and the dual systems model of vision.
O’Regan (2012) later asserts that the tracking carried out by Tiers 2 and 3 involves
neural states that ‘track’ or ‘register’ the appropriate lower-order activity, but do not
constitute representations. The neural states register the appropriate interactions by virtue of
being the sorts of physical states that ordinarily occur when the appropriate interactions are
taking place. O’Regan denies that these states thereby count as representations, although it is
notable that some accounts of representation (e.g., Tye, 2000, or Rupert, 2011) appeal to no
more than simple covariance relations of this sort to constitute representation, as I will discuss
in chapter 5. As it is, O’Regan’s (2012) notion of tracking appears to correspond to Myin and
Degenaar’s (2014) notion of attunement to sensorimotor contingencies (not to be confused
with ‘Sensorimotor Attunement’ as I use it here) in which the agent is attuned to
sensorimotor contingencies by virtue of being in some unspecified physical state while having
the relevant history of sensorimotor interactions.
The notion of tracking or registering just described appears to be inadequate by itself
to do justice to O’Regan’s (2011) multi-tiered account, however, inasmuch as it does not
explicitly specify the role these physical states perform when deployed in reasoned behaviour
(at Tier 2) or reflective thought (at Tier 3). Considering these activities are supposed to be
essential for enabling perceptual consciousness, it is reasonable to desire a better developed,
naturalistically-respectable account of what these higher order capacities involve. One
possibility is that Tier 2 and perhaps even Tier 3 capacities depend only on capacities for
behaviour, for example behaviour that is suitably sophisticated, or answers to appropriate
rational norms. O’Regan does not say much about this, but suggests possible sympathy toward
the suggestion that we ascribe these capacities to an agent through a Dennett-style interpretive
stance similar to the one I discussed in Section 3.3.1. O’Regan hints at a position of this nature
in a footnote, where he declares: “The implication is that conscious access is not something in
the agent. It is a way that an outside person (and consequently the agent itself) can describe
the state of the agent” (2011, p. 125n1).
66
3.3.3 - Sensorimotor Understanding
Sensorimotor Understanding is the variety of sensorimotor mastery featured in Noë’s (2004;
2012) sole-author versions of the sensorimotor account. I examine the capacity in greater
detail in the next chapter, so for now I will restrict myself to a brief outline of its key features.
In contrast with the other varieties of sensorimotor mastery, Sensorimotor Understanding
pre-supposes consciousness. For this reason, Noë does not present his version of the
sensorimotor account as an attempt to dissolve the hard problem of consciousness (cf., O&N;
O’Regan, 2011) and Sensorimotor Understanding is instead merely intended to help
characterise perception and perceptual consciousness in an already conscious perceiver. Noë
(2004) describes the capacity as an implicit understanding of P-properties, the understanding
of which requires an appreciation of your egocentrically specified alignment to objects in the
environment, and objective properties, the understanding of which requires an appreciation
of how P-properties would change in line with movement. Although he downplays the
importance of the personal/subpersonal distinction, Noë’s (2004) characterisation of
Sensorimotor Understanding presents it primarily as a personal-level phenomenon. However,
he suggests that for some kinds of experience, including P-colour experience, we do not have
conscious access to our exercise of sensorimotor mastery, thereby implying that in limited
cases it is firmly subpersonal.
Noë and O’Regan’s respective sole-author accounts offer quite different treatments of
sensorimotor mastery and there is little to suggest that Sensorimotor Tracking and
Sensorimotor Understanding should necessarily be regarded as different descriptions of the
same notional faculty. However, given that they both originate from the early O’Regan and
Noë paper, they could, with a little finessing, be thought of as different treatments of the same
phenomenon. If so, Sensorimotor Understanding could be regarded as a more philosophical
exposition of Sensorimotor Tracking. The main obstacle to such a reconciliation is the
difference between the properties the respective accounts claim are the objects of
sensorimotor mastery, namely subdoxastic sense inputs (O&N; O’Regan, 2011) and
P-properties and objective properties (Noë, 2004; 2012). Noë’s (2004) account does make
reference to the patterns of movement-related change governing input from the sense organs,
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claiming we must master them to experience P-colour. This indicates that Noë does not
intend his sole-author account to entirely supersede the early statement of the sensorimotor
theory, and thereby makes a reconciliation between his and O’Regan’s later solo accounts look
more promising. Sensorimotor Tracking and Sensorimotor Understanding notably both lack
a proper account of the physical or subpersonal mechanisms they are realised or constituted
by.
Sensorimotor Understanding is uncertainly defined in a couple of key respects. One,
as I just suggested, concerns the capacity’s place in a scientific account of perception, in
particular whether or not it depends on internal representation, and more narrowly the
precise representational or non-representational mechanism that enables it. Another concerns
Noë’s (2004) claim that it is a kind of knowing-how, and not a kind of knowing-that, which is
in tension with his firm insistence, elsewhere in the book, that Sensorimotor Understanding is
not knowing how to act but knowing what would happen if you did act. I make some
suggestions about how we should resolve these issues in chapter 4.
3.4 - Perceptual Presence: As-Access and In-Absence
As we have seen, the sensorimotor theory frequently criticises the idea that vision is enabled
subpersonally by the neural activation of a detailed or, in particular, pictorial representation of
the outside world. The outside memory thesis says that the brain does not internally model
the outside environment but instead accesses information directly from the outside world.
This entails that perception, considered subpersonally, depends non-trivially on bodily
interaction with the outside environment, and therefore does not depend solely or primarily
on internal representation.
In his sole-authored versions of the sensorimotor theory, Noë turns his attention to a
personal-level analogue of the subpersonal views targeted by O&N. The ‘snapshot conception’
(Noë, 2004) endorses a pictorial understanding of the phenomenology or what-it-is-likeness
of visual experience, suggesting that visual experience presents in pictorial fashion a large and
uniformly detailed visual field. Noë (2012) draws a connection between this
phenomenological claim and the logical claim that perception at the personal level involves
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representing the outside world. Declaring an allegiance with relational realism (e.g.,
McDowell, 1994a; Campbell, 2002), he denies that conscious perception involves
personal-level representation, and claims instead that it involves standing in a specific kind of
relation to the outside world itself. This point is reflected by the word he uses to label the
objects and properties to which we are intentionally-directed in conscious perception, which
he describes as being ‘present’ rather than ‘represented’.
Noë claims that objects and properties in the outside environment become
perceptually present when we stand in a particular kind of bodily relation to them. As we have
seen, that bodily relation can be specified by counterfactual conditionals describing the effects
of possible movements, with the relevant counterfactual conditionals being ones the perceiver
implicitly understands. Noë’s (2012) relational view of intentionality generalises to
encompass non-perceptual forms of thought, with perceptual presence being distinguished
from other forms of presence by the fact that the perceptual relation belongs to this particular
type. Crucially, the presence perceivers achieve by standing in this relation is not the simple
kind of presence characteristic of the snapshot conception, but a special kind of presence
which Noë calls presence-as-access.
The idea of presence-as-access is best illustrated by how it accounts for a feature of
visual phenomenology called presence-in-absence. Noë’s favourite example features a tomato
(2004; 2012). As with any opaque, three-dimensional object, you can never see every side of a
tomato at once - you see one side, while another side remains out of view. However, Noë
claims that when you look at a tomato, the rear side is nonetheless perceptually present ‘as
absent’. This is motivated by attention to visual phenomenology. Noë takes it as a primitive
that the back of the tomato has perceptual presence even though it is not visible in the way
that the front of the tomato is, a claim he justifies in part by noting that it does not seem as if
you are merely looking at a two-dimensional cut-out of a tomato. The perceptual presence of
the back of the tomato is enabled, he suggests, by your understanding of the movements that
would bring the rear of the tomato into view.
The perceptual presence of objects and properties that are out of view is a pervasive
feature of perceptual experience, and Noë emphasises the distinctive ability of
presence-as-access to account for it. Another central case is the perceptual presence of
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occluded parts of an object, for example a cat sitting behind a fence (Noë, 2002; 2004).
Although parts of the cat are occluded by the fence posts, a true characterisation of visual
phenomenology will observe that a visual experience of the cat is not an experience of a cat’s
parts, but of a whole cat. This is accounted for, as before, by the perceiver’s understanding of
the movements they or the cat would have to make to bring the occluded parts into view.
Presence-as-access is also intended to account more generally for the perceptual
presence of a richly detailed visual environment. Although the visual system does not process a
lot of environmental detail all at once, as evidenced by the experiments on change blindness
and inattentional blindness, Noë (2002) suggests that visual perceivers experience the
environment’s rich detail as present thanks to their implicit understanding of the movements,
such as eye movements, that would bring relevant detail into view. Interestingly, he denies
that perceivers ordinarily suffer from any delusion about the character of their access to
environmental detail (cf., Dennett, 2001). He suggests that the surprise participants in
Simons and Chabris’ (1999) inattentional blindness experiment reported on finding out that
they failed to notice the gorilla walking through the scene is explained by the implicit
expectation that their attention would be directed toward the gorilla, rather than the belief
that visual experience presents rich detail all at once.
Noë (2012) claims that there is no firm dividing line between objects that are
perceptually present and objects that are not. He claims that a perceiver may even have
quasi-perceptual experience of an object in the very distant environment, such as a friend
living in a distant city. If you know where that friend lives, your thoughts about him are
characterised, in part, by an understanding of the fact he is far away and an understanding of
the movements you could make to reach him, such as getting on a plane. For this reason, the
thought takes on, in part, a quasi-perceptual character, although Noë does not claim this
counts as a proper instance of perceptual presence. He contrasts this with the case of a friend
with whom you have lost touch. Because you do not know where the friend lives, or whether
he is alive or dead, the phenomenology of thoughts about this friend is quite different, a
difference explained at least in part by the fact that thoughts in the latter case do not draw on
an understanding of your sensorimotor relation to the friend.
The most striking feature of presence-in-absence (the phenomenology) taken together
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with presence-as-access (the logical claim that accompanies it) is that all perceptual experience
is supposed to belong to this type. This means presence-in-absence and -as-access incorporates
experiences we might be tempted to think feature a simpler kind of presence, for instance the
experience of the front side of the tomato. This is a counter-intuitive and, on a certain reading,
highly problematic claim, so it is worth noting that Noë is explicit on this point. He says: “all
perceptual presence is presence as absence […] perceptual presence is availability; the world
shows up for us as accessible” (Noë, 2012, pp. 95-96). Instead of imagining that the tomato’s
facing side has presence simpliciter while the non-visible parts are presented as absent but
accessible, Noë is explicit that the perceptual presence of the facing and the rear side both
belong to the latter kind. This is supposed to be evident from introspectable features of visual
phenomenology. In a description duplicated with slight modification from a passage originally
found in his earlier book, he says:
[S]top and look again, for example, at the face of the tomato. You can’t comprehend the whole of
it all at once in your visual consciousness. You focus on the color now, but in doing so, you fail to
pay attention to the shape, or to the variations in brightness across the surface, but only at the
price of ignoring the rest of it. You can no more achieve perceptual consciousness of the whole
aspect of the tomato’s front side all at once than you can see the tomato from every side all at once
[…] In a way, for perception, everything is hidden. Nothing is given. (Noë, 2012, p. 19)
The observation that we cannot fixate on atomic features of the visual environment is
compelling, but the suggestion that everything is hidden is more obscure and can be glossed in
a number of different ways, as we will see.
In his earlier account, Noë (2004) gives a similar description of visual phenomenology
and suggests it falls out of a particular understanding of the physical process that underlies
perceptual consciousness. To this effect, he offers an analogy between visual perception and a
computer accessing an online version of a newspaper via the World Wide Web. Rather than
downloading the entire issue at once, the computer downloads the articles one at a time,
accessing them only when called upon by the user. Downloading the issue in a piecemeal way
has certain advantages. It limits the burden placed on the computer’s bandwidth and
processing power, and it means that if an article is amended, the user can rely on seeing the
most up-to-date version. Notice that this is similar to perception, understood in accordance
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with the ‘outside memory’ thesis that perceivers use eye movements to access missing detail,
when required, directly from the outside world. Importantly, it makes no practical difference
to the person reading the newspaper that the computer downloads the articles one-by-one
rather than all at once, since they have immediate access to the articles as they request them.
As Noë puts it, the computer and its user therefore have ‘virtual’ access to the entire
newspaper. This is comparable to conscious vision, in which he alleges not only that perceivers
access detail in the way suggested by the outside memory thesis, but also that they have a
phenomenological sense of that detail’s presence by virtue of knowing how to access it when
required. Foreshadowing the claim that all perceptual presence is presence-as-access, Noë
claims that conscious vision is in part disanalogous to the computer case, because rather than
factoring into an offline and online component, perceptual presence is “virtual all the way in”
(2004, p. 134).
The computer analogy may invite a problematic understanding of the claim that in
perception, everything is hidden. While the computer ‘knows’ how to access the New York
Times, it does not anticipate, in advance, what the contents of the articles will be. Noë’s
descriptions of presence-as-access frequently imply that conscious accessibility works in a
similar way. On a certain reading, this suggests that subjects never consciously perceive the
environment, and that all they are conscious of is a disposition to make exploratory bodily
movements. The claim that perceptual consciousness consists of no more than this is
suggestive of an outright denial of perceptual consciousness. Noë (2004) explicitly disavows
the suggestion that denying perceptual consciousness is a consequence of the account. If it was
a consequence, it would be difficult to accept, since it is not clear that there is good reason to
think that conscious perception encompasses knowing how to access missing detail but does
not encompass the detail itself. Moreover, if the theory deflates qualia so much that
phenomenal consciousness is no longer supposed to exist at all, the sensorimotor account loses
much of its explanatory advantage when compared with accounts of neural-correlates of
consciousness, which themselves invite the suggestion that there is nothing more to
phenomenal consciousness than being in a particular neural state. Although it is a conceptual
possibility that we are radically deceived about the existence of perceptual consciousness, the
claim is not a good fit with the sensorimotor theory.
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There are, however, more promising ways to make sense of the claim that everything is
hidden. At times, in particular in his description of P-property experience, Noë (2004) implies
that understanding which movements will bring an object (or part of an object) into view is
more than merely knowing how to access missing detail. It is equivalent to knowing what that
object is actually like. As we saw earlier, knowing what movements to make to face an object
involves knowing the object’s relative location, and having the ability to reach out and grasp it,
for instance, implies knowing something about its perspectival shape. With this in mind,
presence-as-access could entail, in a disanalogy with the online newspaper case, that perceivers
have somewhat detailed prior expectations about what the results of their bodily engagements
with the environment will be. These expectations may be enough to explain the
presence-in-absence (rather than mere absence) of determinate features of the visual
environment. Moreover, there could be nothing more to perceptual experience than these
expectations.
The claim is plausible when we consider the analogy with touch, favoured especially
by O’Regan (1992; 2011). You close your eyes and pick up an object, for instance a bottle.
Your feeling of holding a whole bottle, despite only being in sensory contact with a small part
of it, is explained by expectations about the results of possible movements. At the same time,
you have a less specific expectation that reaching out to touch other parts of the environment
will reveal the presence of an assortment of further objects. The presence of the bottle, and the
more general presence of a detailed environment, are genuine examples of conscious presence
and are each accounted for by sensorimotor mastery, even though they are slightly different
phenomena. It might seem that there is also a narrower kind of presence which does not
consist of sensorimotor expectations but merely of a conscious sensation caused by parts of the
environment you are in sensory contact with, for example, the feeling of pressure on your
fingertips where they are in contact with the bottle. There is certainly a difference between
your awareness of the parts of the bottle that are in contact with your skin and those that are
not - I will examine Noë’s explanation of this in a moment. What is in question, however, is
that the experience of pressure on your fingertips is anything other than the expectation that
given certain movements the input to your sense organs (O&N, O’Regan, 2011) or your
alignment to the object (Noë, 2004; 2011) would vary in systematic ways. The sensorimotor
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account contends that once we discount these expectations, there is no raw feel - as Noë
would put it, no qualitative residue - remaining.
One might be tempted to think that perceptual consciousness divides into a
sensational component, which might be generated by inputs from the eyes and other sense
organs, and a separate intentional component that gives sensations their world-directed
content. Noë denies that sensations account for phenomenal character. He says: “We can’t
explain the qualitative features of experiential states (veridical or nonveridical) by supposing
that they depend on the instantiation of sensations in consciousness” (2012, p. 63), and
elsewhere: “Where there is an object, but no [sensorimotor] understanding, there is nothing
that even rises to the level of being misleadingly like perceptual consciousness; there is only, in
effect, blindness” (2012, p. 25). This might be taken to allow that perceptual experience does
factor into distinct components, namely sensation and sensorimotor mastery, but that
sensorimotor mastery is a necessary condition for perceptual experience.
This would be one way of explaining why your experience of the parts of the bottle
that are in contact with your skin seems different from your experience of the parts of the
bottle that are not. However, given that sensations cannot explain the phenomenology or
intentionality of perceptual experience without sensorimotor mastery, it is hard to see why
they should play a role once sensorimotor mastery has entered the story. Thus we should take
it that the feel of the parts of the bottle in contact with your fingertips is explained by your
grasp of how your relation to the bottle would change in line with movement, and does not
depend on anything distinct from Sensorimotor Understanding. The present story makes a
good fit with the claim that Sensorimotor Understanding is realised by the deployment,
subpersonally, of representations of SMCs (a claim found, for instance, in a proposal by Seth,
2014, more on which in chapter 4). It is also compatible, in principle, with the suggestion that
perceptual consciousness is enabled by nothing more than a non-representational dynamical
system.
There is a slightly different way to understand the claim that all presence is
presence-in-absence, which suggests that conscious perception does not just depend on
possessing practical knowledge about the movements you could make to bring missing detail
into view, but also, in an ineliminable way, on the way that the knowledge is exercised in the
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course of a perceiver’s temporally-extended engagement with the environment. Noë does not
unequivocally endorse this suggestion, but hints at this view by observing that perception is a
temporally-extended process (2004; 2012). As Clark (2009) comments, the way the process
unfolds over time may be essential to the character of perceptual awareness, meaning that
there may be nothing about a perceiver’s physical state considered at a fixed moment in time
that would yield perceptual awareness with a determinate content or phenomenal character. If
this were true, it would be possible to say, with reference to the perceiver’s bodily dispositions,
which aspects of the environment the perceiver, at a given moment, has the possibility of
accessing. However, we would have to refer to the perceiver’s temporally-extended
engagements with the environment, which might incorporate the exercise of those
dispositions, to fully account for the character of her perceptual experience. I make a
suggestion along these lines in chapter 7.
I have one final point to discuss before concluding this section. Noë (2012) observes
that there is a need to distinguish the kinds of perceptual presence enjoyed respectively by the
front of the tomato, the back of the tomato, and objects in another room. He claims that
perceptual presence admits of degrees, such that the front of the tomato has more presence
than the back of the tomato, while objects in the next room are not, in a strict sense,
perceptually present at all. To account for this, he appeals to quantifiable properties called
movement-dependence and object-dependence, each of which are necessary for full-blown
perceptual presence to occur. The former is the degree to which movements by the perceiver
‘manifestly’ change the perceiver’s sensorimotor relation to a feature of the outside
environment, while the latter is the degree to which movements by the object do the same.
Assume, for the time being, that a ‘manifest’ change in the sensorimotor relation is
one that coincides with a change in retinal stimulation. I will return to this point in a moment.
Noë observes that small movements by the eyes or the tomato are enough to manifestly
change the sensorimotor relation between the perceiver and the front of the tomato, meaning
this relation bears a high degree both of movement-dependence and object-dependence. A
small rotation by the tomato is enough to manifestly change the perceiver’s sensorimotor
relation with the back of the tomato, but something greater than an eye movement is required
by the perceiver to effect a manifest change in this case - for instance, she might have to stand
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up and walk to the opposite side of the table. This means that the subject’s sensorimotor
relation to the back of the tomato bears a high degree of object-dependence and a more
limited degree of movement-dependence. This accounts for the lesser perceptual presence of
the back of the tomato. The perceiver’s sensorimotor relations to objects in other rooms, or
other cities (etc.), bear only negligible degrees of object-dependence and
movement-dependence, since dramatic movements by the perceiver or object are required to
effect changes in the retinal stimulation the subject receives from those objects. The degree of
object- and movement- dependence in these cases is sufficiently low to entail that the objects
are not perceptually present at all, although they may, as we have seen, bear a kind of
quasi-perceptual presence.
It is apparent that Noë has to stipulate that the movements in question cause
‘manifest’ changes in the character of the sensorimotor relation, since a perceiver stands in a
sensorimotor relation to every object in the world, each of which is equally prone to changing
as the object or perceiver moves. However, he does not explain what it takes for a change in
the relation to be manifest in the appropriate sense. Notice that in some cases, we might
understand the way movements cause sensorimotor relations to change even when they are
relations with unperceived objects. For example, you could be in Europe walking due north
and reflecting on the fact that every step forward takes you an equal distance closer to the
North Pole. In the event that the position of the North Pole suddenly changes, a compass
needle will be enough to show you how your sensorimotor relation with the North Pole has
changed. This means your relation with the North Pole satisfies the criteria for
object-dependence and movement-dependence, somehow construed. This would not, of
course, count as a case in which the North Pole is perceptually present. This is not intended as
a counterexample to Noë’s claims, but simply to underline that an explanation must be given
of what it takes for a change in a sensorimotor relation to be manifest in a distinctively
perceptual sense.
This is important, because the invocation of a perceptually manifest change to the
sensorimotor relation invites a misunderstanding of the sensorimotor theory. Specifically, it
invites the faulty view that the changes to the sensorimotor relation become manifest first,
and that this subsequently causes the perceiver to revise their understanding of the
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sensorimotor relation. One understanding might be that objects cause us to have conscious
sensations, and that the sensations come to be intentionally-directed when we understand
how they change in line with movement. As I have noted, Noë rejects this understanding of
the sensorimotor account: rightly so, as it would undermine the insight that phenomenal
character can be accounted for naturalistically by nothing more than a skill-driven
sensorimotor relation to the outside world. An alternative understanding of the sensorimotor
theory might say that the world is, in fact, represented pictorially in perceptual consciousness,
and that changes to this pictorial representation enable you to revise your understanding of
the sensorimotor relations you stand in. This is no good, because sensorimotor understanding
is required for perception to be intentionally-directed in the first place, and we could not
therefore appeal to the world-directed content of pictorial representations to account for
sensorimotor understanding.
The proper understanding of ‘manifest’, I suggest, instead specifies that the perceiver
does not consciously access whatever change in input causes the change in the sensorimotor
relation to be manifest. On this basis, we should take it that the relevant input is a subdoxastic
sense input. The upshot, given that movement-dependence and object-dependence are
necessary conditions for the perceptual presence of P-properties and objective properties, is
that a necessary condition for perceptual presence, at the personal level, is that subdoxastic
sense inputs originating from the objects and properties consciously perceived must currently
be prone to exhibiting patterns of movement-related change.
Notice that the claim that perceptual experience does not factor into an occurrent and
a merely potential part is, on the present understanding, compatible with the outside memory
thesis (O’Regan, 1992), which claims that visual processing involves an occurrent part, namely
the retinal image, and a potential part, namely expectations - represented, or
physically-constituted in a non-representational way - about the consequences of possible
movements. The current personal level account can be taken to imply that this distinction
between the occurrent and the merely potential does not manifest itself in a straightforward
way to the conscious agent. This makes sense when we consider that appeals to the character
of retinal stimulation are not sufficient to explain the phenomenal character or intentionality
of perceptual consciousness. In light of this limitation, Sensorimotor Understanding is all
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there is to go on. Noë’s notion of presence-as-access is in principle compatible, unlike the
outside memory thesis, with the existence subpersonally of filling-in and pictorial
representation, since it does not need to claim that there is a one-to-one mapping between
perceptual experience and the physical processes that enable it. Indeed, Pessoa et al. (1998)
and Noë and Thompson (2004) actively deny that there is such a mapping between
subpersonal content and the contents of visual experience. Notice, all the same, that
presence-as-access does not do anything to invite the view that filling-in or pictorial
representation take place subpersonally, and makes a very good fit with the outside memory
thesis.
3.5 - Perception andDynamical Entanglement
According to one current within sensorimotor theory, associated in particular with Hurley
(1998), perception should not be understood subpersonally as a matter of information
processing, but as a dynamic process comprising a messy entanglement between different parts
of the brain, non-neural body and outside environment. Hurley contrasts her view of
perception and action with an orthodox conception she calls the ‘classical sandwich’, which
claims that the mind decomposes into discrete subpersonal systems responsible, respectively,
for perception, thought, and action. Perception and action are the respective top and bottom
layers of the sandwich, and thought makes up the filling. Thus perceptually-guided action, on
the classical sandwich conception, takes the form of a ‘sense-represent-plan-move’ cycle
(Wheeler, 2005). The visual system uses retinal inputs to construct a representation of the
outside world, in a manner broadly in line with the approach offered by Marr (1982). This
representation serves as an input to an informationally encapsulated and functionally distinct
central cognitive system. The central system chooses a course of action and sends instructions
to a separate motor action system, which is responsible for generating the appropriate motor
movements. Fodor’s (1983) account is a good example of this kind of framework.
One’s preferred conception of the causal processes involved in action and perception
can be laid out diagrammatically with sense inputs at the top and motor outputs at the
bottom. Hurley suggests that the classical conception endorses ‘vertical’ modularity, since the
78
modular layers responsible respectively for perception, cognition and action are stacked
vertically on top of one another, with perception at the sense input end and action at the
motor output end. Hurley agrees that the mind decomposes into a number of informationally
encapsulated systems geared toward differing tasks, for example different kinds of
perceptually-guided action. The layers in her conception, however, are stacked side-by-side,
meaning the boundaries between sense inputs, motor outputs and central cognition are
non-existent or at least considerably more porous than conceived by the classical sandwich
view. Thus one distinctive feature of perception in Hurley’s account is that it depends
constitutively on fluidly integrated causal processes running between sense inputs and motor
outputs.11
Hurley suggests that the causal flow runs from sense input to motor output and,
importantly, loops back to sense input again, as body movements alter the character of the
sensory stimulation received from the environment. In addition, she claims that the causal
flow runs in the opposite direction too, as efferent copy from the motor outputs makes a
causal impact upstream. She states that these points distinguish her account from
behaviourism, which conceives of cognition as depending solely on unidirectional relations
between sense inputs and motor outputs. Thus Hurley claims perception and action depend
constitutively on messy dynamical processes, carried out without internal representations12,
and involving a complex entanglement between different parts of the brain, extra-neural body
and environment. In addition to claiming that the substrate of perceptual consciousness is
wider than sometimes thought, incorporating motor regions of the brain and perhaps the
non-neural body and environment, Hurley claims that perceptual experience depends
constitutively on the way the interactive process unfolds over time. Thus she rejects temporal
11 Chemero and Cordeiro (2000) object to Hurley’s continued use of the words ‘input’ and
‘output’ on the ground that on the dynamical conception, which they and Hurley endorse,
there is no principled reason for conceiving of them as inputs and outputs. Still, we can
describe them as inputs and outputs for heuristic purposes while acknowledging that this may
not reflect a genuine functional distinction.
12 As with ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’, Hurley retains an apparently orthodox commitment by
endorsing the vehicle/content distinction, implying that the entire processing loop could be
considered one big representation. This is nonetheless quite different from the wholly internal
representations endorsed by the classical sandwich conception.
79
atomism, the claim that the processing can for explanatory purposes be broken down into
temporally discrete chunks.
With the points in mind, perception (and action) are held by Hurley’s account to be
best interpreted as dynamical systems. As such, they have the potential to be modelled using
dynamical systems theory, which uses difference or differential equations to describe the ways
a mechanistic system evolves over time. Hurley’s account is just one example of a broader
‘dynamicist’ approach to cognitive science, associated in particular with van Gelder (Port and
van Gelder, 1995; van Gelder, 1998) and Thelen and Smith (1994) and encompassing work
in biological enactivism (e.g., Thompson and Varela, 2001) and ecological perception
(Chemero, 2009). All endorse the suggestion that cognitive activities can be best understood,
and in particular formally modelled, as temporally-evolving, dynamical processes, usually
without reference to representation.
Aside from Hurley’s account, canonical work on the sensorimotor theory is by and
large non-committal about the dynamical approach. O’Regan (2011) makes no mention of
dynamical systems, appearing, in spite of his account’s emphasis on interactive engagements
with the outside environment, to prefer an information processing stance. Noë (2004) only
claims that perception might depend constitutively on dynamic input-output-input loops.
The dynamical view is given a fuller endorsement, however, by other work on the
sensorimotor theory, including Hurley and Noë (2003), Gangopadhyay and Kiverstein (2009)
and Burhmann, Di Paolo and Barandiaran (2013).
There are numerous available motivations for endorsing the claim that perception
depends constitutively on an embodied dynamical process. One such motivation is evidence
that the phenomenal character of perceptual consciousness is partly determined by motor
output activity. Standard representationalist models do not expect perceptual experience to be
non-instrumentally dependent on activity by the brain’s motor regions. If perceptual
experience depends constitutively on motor activity, it plausibly depends on entire loops of
interaction between brain, body and outside environment. Hurley (1998) appeals to an
experiment by Kohler (1962) featuring goggles in which the left half of each lens was tinted
yellow and the right half tinted blue. After wearing the goggles for several weeks, the subjects
adapted to the coloured lenses, meaning that the visual scene came to appear normal and
80
untinted. After removing the glasses, the subjects reported that moving their eyes to the left
caused objects to appear with a yellow tint, while moving their eyes to the right produced a
blue tint. Hurley claims that this supports the view that motor output states partly drive visual
experience and determine its phenomenal character.
The dynamical approach can also be motivated by the idea of the world as an outside
memory. Although O’Regan does not pursue the outside memory idea to this conclusion, the
idea that perception is best characterised as a dynamical system is a natural extension of the
claim that perception depends on embodied interactions and not solely or primarily on
internal information processing. Thus the arguments provided by O’Regan and others in
favour of the outside memory view, for example the empirical work on change blindness and
inattentional blindness, give some evidential support for a dynamical systems version of the
sensorimotor theory.
Elsewhere, the dynamicist approach is strongly associated with accounts that claim
internal representations do not exist at all or cannot do the explanatory work required to
bridge the explanatory gap between consciousness and the physical. As Chemero (2009)
comments, dynamical systems models can frequently be given a representationalist gloss, but
such a gloss is not necessarily required for the models to do the explanatory work they do. This
contrasts with orthodox information processing accounts, which typically make
representation an essential posit. Hutto and Myin’s account (2012), which claims on
conceptual grounds that subpersonal representational content probably does not exist, thus
provides support for the dynamical systems perspective. Biological enactivists (Varela,
Thompson and Rosch, 1991; Thompson, 2007) have a further reason to endorse dynamical
systems, namely the view that cognition is continuous with the self-organising dynamical
systems they hold are constitutive of life.
Chemero (2009) claims that the merits of a nonrepresentational dynamical systems
approach must be judged by its explanatory success in making sense of empirical data rather
than by metaphysical considerations about content of the kind endorsed by Hutto and Myin.
However, Silberstein and Chemero (2012) offer a metaphysical-motivation of sorts for
adopting a dynamical systems perspective, claiming that it helps motivate a direct realist
account of phenomenal qualities, which in turn means it promises to do a better job than
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competing accounts of explaining phenomenal qualities physicalistically. I will return to this
point in the next section.
3.6 - The Extensive ConsciousMind
The sensorimotor account, in some variants, advocates one of the more extreme departures
offered recently from the mainstream view that the mind is located purely ‘in the head’ and
does not need to be explained by appeal to the body or outside environment. The orthodox
position, to which the sensorimotor theory sets itself in opposition, is sometimes traced back
to Descartes, who claimed that the mind was an immaterial entity distinct from the body,
with which it interacted via a prescribed channel at the pineal gland. Since the mind, on the
Cartesian view, is not even physical, it is in this sense more disengaged from the body and
physical environment than it ever is in contemporary cognitive science. However, orthodox
physicalist accounts of mind continue to subscribe to what Wheeler (2005) describes as
Cartesian psychology, an approach which implies, amongst other things, an analogous
separation between the neurally-realised mind and the extra-neural body. Descartes was, in
fairness, careful to claim that the mind is intimately joined with the body and not detached, as
he put it, in the way a pilot is from their ship (1647/1985b). Wheeler, attempting to do justice
to the position, suggests this claim can be reconciled with Descartes’ dualism if we regard it as
a principle of Cartesian psychology that the mind makes use of informational content
specifying the body’s state, but that the way it uses this information to generate intelligent
action can be fully characterised without reference to the body. This principle, drawn from a
nuanced version of Cartesian psychology, is explicitly endorsed by a number of recent, largely
orthodox accounts of cognition, which hold that the mind supervenes purely on the brain but
frequently trades in representations of bodily states (e.g., Goldman and de Vignemont, 2009;
Rupert, 2011).
Drawing a less kind parallel between Descartes and contemporary accounts, Dennett
(1991) issued a well-known warning against being tacitly committed to Cartesian materialism,
the view that the mind is unitary and its physical substrate confined to a circumscribed area of
the brain - an outlook that must be avoided on pain of committing the homunculus fallacy.
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Present day theories often maintain an orthodox position while appearing to avoid this
mistake. Rupert (2011) is again a good example, since it is the central thesis of his ‘massively
representational mind’ that representations are manifold throughout the brain, although he
maintains that cognition is overwhelmingly brain-bound. Noë (2004) argues that
brain-bound accounts cannot avoid the Cartesian mistake altogether, since they continue to
endorse a conception of the brain itself as a homunculus subsisting within the wider confines
of the person as a whole. This need not be a viewed as a mistake, so long as you are happy to
endorse the view that in an important sense, you are your brain. This is nonetheless strikingly
similar to Descartes’ claim, with reference to his immaterial mind, that “I am in the strict sense
only a thing that thinks, that is, I am a mind or intelligence or intellect or reason”
(1647/1985b, p. 18). The moral is that although orthodox theories are often deliberate in
avoiding the extremes of Cartesianism in a crude rendition, they retain Cartesian
commitments.
One point of departure from the Cartesian orthodoxy occurs with the thesis known as
vehicle externalism. To explain the generic position, it will help to compare it with content
externalism (Putnam, 1975; Burge, 1979). This longer-established position holds that mental
content is not fixed solely by things in the head. In Putnam’s classic thought experiment,
Oscar, who lives on Earth, has an exact physical duplicate, Twin Oscar - who lives on Twin
Earth. Twin Earth is identical to Earth in every respect, except the clear liquid which fills
rivers, lakes, and has all the other surface features we associate with water, has the chemical
composition XYZ rather than H2O as it does on Earth. Oscar and Twin Oscar live in
medieval times and are ignorant of the microstructural properties of water. But when Oscar
and Twin Oscar each utter the word ‘water’, the differing properties of the natural kinds they
are in causal contact with entails that they express different thoughts.13 The moral is that
identical vehicles can bear non-identical contents, because content is fixed in part by
properties of the outside environment. Vehicle externalism bears comparison with content
externalism, although it is a quite different position. Importantly, content externalism is not
13 When Putnam (1975) formulated the view, he intended it to apply to linguistic rather than
mental content, but the thesis came later to be widely applied by Burge (1982) and others to
the thoughts underlying the utterance and not just the words themselves
83
generally thought to threaten the view that the vehicle of thought and experience is wholly
neural. Vehicle externalism, by contrast, contends that the physical substrate of contentful
mental states is sometimes outside the head.
Vehicle externalism, generically, decomposes into a number of quite distinct and,
indeed, frequently incompatible strands. One such position is the extended mind thesis
(Clark and Chalmers, 1998; Clark, 2008). Proponents of the extended mind frequently
endorse functionalism (Clark, 2008; Wheeler, 2010), and hold that although cognition
frequently involves the construction and deployment of representations, typically in the brain,
it sometimes makes use of representational vehicles outside the skin. The most famous
example, from Clark and Chalmers (1998), uses a ‘parity’-based heuristic to lend support to
the extended mind. Two protagonists, Otto and Inga, go about their daily business. But Otto,
unlike Inga, suffers from mild dementia, meaning that unaided he suffers from severely
impaired short term memory. To compensate, he makes use of a notebook which he keeps
with him at all times, frequently noting down relevant facts and occurrences from his daily life,
and calling upon the notes automatically and non-critically as needed. By interacting with the
pen and notebook, Otto is able in a relatively smooth way to replicate the mental function for
which Inga relies on her neurally-encoded short term memories. Clark and Chalmers suggest
that because representations in the notebook, in Otto’s case, function in an appropriately
similar way to the relevant neural representations for Inga - hence the parity - the pen and
notebook can be regarded as forming part of an extended cognitive system.
The extended mind thesis is one way of breaking from the tradition which says that
the physical substrate of cognition is purely internal. However, the thesis is conservative in
several key respects. It maintains a commitment to internal representation, and indeed uses
the idea that cognition frequently depends on internal representation to motivate the
parity-based claim that Otto’s cognition extends, given that he uses representations in the
notebook in the way other cognisers use internal representations. Moreover, it is committed
only to the claim that unconscious mental processes sometimes extend beyond the skin, and
proponents of the extended mind are sometimes explicit in denying that the substrate of
consciousness extends (e.g., Clark, 2009).
The extended mind contrasts with a quite different vehicle externalist approach
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associated with sensorimotor theory and other dynamical-systems oriented accounts of
perception, which claim that the substrate of perceptual consciousness incorporates the
extra-neural body and environment in addition to the brain (Hurley, 1998; Noë, 2004;
Rowlands, 2010; Silberstein and Chemero, 2012). This approach, which I focus on for the
remainder of the section, is sometimes called the ‘extended conscious mind’, a label intended
to capture its resemblance to the extended mind. In fact, this label may not have the
appropriate resonance, since it suggests a continuity with the extended mind thesis that does
not reflect its quite different motivation. Vehicle externalism, strictly speaking, is a
problematic label too, since some of the views falling under the present approach reject the
claim that cognition, and specifically perception, involves content at all, and hence that there
is a vehicle/content distinction to be made in this case. After Rowlands (2010), we could
recast the distinction between vehicles and contents as a distinction between vehicles of
consciousness and the conscious states that supervene on them.
A better label is perhaps suggested by Hutto and Myin (2012), who describe their
approach to cognition as the extensive mind to underline their view that because there is no
content there is, in the first place, no theoretically relevant inner-outer boundary between the
brain and its surroundings from which cognition might extend. Hutto and Myin are
sympathetic but not fully signed-up to the claim that perceptual consciousness supervenes on
extra-neural activity. To make sure it has all the correct resonances, let us call the present view
the extensive conscious mind (ECM). The core principle underlying ECM is the claim that
perception is best explained by appeal to dynamical systems rather than computation.
Although this claim is motivated in varying ways, and in turn supposed to justify ECM on the
basis of varying further premises, adherents of ECM consistently endorse the principle that
perception is best understood as a dynamical system, in principle describable using differential
equations, incorporating features of the brain, body and outside environment.
A large part of ECM’s appeal is its distinctive way of accounting naturalistically for
consciousness and phenomenal qualities. Because the objects of perception are themselves
constituents of perception, phenomenal qualities can be accounted for non-mysteriously by
appeal to physical properties the objects bear in relation to the perceiver’s body - for example,
SMCs. One place ECM is endorsed is in Silberstein and Chemero (2012, henceforth S&C),
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who advocate a version of the ecological approach to perception. The approach differs from
sensorimotor theory by claiming that the features we are responsive to in perception are not
SMCs but affordances. Like SMCs, affordances are relations between a perceiver and their
environment, and can be straightforwardly specified from a third-person perspective. Unlike
SMCs, they describe possibilities for bodily movement rather than sensory consequences of
possible movement. Notwithstanding this difference, S&C’s arguments in favour of ECM are
compatible with the sensorimotor theory.
S&C emphasise that ECM can dissolve the hard problem of consciousness, by which
they mean the problem of accounting naturalistically for specific phenomenal qualities and
the more general question of why there is consciousness at all. They take inspiration from a
point made by Ryle (1979), who identified a dilemma faced by theories of discursive thought.
Ryle claimed the theories were prone to pivot between two unsatisfactory positions, either
casting thought as ‘nothing but’ inner speech, or casting it as ‘something else as well’. He
illustrated the problem by analogy with a coin. It would be wrong to claim that a coin is
‘nothing but’ a metal disc, but wrong to claim it consists of a metal disc plus some other entity
as well. S&C argue that the problem facing theories of consciousness takes a similar shape.
Proponents of orthodox approaches to cognition sometimes claim that phenomenal
consciousness is ‘nothing but’ a certain kind of neural activity - an unsatisfying position which
also comes under target in O&N, as I discussed in section 3.2.2. Alternatively, they accede to a
dualist impulse and claim, like Chalmers (1996), that consciousness is a non-physical
‘something else as well’.
S&C blame computationalists for the apparent dilemma, offering the following
diagnosis: Computationalism, which as S&C take it entails the representational theory of
mind, states that computation is sufficient for cognition. Computationalists remain loath,
however, to accept that metal and plastic artifacts could be conscious merely by virtue of
performing appropriate computations. They are therefore forced to separate consciousness
from cognition, and for this reason account for consciousness separately, either deflating it to
brain state or inflating it to something non-physical. To avoid the dilemma, S&C reject the
representational theory of mind and instead propose that the properties to which we are
intentionally-directed in perceptual consciousness are themselves constituents of perception.
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The fact that the properties we perceive, affordances, are specified with egocentric reference to
the perceiver is supposed to account for perception’s intrinsic subjectivity, and therefore
consciousness in general.
Although S&C’s solution is appealing, it is worth taking note of a limitation they
share with O&N. It is true that the representational theory of mind is not necessarily
committed to the claim that consciousness, like cognition, is best explained by appeal to
representation. However, there are also representationalist proposals which take seriously the
claim that contentful states, meeting certain other functional criteria, are sufficient to account
for phenomenal consciousness (e.g., Lycan, 1987; Dretske, 1995; Tye, 2000). Accounts in this
category accord with S&C’s demand that consciousness is neither ‘nothing more’ than brain
state nor ‘something else as well’, and like S&C they attempt to avoid the dilemma by
identifying consciousness with cognition. However, they do not use ECM to make this work.
ECM has one key advantage compared to representationalism about phenomenal qualities,
namely that it avoids much of the latter’s explanatory burden. ECM does not have to offer (or
hold out for) a naturalistic account of content, a project which faces serious conceptual
obstacles (Hutto and Myin, 2012; see section 6.4). Notice that reducing phenomenal
character to content only helps naturalise phenomenal character if the content can itself be
naturalised. Moreover, the success of representationalist accounts of phenomenal character is
in part dependent on the sort of content involved. For instance, externalistically individuated
content faces a distinctive challenge in light of Twin Earth-style cases, as we will see shortly.
Hurley (1998), offering a different argument for ECM, endorses the vehicle/content
distinction, arguing that the vehicle of conscious content extends beyond the brain. She claims
that vehicles of content play an essential theoretical role in explaining the relation between the
mental and the physical. Drawing a distinction between type-explanations and
token-explanations, she claims the former explain why there is mentality at all. For example, in
line with Millikan’s (1984) biosemantics, facts about natural selection and the ancestral
environment might explain how certain types of physical state bear content. To explain a
subject’s present mental state, we must also appeal to presently occurring states and processes.
We are now offering a token explanation, because we are specifying which physical states and
processes token the relevant type. Thus Hurley claims that when we talk about a vehicle of
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content, we are attempting to offer a token-explanation.
If one wanted to deny that perceptual experience is contentful or depends on
content-bearing vehicles, the vehicle/content distinction could be recast as a relatively
harmless vehicle/experience distinction. This avoids the need to stipulate that experience
involves truth or correctness conditions. However, maintaining the reformulated distinction
is only valuable if phenomenal states are multiply realisable, meaning that non-identical
physical processes can yield phenomenologically indistinguishable experiences. S&C maintain
that the dynamical systems which constitute perception are ‘soft assembled’ from varying
physical components, sometimes wholly internal and at other times incorporating varying
parts of the outside environment. This implies that perception, in general, is in one sense
multiply realisable. However, the point here is that the vehicle of perceptual experience in
general can vary, bringing with it attendant differences in perceptual phenomenology, and not
that an identical experience could supervene on a range of different vehicles. The
sensorimotor theory, on the gloss I argue for later in the thesis, allows that perceptual
experiences may in a weak sense be multiply realisable, given that phenomenal character could
stay the same across perceivers with limited differences in body morphology. However, the
multiple realisability that applies in this case is too constrained to make a vehicle/experience
distinction particularly useful, especially when contrasted with the functionalist thesis that
phenomenology could stay the same despite radical differences in embodiment.
Hurley’s arguments in favour of vehicle externalism are equally applicable to other
versions of ECM. Conceding that neural processes are likely to be sufficient for consciousness,
she challenges the assumption that suitable attendant outer states are not themselves necessary
for the neural processes in question to occur. The ‘duplication assumption’, as she calls it, is a
standard background assumption underlying the twin test for content externalism. Recall the
Twin Earth thought experiment from Putnam (1975). Block (1990b) offers a similar thought
experiment intended to test representationalist accounts of phenomenal character (see
chapter 5). Suppose there is a planet called Inverted Earth, which is like Earth except the
colours of objects are all inverted. A subject travels from Earth to Twin Earth and puts on
colour-inverting goggles. As a result, the subject’s phenomenal states remain as they were on
Earth, even though, according to content externalist accounts, the content of the subject’s
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perceptual states must differ. According to Block, this demonstrates that content externalist
variants of representationalism about phenomenal qualities fail. His own view is that we
should appeal to some non-representational property of the brain to explain phenomenal
character. Hurley’s argument undercuts this debate by casting doubt on the claim that twin
tests are possible. If successful, it challenges Block’s view that we must only appeal to the brain,
since it sheds doubt on the claim that phenomenal states can stay the same while the
environment radically changes. It challenges the content externalist proposal, since it denies
that the vehicle can stay the same while the content changes. Notice that it thereby offers a
response to representationalism about phenomenal qualities absent from S&C’s more recent
piece.
Hurley observed that the duplication assumption becomes problematic when we
apply it to realistic rather than toy cases. In Consciousness in Action, she offers a series of
Twin Earth-style scenarios which challenge the assumption in progressively demanding ways.
A first concerns a case of colour inversion in which all objects that are red on Earth are green
on Twin Earth but not vice versa. Because the transformation between Earth and Twin Earth
is not information preserving, the subject on Twin Earth is unable to make the same range of
discriminations as the subject on Earth, therefore their neural states are not duplicated and
the duplication assumption fails. This shows that even for cases where the differences between
the Earths are limited to colour and not shape, the duplication assumption only holds for a
heavily restricted set of cases.
A further scenario features a planet called Mirror Earth in which everything is
reversed from left to right, so that everything is flipped on a vertical axis. The Mirror Earth
subject wears left-right inverting goggles, meaning their retinal input, right now, is identical to
the state it would be in on Earth. However, when the twin moves their right hand, the visual
feedback they receive duplicates the visual feedback they would receive from moving their left
hand, not their right, on Earth, and therefore duplication fails. To correct for this, we could
imagine that a device is attached to the twin’s peripheral nervous system, intervening in their
motor outputs and proprioceptive inputs, such that the same instruction causes the subject to
move their left hand, and hence receive the necessary visual feedback, while receiving the
proprioceptive input they previously received after moving their right hand. This saves the
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duplication assumption, for the time being, although it depends on confining duplication to
the central rather than peripheral nervous system.
Lastly, there is El Greco Earth, in which everything is vertically elongated compared to
Earth, such that the counterparts of spheres are egg-shaped. This leads to a challenging
asymmetry between the respective Earths. When an Earth subject nudges a sphere, its
orientation stays the same - perhaps it rolls a little to the left or right. The same action on El
Greco Earth causes the egg-shaped object to fall over. Because of the asymmetry between the
effects of motor movements on visual input in subjects on the two worlds, duplicating the
Earth subject’s internal states on El Greco Earth would require a vastly complicated device to
correct the visual inputs in different situations. On a similar theme, Hurley remarks that real
life Virtual Reality simulations depend on heavily restricting the range of possible movements
afforded to the perceiver. The more freedom of movement the subject has, the greater their
ability to disambiguate visual inputs by moving around, which means, claimed Hurley, that
creating a fully realistic virtual reality simulation pushes toward the limit of what is, even in
principle, physically possible. Noë (2004) makes a similar point, asserting that a completely
realistic virtual reality simulation cannot be much less complex than the world itself.
The upshot, for Hurley, is that once it is established that the duplicationist must go to
byzantine lengths, at the bounds of physical possibility, to preserve duplication with regard to
a restricted area of the brain, the vehicle internalist thesis comes under threat. For one thing,
there is no guarantee that the same area of the brain will be duplicated in each Twin Earth
scenario. For another, even if some part of the brain can be consistently duplicated, without
some strong motivation, the insistence that this region of the brain alone is the vehicle of
consciousness appears arbitrary rather than principled. An important feature of this
discussion is that it sets out to challenge duplication for a range of realistic cases. This does not
mean denying that duplication is possible, even straightforward, in some cases. Establishing it
in some cases is insufficient to show that perception in general supervenes only on neural
activity. Hurley observes that in cases that are restricted enough to make duplication
straightforward, for example because we imagine the subject’s sensorimotor capacities are
highly constrained, it is doubtful whether the subject enjoys perceptual experience in the first
place.
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She also pre-empts a number of more sophisticated objections that might be offered
by a vehicle internalist. One such objection is that the laws of physics might vary between
Earth and Twin Earth, such that complicated devices for altering the nervous system are not
required to achieve duplication. Hurley counters that the twins cannot be considered
duplicates if the laws of physics vary between the cases. Another objection is that a mad
scientist could duplicate a subject’s neural states in a different environment by intervening to
alter them frame-by-frame. Hurley rejects this, because she rejects temporal atomism, the view
that perception depends on a succession of moment by moment states rather than a smoothly
continuous process.
The success of Hurley’s argument, it should be noted, depends in part on endorsing a
dynamical systems approach to perception. Indeed, Clark (2009) observes that it depends on
more than just the claim that perception involves a temporally-extended, dynamical process.
Such a process may merely be instrumental in causing the activation of a brain state which
itself generates a perceptual experience in an instant, without requiring temporal extension.
Alternatively, the brain state may need to persist through time, but it may not itself need to
dynamically evolve through time in a way that would make the contribution of extra-neural
states essential. Thus Clark suggests that Hurley’s view must endorse a conception he calls
Deep Dynamic Entanglement + Unique Temporal Signature, or ‘DEUTS’ (p. 980), which
holds not only that perceptual consciousness is enabled by a temporally-extended, dynamic
process, but also that the conscious experience is constitutively dependent on the precise way
the neural as well as extra-neural states involved evolve over time.
If there are satisfactory independent grounds for thinking that perception depends on
a specific functionally distinct, informationally encapsulated area of the brain, then it is no
longer a prejudice to think that the same area of the brain can be duplicated in all the Twin
Earth scenarios (notwithstanding the technical challenge) and that the area of the brain so
duplicated is genuinely the area responsible for visual awareness. Of course, were the
commitment to this view of perception motivated by a prejudice (recall the discussions of
Cartesian materialism and analytic isomorphism) it would not be a suitable independent
ground. Importantly, although a well-motivated version of vehicle internalism might support
the duplication assumption, the duplicationist hypothesis cannot be used to motivate vehicle
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internalism, as this would be getting things the wrong way round. Conversely, Hurley’s
argument shows that if perception depends constitutively on a dynamic, interactive process
with a unique temporal signature, there is also a strong motivation for endorsing ECM.
Clark argues that if deep dynamic entanglement and a unique temporal signature are
indeed essential to consciousness, this threatens a stalemate between ECM and its opponents.
He argues that DEUTS cannot establish ECM, but it can expose the rejection of ECM as a
prejudice. To show that ECM fails, the opponent has to identify a special property that the
neural component of the processing possesses and that the extra-neural activity lacks, and
show that this difference is a principled rather than arbitrary ground for thinking that
perceptual consciousness supervenes solely on the neural activity. Clark claims that such a
difference can be established in light of DEUTS’ own appeal to a unique temporal signature.
One aspect of the temporal signature that consciousness is likely to depend on is
informational processing at very high speed. This, in turn, depends on the high-bandwidth
available in the neural portion of the wider interaction between brain, body and environment.
The interface between the brain and extra-neural body has a much lower bandwidth,
suggesting it cannot do the work required to generate consciousness, and therefore serves as
mere causal scaffolding (Clark, 2009). Importantly, Clark does not reject Hurley’s insight that
the neural processes involved in a particular conscious experience are likely to require that the
subject is embedded in a specific type of environment, and hence her rejection of the
possibility of duplication as illustrated by the Twin Earth-style cases.
I am not going to consider any further whether ECM finally goes through, as ECM is
a mere nicety in the context of the sensorimotor theory as a whole. Equally important are the
insights that lead up to ECM, including, on a dynamical version of the sensorimotor account,
the claim that architecture of perception involves a dynamic, interactive process with a unique
temporal signature, and the fact that the neural duplication is likely to fail. Silberstein and
Chemero associate ECM’s claim that the objects of perceptual awareness are constitutive
features of perceptual processing with direct realism. However, it is not obvious that ECM is
needed for direct realism to go through. Direct realism, including the relational realism
endorsed by Noë (2012), could be motivated by the fact that perception is an interactive
process in which duplication scenarios are impossible, without needing ECM too. Thus the
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arguments that lead up to ECM are enough to get a dynamical version of the sensorimotor
theory what it really needs.
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4 -Mastering Sensorimotor Understanding
The sensorimotor theory’s most crucial tenet is also the one least well-defined by the theory’s
flagship statements. Expanding on the work done in the previous chapter, I will in this chapter
address in further detail the claim that perception depends on sensorimotor ‘mastery’.
Specifically, I will focus on the variety of sensorimotor mastery found in Noë’s (2004) account,
which I have officially labelled Sensorimotor Understanding, reflecting the terminology
sometimes used by Noë. Many of the important things Noë says about Sensorimotor
Understanding concern the ‘presence’ that arises when we exercise it (see section 3.4), and the
nature of the properties it puts us in touch with, P-properties and objective properties (see
section 3.2.5). In this chapter, I focus on Sensorimotor Understanding itself, with a view to
addressing a lack of clarity about what it is, and how it fits into a scientific account of
perception and perceptual consciousness.
Although the faculty featured in O’Regan (2011), which I label Sensorimotor
Tracking, is characterised in somewhat different terms to Sensorimotor Understanding, the
respective varieties of sensorimotor mastery are each loosely enough defined in the original
work to leave open the possibility that they are one and the same faculty. Although my
discussion will focus on Sensorimotor Understanding, the characterisation I end up with
could also, therefore, describe Sensorimotor Tracking. I will continue this chapter by
identifying what I regard as a key limitation with the concept presented by Noë, namely a lack
of clarity about how to account for Sensorimotor Understanding physicalistically, particularly
in the domain of cognitive science. In section 4.2, I address a specific ambiguity concerning
the explanandum, and suggest two alternative ways of resolving it. In sections 4.3 and 4.4, I
return to the scientific tractability issue by explaining the impact that the respective views of
Sensorimotor Understanding should have on our understanding of sensorimotor theory as an
account in cognitive science.
4.1 - 'Action in Perception' in Action in Perception
One of the most important differences between the early sensorimotor account (O&N) and
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Noë’s (2004) version is the leap from what we could think of as a ‘bottom up’ type of
explanation to a ‘top down’ one. By bottom-up, I mean an explanation that starts by
describing low-level physical states and processes that could be possessed by an unconscious
machine, and expands to encompass consciousness and the personal level. By top-down, I
mean an account that takes consciousness as its starting point and saves the question of how
consciousness arises until later.
It will be useful if I explain Noë’s motivation for this shift in emphasis. In the (2004)
book, he notes that the early account focuses on how sense input signals, rather than conscious
sensations, change in line with movement, observing that it therefore has no need to
pre-suppose consciousness and is well-positioned to give a physicalistic account of how
perceptual consciousness arises. The drawback with this strategy, Noë says, is that it comes at a
cost to what he calls “phenomenological aptness” (Noë, 2004, p. 228). Expanding on this
point, we might say something like this. The sense inputs featured in O&N are subdoxastic, i.e.
inaccessible to the conscious agent. Even when the agent’s mastery of the SMCs associated
with those sense inputs is integrated with the appropriate capacities for thought and planning,
the subject does not become aware of the sense inputs themselves, but of the relevant features
of the outside environment. Since sensorimotor mastery, in the early account, is mastery of
how sense inputs change with movement, there remains a question of which features of the
outside world we consciously perceive, and how they show up for us.
The O&N account does answer these questions in part. The environmental features
we perceive are those that cause the sense inputs whose patterns of movement-related change
we, or our bodies and brains, have mastery over. The account also makes some observations
about the phenomenal character of perceptual experience, and attempts in particular to
resolve the problem of supposedly irreducible qualia by suggesting that there is nothing more
to experiencing the redness of red, for example, than exercising one’s mastery of the
sensorimotor laws associated with redness for the purpose of thought and planning. However,
this solution is in danger of failing to unseat the intuitions of someone who thinks that qualia
are irreducible, because it invites them to ask why exercising mastery of a particular set of
SMCs has one phenomenal feel and not another - this is another of the unresolved ‘why’
questions about the relation between consciousness and the physical that O&N make it their
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project to avoid.
The problem arises because the O&N version of the sensorimotor theory cannot
convincingly claim that perception feels like exercising sensorimotor mastery, given that the
sense inputs which are the targets of the mastery remain subdoxastic. If perception does not
feel like the exercise of sensorimotor mastery, the endorser of irreducible qualia will continue
to hold that the relation between sensorimotor mastery and conscious feel is only contingent,
meaning that the conscious feel is therefore nonidentical to the associated sensorimotor
mastery. The sensorimotor theorist could respond that perceiving does feel like exercising
sensorimotor mastery - necessarily, because perceiving just is exercising sensorimotor mastery -
even though perceivers typically lack the ability to recognise that this is what perception feels
like. However, if the sensorimotor theory concedes that conscious perception does not feel
recognisably like the exercise of sensorimotor mastery from the subjective point of view of the
perceiver, it finds itself deprived of powerful reason for thinking the sensorimotor theory is
true, namely that the theory makes it impossible to conceive of a given act of perceiving feeling
other than the way it feels. In any case, the early sensorimotor account simply does not go into
as much detail about visual phenomenology as it could.
Like the original version of the theory, Noë (2004) claims that conscious perception is
identical to the exercise of sensorimotor mastery. In a progression from the earlier account,
however, he implies that introspection reveals that exercising sensorimotor mastery is
recognisably what conscious perceiving feels like. This is useful because it provides a further
reason for thinking that the act of consciously perceiving, with its distinctive qualitative feel,
just is the exercise of a variety of sensorimotor mastery and nothing more. As we saw in the
last chapter, the account claims that absent features like the back of a tomato are experientially
present, in absence, because we know which movements would bring them into view. It also
claims that objective properties, like the circularity of a plate, show up in visual experience as
being mediated by the perspectival properties that presently obtain, which we implicitly
understand will change in specific ways in line with possible movements.
In order to introduce these elements, Noë has to present sensorimotor mastery as a
feature of perceptual consciousness rather than a faculty that enables perceptual consciousness.
Because P-properties and objective properties are consciously accessible, it is natural to think
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the faculty we use to access them is conscious, even though the understanding in question is
implicit. Although Noë downplays the importance of the personal/subpersonal distinction, it
is plausibly a requirement of Noë’s account that the faculty we use to master P-properties and
objective properties is itself a personal level faculty, since he explicitly intends the account to
do justice to McDowell’s (1994a) conceptualism about perceptual experience and Kant’s
famous maxim that “thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are
blind” (CPR A51/B75), which in each case require that the person brings some capacities for
thought to bear in experience. Noë does not say so, but it follows from this that Sensorimotor
Understanding must also be amenable to a kind of self-reflexivity; not only do you consciously
exercise Sensorimotor Understanding, but you have the capacity to be conscious of exercising
it. This point notwithstanding, Sensorimotor Understanding is characterised by Noë most of
the time as a conscious faculty possessed by the person rather than their brain or body, and
Noë explicitly concedes that the account presupposes consciousness.
This reflects an important difference between Noë’s sole-authored version of the
sensorimotor theory and the others. As we have seen, the approaches to perception detailed in
O&N and O’Regan (2011) focus, in particular, on processes that could be instantiated by an
unconscious machine rather than a human perceiver. The accounts begin by describing a
process of sensorimotor coupling sufficient for a certain kind of unconscious perceptual
activity, and widen the explanation in a bottom-up fashion by introducing additional
processes, the contributions of which they allege enable perceptual consciousness. Specifically,
these are the integration of the lower-level process with thought and planning, and, in
O’Regan’s (2011) model, an additional faculty corresponding to the ‘self’. Although the
accounts do not give detailed proposals about how these higher faculties are physically realised,
the authors intend us to suppose that the relevant faculties are things we could readily account
for by appeal to appropriate physically-realisable states and processes. O&N at times suggest
an information processing-style account is needed, while O’Regan (2011) explicitly endorses
functionalism of a sort that means a robot could in principle possess the relevant
functionally-defined faculties. Thus an important difference between these accounts and the
version of the sensorimotor theory offered by Noë (2004; 2012) is that the latter pre-supposes
consciousness and does not make any claim to explain it. The Sensorimotor Understanding
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Noë appeals to is intended to explain something about perception and the character of
perceptual consciousness, but is not thereby supposed to account for the existence of
consciousness in the first place.
Neglecting to explain how consciousness in general arises is not an unreasonable
limitation, as long as we think of the account as an account of perceptual consciousness rather
than consciousness in general. More troubling is the fact that the account fails in great respect
to commit itself to clearly defined theses about the physical processes implicated in
Sensorimotor Understanding, something the sensorimotor theory could be expected to offer
even in the absence of an account of how consciousness in general occurs. The omission would
not be problematic if we took the account solely as an entry into philosophy of perception,
which is not necessarily concerned with the physical states and processes that realise conscious
perception. However, it becomes more of a problem when we consider that Noë continues to
present the sensorimotor account as a rival to orthodox scientific accounts of vision. In
response to Marr (1982), Noë says that: “Vision shouldn’t be thought of as a computation
performed by the brain on inputs provided by the retina. What is vision? How should it be
characterised computationally? This book suggests the outlines of an answer. Vision is a mode
of exploration of the environment drawing on implicit understanding of sensorimotor
regularities” (Noë, 2004, pp. 29-30). One of his points is that Marr presents the subpersonal
processes that enable perception as if they were identical to the higher-level processes that
perception is constituted by. This is not only meant to be a logical error, however. His
objection is that the error causes Marr to get his account of the lower-level processes wrong.
Indeed, Noë casts doubt on many of the principles needed to make a computational account
stand up, claiming for example that perceptual consciousness depends in part of having the
right kind of body (p. 25), a claim by which he intends something stronger than the mere
suggestion that you need a body capable of implementing the appropriate computations.
We could simply take the sensorimotor theory as a rebuttal of orthodox scientific
accounts like Marr’s without expecting it to provide an alternative account of the subpersonal
processes involved in perception. It would be better, however, if the theory gave an account of
the physical or physically-realised functional states implicated in Sensorimotor Understanding.
Offering such an account involves answering some very abstract questions, for example
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whether functionalism and representationalism are conceptually viable approaches for
reducing the mental to the physical, and slightly more concrete questions, for example
whether information theoretic or dynamical systems frameworks have the most theoretical
utility for explaining what is going on in human brains and bodies. Even more concretely, it
would be nice to know the precise mechanism involved in human Sensorimotor
Understanding. For instance, if we concluded that the best way to physicalistically account for
Sensorimotor Understanding is to suppose that it supervenes on the construction and
deployment of neural representations, perhaps of some relatively novel kind, we would still
need to know what kind of content they bear and what functional role they play.
Ward (2009), for example, has argued that the representations in question might
specify possibilities for highly planned agent-level action. Elsewhere, Seth (2014) has proposed
that aspects of the sensorimotor approach can be allied with predictive coding approaches to
cognition, which I will explain below. In contrast with representationalist proposals like these,
Hutto and Myin (2012) suggest that Sensorimotor Understanding must be explained by
appeal to the agent’s history of sensorimotor interactions rather than by representational
content, although it remains to be properly explained how we should characterise the physical
processes that underlie the exercise of sensorimotor mastery right now if we endorse this view.
Burhmann, Di Paolo and Barandiaran (2013) have offered a way to model sensorimotor
perception using a dynamic systems framework. The dynamical systems approach was also
endorsed by Hurley (1998), whose account can be considered part of the sensorimotor
approach, and Chemero (2009; see also, Silberstein and Chemero, 2012), who endorses a
Gibsonian account of perception, but whose appeal to sensorimotor abilities offers a proposal
that may usefully help do justice to the sensorimotor approach.
The founding statements of sensorimotor theory can be forgiven for not arriving with
a prefabricated and fully-developed account of the physical processes involved in
Sensorimotor Understanding, but if it is to convince as a serious rival to orthodox scientific
accounts of vision, we need a direction of travel toward answering them. A good place to start
is to have a clear working proposal about what the explanandum, Sensorimotor
Understanding, actually is. In fact, even this so far is ambiguous.
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4.2 -WhichDirection of Fit?
In the sections that follow, I will further discuss the physical or functional processes involved
in Sensorimotor Understanding, but in this section I will first address a significant ambiguity
about what Sensorimotor Understanding is, namely the fact that it is sometimes pitched as
Being Able to Act and sometimes as Knowing WhatWould Happen if You Did Act.
The former, Being Able to Act, could be understood in various ways. In a position
approximating behaviourism, it could be taken to mean having a disposition or ability to act.
Alternatively, in a position resembling Gibsonian ecological psychology (e.g., Chemero, 2009)
or the literature on action-oriented representation (e.g., Clark, 1997; Wheeler, 2005; Ward,
2009; Ward, Roberts and Clark, 2011), it could be taken to mean knowing what actions and
behaviours are open to you. Although Noë (2004) sometimes disowns these possibilities, there
is much evidence that even his version of the sensorimotor theory is committed to a view of
Sensorimotor Understanding as Being Able To Act. If Sensorimotor Understanding is like
this, it has a desire-like direction of fit, because it is the state of the world, specifically the
agent’s behaviour (which for this purpose counts as a state of the world) that must fit with the
agent’s mental state, and not the other way round. Contrast this with Knowing What Would
Happen if You Did Act. This calls upon (perhaps implicit) knowledge about counterfactual
conditionals, and to be effective, the agent’s mental state in this case must be sensitive to the
state the world is in rather than vice-versa - hence it has a belief-like direction of fit.
Noë, as we will see, is sometimes explicit that Sensorimotor Understanding is not
desire-like but belief-like. But to begin, let’s review the textual evidence that Noë’s account is
committed to the idea that Sensorimotor Understanding is desire-like. Although he
insistently denies charges of ‘behaviourism’, he endorses the desire-like direction of fit option
at the very beginning of his book, where he says: “Perceptual experience acquires content
thanks to our possession of bodily skills. What we perceive is determined by what we do (or
what we know how to do); it is determined by what we are ready to do” (2004, p. 1).
Throughout the book, he makes the recurrent claim that perception is constituted by the
exercise of ‘sensorimotor skills’ (e.g., Noë, 2004, p. 90), a phrase which without some
gymnastics is hard to think of as referring to anything other than capacities of one kind or
100
another for skillful bodily behaviour. Noë also equates sensorimotor skills with ‘practical
knowledge’, and this, he makes a point of arguing, conforms to Ryle’s (1949) view of
knowing-how, which Noë suggests means it is an ability and does not reduce to a variety of
knowing-that.
Replying to Stanley and Williamson’s (2001) argument that knowing-how cannot be
an ability because you can know how to do something without having the ability to do it, Noë
argues that it is in keeping with ordinary language, which he takes Stanley and Williamson to
be motivated by, that a ski-instructor who cannot perform the moves they teach, or a pianist
who loses the use of their hands, does not in fact know how to perform the relevant tasks.
Again, if Sensorimotor Understanding is a practical ability and not a form of knowing-that -
and if it resembles the pianist and ski-instructor examples - then we must think of it as an
ability to make skillful bodily movements. It is therefore desire-like; consider the incoherence
of saying that Sensorimotor Understanding involves ‘knowing-how what would happen if you
did act’.
Noë goes on to contrast Sensorimotor Understanding - which does not necessarily
draw on propositional knowledge - with linguistic ability, which does. He claims that a better
analogue for Sensorimotor Understanding than linguistic ability is the ability to communicate
using bodily gestures (2004, p. 90), although he does not make it explicit what one should take
from this analogy. Taken in a minimalistic way, the lesson is merely that neither sensorimotor
knowledge nor the ability to gesture call upon a capacity for propositionally-structured
thought like linguistic ability does. Noë draws a more direct connection between
Sensorimotor Understanding and gesture elsewhere in the book, however, when he suggests
that sensorimotor knowledge is actually constituted, at least sometimes, by an ability to
gesture. Gesture makes an appearance, in particular, in Noë’s account of the skills that
underlie the perceptual experience of P-properties. He claims that the ability to experience
P-size - the apparent size on an object in your visual field - is equivalent to the ability, for
example, to hold out an arm and represent the perspectival size using thumb and forefinger.
Endorsing an explicit appeal to capacities for bodily movement made by Pettit (2003), he
suggests that experiencing the motion of a ball as it flies through the air involves being able to
make bodily movements that manifest a discrimination of its speed, for example by catching
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the ball.
Following Evans (1982), Noë suggests that experiencing an object’s location in
egocentric space, for example its being ‘off to the left’, is identical to practically understanding
the movements you would have to make to face the object head-on. Evans (1985) pointed out
that it will not do to specify the relevant movements solely in terms of muscle movements,
because the appropriate behaviours could include, for example walking, crawling, swimming
and indefinitely many others. Evans concluded from this that we cannot derive the notion of
space by specifying appropriate behavioural capacities, but must presuppose space in order to
specify what the relevant behavioural capacities are, thus endorsing a notion of ‘behavioural
space’. In contrast, Noë endorses a notion of “egocentric, sensorimotor space” (2004, p. 89).
The concepts of behavioural space and sensorimotor space appear to be the same, or closely
related: both characterise the environment spatially and in egocentric reference to the
subject’s body. Noë does not explain what difference there is, if any between the concepts, and
what he probably intends is merely to underline his difference with Evans on the subject of
how perceivers master that space.
Here Noë distances himself from the idea that sensorimotor mastery is Being Able To
Act. He says:
Evans (1982) sometimes seems to offer such a behaviorist account, suggesting that the experience
of something as off to the left consists, as it were by definition, precisely in the possession of
certain dispositions to move with respect to the thing. My claim is not behaviorist in the way
Evans’s appear to be. When we see a flicker on the right we know - in a practical, implicit way -
that movements of the eyes to the right bring (or would bring) the flicker better into view (Noë,
2004, p. 89).
This implies that Sensorimotor Understanding is Knowing What Would Happen If You Did
Act, which is to say has a belief-like direction of fit. That Noë intends Sensorimotor
Understanding to have a belief-like direction of fit is underlined in an exchange between Noë
and Campbell concerning the experience of P-properties. Campbell (2008) observes that
Noë’s account lacks an explanation of how we locate objects in sensorimotor space to begin
with. Campbell’s point is that Sensorimotor Understanding, taken as an implicit, belief-like
mastery of how P-properties change in line with movement, is sufficient to explain the
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experience of objective properties, but that we must appeal to a distinct faculty to account for
the experience of P-properties. He complains that in Noë’s account: “there is no attempt at all
to explain what it is to perceive an aspect of an object” (p. 669). Campbell’s friendly
suggestion is that the sensorimotor account should explain P-property experience by appeal to
neurally-realised capacities for actions such as reaching out to grasp the object in front of you.
This suggestion does not appear to be very far removed from the spirit of Noë’s proposal. Noë
(2008) rejects this, however, on the ground that that perceptual experience is not for action.
He responds that experiencing P-properties implies knowing what movements one could
make to gesture to the object or to bring it into view, but emphasises that this knowledge does
not require an ability or disposition to make the relevant movements.
As an aside, Noë’s reply to Campbell is unconvincing. He implies that as long as we do
not stipulate that P-property experience happens prior to objective-property experience, we
need not be committed to the view that they are the result of separate faculties. But the
import of Campbell’s point, concerning the ‘to the left’ case for instance, is that in order to
know which movements would cause you to face the object head-on, you need some way to
recognise the state of affairs that obtains when you are facing the object head-on. You may
know that no movements are required to face the object head-on, and that you are therefore
facing the object head-on. But in this event, some account must be given to explain how you
know that no movements are required. Adopting Campbell’s proposal, we could propose that
you know this because you have the ability to carry out a practical task like picking the object
up, but Noë rejects this solution. I will examine shortly how this limitation in Noë’s account
might be redressed while maintaining that Sensorimotor Understanding has a belief-like and
not merely a desire-like direction of fit.
Elsewhere, Noë (2004) repeatedly disavows ‘behaviourism’ on various grounds. He
states that it is a mistake to suppose that “effects are logical constructions of their causes” (p.
118), i.e. that the behaviours that are the effects of Sensorimotor Understanding themselves
constitute Sensorimotor Understanding. He claims that Sensorimotor Understanding is not a
set of behavioural dispositions, but the ground of your dispositions (p. 88). Importantly, he
notes that you do not always need to move, or even have the ability to move, in order to
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perceive (p. 90).14 These are sound objections to certain positions that might be deemed
behaviourist, and I will later attempt to demonstrate that a position which does claim that
Sensorimotor Understanding depends on behavioural capacities can be finessed in a way that
defuses these worries (sections 4.4 and 6.2).
The uncertainty around direction of fit leaves us with two opposed possibilities. On a
belief-like account, Sensorimotor Understanding is a non-propositional belief-like
understanding of the sensory consequences of possible movements. This possibility is difficult
to square with Noë’s claims that the understanding is practical knowledge or a set of
sensorimotor skills, and with his claim that perceptual consciousness depends on what we are
able to do. But it does justice to Noë’s denial that Sensorimotor Understanding is for action,
or depends on movement or the ability to move. Accounting for the physical processes that
enable Sensorimotor Understanding, on this view, appears to require explaining how neural
states and processes yield belief-like states, and this may require endorsing one kind of internal
representation account or another, since it is not apparent what other kinds of subpersonal
state could do the necessary explanatory work.
Sensorimotor Understanding, on a desire-like account, could involve knowing what
movements to make to achieve various practical goals, and this knowledge might itself depend
on the deployment of action-oriented representations. Alternatively, Sensorimotor
Understanding may, on the desire-like account, consist of dispositions or capacities for various
behaviours which are not best accounted for by reference to representation or ‘knowledge’ at
all. Noë, at times, resists both these possibilities. In section 4.4, below, I will argue that one can
avoid the most important worries associated with behaviourism while nonetheless taking
behavioural capacities to be necessary and sufficient for the existence of Sensorimotor
Understanding. To this effect, I will attempt to establish that Sensorimotor Understanding
exists by virtue of the subject’s possessing an appropriate set of behavioural capacities, but that
it ‘grounds’ the capacities rather than being identical to them. This thesis, as will become
evident, is compatible with the further claim that representations are required to explain how
14 Noë’s other objection is that behaviourism denies the existence of phenomenal
consciousness (2004, p. 32). However, it is not obvious that explaining experience by appeal to
behavioural dispositions necessarily entails denying consciousness.
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the relevant behavioural capacities are realised, but also with the claim that
nonrepresentational explanations are more appropriate. Before I get to this, I will examine a
more straightforwardly representationalist option, involving the claim that Sensorimotor
Understanding is Knowing What Would Happen If You Did Act, and depends on the
deployment of a particular kind of internal representation.
4.3 - Sensorimotor Understanding as Subpersonal Representation
Suppose, in accordance with some of Noë’s (2004) claims, that possessing and exercising
Sensorimotor Understanding neither requires bodily movement nor an ability or disposition
to move. To adopt this position is, by definition, to reject a number of claims that could be
deemed behaviourist. In addition, suppose that action is not what Sensorimotor
Understanding is primarily for. Instead, let’s take it that Sensorimotor Understanding is a
kind of knowledge about the P-properties that presently obtain, and the P-properties that
would obtain given various possible movements. As I put it earlier, Sensorimotor
Understanding, on this view, has primarily a belief-like direction of fit. Sensorimotor
Understanding continues to have one non-trivial conceptual link with bodily behaviour,
namely that it incorporates knowledge about the consequences of possible bodily movements.
Noë (2010) continues to deny that conscious vision is primarily for action, but argues
that if action-guidance is one purpose of conscious vision, then conscious vision requires
Sensorimotor Understanding. He contrasts the sensorimotor approach, as usual, with the
claim that perception consists of the activation of an inner world model. On the inner model
conception, perceiving involves knowing what objects are out there, but not what bodily
relation you stand in to them. Lest one think that Noë is targeting only a pictorial theory
which no one endorses, notice that any representationalist theory is in this position by default
if the representational content it endorses does not somehow specify a bodily relation. Noë
claims that if your perceptual awareness did not represent your bodily relation to the world,
then the world would not seem phenomenally ‘present’ to you. Even if this is not true, it is not
apparent how your perceptual awareness in this event could help guide action. Noë observes
that it must be possible to integrate what you see with what you do, and argues that it is a
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virtue of the sensorimotor theory that it shows how this integration is possible.
An upshot of this point, we might think, is that Sensorimotor Understanding
necessarily involves an ability to make skillful bodily movements, so long as something else
does not block the ability - for example paralysis, or optic ataxia, an inability to co-ordinate
muscle movements. This is one way of weakly motivating the conceptual link between
perception and action implied by the title of Noë’s (2004) book. It also justifies the
description of Sensorimotor Understanding as practical, but only if we take ‘practical’ to mean
knowing-that and knowing-how, as Stanley andWilliamson do and Noë denies. Sensorimotor
Understanding, on the present view, is knowing what would happen if you moved, a
knowing-that, accompanied by a knowing-how to act, which depends on the knowing-that.
However, the present link between perception and action is less tight than the one expressed
by Noë’s claim that “What we perceive is determined by what we do (or what we know how to
do)” (2004, p. 1), since the present view is in essence only signed up to the more pedestrian
claim that what we do or know how to do is determined by what we perceive.
Contradicting Noë’s (2004) discussion of practical knowledge, Sensorimotor
Understanding on the present view is not merely a practical ability, but a belief-like
understanding of SMCs that enables behaviour. This means that the sensorimotor approach
owes an explanation of what Sensorimotor Understanding is and, in particular, how it is
physically constituted or realised. Since it is belief-like, it appears to require truth-evaluable
content. Despite asserting that we cannot usually express our understanding of SMCs using
propositions or bring it to bear in “explicit deliberative judgement” (p. 187), Noë asserts that
Sensorimotor Understanding is conceptual, on what he takes to be a legitimately unrestrictive
account of what conceptual thought requires. He changes this position in later work, asserting
instead that Sensorimotor Understanding involves a kind of nonconceptual content, but
maintaining that Sensorimotor Understanding occurs on a continuum with conceptual skills
rather than belonging to a radically different kind (Noë, 2012). This does better justice to the
suggestion that Sensorimotor Understanding involves content which the perceiver cannot
fully express using propositions, even, presumably, by pointing to an object and saying ‘that
sensorimotor law’. This raises the possibility that Sensorimotor Understanding supervenes on
the deployment of neural representations bearing nonconceptual content.
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Seth (2014) has recently offered a specific representationalist proposal intended to do
justice to some aspects of the sensorimotor theory. His account rejects the sensorimotor
theory’s explicitly enactivist apparatus, namely anti-representationalism, vehicle externalism
and the endorsement of dynamical systems explanations. However, he endorses the account’s
approach to naturalising phenomenal qualities, and, in particular, Noë’s (2004) insights into
visual phenomenology, including presence-in-absence. Seth combines these aspects of the
sensorimotor theory with predictive coding (see, Clark, 2013; Hohwy, 2013). Like the
orthodox approach, predictive coding accounts of perception hold that the brain constructs
internal representations designed to represent features present in the outside environment as
accurately as possible, based on the limited information available at one time via the sense
organs. Orthodox theories make sensory inputs the starting point, and propose that the brain
uses them to build up an inner model. By contrast, predictive coding accounts hold that the
brain constructs models of the environment which it ‘predicts’, using Bayesian inference, will
prove to be in keeping with the worldly state of affairs that really obtains.
The difference between this and the orthodox approach is that sensory inputs here
serve as error correction signals; instead of acting as precursors to the construction of an inner
model, the sense inputs function to tell the brain when the inner models it has already
deployed are wrong. Further, the predictive approach holds that the brain simultaneously
holds multiple inner models organised hierarchically into tiers at increasing levels of
abstraction. Only the lowest model in the hierarchy uses sense inputs themselves as error
correction signals. This model functions as an error correcting signal for the model above, and
so forth. An example of a substantive explanatory difference between orthodox and predictive
coding accounts occurs in the phenomenon of repetition suppression, a tendency of the brain
to respond less to a stimulus as it becomes more familiar. Seth cites work showing that
repetition suppression fails to occur when the subject does not expect the stimulus to be
repeated (Summerfield, Trittschuh, Monti, Mesulam and Egner, 2008). He observes that this
is intelligible within a predictive coding approach, since the approach makes expectations a
central feature, whereas there is no natural way to make this intelligible within an orthodox
framework, where sense inputs come before the models which make use of them.
Seth endorses some of the Noë’s (2004; 2012) insights about visual phenomenology.
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One example of this, which I have discussed already, concerns shape-related P-properties and
objective properties. You are confronted with a coin, tilted at an angle, which is therefore
elliptical in aspect. Thanks to your Sensorimotor Understanding, you appreciate both that it
has an elliptical aspect and that objectively it is circular. It is a key virtue of the sensorimotor
approach that it explains how you are sensitive to objective properties while at the same time,
necessarily, being sensitive to them from some perspective rather than from nowhere. Another
aspect of this phenomenon is ‘presence-in-absence’, the tendency of environmental features
which are strictly speaking out of view to show up in visual consciousness anyway. Noë’s
(2004) prototypic example concerns looking at a tomato. In one sense, you can never see the
whole tomato at once, but only one side of it, while the other side remains out of view.
According to Noë’s phenomenology, which Seth endorses, the back of the tomato nonetheless
has presence-in-absence, which is to say your visual experience is of a whole tomato rather
than something like a 2D cut-out.
Seth argues that a predictive coding account can do justice to this, proposing that the
predictive models employed by the brain in perception incorporate not only predictions about
the features of the present environment causally responsible for present sense inputs, but also
counterfactual predictions about the changes in sense input that would result from a range of
possible movements. Perceptual presence is explained by these counterfactual predictions, and
the more predictions there are about movement-related counterfactuals relating to some
feature, the greater the degree of felt phenomenal presence there is associated with that
feature.
For my present purpose, the crucial feature of Seth’s account is that it provides a
better developed explanation of the mechanism that underlies Sensorimotor Understanding
than found in the original statements of the sensorimotor approach, and does justice to the
‘belief-like’ construal of Sensorimotor Understanding I have been addressing in this section. It
is notable that adopting this view means adopting a very conservative rendering of the
sensorimotor account. It means endorsing representationalism, rejecting dynamical
entanglement and ECM, and by focusing on internal models, downplaying the role played by
embodied interaction even as causal scaffolding.
Sensorimotor mastery, and in particular Sensorimotor Understanding, one of the
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most important notions in the sensorimotor theory, is ambiguously defined by the theory’s
original statements. At times, it appears to be implicit knowledge of the SMCs that presently
obtain, and nothing more. In this case, the obvious way to explain Sensorimotor
Understanding is in keeping with orthodox cognitive science via a representationalist story.
Seth’s account has the virtue of doing justice to Noë’s (2004) insights about visual
phenomenology and perceptual presence, and of allying this aspect of the sensorimotor theory
with insights from the currently popular predictive coding approach. If nothing else, Seth’s
account also has the virtue of beginning to repair the sensorimotor theory’s serious
explanatory deficit by accounting for the precise mechanism that realises Sensorimotor
Understanding. However, this comes at a cost. For anyone who is motivated, on whatever
independent grounds, to endorse the enactivist theses of anti-representationalism, vehicle
externalism and dynamical systems, Seth’s account will not help, since it serves only to co-opt
insights from the sensorimotor theory into a much more conservative representationalist
framework. In particular, accounting naturalistically for representational content brings with
it a heavy and as yet unresolved explanatory burden (Hutto and Myin, 2012), as I discuss
further in chapter 6.
Moreover, the approach has costs for the sensorimotor theory itself. If we endorse
internalism and representationalism, then the sensorimotor theory no longer gets to make
distinctive use of the appealing proposition that the brain offloads the burden of modelling
onto the environment itself. Although any variety of representationalism can observe that the
amount represented at any one time is minimal, and that as active perceivers we move around
to acquire new information, the implication of Noë’s (2004) account is that Sensorimotor
Understanding is computationally more efficient than inner modelling, because we merely
need to be poised to interact with the environment, rather than modelling the environment
and then becoming poised to interact with it on the basis of this model.15 Seth’s proposal also
has the drawback, from the perspective of sensorimotor theory, of making the sensorimotor
account hostage to phenomenological fortune, hanging as it does in large part on Noë’s
15 Of course, whether the non-representationalist version of the sensorimotor account really
implies a more efficient process than a representationalist alternative depends on how the
representationalist and non-representationalist alternatives are precisely cashed out.
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description of visual phenomenology. Clark (2008), for instance, suggests that the feeling of
presence-in-absence could be well accounted for by the general feeling that there is more to be
seen, rather than any more explicit representation of or knowledge about the sensory
consequences of possible movements. For these reasons, I endorse a different view of
Sensorimotor Understanding, which I lay out in the next section.
4.4 - Sensorimotor Understanding in Bodily Capacities
Notwithstanding suggestions by various commentators that the sensorimotor account
requires representation, the theory is, in at least one sense, strongly anti-representationalist.
The idea is that there is no need to represent the world, because it is already present to you.
This is reflected by the outside memory thesis (O’Regan, 1992; O&N), and in Noë (2004;
2012) by the idea of presence-as-access, which implies that perception does not depend on
representing even a small part of the outside world. One way of thinking about the theory’s
anti-representationalism is to think of it as a constitutive claim about perception at the
personal level. On this proposal, we are not, as persons, in touch with representations of the
world, but stand in an unmediated relation to the world itself. This is not necessarily
incompatible with the claim that perception depends on internal representations
subpersonally, a point I return to later.
The sensorimotor account’s way of cashing out this (personal level) relation with the
outside world is to say that it involves possessing and exercising a set of bodily capacities;
specifically, capacities to skillfully interact with the outside environment in ways that draw on
an implicit understanding of the SMCs that obtain. Consider that on a representationalist
account, perception involves representing the world, and interacting with the environment in
a goal-directed way is a contingent consequence of the fact you perceive it. Since the role of
the ‘representation’ is played in the sensorimotor account by the world itself, it follows that
perceiving itself in the sensorimotor account is equivalent to possessing and exercising the
capacity to skillfully interact with the world in a goal-directed way. This provides a solid
motivation for the claim that perception depends on action and Being Able to Act, which, as I
said earlier, implies a desire-like direction of fit.
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The question remains, however, of how we account for Sensorimotor Understanding
in its guise as a belief-like faculty, a Knowing What Would Happen If You Did Act. The best
approach, I suggest, is to avoid reifying Sensorimotor Understanding. We should not think of
it as the sort of thing that depends, by definition, on a particular sort of concrete entity, for
example a conscious or purely subpersonal representation, which causally mediates behaviour.
Instead, we should think of it as a set of necessary conditions that our capacities for
practically-oriented, goal-directed behaviour must meet to implicate perception and
perceptual consciousness.
To understand the explanatory relation between Sensorimotor Understanding and
behaviour, it will help to distinguish between some different varieties of explanatory relation
theoretical entities can stand in to one another. Bermudez (2000) distinguishes between
‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ explanations in cognitive science (not to be confused with Hurley’s
1998 usage of the vertical/horizontal metaphor). Horizontal explanations exist at one level,
the personal or subpersonal, and describe temporally distributed events. So if we are offering a
horizontal explanation and we say that A causes B, we mean that A happens and this causes B
to happen a short time later, where A and B occur at the same explanatory level. On Seth’s
(2014) proposal, we might imagine that neural representations of the sensory results of
possible movements send information to motor output areas of the brain, and so generate
behaviour. This would be a horizontal explanation. Vertical explanations describe events that
happen simultaneously at different explanatory levels. In this case, A might be a subpersonal
computation, and B might be a psychological state possessed by the whole person. People
sometimes use the word ‘cause’ in vertical explanations too, although it is not causation of the
sort that implies temporal extension. We might also say, here, that A enables B. If we said that
the deployment of the subpersonal representations described by Seth enable perceptual
consciousness, this would be a vertical explanation.
The important thing, for the moment, is that the explanatory relation between
Sensorimotor Understanding and a capacity for skillful behaviour is neither a vertical nor a
horizontal one. Sensorimotor Understanding, I propose, is a logical condition that the
behaviour enabled by our behavioural capacities must meet in order to constitute perception
and perceptual consciousness. The identity between perception and skillful behaviour arises
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from the fact that to perceive is not to model the world and then use this model, but merely
use the world in the way traditional theories hold that we use an inner model. The fact that
the behaviour needs to manifest a belief-like Sensorimotor Understanding is an upshot of the
straightforward claim that it would be impossible to skillfully interact with the world in more
than a very basic way if you did not have the ability to anticipate, in at least some cases, the
sensory results of your movements. On this basis, behavioural capacities manifesting
Sensorimotor Understanding can be described as a condition of possibility for perception.
This is one way of understanding the claim that Sensorimotor Understanding grounds
perception-implicating behaviour.
The view I am advocating is neutral with regard to whether or not Sensorimotor
Understanding is enabled by the deployment of subpersonal representations. However, it does
not require internal representation as a matter of definition or logical necessity. Sensorimotor
Understanding should be thought of as a characteristic of behaviour; an adverb or adjective
used to describe behaviour or a behavioural capacity, and not a noun. Although there is no
adverb ‘understandingly’, we might say that a behaviour ‘shows understanding’, and mean that
the understanding is constituted by the behaviour rather than that the behaviour merely
demonstrates the existence of a pre-existing entity called understanding. Since Sensorimotor
Understanding is a logical condition for certain kinds of skillful behaviour, appropriate
behaviour is almost sufficient by itself to guarantee the truth of an ascription of Sensorimotor
Understanding. We should add to this an extra requirement that the brain makes an
intelligible contribution to the behaviour, since it is doubtful that a person in a metaphysically
possible world who exhibits appropriate behaviour but lacks internal states to enable the
behaviour could be conscious.
It may help to compare the current view of Sensorimotor Understanding with
Dennett’s (1987) intentional stance, which I discussed in chapter 2. According to the
intentional stance, mental states such as beliefs and desires exist just as long as ascribing them
to a person or other agent helps an outside observer explain the person’s behaviour. Like
Sensorimotor Understanding, this implies the existence of a set of necessary and sufficient
conditions that an agent’s behavioural repertoire must meet for the agent to possess a
particular mental state. Sensorimotor Understanding is correctly ascribed to any perceiver
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whose behavioural repertoire meets the appropriate conditions. In contrast with a certain
understanding of the intentional stance, however, Sensorimotor Understanding is, in a robust
sense, real, and not observer-relative. This is because certain kinds of skillful behaviour require,
as a matter of necessity, a sensitivity to certain presently obtaining SMCs.
If we can account physicalistically for the relevant behavioural capacities without
appeal to neural representations, this will be enough to account for perception, and the
belief-like Sensorimotor Understanding will come for free. The suggestion that it is possible to
explain the relevant behavioural capacities without appeal to representations is controversial,
of course, and nothing I have said so far shows this can be done. However, it is important that
Sensorimotor Understanding, on the view I propose, does not require subpersonal
representation by conceptual necessity. Moreover, the present view is compatible with the
possibility that perception does involve neural representations, but not neural representations
of SMCs. This holds open the possibility of a subpersonal representationalist explanation of
Sensorimotor Understanding quite different from Seth’s approach.
We need, of course, to know something about the behaviour required to justify
ascriptions of Sensorimotor Understanding. In the case of P-properties like relative location,
P-size and P-shape, Sensorimotor Understanding is manifest in the capacity to make
appropriate movements in sensorimotor space. For instance, an understanding that something
is to the left might be manifest in the capacities to walk, run, crawl (etc.) in a leftward
direction for the purpose of bringing the object into view. When we experience something as
being to the left, this usually implicates, as Evans (1985) says, a capacity to walk or run or
crawl, or perform any action from an indefinitely wide range of possible actions in order to
reach the object. If we know that someone intends to face the object head-on, and we see them
walking toward it, we could, in a manner reminiscent of the intentional stance, interpret them
as possessing an implicit understanding of the fact that this movement will bring the object
into view, hence as possessing Sensorimotor Understanding. However, ascribing a perceptual
state to a person or animal on the basis of this single behaviour would be ascribing too much.
The behaviour could be a reflexive response to a stimulus, where perception ought to enable
an ability to respond flexibly using a wide repertoire of behaviours. So the subject ought to
have the ability to run, crawl, etc., as well as walk in order to reach the stimulus; the capacity
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has, in this sense, to admit some degree of generalisability. We can do justice to Noë’s
contention that the experience of objective properties is grounded by the same faculty of
Sensorimotor Understanding as the experience of P-property if we cast the experience of
objective properties as involving the exercise of a behavioural capacity, too. In common with
Sensorimotor Attunement, appealing to this capacity differs from the behaviourist appeal to
input-output relations, because it does not specify which outputs should follow when
particular inputs obtain, but which outputs should follow when particular SMCs obtain.
There are various similarities and differences between Sensorimotor Understanding
and the notion of Sensorimotor Attunement, which I reconstructed from O&N in section
3.3.1. In Noë (2004), Sensorimotor Understanding is largely if not entirely framed as a
personal-level capacity, meaning that its operations are accessible to the conscious subject.
This reflects the fact that we are conscious of possessing and exercising the relevant
understanding, or at least we always have the possibility of becoming conscious of it, even if
there are cases in which we are not conscious of our behaviour because we are sufficiently
absorbed. Evans (1985) claims that to experience an object as occupying a particular spatial
location, the conscious subject must understand the movements required to get there. This
might be equivalent to nothing more than being aware of what your bodily dispositions are. If
you are aware of the movements you must make to reach an object that is to your left, for
instance, then you are aware of the SMCs associated with the object’s being on the left, i.e. the
movements that will result in your facing the object head-on. In this sense, the SMCs involved
in ‘being to the left’ are transparent to you (i.e. you know what they are). The experience of
P-colour, the colour a surface presents when viewed from a particular location and under a
particular lighting condition, is a different sort of case. From the perspective of a conscious
perceiver, there is no transparent connection between this aspect of colour phenomenology
and possibilities for bodily movement. Noë (2004) thus suggests that P-colour experience is
accounted for by a subpersonal (for which we can read subdoxastic) variety of sensorimotor
mastery (p. 140). Since I am attempting to offer a maximally coherent reconstruction of the
sensorimotor theory, I will take it that this is accounted for by Sensorimotor Attunement.
This brings to the fore an important difference between Sensorimotor Attunement
and Sensorimotor Understanding. When I attempted to do justice to O&N’s notion of
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Sensorimotor Attunement, I noted that there was more than one way the theory could
propose we identify the specific SMCs to which a perceiver is presently attuned when she
exercises the relevant behavioural capacity. I suggested that one option is to endorse a
Dennett-style interpretative stance and identify the SMCs by appeal to a combination of
teleology or proximal goal and present behaviour. I went on to endorse a more austere
alternative in which we suppose that a goal-directed agent masters a given set of SMCs if she
responds differentially to them in her behaviour, regardless of whether or not one could
identify what the SMCs are by running the interpretative stance.
In this event, the agent does not have to know or represent what the SMCs are, she
merely has to discriminate them. This is compatible with the suggestion that conscious
perceivers do not have cognitive access to the SMCs involved in P-colour. This contrasts,
however, with the conscious Sensorimotor Understanding that applies to P-shape, location
and movement. In this case, where we do have the option of running a behavioural test to see
if a subject possesses Sensorimotor Understanding, the subject in some sense consciously
knows what the SMCs are, because the SMCs themselves, and not just discrimination of the
SMCs, are identifiable from the subject’s behavioural repertoire - e.g., she is going to the left,
she wants to face the object head on, so she has mastered the fact that going to the left will
result in facing the object head on.
To conclude this section, I will attend to some interesting remarks by Glock (2008)
on the subject of animal thought. In the piece, Glock attempts to tread a middle path between
lingualism, which claims that non-human animals lack thought altogether because they lack
language, and the mentalist claim that animal thought differs from human thought only in
degree and not kind. Although this is a quite different topic to the one that concerns us here,
it chimes with Noë’s (2012) stated ambition of accounting for continuities between thought
in humans and other animals, and between non-linguistic thought and sensorimotor skills in
mature humans. Glock criticises Searle (1994), who claims that the best way to identify
whether or not an animal is conscious is to identify neurophysiological features correlated
with consciousness and check whether the animal possesses them or not. Glock points out
that this only works if you have a way to test outwardly observable behaviour for
consciousness in the first place. Even once you have identified the relevant features in one
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species, there is no guarantee that another species which also possesses those features is also
conscious purely because it also possesses them. Glock’s solution to the question of animal
minds is to focus on capacities that can be manifested in behaviour instead. The capacities in
question are not mere dispositions to discriminate one object from another, but more flexible
abilities, for example, to respond to distinct objects differently in one situation but not
another, and to correct mistakes. The idea is not that thoughts reduce to certain behavioural
dispositions, but that they ought only to be ascribed on the basis of them.
In the case of human perceptual consciousness, the problem is different. There is no
need to concern ourselves with the question of whether or not other humans enjoy perceptual
consciousness. But a question does arise with regard to what perception consists of. It is
possible that the only thing which would licence us to claim that a particular
neurophysiological state gives rise to perceptual consciousness is its being correlated with a
behaviour too. As I have suggested here, that is behaviour meeting a certain set of conditions
described as Sensorimotor Understanding. This is an epistemic motivation for ascribing
perceptual skills on the basis of behavioural capacities.
However, there is a deeper motivation, which is the possibility that perception just is a
capacity for skillful bodily interaction with the environment. There is no default reason for
thinking this claim fares any worse than the claim that perception is constituted by the
activation of an inner world model. If the capacity claim is true, we get the benefit of a direct
realist account of phenomenal qualities, which I mentioned in section 3.6 in the discussion of
ECM, as well as the epistemic benefit of a non-mysterious way to explain how physical states
and processes give rise to perceptual consciousness. In the next chapter, I claim that
sensorimotor theory can enjoy partial success as an account of phenomenal qualities even if
the present view fails. In chapter 6, I defend the claim that perception is constituted by the
possession and exercise of a set of behavioural capacities.
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5 - Phenomenal Character: A Sensorimotor-Representation Hybrid
The next two chapters address a response made by Clark (2008) to the sensorimotor account
in which he claims that perception plausibly consists of the construction and deployment of
representations standing in for types, categories and relative locations, and not the exercise of
sensorimotor skill. In chapter 6, I pursue some more radical claims arising from the view of
Sensorimotor Understanding as a set of conditions that behaviour must meet, and the
attendant possibility that perception does not involve representation at all. In this chapter,
however, I explore a response by the sensorimotor theory to a worst case scenario in which it is
established that perception does depend on representation, and not on behavioural capacities.
I argue that even in this event, the sensorimotor theory has the ability to provide a tenable,
compelling account of phenomenal qualities. This chapter is structured as follows. In the first
section, I outline a criticism levelled by Clark (2008) again the sensorimotor theory. In the
second section, I propose a line of response that could be adopted by a conservative rendering
of the sensorimotor approach. In the third section, I examine an apparent problem for this
response, and explain how it can be overcome. In the fourth section, I offer further reasons to
endorse the sensorimotor account of phenomenal qualities. In the fifth section, I examine the
relation between sensorimotor theory and Rupert’s (2011) model of the ‘massively
representational mind’.
5.1 - TheNon-Sensorimotor, Skill-Based Approach
In a critical response to the sensorimotor theory, Clark (2008) endorses, in broad outline, an
approach to perceptual consciousness which he suggests is both more plausible than the
sensorimotor account, and incompatible with its key claims. Clark’s preferred approach in
part comprises a philosophical approach to phenomenal qualities or ‘qualia’, which he argues
are properly accounted for by the perceiver’s exercise of ‘epistemic’ skills and not the
sensorimotor skills that Noë and O’Regan appeal to. The approach also comprises an
empirically-oriented account of the cognitive processing that underlies perceptual
consciousness. Drawing in particular on Milner and Goodale’s work on dorsal and ventral
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stream perception (e.g., Milner and Goodale, 1995), Clark suggests that the empirical
evidence demonstrates that conscious perception is not primarily the result of a sensorimotor
process. I will begin by outlining Clark’s preferred approach to phenomenal qualities, and
subsequently move on to his claims about cognitive processing.
Skill-based accounts of phenomenal quality propose a way to account naturalistically
for the phenomenal qualities featured in perceptual consciousness, for example the look of red.
On this approach, a given phenomenal quality is accounted for by nothing more or less than
the subject’s ability to skillfully discriminate, in some relevant way, a feature of the
environment associated with the quality from other features they have the ability to
consciously perceive. One such account is offered by Pettit (2003). As Pettit notes, traditional
accounts imply that a subject’s capacity to discriminate one property from another is merely
the contingent outcome of a difference in phenomenal look. Conversely, skill-based accounts
claim that there is nothing more to experiencing a given phenomenal look than exercising the
associated discriminatory capacity. In Pettit’s examples, you exercise these capacities in making
judgements, for instance that an object is red, or a brighter shade of red than some other
object, as well as in bodily behaviour, for example reaching out appropriately to catch a
fast-moving ball. An object looking a particular shade of red to you is, on this view, no more
than it looking to you like you can discriminate it in an appropriate way from other shades of
red, and other colours, and so forth. Presuming that there is no fundamental obstacle to
describing the exercise of these capacities for discrimination in physicalistic vocabulary, there
is no deep-seated obstacle on this approach to understanding phenomenal qualities
physicalistically.
Clark takes it that the sensorimotor theory is itself a skill-based approach. On most
ways of understanding the account this is true, although we must take care to be clear on why
this is so. The sensorimotor approach proposes that the look of red, like other phenomenal
qualities, is properly accounted for by a sensorimotor law, which is a systematic way that sense
input signals originating from a relevant object change in line with movements and varying
ambient lighting conditions (e.g., Noë, 2004). One way to understand the concept of
sensorimotor law, therefore, is to think of it as something that can be described solely by
reference to counterfactual conditionals of the form ‘if the subject moved like this, sense input
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would change like this’ (suggested by Noë, 2004). So understood, sensorimotor laws comprise
what Burhmann, Di Paolo and Barandiaran (2013) describe as the subject’s sensorimotor
environment. These laws have a motor output to sense input direction of fit, since they
characterise how sense input will change in line with given movements, but do not describe
how the subject will move given particular sense inputs. So understood, sensorimotor laws
may, in principle, be sufficient to explain degrees of similarity and difference between specific
phenomenal qualities where it is assumed that the subject is in some appropriate way sensitive
to those sensorimotor laws. But they could not explain how a perceiver can be in conscious
states characterised by those qualities, considering that the relevant counterfactual
conditionals might be true even if the perceiver was dead, or their brain were made of jelly
(etc.).
To explain how perceivers do come to be in the relevant conscious states, the
sensorimotor approach posits that in some way or another we master sensorimotor laws.
Depending on how we construe the notion, mastery of the sensorimotor environment could
include internal representations of counterfactual conditionals, perhaps even propositional
knowledge, without necessarily calling on any bodily skills whatsoever. As it happens, however,
most versions of the sensorimotor account individuate phenomenal qualities by reference only
to patterns of counterfactual dependence that the perceiver manifests a sensitivity to in their
bodily movements.16 Burhmann, Di Paolo and Barandiaran (2013) characterise the
perceiver’s repertoire of bodily responses in a given sensorimotor environment through what
they term a sensorimotor habitat, which this time comprises the movements the perceiver
makes in line with given sense inputs and the changes in sense input that follow. The need to
refer to a perceiver’s sensorimotor habitat and not just their sensorimotor environment is
evident in O&N and O’Regan (2011), regardless of their further appeal to higher-order
16 Noë (2010) actually denies that the sensorimotor theory is a skill-based approach, on the
ground that perception depends on understanding SMCs rather than merely being able to
skillfully discriminate them. However, the frequent invocation of sensorimotor ‘skill’ invites a
reading in which the sensorimotor theory is a skill-based approach. This reflects the tension
between competing directions of fit I discussed in section 4.2. Since I concluded that
Sensorimotor Understanding ought to be thought of as depending on knowing how to act as
well as knowing what would happen given possible movements, I think it appropriate to
consider the sensorimotor theory a skill-based approach.
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tracking of those bodily interactions. Noë (2004) does not say anything explicit to suggest that
a perceiver can only be conscious of sensorimotor laws featured in their sensorimotor habitat.
However, the claim is not explicitly retracted in Noë’s (2004) solo account. At times, Noë
attempts to avoid endorsing an unduly strong link between perception and action, and in
particular denies that you necessarily have to be moving your body right now in order to see.
This does not compromise the suggestion that you can only have perceptual experiences
characterised by SMCs featured in your sensorimotor habitat, so long as we take the
sensorimotor habitat only to characterise ways you are disposed to skillfully interact.
Clark agrees that phenomenal qualities should be explained by reference to the
exercise of skills. However, instead of appealing to bodily responsiveness to patterns of
sensorimotor dependence, his favoured account appeals to personal-level responsiveness in
reasoning and action planning to categories, types and locations. He takes it that ‘epistemic’
skills of this sort either do not call upon capacities for bodily movement, or at least do not do
solely call upon such capacities, and are distinct from the bodily skills appealed to by the
sensorimotor theory. To keep things unambiguous, I will describe epistemic skills, as Clark
understands them, as ‘non-sensorimotor’ skills, leaving the designator ‘epistemic’ neutral on
whether or not the skills in question are identical to capacities for bodily movement.
Importantly, Clark argues that sensorimotor and non-sensorimotor skill-based accounts of
phenomenal qualities share a common explanatory virtue when it comes to accounting for
phenomenal qualities non-mysteriously; indeed, nothing he says is intended to call into doubt
the view that the sensorimotor and non-sensorimotor skill-based accounts are, in principle,
equally well-suited for resisting the claim that phenomenal qualities cannot be accounted for
naturalistically. This makes it plausible that Clark thinks the appeal to skills is enough to solve
this problem without even getting into the question of whether they are sensorimotor or not.
His objection to sensorimotor theory, by contrast, is that it provides an implausible account of
the capacities that are, as a matter of fact, deployed in perceptual consciousness.
Clark’s objection partly reflects a complaint that the sensorimotor theory is untenably
committed to supposing that the range of phenomenal qualities featured in an agent’s
perceptual awareness is no less fine-grained than the discriminations evident in the agent’s
most finely sensitive bodily behaviour. This commitment is a consequence of the
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sensorimotor theory’s claim that two perceivers could only share identical perceptual
phenomenology if they are identically embodied. O&N, for example, say: “For two systems to
have the same knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies all the way down, they will have to
have bodies that are identical all the way down” (p. 1015), with a similar claim appearing in
Noë (2004).
In fact, it is not apparent that the sensorimotor theory has any essential need to make
the claim. Logically-speaking, the sensorimotor version of the skill-based view only needs to
say that for every difference in phenomenal quality there is a corresponding difference in the
bidirectional patterns of dependence between input and output featured in the perceiver’s
skill-driven bodily interactions. It need not make the inverse claim that every discrimination
manifest in an agent’s behaviour must be reflected in the phenomenal character of their
perceptual consciousness. The sensorimotor theory faces pressure to say that the input-output
patterns relevant to perceptual experience are very fine-grained in order to avoid an objection
levelled by Block (2001). Block’s charge is that the sensorimotor theory must claim that a
rudimentary machine, differently embodied but manifesting comparable input-output
relations, undergoes human-style perceptual experience. O&N’s reply is that sameness of
perceptual experience depends on sameness in fine-grained input-output relations, which
themselves depend on being embodied in a particular way. However, they need not have
claimed that sameness of embodiment is required all the way down. The sensorimotor theory
could respond to the charge just as well by claiming that two perceivers must be embodied in a
sufficiently similar way in order to enjoy identical perceptual experiences.
If Clark’s view were merely that we should account for qualia by appealing to
coarse-grained bodily skills, it would not be inconsistent with the most indispensable
commitments of the sensorimotor theory. More seriously, however, his comments imply that
the relevant capacities may not be bodily capacities at all. The capacity to reason, certainly,
does not on the face of it appear to be a bodily skill, and nor does the capacity to plan an
action if this is taken to mean choosing an action rather than actually performing it. Clark
bases his response largely on empirical work, which he alleges shows that perceptual
consciousness is not realised by sensorimotor coupling but a process involving the deployment
of internal representations that are in large part unaffected by occurrences at the sensorimotor
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periphery.
In particular, he cites Milner and Goodale’s (1995) dual systems account of vision.
According to the dual systems model, the brain’s dorsal stream is associated with a visual
system responsible for fine-grained sensorimotor coupling but not conscious visual awareness.
Clark does not raise any objection to describing this bodily behaviour as the exercise of
sensorimotor mastery, and we can plausibly take this activity to be identical to the activity
characterised as the lowest tier of sensorimotor mastery in O’Regan’s (2011) multi-tier
sensorimotor account. The other visual system is realised primarily by activity in the ventral
stream, and is alleged by Clark to enable coarser-grained “reasoning, choice and action
selection” (Clark, 2008, p. 190), a description which is strikingly akin to the “planning,
decisions, or other rational behaviour” (O’Regan, 2011, p. 121) featured in the second of
O’Regan’s four tiers. Clark argues that ventral stream activity is not sensorimotor mastery but
involves the deployment of representations that, in line with the epistemic skill-based
approach to qualia, stand-in for attributes such as “categories, types, and relative locations” (p.
192), optimised for the exercise of epistemic skills, i.e. to enable to person to “sift, sort, select,
identify, compare, recall, imagine and reason” (p. 192).
In this vein, Clark says: “[T]he best functional and architectural explanation,
according to Milner, Goodale, and others, is that conscious perceptual experience reflects the
activation of representations that have less to do with the fine details of world-engaging
sensorimotor loops and more to do with the need to assign inputs to categories, types, and
relative locations” (p. 192). The role of representation here needs to be treated with care.
O’Regan (2011) explicitly denies that conscious states can be adequately accounted for by
reference to the ‘activation’ of representations, a locution featured in the Clark quote above,
on the ground that accounts of this sort cannot adequately explain why the conscious states in
question have one phenomenal character rather than another. Clark appears to endorse
O’Regan’s view, at least insofar as he endorses a skill-based account of phenomenal qualities
and not, for instance, an account that says phenomenal qualities are accounted for directly by
the content of the purported representations (cf., Tye, 2000). Being mindful of this, Clark’s
view ought to agree that it is not just the ‘activation’ of a representation, but the contribution
the representation thereby makes to the exercise of the relevant personal-level skillful activities
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like sorting and sifting that contributes to an explanation of phenomenal qualities. At the
subpersonal explanatory level, it is an open question how a given ventral stream representation
contributes to the exercise of personal-level skill. An explanation here may appeal to some
combination of its content, its functional role within a given system, and that system’s
functional role in the wider cognitive economy. Whichever features an endorser of this
approach appeals to, they must explain what contribution these features make to the exercise
of a personal-level ability to skillfully discriminate aspects of the visual environment.
In the discussion that follows, I will describe the account of perception and
phenomenal qualities that Clark endorses as the non-sensorimotor, skill-based approach. The
approach is framed by Clark as a chapter-long response to the sensorimotor theory rather than
a developed account of perception, but in broad terms it advocates a number of positive claims
about visual processing and the phenomenal qualities that characterise visual consciousness.
The account’s claims can be summarised as follows: (i) There are two visual systems, which
operate in the way described above; (ii) Ventral stream vision deploys representations that
represent properties like type and location rather than sensorimotor law; (iii) The ventral
stream deploys these representations in the course of enabling the exercise of skillful capacities
like sorting, sifting, classifying, selecting and others, which for shorthand I will refer to just as
sorting and sifting; (iv) The properties sorted and sifted are not sensorimotor laws, but types,
categories and locations; (v) The appeal to sorting and sifting offers, in principle, a
non-mysterious, physicalistic account of the phenomenal qualities associated with conscious
perception; (vi) Sorting and sifting are not sensorimotor skills. They are realised by
subpersonal systems which are, to a significant degree, informationally encapsulated from the
operation of the dorsal stream and motor output systems. This enables them also to be largely
insensitive to the fine-grained morphological characteristics of the agent’s body.
5.2 - The Policy of Containment: AConservative Response
Clark (2008) suggests that the sensorimotor approach to phenomenal qualities enters the
running alongside competing skill-based accounts that share the explanatory benefit gained by
appealing to skills, but lack what he regards as the undue insistence that the skills in question
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are necessarily sensorimotor. His response to the sensorimotor account in that chapter is not
primarily concerned with phenomenal qualities, however, but with the character of the
cognitive processing that realises perceptual consciousness. He argues that the empirical
evidence concerning ventral stream perception challenges the sensorimotor account by
indicating that perceptual consciousness supervenes on internal states, in particular
representations, that stand-in for categories, types and locations rather than sensorimotor
contingencies.
To respond, the sensorimotor theory could adopt an approach I will call the Policy of
Containment. The response aims to contain Clark’s criticisms by restricting the explanatory
role played by law-governed sensorimotor interactions to one domain, while asserting that the
evidential force of the empirical work Clark cites is restricted to another. Specifically, it
contends that the appeal to sensorimotor coupling is not meant to characterise cognition in
humans, but solely to account for the phenomenal qualities that feature in perceptual
consciousness. As an account of qualia, the sensorimotor approach enters one classic debate,
prompted by philosophers like Jackson (1982) and Chalmers (1996), over whether
phenomenal qualities are an intelligible part of the physical world. Assuming that phenomenal
qualities are physical, it also enters mainstream debates over what sort of physical qualities
they are, included in which is the question of which characteristics make one phenomenal
quality different from another. On this latter set of questions, the approach enters the field
alongside the accounts offered, for example, by Tye (2000), who proposes that phenomenal
qualities reduce to representational content; Block (1996), who suggests they reduce to some
non-representational neural property; and Pettit (2003), who, in common with sensorimotor
theory, offers a skill-based account.
It is important to emphasise that it is not obvious, pretheoretically at least, that an
account can address the above topics simultaneous to characterising the cognitive processing
that underlies perceptual consciousness. Tye addresses cognition and phenomenal qualities at
once, since he proposes that phenomenal qualities are individuated and reduced to the
physical by reference to the content of neurally-realised representations, and thereby overtly
commits himself to the existence of internal representations in cognition. Clark’s account also
appears to suggest that there is a one-to-one mapping between the properties represented
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subpersonally by the ventral stream and the properties skillfully discriminated in conscious
perception. Despite this apparent mapping, however, Clark appeals to quite different things
respectively to explain phenomenal qualities and cognition. In the former case, it is the
exercise of personal-level skills; in the latter, the activation of representations. In this respect,
Clark’s account is quite different to Tye’s.
On the gloss endorsed by the Policy of Containment, the sensorimotor theory is open
to endorsing an account of cognition along the lines of the one advocated by Clark (2008), in
particular the claim that visual consciousness is realised by representations that stand in for
categories and types. In this respect, the theory endorses a traditional representational
approach, although it emphasises that cognitive processing is importantly scaffolded by bodily
exploration, a claim which does not conflict with Clark’s characterisation of ventral stream
vision. To account for phenomenal qualities, however, the sensorimotor theory suggests that
we need only focus on regularities in the agent’s skill-driven sensorimotor coupling, avoiding
altogether the more opaque territory of the brain. On this reading, the theory can be regarded
as a kind of sui generis hybrid between traditional and radically embodied accounts of mind.
The success of this approach depends on showing that there is no incompatibility between its
respective accounts of phenomenal qualities and cognitive processing, and, additionally, that
there are positive reasons to endorse its account of phenomenal qualities. I address these
considerations in turn in the next sections.
5.3 - AChallenge to the Policy of Containment
The dual visual systems account offers one lens through which to understand O’Regan’s
(2011) claim that conscious perception involves a second-order tracking of the regularities
manifest in the perceiver’s sensorimotor coupling. We can plausibly suppose that the
second-order tracking O’Regan describes is carried out by the ventral stream, which, as Clark
contends, fails to play a consistently fluid role in the perceiver’s ongoing sensorimotor
engagements. The object of the tracking is the bodily coupling that comprises the lowest of
O’Regan’s hierarchically-organised tiers, and this is plausibly modulated by the dorsal stream.
Although Noë (2004) fails to say much about perception at the descriptive level employed by
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cognitive science, the conscious sensorimotor understanding featured in his account could
itself conceivably be the outcome of the same second-order tracking. The Policy of
Containment endorses this picture, but proposes that phenomenal qualities are accounted for
by the sensorimotor coupling rather than the second-order tracking.
Notwithstanding its explanatory virtues, this account of phenomenal qualities may
fail to persuade if it is not tightly integrated into the sensorimotor account of visual processing.
In the next two sections, I examine different versions of the same problem and suggest ways
the sensorimotor approach can respond. The drawbacks all follow from the apparent role
played by the second-order tracking. As I observed in chapters 3 and 4, the variety of
sensorimotor mastery deployed in conscious perception - either Sensorimotor Tracking or
Sensorimotor Understanding - is not fully developed by the original statements of the
sensorimotor theory. The authors explain what the mastery is mastery of, namely SMCs, and
claim that it is practical and not propositional (O&N; Noë, 2004). Noë (2004; 2012) also
discusses its phenomenology at length. However, neither Noë nor O’Regan offer a clear
proposal about how this sensorimotor mastery is realised at the descriptive levels employed by
cognitive science or neuroscience. The absence of an explicit proposal about how
sensorimotor mastery is physically realised is problematic. Firstly, it entails, straightforwardly,
an explanatory limitation: the sensorimotor approach, on the present understanding, comes
with no clear naturalistic account of what it is for perceivers to be intentionally-directed
toward the objects of conscious perception. Moreover, it invites the view that the
sensorimotor account must appeal to internal representation, a reading endorsed by
commentators such as Roberts (2010) and Hutto and Myin (2012). From this, all sorts of
question follow about the nature of the representations and the explanatory work that they
properly do.
5.3.1 - TheWAYproblem
The suggestion that perception involves representation invites a broad threat to the Policy of
Containment, namely the charge that perceptual consciousness, in particular the phenomenal
qualities that characterise it, must be accounted for not by the law-like patterns of dependence
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that govern the perceiver’s sensorimotor engagements, but by properties of the representations
themselves. In dialogue with O’Regan, Block makes the following point:
In having a cognitive appreciation of a law involving inputs and outputs, one has to think of or
represent those inputs and outputs in some WAY. A machine or a creature from outer space
might be able to think of human inputs and outputs in WAYS that do not involve any conscious
experience. Alternatively, the WAY might itself be phenomenal—say if our cognitive
appreciation is coded in imagery. Given that cognition cannot grasp anything without grasping it
in some WAY, the appeal to COGNIZING in explaining sensory qualities smuggles in the very
notion that is supposed to be explained. (O’Regan and Block, 2012)
This is a fairly broad point, from which we might identify various specific problems. I will
discuss two of them in the remainder of this passage, and a third in the section that follows.
One of Block’s complaints is that there are ways of representing sensorimotor
contingencies that do not involve consciousness, meaning that an appeal to nothing more
than the representation of sensorimotor contingencies cannot be sufficient to account for the
existence of consciousness. This is a limitation that the sensorimotor theory can and should
accept, given that certain other conditions must be in place for an agent to be conscious at all.
O’Regan (2011) asserts that consciousness requires the functional realisation of a faculty
described as the self, while Noë (2004) expresses sympathy toward the view that consciousness
is connected somehow to life; and there may be distinct proposals about consciousness that
are equally compatible with the sensorimotor approach. While offering some such
background conditions for perceptual awareness is no small task, it is not obvious that an
account of perception and the phenomenal character of perceptual consciousness is
committed to offering a fully-developed answer to this broader question. With the
assumption that appropriate background conditions are in place, the sensorimotor theorist
can claim not just that sensorimotor contingencies explain differences and similarities in
phenomenal quality, but, more fundamentally, that it is by virtue of representations of
sensorimotor contingencies that there are, in general, such things as phenomenal qualities at
all.
More seriously, Block’s objection suggests that once you have accounted for the
presence of conscious qualities by appeal to the representation of some feature, the
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explanatory weight is borne by some property of the representation other than what it
represents - making any proposal about the particular properties represented a dispensable
feature of the account. To assume this suggestion is correct without further argument would
be a prejudice. Developing the criticism, if it is not the representation’s extension that does the
explanatory work, it might be an intrinsic property of the neural vehicle that could inhere
even if that vehicle lacked other properties, in particular extrinsic ones, by virtue of which it
bears representational content.
Block pursues this line of argument elsewhere in an argument against
representationalism about phenomenal qualities. In a thought experiment similar to
Davidson’s Swampman (1987), Block (1998) imagines that an atom-for-atom duplicate of
himself appears, by pure chance, which lacks the causal history needed to possess
content-bearing inner states. The duplicate nonetheless undergoes the same phenomenal
states, suggesting it cannot be content that yields the phenomenal state. Transposing this
objection to the sensorimotor theory, Block imagines a neural duplicate of himself that lacks
the relevant ongoing or historical sensorimotor interactions but enjoys identical phenomenal
states (O’Regan and Block, 2012). Assuming that this is possible, the scenario appears to
suggest that ongoing or historical sensorimotor interactions themselves cannot explain
phenomenal qualities, because the neural duplicate does not have them. Similarly, the neural
duplicate’s brain cannot track or represent the appropriate sensorimotor laws, again because
there are no sensorimotor interactions to track or represent.
The sensorimotor theory, on a dynamical systems approach, could respond that
duplicating the necessary neural states depends on duplicating the appropriate sensorimotor
interactions, as we saw in chapter 3. However, the present aim is to defend a more
conservative version of the sensorimotor theory that cannot make use of this argument.
Another possible response is to endorse disjunctivism, the claim that veridical perceptual
experiences are a different kind of state to non-veridical experiences like hallucinations, even if
they are phenomenologically indistinguishable. The disjunctivist response would claim that
since the duplicates’ states differ in kind, with one undergoing a perceptual state and the other
something else, we are entitled to provide a distinct explanation for each. This response may
fail to convince, however, on the ground that the sensorimotor account of phenomenal
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qualities is not meant to explain perception itself, but the phenomenal character common to
both the perceptual and the non-perceptual states.
It is perhaps for this reason that O’Regan endorses a different kind of response. He
replies that the neural duplicates share a pertinent feature, but, contra Block, that this is not
some set of intrinsic neural properties. The pertinent feature is, instead, the fact that the
duplicates’ brains are each in the state they would ordinarily be in if they possessed the
relevant ongoing or historical sensorimotor interactions (O’Regan and Block, 2012). This line
of response is insufficient to defend the radical claim that the vehicle of perceptual
consciousness extends into the outside environment - notably, it is less robust than the
argument offered by Hurley (1998) for ECM, which I discussed in section 3.6. But O’Regan’s
argument is itself sufficient to defend the claim that a proper explanation of conscious
qualities must make reference to features of the outside environment.
5.3.2 - Sense and Sensorimotor Contingencies
On a more interesting reading of the WAY objection, phenomenal qualities are not explained
by the extension of the representations, but their intensional content, which the empirical
work on the ventral stream perception perhaps suggests is likely not to represent the relevant
properties as laws of sensorimotor contingency. In this section, with special attention to Tye
(2000), I will respond to this worry.
The clearest way to explain the distinction between intension and extension is by
reference to the appearance it makes in theories of linguistic meaning. In the standard Fregean
example, the terms ‘morning star’ and ‘evening star’ share an extension, because they both pick
out Venus. However, when we first learn that they pick out the same thing, we learn
something new. This is explained by the fact that they differ in intension, an attribute of
meaning sometimes described as a mode of presentation. A term’s intension is often
understood to be a set of truth conditions, although the intension could also be some other
feature that meets the requirement of explaining how statements of identity between
co-referential terms can be informative. The distinction between intension and extension can
also be applied to non-linguistic forms of representation, including internal representation at
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the explanatory level employed by cognitive science.
An opponent of the sensorimotor theory might concede that for every difference in
phenomenal quality there is a corresponding difference in the pattern of sensorimotor
dependence governing your bodily interactions with the object perceived. In so far as this
holds true, they might say, phenomenal qualities can be individuated by reference to
sensorimotor laws. Nonetheless, the objection continues, it is merely incidental that
differences in look are accompanied by differences in sensorimotor dependence. The feature
that truly explains a tomato’s looking red rather than blue, for instance, is not this
unextraordinary feature of the extension, but the intension under which the tomato is
represented. The intension may not specify that you stand in a particular relation of
sensorimotor dependence to the tomato, but instead that you are looking at an object with a
particular set of intrinsic properties, or that you are looking at some object which falls under
the descriptor ‘red’. To secure an absolute victory over the sensorimotor account, an endorser
of this line of response must show that the ventral stream, for instance, represents objects
under intensions that determinately do not specify patterns of sensorimotor dependence.
The force of this objection will depend on further technical details about the
representational content featured in our account of visual consciousness. As it happens, there
is at least one leading representationalist account of phenomenal quality pre-existing the
sensorimotor account under which intension poses no threat to sensorimotor theory.
Although the account offered by Tye (2000) is superficially quite different from the
sensorimotor theory, the variety of representational content he endorses makes a good fit, as it
will emerge, with the account of phenomenal qualities offered by the particular reading of
sensorimotor theory I am pursuing for the time being. In the remainder of this section, I will
focus on Tye’s account in order to explain how it defuses the threat posed by intension to the
sensorimotor account.
The accounts offered by Clark (2008) and Tye resemble each other inasmuch as they
both endorse an important role for internal representation in accounting for cognition and
phenomenal character. Tye, however, is not directly interested in the details of human
cognition, but in using representational content to account for the latter. Where Clark argues
that representations enable the exercise of epistemic skills, which themselves account for
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phenomenal character, Tye accounts for phenomenal character directly by appeal to the
content of the representations. In the apparent converse of Clark’s position, Tye ascribes an
enabling role to epistemic skills, suggesting that to feature in perceptual consciousness, the
representational content must be poised to impact on beliefs and desires. These positions
appear to come apart quite considerably, although I will argue later that Clark’s account lapses
into something close to Tye’s than appearances at first suggest.
Tye’s account of representational content is in some ways straightforward. His
account of content appeals to no more than a simple co-variance relation between aspects of
the brain and environment. He suggests that a neural structure bears content about some
feature of the environment just in case it is ordinarily present when and only when that
feature of the environment is present. Content in Tye’s account is individuated
externalistically. To understand this point, recall from earlier Putnam’s (1975) classic
distinction between internalism and externalism about content. The former denotes that
content is fixed entirely by features inside the subject’s skin. The latter denotes that it is fixed
by properties of the extension. To identify which account is correct, we use a thought
experiment featuring physically identical inhabitants of superficially identical planets, Earth
and Twin Earth. On Earth, the clear liquid that comes up of taps, fills lakes, and so forth, is
H2O. Twin Earth is identical in every respect, except the substance bearing the same
superficial features is a different chemical, XYZ. If physical duplicates living respectively on
Earth and Twin Earth mean different things when they say ‘water’, then externalism is true; if
they mean the same thing, then internalism is true. And the same distinction can be applied to
subpersonal content. On Tye’s account, then, a neural state represents water if it is ordinarily
present when and only when water is present, and it represents H2O rather than XYZ on
account of the properties that water happens to actually have.
Suppose that you see a red object, and your brain represents it as falling under the
designator ‘red’. Further suppose that being confronted by a red object is the same as standing
in a bodily relation to the environment where particular patterns of sensorimotor dependence
obtain. If externalism is true, then it may follow that the representational content includes
this pattern of sensorimotor dependence. However, this suggestion will not by itself serve well
enough as a defence of the sensorimotor theory. Even if intension is determined by properties
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of the extension, externalism in itself does not require that the intension is determined by
every property of the extension. Tye is motivated to endorse intensional content in the first
place in part by the need to account for the fact that we may be aware in perceptual experience
of some properties of the extension, but not all. In his example, we might see a vegetable as
purple, but not see it as poisonous, even in a possible world where all purple things are
poisonous. Intension is needed to account for this, since if all purple things were poisonous,
the expressions ‘purple object’ and ‘poisonous object’ would be coextensive.
To see how the sensorimotor account can be defended, we need to look further at
Tye’s account. Tye endorses a distinction between phenomenal and epistemic uses of the
word ‘looks’. He argues that the distinction is in evidence in everyday discourse about
perceptual states when we talk, at times, about an object ‘looking F to S’ and, at other times,
about an object ‘looking as if it is an F to S’. The former locution describes the phenomenal
character of a person’s perceptual awareness, while the latter describes the person’s epistemic
state. On this account, to say something like ‘the shape looks as if it is a trapezoid to Jim’
implies that Jim has the concept TRAPEZOID, and believes the object he is looking at falls
under that concept. Tye implies that this is neither necessary nor sufficient for us to truly say
‘the shape looks trapezoid to Jim’, a locution which implies, distinctly, that a trapezoid shape
is part of the phenomenal character of Jim’s perceptual consciousness. Endorsing this
distinction allows Tye to suggest that when we talk about looks we are at least sometimes
talking about phenomenal character and not epistemic situation. On Tye’s account, the shape
may look, phenomenally, trapezoid to Jim even if Jim does not possess the concept
TRAPEZOID, because the phenomenal look is accounted for by the non-conceptual content
of his perceptual representations. Tye’s motivation for focusing on what we say, or are entitled
to say, about the way things look to some third person is, presumably, intended as a way to (1)
make it plausible that there is such a thing as a phenomenal look which is not to be glossed in
terms of conceptual content and (2) discuss the alleged non-conceptual content of perceptual
consciousness without attributing the concepts in question to the subject.
Tye describes epistemic ‘looks’ ascriptions as requiring hyperintensionality. Where
regular intension allows coextensional expressions to have different contents, hyperintension
allows cointensional expressions to have different contents. Hyperintension is needed on the
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ground that two terms have the same intension so long as they have the same extension by
metaphysical or logical necessity. Thus ‘H2O’ and ‘water’ share an intension, as do ‘552’ and
‘3025’. These cases are different to the ‘morning star’ and ‘evening star’ case, since the shared
extensions must be shared in every possible world, while there is a possible world in which
‘morning star’ and ‘evening star’ have the intensions they do on this world but are not
coextensional, entailing that you are finding out something particular about our world when
you learn that they share an identity. The same applies to ‘purple object’ and ‘poisonous
object’ in Tye’s possible world. Nothing turns on whether or not cases where hyperintension
is allegedly required cannot, in fact, more accurately be described as instances requiring a
variety of plain old intension. It will suffice if we agree that the supposed
hyperintension-involving cases are, at least, a distinctive subset of cases involving intension,
and I will therefore describe them as involving ‘hyperintension’ to designate that they belong
at a minimum to this special subset, and use ‘intension’ to describe cases that do not fall under
this subset.
Tye argues that the representational content that accounts for phenomenal character
is nonconceptual. This reflects the distinction about what we mean in epistemic and
phenomenal ‘looks’ contexts. Crediting Dretske for the example, Tye offers a case in which
you see a man in a police uniform, but fail to recognise that he is a policeman. Nothing is
strange, Tye observes, about the contention that the man could nonetheless be truly said to
look phenomenally to you the way a policeman looks. This lends apparent support to the
claim that epistemic and phenomenal looks attributions come apart, and suggests that in the
phenomenal case, you need not possess the concept POLICEMAN. If it is indeed appropriate
to explain phenomenal look by reference to representational content, then the content in
question must therefore be nonconceptual.
Importantly, Tye takes it that the nonconceptual content of perceptual experience
cannot be hyperintensional. His argument, which he puts briefly, is that this follows from the
fact that hyperintension depends on having “conceptual modes of presentation” (2000, p. 57)
which are lacking in the case of nonconceptual content. It is not straightforwardly evident
from Tye’s discussion why hyperintensional content must be conceptual, but the milder kind
of intension that Tye holds is characteristic of nonconceptual content need not be. However,
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the view is compelling in light of the following thought, which is perhaps what he has in mind.
In the scenario mentioned above, PURPLE OBJECT and POISONOUS OBJECT are
co-extensive, because on Earth it just so happens that all purple objects are poisonous, and all
poisonous objects are purple. Since the concepts are co-extensive, we cannot identify any
physical differences in the way a subject responds to a poisonous object and the way they
respond to a purple object. However, we can conceive of a counterfactual circumstance in
which the concepts are not co-extensive, and hypothesise that the subject’s brain would
continue to respond in the relevant way to purple objects that were not poisonous, while
failing to respond in the relevant way to poisonous objects that were not purple. The
intension is then fixed by the aspect of the extension that the subject’s brain reliably responds
to, not just now, but in other physically possible circumstances. We cannot, however, make
the same move for cases in which the identity is logically or metaphysically necessary, as with
water and H2O, since it is not coherent to hypothesise about how a subject would respond to
H2O that was not water, a scenario that is impossible and perhaps even inconceivable. In the
absence of any other readily apparent options for locating hyperintensional nonconceptual
content, the only means available to master hyperintensional ‘H2O’ and ‘water’ modes of
presentation appears to be by using concepts.
Tye notes therefore that on his account, an object’s looking phenomenally red is
identical to its looking like an object characterised by the physical properties which constitute
being red; as Tye supposes, looking “disposed to reflect such-and-such percentages of light of
so-and-so wavelengths” (2000, p. 55). This makes Tye’s representationalism quite compatible
with the sensorimotor theory’s present gloss. On this view, we can take it that second-order
tracking of sensorimotor laws involves the activation of representations of the sort described
by Tye. In supplement, we merely add that the physical properties represented are not
dispositions to reflect such-and-such percentages of light, but patterns of sensorimotor
contingency. Importantly, it makes no difference that the sensorimotor laws represented may
be more coarse-grained than those discriminated in dorsal stream vision. The sensorimotor
account of phenomenal qualities has several important virtues in comparison to Tye’s
suggestion about the physical properties that underlie colour. Being ‘disposed to reflect
such-and-such percentages of light’ implies that the object activates this disposition when
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certain conditions external to the object itself obtain. As such, the disposition is a relational
rather than intrinsic property. But Tye’s suggestion, which he would of course point out is not
intended as a developed proposal, gives no indication of what the other relata is. Sensorimotor
theory does offer a proposal on this score, suggesting that the relevant relations are those in
which the object stands with ambient lighting conditions and with the agent’s body. As a
consequence, sensorimotor theory is able to give a better-developed and therefore more
principled account of why particular physical states are associated with particular phenomenal
qualities, including, crucially, the degrees of similarity and difference between phenomenal
qualities. On this basis, there is good reason for an endorser of Tye-style representationalism
to adopt the sensorimotor account of phenomenal qualities.
On the present view, the sensorimotor theory emerges as a hybrid of skill-based and
representationalist approaches to qualia. The above discussion has shown we can claim,
without contradiction, that sensorimotor skill does the main explanatory work in accounting
for conscious feel, even though representation is a necessary condition, along with other
enabling conditions, for being in states characterised by the relevant phenomenal qualities. On
this proposal, the ventral stream plausibly groups together fine-grained patterns of
sensorimotor dependence under representations of coarser-grained categories and types,
which it deploys for the purposes both Clark and O’Regan recommend. Since the
representations lack the strong kind of intension required to represent the relevant features,
determinately, as categories and types and not patterns of sensorimotor dependence, the
option remains to individuate the associated phenomenal qualities by reference to
sensorimotor law. I have shown in brief that the sensorimotor account, on the present
understanding, brings explanatory benefits as an addendum to Tye’s representationalism, and
another such benefit will become evident in the next section when I discuss the Inverted Earth
thought experiment. Returning to the central focus of this chapter, it remains necessary to
show that the sensorimotor account is not just coherent but actively compelling when
considered alongside the alternative, non-sensorimotor, skill-based approach.
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5.4 -Mary and Inverted Earth: A Sensorimotor Response
The above discussion has illustrated that we could quite consistently hold that perceptual
experience is realised by the deployment of representations which themselves are not
intimately involved with bodily movement, while also holding that the phenomenal character
of the experience so-realised is best explained by the sensorimotor laws that govern the
perceiver’s bodily interactions. Nonetheless, it may seem more natural to suppose that
phenomenal character is accounted for by the personal-level skills the representations enable -
as Clark (2008) argues, the sorting and sifting of categories and types for the purpose of
judgement and action-planning. In this section I offer independent reasons for endorsing the
sensorimotor account of phenomenal qualities. Importantly, there is a range of conceptual
demands an account of phenomenal qualities must meet that turn on considerations
superficially distinct from the character of the representations we are supposing enable
perceptual consciousness; and it will become evident as I proceed that sensorimotor and
non-sensorimotor skill-based accounts are not equivalent in their ability to meet these
conceptual demands. Attention to some classic thought experiments will help show that there
is reason to think the sensorimotor approach to phenomenal qualities is more effective at
meeting these demands than its competitors.
Consider first the debate over the ‘inverted spectrum’ thought experiment.
Generically, inverted spectra thought experiments feature two perceivers, one whose colour
phenomenology is inverted relative to the other, but who exhibits an identical repertoire of
behaviour. Block (1990b) has used a version of the thought experiment in an attempt to
refute the view, endorsed by Tye (2000) and many others (e.g., Lycan, 1987; Dretske, 1995),
that phenomenal qualities reduce to representational content. Block and his opponents share
the background assumptions that phenomenal qualities are physical, and that there is no
deep-seated conceptual obstacle to accounting for representational content in physicalistic
language either. Block imagines a planet which is identical in all respects to our own apart
from the fact that the colours of objects are complementary to the colour they possess on
Earth, meaning the sky is orange, the grass red, and so forth. The inhabitants of Inverted Earth
correctly describe the sky as ‘blue’, and the grass as ‘green’, since the meanings of those words
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on Inverted Earth differ appropriately from their meanings on Earth. Block asks us to imagine
that we put on a pair of colour-inverting glasses and travel to Inverted Earth. The inverting
effect of the glasses means that things appear phenomenally to us on Inverted Earth exactly as
they do on Earth without the glasses. Yet, at least on externalist accounts of representational
content, the content our experiences possess must now differ in line with the differing
properties of the objects we are now in causal contact with. This appears to show that
phenomenal qualities cannot be adequately accounted for by representational content, at least
so long as the content is individuated externalistically.
The sensorimotor approach (on the present gloss) agrees with the representationalists
that phenomenal qualities are necessarily individuated by properties represented when we
perceive. However, sensorimotor theory avoids the threat that the Inverted Earth case poses to
this view, since it is not committed to the suggestion that the intrinsic properties of the
objects we come into perceptual contact with could not vary while phenomenal character
stays the same. The approach instead holds that phenomenal character will stay the same
between Earth and Inverted Earth so long as the relevant patterns of dependence between
motor output and sense input are preserved. If this is correct, the inverting goggles could only
do the job they are supposed to do if they somehow preserve the patterns of output-input
dependence that obtain on Earth. In this event, the phenomenal character of your experience
on Inverted Earth is explained, amongst other things, by properties of the objects perceived
and properties of the goggles (although, as Myin, 2001, points out, inverting goggles that
preserve the relevant patterns of sensorimotor dependence may be a physical impossibility).
Suppose that objects with intrinsic property X are, in every possible world,
co-extensional with objects with which a perceiver embodied in a particular way stands in
sensorimotor relation S. This means that a neural representation, lacking hyperintension, does
not represent only X or only S, but represents both simultaneously. On Inverted Earth, the
equivalent object has intrinsic property Y instead of X. Because you are wearing appropriate
goggles, neural implants, etc., you stand in sensorimotor relation S2 to the object. S2 is, in one
respect, non-identical to S, because it is realised in part by an object with different intrinsic
properties. However, S and S2 correspond isomorphically in a way that X and Y do not,
entailing that there is a level of description at which S and S2 are identical. On Inverted Earth,
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there is no way to specify determinately whether the neural representation bears content
about Y or S2. However, by appealing to the resemblance between S and S2, we can explain
why the phenomenology is preserved in spite of the difference in representational content.
This response gives a representationalist like Tye further reason to incorporate the insights
provided by the sensorimotor account.
The non-sensorimotor skill-based approach offers a different kind of response to the
Inverted Earth case. The approach has no need in the first place to insist that phenomenal
qualities are individuated by properties of the objects we perceive. All that matters is that, for
whatever reason - whether because of the goggles, or some property of the environment - we
are able to make a suitable range of discriminations, which do not merely involve judgements
that one property is nonidentical to another, but graded judgements about similarity and
difference along various scales, for example hue, saturation and brightness. So far, both
skill-based accounts offer in principle an equal improvement on representationalism about
qualia, although I have established so far that they are not equivalent, since the sensorimotor
account appeals, in part, to properties of the outside environment, while the
non-sensorimotor skill-based account does not obviously do so.
Consider now a debate concerning the more general question of whether phenomenal
qualities are physical at all, and the vivid challenge posed to physicalism by Jackson’s Mary’s
room thought experiment. To recap, the story features Mary, a vision researcher, who is
locked in an entirely black and white room and never comes into direct visual contact with
any coloured objects. Via black and white TV screens, Mary studies vision science and comes
to know every fact that there is to be known about the physical world. Yet when she is finally
released from the room, and shown a red rose, Mary, it is alleged, learns a new fact; namely,
what it is like to see something red. Since Mary, by hypothesis, already knows every physical
fact, Jackson concludes that she learns a non-physical fact, and hence that physicalism about
qualia is false (Jackson, 1982). The sensorimotor theory does not come with an entirely
prefabricated response to the Mary scenario, but it does invite certain lines of response, and
precludes others. The theory says that the look of red can be characterised by reference to a
bodily relation the perceiver stands in to the world, which is itself a physical relation, meaning
the theory is committed to arguing somehow that phenomenal qualities are physical.
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More importantly, the theory is independently committed to the view that to stand in
this relation is to possess and deploy a certain kind of skill or practical knowledge. With this in
view, it is natural for it to endorse the suggestion (see, Lewis, 1983) that to ‘know what it is
like to see red’ is to possess a kind of practical rather than propositional knowledge. Mary’s
new knowledge, in this light, plausibly consists of the ability to deploy, at will, the same
sensorimotor mastery she deploys to perceive a red object even on occasions where there is no
red object present. This is an act of the imagination, and involves naturally extending the
sensorimotor theory to encompass imagination in addition to perception. The sensorimotor
account is able to make better use of the appeal to practical knowledge to account for the
Mary case than accounts appealing to practical knowledge in a more ad hoc way, because the
theory makes use of practical knowledge to account for perception anyway.
This response gives the sensorimotor account an advantage over the
non-sensorimotor skill-based account. In line with Clark’s proposal, that account is
committed to the suggestion that seeing something phenomenally as red consists in nothing
more or less than having the ability to judge that it is red, or plan one’s actions with sensitivity
to the fact that it is red. Mary, locked in the room, possesses all the propositional knowledge
about physical facts there is to be possessed. If deploying this propositional knowledge in
thought depends on possessing practical knowledge, as Ryle (1949) contended, there is no
reason to think she lacks this ability. With this in mind, she can discriminate in judgement the
same range of properties before leaving the room as she can after leaving it. If the epistemic
skill theorist thinks it is the capacity to make propositionally-structured judgements that
makes the difference, they are committed to the view that Mary knows what it is like to see
red before leaving the room, a position endorsed by Dennett (1991), but which would, at best,
add a substantial and perhaps unpalatable additional commitment to the epistemic skill-based
approach.
The non-sensorimotor skill theorist could instead suggest that the capacities involved
in ventral stream perception involve neither the deployment of propositional knowledge nor
the exercise of fine-grained sensorimotor skill, but a different kind of practical skill. Ward
(2009), for instance, suggests that the skill in question is the planning of agential action. If this
amounts only to an appeal to coarse-grained rather than fine-grained sensorimotor skill, this is
139
the position I argued earlier is not, as Clark suggests, incompatible with the sensorimotor
theory. Alternatively, the skill might be a capacity for something other than bodily movement
or conceptual thought. It is not self-evident what we should take this capacity to be. The most
obvious possibility is that it is a capacity for nonconceptual thought. In line with the
understanding of nonconceptual content endorsed, for instance, by Tye (2000), a thought of
this kind is a conscious state featuring content only characterisable by concepts that the
subject does not possess.
However, the appeal to personal-level nonconceptual content is baseless unless some
independent considerations make it plausible and intelligible that we actually undergo states
of this kind. We cannot make the existence of such states intelligible by appeal to visual
phenomenology, as this would be circular: we are trying to make the visual phenomenology
intelligible by appeal to the content. The only remaining option is to appeal to the
subpersonal content borne by representations realised by the ventral stream or another part of
the brain. To explain what it is for a person to experience one patch of red as darker than
another, for instance, the present approach would have to say that the person’s ventral stream
represents it as darker. Notice that the epistemic skill-based account amounts, on this
proposal, to nothing more than representationalism in a different guise. Lacking the
modification that sensorimotor theory makes on its present representationalist construal, this
threatens a return to the Inverted Earth problem, namely the possibility that the
discriminations you make could vary while your experience’s phenomenal character remains
the same.
5.5 - Relation toRupert's 'Massively Representational Mind'
On its present gloss, the sensorimotor account endorses something similar to Rupert’s (2011)
notion of internal-externalist content. Typically, representational stories pitched at a
subpersonal explanatory level propose that the brain traffics in representations which stand-in
purely for outer features of the subject’s environment. This holds true in the account offered
by Tye (2000), and could correctly characterise Clark’s (2008) claim that the ventral stream
represents types, categories and locations. Rupert’s relatively novel suggestion is that parts of
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the brain frequently represent other parts of the brain, and parts of the extra-neural body. In
one sense, this content is internalistically individuated, since it is individuated only by features
inside the skin of the subject. In a more interesting sense, however, the content is
externalistically individuated, because it is fixed entirely by properties of the extension and not
by properties internal to the neural state that does the representing. As presently construed,
the sensorimotor account suggests something similar. The contents borne by representations
in the ventral stream are fixed entirely by properties of the extension. The extension, in this
case, is not an external feature but a pattern of dependence governing the perceiver’s bodily
interaction with the environment. This is not, as with Rupert’s internal-externalist content, a
purely inner state, but is not wholly external either. Instead it is a relational property that
holds between the perceiver and their environment. As I explained in the last section, one
benefit of adopting this claim is its ability to overcome the Inverted Earth problem.
It is worth looking in more detail at Rupert’s model, the ‘massively representational
mind’, and considering its implications for the sensorimotor account. Rupert offers a very
austere account of representation and content, suggesting that X represents Y in the event
that it reliably co-occurs with Y. X here is some neural state, and Y is a feature of the outside
environment, body or brain. Where the thing represented is another part of the brain, it may
be the neural state itself, or it may be the content carried by that neural state. Content is in
every case individuated solely by the properties of its extension. Moreover, bearing content is
sufficient on Rupert’s model for constituting a representation. Rupert makes no demand that
the contents fulfil, for example, any particular functional role. In offering such a liberal
account of ‘representation’, Rupert finds that there are representations everywhere; the brain
is massively representational. One important feature of the model is that the brain employs a
great deal of ‘redundant’ content, which is content borne at once by multiple representations.
He addresses the dual visual systems to illustrate this feature, arguing that the systems carry
some content in common, albeit using different representational formats and in the service of
performing distinct functions. Rupert does not claim that the ventral stream bears
internal-externalist content; he merely suggests that the ventral and dorsal streams each
represent the same features of the subject’s external environment. However, it is worth
considering the dual visual systems in light of Rupert’s internal-externalist content and some
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of Clark’s claims.
One observation Clark makes is that the ventral stream is indeed sensitive to efferent
copy from motor output regions in addition to sense input, suggesting it is sensitive to the
relation between motor output and sense input, i.e. the patterns of dependence appealed to by
the sensorimotor account. His argument, however, is that the ventral stream is sensitive to
motor output states only during learning phases, when it is acquiring new information about
the significance of various kinds of sense input. In the normal course of perception, however,
he claims that the ventral stream is sensitive only to sense inputs. The representations it
constructs in the course of ordinary perception are, meanwhile, insensitive to fine-grained
patterns of sensorimotor dependence. Clark’s opposition here depends on what he describes
as “the best functional and architectural explanation” (2008, p. 192) for the available evidence.
This is important. The fact that the ventral stream is insensitive to fine-grained differences in
sensorimotor law does not mean that it is insensitive to sensorimotor laws. Moreover, the
distinction between learning and ongoing sensitivity is only important if we focus on neural
architecture. Focusing only on content, where we take this to be explained by co-variance,
there is no theoretical difference between a case where the ventral stream co-varies with
particular sensorimotor laws because it is responding in part to efferent copy from the motor
areas, and a case where it co-varies with sensorimotor laws even though it is responding
directly to sense inputs alone.
We could, on Rupert’s model, propose that the ventral stream groups the fine-grained
patterns of sensorimotor dependence governing dorsal stream activity into coarser-grained
representations corresponding to types, categories and relative locations - thereby altering the
representational format - and puts them to use for reasoning and action planning. Despite this
difference in format and function, the ventral stream represents or borrows content from the
dorsal stream. This proposal therefore assigns to the dorsal stream an explanatory role in
individuating the content borne by ventral stream representations, even if it is ventral stream
representations that serve as the primary vehicles of visual consciousness. If the content by
itself explains phenomenal character, then activity modulated by the dorsal stream plays a
relevant role in accounting for phenomenal character. And as I argued in the previous section,
Clark’s preferred variety of skill-based account in the end depends crucially on the content
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borne by the ventral stream representations to explain which properties have been skillfully
discriminated.
Simultaneous to co-varying systematically with the operations of the dorsal stream,
the ventral stream also co-varies with categories and types present in the outside environment.
This may lead an endorser of Clark’s view to repeat the claim that the ventral stream’s
co-varying with features of the dorsal stream is merely a contingent feature, while its directly
co-varying with features of the subject’s outside environment is the pertinent co-variance
relation when specifying the content borne by ventral stream representations, and so
accounting for the acts of discriminations that explain phenomenal character. In this event,
sensorimotor contingencies play no essential role. But nothing in co-variance based accounts
of content, like Rupert’s, shows that the content of ventral stream representations are not
sensorimotor contingencies. The claim that sensorimotor contingencies are the contents is
certainly not arbitrary or unmotivated, either, considering that, as Clark appears to allow, the
dorsal stream is appropriately described as enabling the perceiver to exercise skillful mastery of
sensorimotor laws, and further that the ventral stream, at least during learning phases, does
not just happen to co-vary with these patterns but is directly responsive to both to sense input
and efferent copy.
It is therefore possible, at least, to characterise ventral stream content as patterns of
sensorimotor contingency. There is at least some positive reason to do so in light of the need
to offer a coherent account of phenomenal qualities, which may appeal to different features
than any accompanying account of cognition. The ability of the sensorimotor model to
respond adequately to the Inverted Earth problem makes the sensorimotor perspective in one
respect more coherent. On Inverted Earth, the ventral stream begins to reliably co-vary with,
therefore represent, different features of the external environment, and therefore enables a
different set of epistemic discriminations, where these discriminations are held to involve
discriminating types and categories in the external environment. Yet phenomenal character
remains the same. However, the ventral stream continues to co-vary in the same way with
dorsal stream activity. This makes dorsal stream activity a better candidate for the content
borne by the ventral stream than the outside environment, at least when it comes to
explaining phenomenal qualities.
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5.6 - Chapter Conclusion
This chapter has observed that phenomenal qualities and cognition are separate topics,
comprising different sets of question and having the potential to demand distinct, or at least
partly distinct, lines of explanation. I have argued that the sensorimotor account of
phenomenal quality is not obviously opposed to a representationalist story about cognition,
and that the account comes with certain explanatory benefits when contrasted with other
available accounts of qualia. I further argued that the epistemic skill-based account of
phenomenal qualities, endorsed by Clark, collapses either into an appeal to sensorimotor skill
or into a more or less traditional representationalist story, albeit one lacking the explanatory
advantage that comes from claiming the properties so represented are patterns of
sensorimotor dependence.
Providing a watertight defence, insofar as this is possible, would require surveying
further accounts of representational content, in particular internalist accounts, and exploring
in more detail ways they can respond to issues arising in debates over phenomenal qualities, in
particular Block’s Inverted Earth case, which has been a key feature of my discussion in this
chapter. Within the scope of this chapter, I have shown, modestly, that the sensorimotor
account is not obviously misguided and has some advantages over Clark’s account as an
account of phenomenal qualities. In the next section, I offer a more robust defence. I will
continue to endorse the suggestion that the ventral stream plausibly tracks and perhaps
represents lower-level patterns of sensorimotor dependence. However, I will suggest that
conscious qualities are accounted for not by the purported contents carried by processes in the
ventral stream, but by the coarser-grained sensorimotor skills that this tracking enables.
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6 - Sorting, Sifting andOther Sensorimotor Skills
This chapter offers a more radical response on behalf of the sensorimotor theory to the
objection levelled by Clark (2008). In this chapter I will suggest that ventral stream
representations, if they exist, and whether or not they stand-in themselves for patterns of
sensorimotor dependence, enable perceptual consciousness by enabling the perceiver to
exercise varieties of sensorimotor skill, which subsume the epistemic skills appealed to by
Clark. It is the exercise of this sensorimotor skill that constitutes perception and accounts for
phenomenal character. The force of the defence will be based on the sensorimotor theory’s
ability to account for the intentional directedness and phenomenal character of visual
consciousness. This will involve subsuming a range of different skills under the heading of
sensorimotor skill, but rather than being an unwarranted instance of, as Clark puts it, the
“enactive framework wagging the empirical dog” (p. 192), I will suggest it is a soundly
motivated demand that subpersonal theories not mis-describe the relation between, on the
one hand, neural and bodily states, and on the other, the personal-level phenomenal states
they realise.
6.1 - Avoiding Zombie Intuitions
To begin, let’s consider yet another famous thought experiment. Chalmers (1996) is an
opponent of the sensorimotor and all other physicalistic approaches to phenomenal
consciousness, since he argues that phenomenal consciousness, in general, cannot be physical.
To motivate this claim, he argues that we can conceive of a world physically identical to our
own and containing creatures that are physically identical to ourselves but entirely devoid of
phenomenal consciousness. He call these creatures zombies. On the ground that we can
conceive of such a world, Chalmers claims that such a world is metaphysically possible. And if
the relevant physical states and processes could exist without the relevant phenomenal states,
then the phenomenal states cannot be identical to the physical states. We could attempt to
resist Chalmers’ argument from the outset by denying that all conceivable situations are
possible, or by denying that zombies are even conceivable. Whichever strategy we pick, it
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behooves the physicalist so far as possible to reply not just with negative claims but also with a
positive proposal about the sorts of physical states that do constitute phenomenal
consciousness. Clark (2008) is explicit that he approves of skill-based accounts because they
offer a conception of qualia in which we cannot conceive of a possible world of the sort
Chalmers describes: on a skill-based account, there is simply nothing more to undergoing a
particular phenomenal state than exercising the relevant skill.
Accounts of cognition, some of which comprise explanations of phenomenal
character, frequently advocate that certain relationships hold between entities at different
explanatory levels. For instance, they might say that representational content, at a subpersonal
explanatory level, supervenes on particular kinds of neural state. They may also, like Clark, say
that visual consciousness supervenes on the deployment of particular kinds of representation.
A supervenience relation implies that the thing doing the supervening cannot vary without
the supervenience base varying. At times, a supervenience relation might be metaphysically
necessary, meaning it holds in every possible world, or nomologically necessary, meaning it
cannot fail to hold in this world. However, there is no general obligation for a supervenience
relation to imply anything so strong. For instance, it would be informative and plausibly true
to claim that visual consciousness supervenes on ventral stream activity in presently living
humans, on the ground that visual consciousness in humans cannot vary without ventral
stream activity varying. However, it would be unjustified to claim, with confidence, that
future humans could not in principle use technological artifacts or a different brain areas to
realise the same kind of consciousness.
Accounts of phenomenal quality are also entitled, for some explanatory purposes, to
make supervenience claims without committing to their obtaining in every possible world. To
show that zombies are impossible, however, an account of qualia must offer something more
robust. At a minimum, it needs to show that a given physical property, or physically-realisable
functional property, is metaphysically sufficient for an appropriate phenomenal state to
obtain. Logically speaking, metaphysically sufficient conditions of this type are enough to
entail that there is no possible world containing zombies. However, metaphysically sufficient
conditions for phenomenal consciousness would not be enough to discount the inverse view
that that there is a possible world where phenomenal consciousness exists without any
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attendant physical state. There is also the question of how to convince present day dualists
subscribing to the zombie intuition that a given set of conditions is indeed metaphysically
sufficient for phenomenal consciousness, considering we cannot travel to other possible
worlds to find out. To offer a convincing reply to dualists, we must make it convincing that
the physical states under consideration are not just sufficient for, but identical to, the
appropriate phenomenal states. This will make it inconceivable that possible worlds exist
where the physical states in question are not metaphysically sufficient.
One view is that psycho-physical identities require metaphysically necessary as well as
sufficient physical states. To identify metaphysically necessary conditions, we must, of course,
be indifferent to facts that are merely contingent. Assuming, for example, that the ventral
stream itself only plays a contingent role in realising the cognitive processing that underlies
visual consciousness, the metaphysically necessary conditions will not include having a ventral
stream. An endorser of a Clark-style position would claim, more plausibly, that
physically-realisable functions are what count. Thus, human-style visual consciousness
depends by metaphysical necessity on representations carrying out the functional roles
performed in this world by the ventral stream. These include playing an appropriate
functional role in the wider cognitive economy, and bearing content that is systematically
insensitive to occurrences at the sensorimotor periphery. If Clark were indeed arguing that
these states are metaphysically necessary for visual consciousness of the sort undergone by
human perceivers, he would be making a strikingly strong commitment. On this basis, he
would have to claim that a subject undergoing the same functionally-defined inner activity but
altogether lacking the capacity to integrate this activity with skillful behaviour will still
experience all or most of the same visual states we do. He would also have to claim that a
subject lacking the functionally-defined inner states we possess, but reliably manifesting an
identical repertoire of skillful bodily behaviour, necessarily lacks the kind of visual
consciousness we enjoy. These claims might be correct, but they go significantly beyond claims
that can be straightforwardly justified by attending to the workings of the ventral stream.
To make the sensorimotor approach a more compelling alternative, we must be
careful how we frame it. The approach would be committing itself to something considerably
less palatable than the above proposal if it claimed that bodily activity is sufficient for visual
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consciousness even in a metaphysically possible world where the perceiver lacks a brain. It
would not be compelling, either, to insist that bodily activity or activity in motor areas of the
brain are necessary for visual consciousness in every possible world. What the sensorimotor
approach ought to say, instead, is that the metaphysically necessary and sufficient condition
for having visual consciousness characterised by the appropriate phenomenal qualities is the
deployment of inner states that make an intelligible contribution to enabling appropriate
bidirectional patterns of systematic dependence between sense inputs and motor outputs.
Nothing in Clark’s (2008) critique demonstrates that ventral stream activity could not be
made intelligible this way. If successful, the present approach falls short of establishing the
strong claim that the extra-neural body and environment play a metaphysically necessary role
in realising perceptual consciousness. But, crucially, it offers a way to resist Clark’s claim that
the skills which constitute visual consciousness are not sensorimotor skills. The present
picture has the advantage of allowing that perception could be sensorimotor, while the
Clark-style position must actively deny that a creature lacking the right internal states could
undergo the kind of visual consciousness humans do, even if they possess the appropriate
sensorimotor skills
If there is a need to choose whether sensorimotor or non-sensorimotor skills are more
plausible candidates as metaphysically necessary conditions for perceptual consciousness, the
sensorimotor account thence has an advantage. However, Clark could reject the need to make
this choice. Instead, he might claim that we should endorse pluralism about the skills that
comprise the metaphysically necessary conditions. On this understanding, the skills we must
appeal to in order to dissolve the zombie intuition are neither sensorimotor nor
non-sensorimotor, but non-specific capacities to make the appropriate discriminations. The
pluralistic perspective entails that the generic skills in question could in principle be
constituted, in different cases, by quite different capacities. In this light, Clark’s objection to
the sensorimotor account can be taken as targeting the claim that the skills in question are
constituted by sensorimotor skills in this world. This returns the advantage to Clark.
However, certain considerations blunt the force of this response. It is an open
question whether sensorimotor and non-sensorimotor skills belong to one broad kind. The
capacity to make skillful bodily movements and the capacity to represent types, categories and
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locations are, on the face of it, quite different kinds of capacity. The only thing they
necessarily have in common is that they involve responses that co-vary systematically with
aspects of the outside environment. But lots of things exhibit this kind of sensitivity and do
not justify ascriptions of ‘skill’. A skill-based account of qualia must therefore appeal to some
further criterion. In Clark’s account, this is the content and functional role of the
representations deployed by the ventral stream, however these notions are themselves glossed.
In the sensorimotor theory, the skill is ascribed by properties of the outward behaviour, a
claim I will elaborate on in the next chapter. Once these criteria are added, there is no
guarantee that the skills appealed to respectively by sensorimotor and non-sensorimotor
skill-based accounts have any common factor that would justify our thinking of them as two
different ways the same generic skills could be constituted. In offering psycho-physical
identities, it will not do, then, to claim that skills are the metaphysically necessary conditions
for perceptual consciousness without specifying in more precise terms what sort of skill we
have in mind. As I have argued, sensorimotor skills are a more compelling candidate, since
they accommodate the possibility that perceivers lacking our functionally defined inner states
may nevertheless enjoy similar types of experience.
Adopting a different tack, we might find that psycho-physical identities fall short of
demanding metaphysical necessity. We could instead make a case that there is simply nothing
more to undergoing a given phenomenal state than exercising a particular skill on the ground
that exercising the relevant epistemic skills is, in this world alone, even in one subject alone,
constitutive of undergoing the phenomenal state. The constitution claim is less strong than
the metaphysical necessity claim, since it allows that a given experience might alternatively be
constituted of quite different things. For example, there might be nothing more to your
travelling to work today than your cycling from A to B, but tomorrow there might be nothing
more to your travelling to work than your driving from A to B. Constitution claims go beyond
mere sufficient conditions, however, by showing that there is nothing more to consciousness
than exercising the appropriate skills, in this world at least. In this light, an endorser of the
non-sensorimotor, skill-based account might accede to what we could describe as a disjunctive
account of the skills that are metaphysically necessary for visual consciousness. This resembles
the pluralistic account of skill I considered above, but rather than claiming that sensorimotor
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and non-sensorimotor skills belong to a single broader class, it simply claims that the relevant
skills could either be sensorimotor skills OR non-sensorimotor epistemic skills. This avoids
the need to claim that a possible creature possessing sensorimotor skills like ours but lacking
the relevant inner representational states could not possibly share human-style visual
experience, but allows Clark to maintain that in human perceivers, in this world, the skills are
non-sensorimotor.
This view has more promise. However, it depends on the claim that there is a genuine
disjunction in this world between sensorimotor skills and the epistemic skills apparently
enabled by the ventral stream. To show that such a disjunction obtains, Clark would have to
show that there can be a difference in epistemic skill without a difference in sensorimotor skill,
and vice versa. To prove the sensorimotor account wrong, Clark would also have to show that
phenomenal qualities vary in line with the former and not the latter. Clark (2008) does not
establish this, only demonstrating that not every difference in sensorimotor skill comes with a
difference in phenomenology, an observation the sensorimotor account can accommodate.
If the sensorimotor perspective is correct, there is a constitutive link between
perceptual consciousness and certain bodily capacities. It might prove that the bodily
capacities in question are constituted in turn by processing involving that deployment of
representations that stand in for types, categories and relative locations. But it would, in this
eventuality, be the bodily capacities themselves that rightly overcome the zombie intuition. In
the next section, I will defend the conceptual claim that the epistemic activities described by
Clark, the sorting and sifting of types and categories, in fact constitute sensorimotor skills.
6.2 - Sorting and Sifting as Sensorimotor Skills
Clark (2008) argues that if conscious perception, as realised by the ventral stream, involves
sorting and sifting of types and categories in place of the fine-grained sensorimotor behaviour
enabled by the dorsal stream, then the sensorimotor approach is thrown into significant doubt.
This only follows, however, if sorting and sifting (and the other ‘epistemic’ activities
mentioned, like classifying, selecting and choosing) are not varieties of sensorimotor activity
themselves. If they are, then it is straightforward that they draw on mastery of the laws of
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sensorimotor contingency. Clark does not explicitly address this possibility, but his rejoinder
to the sensorimotor approach implies that sorting and sifting draw purely on internal
processes, in particular the activation of internal representations, and not sensorimotor
mastery. In this section, I am going to attempt a defence of the sensorimotor approach by
showing that sorting and sifting are themselves plausibly best understood as varieties of
agent-level sensorimotor activity.
Sorting and sifting make an interesting case study, since they are paradigmatically
cognitive activities, while at the same time being, ordinarily, activities carried out through
bodily engagement with the environment. This point dovetails with the main focus of Clark’s
(2008) book, which argues that many of the cognitive processes traditionally held by cognitive
scientists to depend solely on neural activity also depend on the agent’s bodily engagements
with the outside environment. Clark claims that in some cases, the substrate of cognition
actually extends into the outside environment. In other cases, he merely claims that to
correctly understand how a subject performs a given task, we must make explanatory reference
to the subject’s embeddedness within a specific environmental niche.
A reasonably paradigmatic example of the latter, offered by Clark, concerns a
technique employed by a practised bar tender (p. 62). Each drink on the menu is served in its
own distinctively shaped glass, and as the orders come in, the bar tender places appropriate
empty glasses in a spatial sequence corresponding to the order in which the drinks are to be
served. This saves the bar tender the trouble of trying to remember which drinks are to be
served and in which order. Clark stops short in this case of claiming that the bar tender’s
manipulation of external props actually constitutes part of the subject’s cognitive processing,
but claims that the trick contributes in an important way to the bar tender’s performance of
the task, while altering the character of the cognitive tasks that must be carried out by the
subject’s brain. It does not matter too much for my present point whether the bar tender’s
interaction with their niche is supposed to itself be cognitive. It suffices to notice that the
subject, here, is performing tasks of the kind allegedly carried out by ventral stream perception
- classifying, selecting, choosing, and so forth - by means of their sensorimotor coupling with
the outside environment. It is striking that from a commonsense perspective, this is no
surprise, since in everyday language, if not the language of cognitive science, activities like
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sifting and sorting are almost always activities carried out through the bodily manipulation of
external props.
By extension from the bar tender case, it is worth entertaining the possibility that the
sorting and sifting of types, categories and locations that Clark thinks underlies perceptual
consciousness are also constituted by bodily interaction with the environment. This proposal
is not altogether outré by the standard of the dual systems model. The model describes dorsal
stream activity, which is not supposed to come with any attendant consciousness, as a kind of
‘vision’, reserving the term ‘perception’ for cases associated with conscious awareness. If the
dual systems and sensorimotor theories are agreed that there is an unconscious kind of vision
best characterised as a sensorimotor process rather than by an orthodox representational
model, then relative to accounts that reserve ‘vision’ for states or activity realised solely by the
deployment of internal representations, it is a lesser step to contend that conscious perceptual
awareness is also constituted by the exercise of sensorimotor skill.
With the above points in mind, the sorting and sifting identified with perceptual
awareness is plausibly constituted - in some cases - by successful behaviour directed at a
practical goal. For example, your sorting red from green might involve nothing more than
your appropriately pulling your car to a stop in front of a red traffic light. It would be useful,
however, to give some account of how such behaviour is actually achieved. Such an
explanation can be given in part, by reference to bodily activity directed toward an epistemic
goal, for example angling your head upward to see the traffic light. This sort of ongoing
re-alignment of bodily posture for the purpose of gathering information also plausibly
constitutes part of the process of sorting and sifting. Although perceptual consciousness does
not usually involve active manipulation, with your hands, of external props, a core analogy
with the bar tender case is maintained by virtue of the fact that the perceiver, in line with
O’Regan’s idea of the world as an outside memory, makes persistent changes to their bodily
relation with the environment in order to achieve both epistemic and practical goals. The fact
that bodily movement plays an important role in perception does not, of course, prove that
the extra-neural activity actually constitutes, rather than merely assists, the exercise of the
epistemic skills Clark talks about. However, my proposal ought to make it at least conceivable
that identifying colours, shapes, locations and so forth is best characterised by reference to a
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bodily process.
This suggestion should not be confused with the implausible thesis that perceptual
consciousness is realised by nothing more than outwardly-observable bodily behaviour. The
proposal is that activities such as sorting and sifting are constituted by sensorimotor coupling
carried out by the whole organism, drawing on both neural and non-neural activity. Where
outward activity is present, this alone is sufficient, sometimes, to constitute an act of sorting or
sifting, provided it is enabled in some intelligible way by the subject’s inner activity. To
account for discriminations made in perceptual consciousness that go beyond those which can
be individuated by outward bodily activity, including documented experiments where subjects
have had their whole bodies, including eyes, completely paralysed while enjoying a restricted
degree of perceptual awareness anyway (Whitham et al., 2011) a different story must be given.
However, these cases could be accounted for by appeal to the agent’s preparedness to make
skillful bodily movements.
It is conceivable, of course, that in order to be prepared to act, the subject must deploy
internal representations, such as forward models or action-oriented representations like the
ones endorsed by Ward, Roberts and Clark (2011). This is not necessarily a problem for the
sensorimotor theory, which on some formulations accepts that subpersonal representations
play a role. In this event, perception can still be understood constitutively as a
temporally-extended process, which, aside from exceptional circumstances, incorporates
bodily movement, which forward models help enable. This is compatible, for instance, with
O’Regan’s (1992) original presentation of the outside memory idea, which suggests that
bodily exploration is assisted by sparse representations of objects and their
egocentrically-specified location in the subject’s environment.
However, recent work on preparatory activity in the motor cortex supports the
suggestion that neural representations are not necessarily involved in preparing for behaviour.
It is agreed that neural activity takes place in the motor cortex prior to movement which helps
enable the subject to move their eyes, limbs (etc.) the appropriate distance, direction and
speed. A popular view has it that certain neurons become weakly active in preparation for a
movement, and that the movement takes place when that neural activation reaches a certain
threshold, suggesting that the preparatory activity acts as a representation of the movement
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that is about to follow (e.g., Tanji and Evarts, 1976). However, this assumption is challenged
by recent empirical work. One study recorded neural activity in monkeys prior to and during
specific reaching tasks. The study found that the preparatory activity correlated with a given
movement was quite different to the neural activity that occurred while the same movement
took place. This does not establish that there is no representation going on, but it counts
against the representational view I just described. Moreover, it is expected by a mechanistic
account, in which the preparatory activity does not represent the movements that are about to
follow, but initiates a dynamical system in which the body movements takes place
(Churchland, Cunningham, Kaufman, Ryu and Shenoy, 2010). Given that the ventral stream
has the function of enabling coarse-grained sensorimotor behaviour, it is conceivable that its
activity could also be understood as non-representational preparatory activity for embodied
acts of sorting and sifting. Moreover, this shows that perceivers could be engaging the relevant
bodily capacities even where the capacities are not manifest in outwardly observable bodily
movements.
Sorting and sifting are, in general, naturally understood as agent-level sensorimotor
activities. In the domain of conscious perception, it is tenable, at least in some cases, that
sorting and sifting are constituted by agent-level sensorimotor coupling. This ought to defuse
the suggestion that where perceptual processing involves sorting and sifting, it does not
involve sensorimotor skill. My discussion has aimed to offer some positive motivation for the
view that sorting and sifting in perception is indeed always a sensorimotor process. It remains
for the non-sensorimotor skill-based approach to show that sorting, sifting, classifying and
selecting can be explained purely by reference to what the brain does without committing a
category mistake.
6.3 - Homunculi that Sort and Sift
In the last section, I noted that sorting and sifting are, on an everyday understanding, properly
thought of as whole-agent bodily interactions with the outside environment. Clark’s (2008)
account correctly acknowledges that the skills at play in a skill-based account of qualia are
personal-level capacities, meaning they are possessed by the perceiver as a whole, not parts of
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the perceiver. It is hard, however, to imagine what the personal-level capacities are if they are
not sensorimotor skills. Clark’s account is mainly pitched at the subpersonal level, and the
only way to make sense of sorting and sifting being wholly inner activities is to suppose that
they are carried out by some purely-inner parts of the agent, in particular the agent’s brain,
and become personal-level activities when the conditions are in place for these subpersonal
activities to enter into consciousness. The burden of proof is on the endorser of Clark’s
non-sensorimotor skill-based approach to show that there are or could be any purely internal
activities that can be legitimately described as sorting or sifting.
Drawing on Bennett and Hacker’s (2003) view, one might argue that everyday usage is
sufficient to show that ‘sorting’ and ‘sifting’ can only meaningfully describe behaviour by a
whole agent. In fact, ‘sorting’ and ‘sifting’ are, in everyday practice, meaningfully applied to
artifacts such as coin sorting machines and sieves, hence they fall under the limited category of
intentionalistic predicates that Bennett and Hacker (2003) allow can be applied both to
persons and other things. However, the Bennett and Hacker-derived point, if I were pushing
it, would nonetheless apply to many of the other activities I have been subsuming under the
phrase ‘sorting and sifting’, such as classifying, selecting, choosing and comparing. In fact, for
reasons I discussed earlier, the view that everyday linguistic practice offers a definitive guide to
the admissibility of applying intentionalistic or other vocabulary to a particular object is
contentious, and there are apparently strong reasons to think it is false. My present line of
argument does not pursue this view, but depends on the observation that sorting and sifting
are as a matter of fact, rather than a matter of linguistic practice, commonly carried out by
whole agents in interaction with the environment. All the same, any deviation from ordinary
linguistic practice requires, as I argued earlier, an accompanying justification for the
application of the relevant terms outside of their usual contexts.
To make a compelling case, the non-sensorimotor skill-based account must endorse
the suggestion, familiar from Dennett’s (1978) proposal concerning homuncular
decomposition, that sorting and sifting are practical activities carried out by subpersons (i.e.
homunculi). If this subpersonal account succeeds, subpersons could engage in their practical
tasks without typically having any attendant effect on, or conceptual connection with, the
whole agent’s bodily interaction with the environment. However, the account must offer
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compelling reasons to think these subpersons exist. Consider that when we observe the bar
tender, we can tell, unproblematically, that sorting and sifting is taking place. Typically,
agent-level, embodied cases like cocktail-making involve ongoing physical manipulation of the
objects being sorted and sifted. Crucially, such processes must have a meaningful outcome in
the sense that we can, if we like, evaluate the outcome relative to some success conditions, for
instance whether or not the bar tender has assembled the correct drinks. Perception is a little
different, since the perceiver need not move objects around in order to perceive. However, as
with the bar tender case, it should at least be uncontroversial that we are frequently licenced to
ascribe visual and/or perceptual states to agents by virtue of their outwardly observed skillful
bodily engagements, leaving open the possibility that the outward bodily engagements in
question constitute part of perceptual processing.
If we wanted to defend Clark’s position, one thing we would have to show is that the
subpersons I just mentioned can, in general, be ascribed functions, which might include
sorting and sifting. One feature of cocktail-making, and of the kind of skillful bodily
behaviour that allows us from the outside to ascribe perceptual states to subjects, is that it is
goal-directed. To maintain in a demanding way the link between the posited subpersonal
activity and the agent-level cases, the activity by the subpersons must be goal-directed too. To
establish this, we would have to show not only that the subpersons happen to sort and sift, but
that they have the proper functions of sorting and sifting, which is to say that they have
sorting or sifting as their purpose; and the theoretical feasibility of ascribing proper functions
to biological things, such as parts of the brain, is a matter of controversy. On this question, one
popular line of thought has it that Darwinian natural selection offers a way to naturalise
teleology, on the basis that a trait has a particular function just in case its having that function
explains the trait’s persistence or the organism’s biological fitness. The diametrically opposed
position is that natural selection - by contrast with divine creation, for example - entails that
there is, properly speaking, no function or design in biology at all (Allen, 2009). Even this
latter view does not, however, rule out the possibility, (i) that neural systems just so happen to
perform the tasks under consideration, even if they are not proper functions, and (ii) that
proper functions can be legitimately ascribed as metaphors, if not literally.
Perhaps the function issue is not of crucial importance in deciding whether or not the
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ventral stream could sort and sift. For the purpose of establishing that subpersonal systems
sort and sift in a way sufficiently analogous to the behaviour of whole agents, we may not
actually need to establish goal-directedness in a robust way, since it is not obvious that
goal-directedness is a necessary rather than contingent feature of agent-level sorting and sifting.
Even if one were sceptical about proper function, then, we could posit that the ventral stream
just so happens to sort and sift, with the addendum, if we wanted to endorse it, that sorting
and sifting are its proper functions metaphorically speaking.
Let’s take it that the aprioristic considerations allow that the idea of ascribing
functions like ‘sorting’ and ‘sifting’ to neural subpersons is uncontroversial. Even where this is
allowed, there persists a distinct obligation to show that there is something purely inner that
can be evaluated relative to success conditions. Consider that in the first place, the
homuncular subsystems require an input, i.e. something to sort or sift. These could be
representations, but they could also be raw sense input signals; this is unproblematic. However,
the systems must, more significantly, also have an output, some outcome by virtue of which
sorting and sifting can be said to have taken place. The internalist model denies that these
outputs are external to the agent as a whole, although to maintain a comparison with ‘sorting’
and ‘sifting’ in the ordinary senses of the words, the objects must be external to the
homunculus.
The output of an act of sorting or sifting could, in principle, be an alteration to the
same state that served as the input, as with the bar tender case, where the cocktail glasses, in
one arrangement or another, feature as both the objects and the outcomes of the sorting and
sifting. Since perception involves processing an ongoing stream of raw data, the homuncular
subsystems that receive this input more plausibly send outputs elsewhere, i.e. to other
subsystems. To licence the claim that there is sorting and sifting going on, there must be some
principled way of evaluating the outputs, and this entails that the outputs must have meaning.
A raw sense input signal is not intrinsically meaningful, but a representation is, by virtue being
intentionally directed toward something external. This means that the non-sensorimotor,
skill-based account must be accompanied by an account of representation that is both
plausible and robust enough to properly account for intentionality.
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6.4 - Radical Anti-Representationalism
On a ‘radical’ reading, the sensorimotor account is situated some way closer to the original
enactivist approach that originates with Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991), and closer still
to the dynamic account of Hurley (1998), the radical embodied cognition of Chemero (2009)
and the radical enactivism of Hutto and Myin (2012). The most important thing these
approaches have in common is that for one reason or another they propose that perception is
realised in part by extra-neural activity and takes place without internal representation. If this
perspective can be convincingly motivated, either by reference to specific empirical evidence
concerning perception or on broader theoretical grounds, then the sensorimotor theory can
respond head-on to Clark’s (2008) objection that the cognitive processing underlying
perceptual awareness does depend on internal representation and not bodily movement.
Enactivism, in its best established guise, originates with Varela, Thompson and
Rosch’s (1991) book The Embodied Mind, drawing also on phenomenology (e.g.,
Merleau-Ponty, 1945) and earlier work by Maturana and Varela (e.g., 1980) on the biological
phenomenon of autopoiesis, the process of active self-creation through which cells and larger
organisms maintain their own internal structure. This tradition denies that the world, as it
features in the subject’s perceptual experience, results from internal representations of an
objectively-specified pre-existing environment. It instead claims that the agent creates its own
environment and experiential world through the same process of bodily coupling with its
surroundings by which it generates and maintains its own existence. Perception, by this right,
is inextricably linked to action. Even more distinctively, cognition is on this variety of
enactivism inextricably linked with life (see, e.g., Thompson, 2007). The neighbouring
accounts I discuss are not committed to this tradition’s view that the organismic interactions
that constitute perception necessarily overlap with the processes by which the organism
constitutes a living thing. For this reason, they are not necessarily committed to the view that
perceivers must be alive at all. However, Hurley, Chemero, Hutto and Myin, and the
sensorimotor account on a ‘radical’ gloss, all concur that perceptual consciousness is realised
by sensorimotor engagements and not representations.
Hutto and Myin (2012) adopt the ‘enactive’ label for their own approach, which they
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call Radical Embodied or Enactive Cognition (REC). REC is motivated by the claim that
‘basic’ cognition, meaning any cognition not structured by natural language, ‘doesn’t need’
and ‘can’t have’ representational content. The authors argue that all attempts to account
naturalistically for content fail because they are unable to surmount the so-called Hard
Problem of Content, a deep-seated conceptual barrier to explaining how one physical state of
affairs can bear truth or success conditions relating to another. The root of the problem, the
authors claim, is expressed by their headline principle that Covariance Doesn’t Constitute
Content. This is to say that X co-varying with Y does not entail that X bears content about Y,
however we flesh out the precise details of the covariance relation. For instance, a tree’s rings
reliably co-vary with its age and therefore carry information about its age, where information
is understood as a kind of covariance. However, this does not entail that the tree trunk bears
content about the tree’s age, as content in this case requires truth conditions, and nothing
about mere covariance entails truth conditionality. An opponent could bluntly insist, of
course, that covariance does entail truth conditionality, to which Hutto and Myin would
reply that this violates explanatory naturalism by introducing an unexplained and ‘spooky’
new entity.
The introduction of additional theoretical apparatus, in particular biological function,
does nothing to overcome the problem so long as we continue to appeal to a covariance
relation to do some of the necessary explanatory work. If Hutto and Myin’s ‘Covariance
Doesn’t Constitute Content’ principle is correct, this at once undermines a large category of
accounts of cognition, among which are developed attempts to account naturalistically for
content (e.g., Dretske, 1981) and theories that appeal more or less in passing to the notion
that covariance does constitute content (a couple of examples, which I discuss elsewhere in the
thesis, include Tye, 2000; Rupert, 2011).
Hutto and Myin broaden their attack on content by targeting leading alternatives to
covariance-based accounts, in particular the producer-consumer model proposed by Millikan
(1984). Millikan’s account suggests that content obtains in informational transactions
between a ‘producer’ and a ‘consumer’, which might be different creatures or different parts of
the brain. This is a variety of homuncular view, which I discussed in the last section and,
earlier on, in chapter 2. Content is individuated, at least in large part, by appealing to the
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purposeful manner by which the consumer responds to given pieces of information. Purpose
can be accounted for naturalistically by reference to the consumer’s evolved biological
function. For instance, a frog’s motor output system might respond to a particular input by
causing the frog to dart out its tongue. If this response evolved because it allowed the frog’s
ancestors to eat food, then the input received by the frog’s motor system carries content about
food.
Hutto and Myin claim that the reference to a ‘consumer’ suggests that there is
pre-existing content to be consumed, a violation of the principle that Covariance Doesn’t
Constitute Content. Where biological function does all the explanatory work, they suggest
the ‘consumer’ would be better labelled a content ‘creator’. Assuming that Millikan does mean
biological function to do all the work necessary in individuating content, Hutto and Myin
argue the account fails anyway. The argument, which they attribute to Fodor (1990), notes
that content must involve intension as well as extension, since if there were only extension the
purported content could not be false, and if it cannot be false then we cannot ascribe to it any
specific set of conditions under which it is true. Natural selection, however, is only sensitive to
organismic dealings with the outside environment, i.e. the extensions of the purported
representations. It therefore provides no resources for explaining intension. Millikan (1993)
has responded that the truth-conditions are not specified by current properties of the
extension, but by properties of the extension that obtained in the historical environment
where the trait evolved. However, Hutto and Myin contend that this does not solve the
problem. They say: “Even if we can specify what is meant to be targeted that would give us
exactly no reason to think that the targeted item is represented in a truth-conditional,
referential, or otherwise semantic way - i.e. that it has intensional content” (2012, p. 80).
Their point, as I take it, is that Millikan’s appeal to teleology is sufficient to show that
a frog may dart out its tongue in response to a fly, or alternatively to some other object
resembling a fly, using a faculty that has the proper function of responding only to flies.
However, teleology is not sufficient to show that that any part of the frog is evolved to bear
intensional content, considering that natural selection could not be sensitive to the guise
under which flies are represented, so long as the frog successfully eats them. Without
intension, we could legitimately describe a frog’s darting out its tongue in response to an
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inedible object as an unsuccessful attempt to perform a proper function, namely to eat. But we
could not make the further claim that the frog or some part of the frog represents the inedible
object as food, because we have no way to specify whether it represents it as food, or as a fly, or
whatever.
I take it that Hutto and Myin make a compelling case that no attempt to naturalise
content has so far been given that will satisfy their metaphysical demands. One way to pursue
the debate is to examine these and other attempts in further detail, and to investigate further
attempts that could be made. Fruitful though this may be, a couple of striking facts undercut
this. One is the sheer number of contemporary accounts featuring representation and content
that appeal to nothing more than reliable covariance (e.g., Tye, 2000; Rupert, 2011). If some
different or more baroque attempt to naturalise content eventually proves correct, there is no
guarantee that these content-involving approaches will be able to straightforwardly substitute
the new account of content for the covariance-based account while leaving all their other key
claims intact. With this in mind, Hutto and Myin will have made substantial progress toward
making radical enactivist approach to cognition appealing if they can successfully unseat
covariance-based accounts of content.
Offsetting this argumentative advantage is the possibility that Hutto and Myin are
simply making unduly grand metaphysical demands of their opponents. Although Hutto and
Myin probe the specifics of individual attempts to naturalise content before arguing that they
fail, their position is not altogether different from Bennett and Hacker’s (2003). Hutto and
Myin, for their part, assume without much argument that the meaning of words including
‘represent’, ‘content’ and ‘truth condition’ are such as to place a demanding metaphysical
burden on anything that can be correctly said to fall under those terms, and go on to examine
specific proposals before finding that they are unable to meet this metaphysical demand.
Bennett and Hacker, by contrast, assume without much argument that there can be no
underlying feature shared by persons and parts of persons that might actually licence the
ascription to both of predicates like ‘representing’. Where Bennett and Hacker make a
linguistic demand, they appeal implicitly to a metaphysical assumption. Hutto and Myin
make a metaphysical demand, but appeal implicitly to similar linguistic assumptions. One
theorist who disputes this approach is Chemero (2009), whose ‘Radical Embodied Cognitive
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Science’ defends a similar positive programme to Hutto and Myin’s, but who sharply disagrees
with their negative claims.
Chemero argues that in line with the linguistic conventions employed by scientists,
the words ‘representation’ and ‘content’ make only modest metaphysical demands. By this
latter standard, certain kinds of covariance relation do, in fact, constitute content. Hence, we
could well say that a tree’s rings represent or bear content about its age. Defending
content-free cognition, Chemero more modestly insists that cognitive scientists should only
appeal to representation or representational content if doing so provides the best explanation
for a given phenomenon. This, he takes it, is an ‘epistemic’ rather than a ‘metaphysical’
demand. Hutto and Myin say something superficially similar when they concede that the
appeal to representational content would be legitimate if the explanatory success of perceptual
science depended on it. However, unlike Chemero, Hutto and Myin suggest that even where
the appeal to content is motivated by epistemic rather than metaphysical considerations, it
nonetheless entails a robust metaphysical commitment of the sort Chemero rejects.
In one way or another, each side justifies its stance by appeal to naturalism. For the
present purpose, we may take it that the naturalism in question is nothing more robust than
the minimal naturalism advocated by Wheeler (2005) and endorsed by Hutto and Myin. This
amounts to the claim that science and philosophy must be consistent, and that where their
respective claims conflict, philosophy must give way. Chemero argues in effect that where
scientific accounts find theoretical utility in positing ‘representations’, and apply the word in a
manner consistent with their own linguistic convention, philosophical considerations cannot
unseat them, since philosophy must give way to science. In this sense, Chemero is assuming
the mantle of explanatory naturalism.
Hutto and Myin deploy minimal naturalism to the opposite effect. They take it that
notwithstanding the apparently productive deployment of the terms ‘representation’ and
‘content’, especially in empirical work, no present theory shows how the physical states in
question genuinely represent or bear content in light of the metaphysical demands Hutto and
Myin think apply. Their point, to extrapolate a little, is this. Explanatory utility is insufficient
to licence the claim that some entity exists if there is otherwise no empirical or theoretical
evidence that the entity does, or even could, exist. If there is no reason to think that an entity
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exists, it is unscientific to claim it does exist. On this basis, the authors appear to have
naturalism on their side.
In Chemero’s favour, it is evident that scientists, especially neuroscientists, frequently
use ‘representation’ and even ‘content’ to denote nothing more demanding than covariance.
Moreover, it is true that people are entitled to use words in accordance with the linguistic
conventions in operation within their own discipline. In Hutto and Myin’s favour, the
problem is that ‘content’ is also frequently used to denote something metaphysically more
robust than mere covariance, even on accounts that appeal to nothing more than a covariance
relation to account for it (Tye, 2000, is a good example, since his account of phenomenal
qualities depends strongly on the idea that they reduce to representational content and not
mere co-variance relations). Where content is used to denote a covariance relation, it is, given
this equivocation between speakers, not always apparent whether the speaker means to make
an extravagant metaphysical claim about the covariance relation in question, or means to use
‘content’ in a deflationary way to denote something metaphysically austere.
To resolve this impasse, both sides ought to endorse McDowell’s (1994b) position
that where content is ascribed subpersonally, i.e. to parts of persons rather than persons, it
should be understood by default, and in all cases, as no more than a metaphorical ascription.
‘As if’ content, as he calls it, is not really content, but may be legitimately ascribed just in case
it proves useful or indeed indispensable as a theoretical posit to explain information
processing transactions between an agent’s parts, a possibility he happily endorses. By
adopting this as a permanent disclaimer, it is possible to accommodate Chemero’s position
that representation and content are legitimate posits when deployed in a metaphysically
austere way. At the same time, this ought to resolve any suggestion that ‘content’, deployed in
a superficially harmless way, actually disguises a more robust metaphysical commitment.
Although metaphorical content is admissible in principle, it is subject to certain
provisos. One is that if we aim to account for phenomenal qualities naturalistically in a way
that defeats anti-physicalist intuitions, we cannot do so by appealing to solely to metaphorical
content. Although a physical state that merits the metaphorical ascription of content may be
real, and the ascription of content genuinely useful for some purposes, the content itself, if
metaphorical, does not really exist; it is just a way of talking. So if you think that a ‘red’ quale is
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a non-physical state, you have no reason to change your mind on discovering that it is
correlated with metaphorical content. However, if perception is constituted by bodily
interactions with objects in the environment, we can appeal to the qualities of the interaction
to account for phenomenal qualities, and use metaphorical content, if appropriate, to explain
how those interactions take place. This brings us to the other proviso, however, which is that
content and representations may not be the most appropriate way to account for the physical
interactions involved in perception, as we will see in the next section.
6.5 - Representation Restricted
According to Marr’s (1982) theory, and accounts in the same tradition, conscious perception
is realised by the brain’s construction and deployment of representations. This processing is
properly understood as an enabling rather than constitutive feature of perception. A
constitutive account of perception says what perception is. An enabling account, in this
context, could be thought of as a variety of causal account, where we take ‘A causes B’ to imply
that A happens at the same time as B but at a lower explanatory level. Endorsers of the
personal/subpersonal distinction observe that the representations in Marr’s account must be
enabling rather than constitutive features of perception because they are subpersonal, and
perception is a personal-level faculty (McDowell, 1994b; Pessoa et al., 1998). Noë (2004)
denies that the personal/subpersonal distinction is important, which means he cannot so
straightforwardly establish that subpersonal representations are not constitutive features of
perception. However, like Pessoa et al, he makes use of Marr’s own distinction between the
task and representational levels of analysis. The former specifies which tasks perception aims
to perform, while the latter describes how the brain processes information, in the form of
representations, to enable these tasks to be performed. As Noë appreciates, the distinction
between the task and representational levels should be taken to track the
constitutive/enabling distinction, meaning representations are mere enabling features even if
the task level is not necessarily the personal level.
McDowell suggests that by appreciating the constitutive/enabling distinction, a
rapprochement can be achieved between Marr’s representationalism and ecological perception,
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which is non-representationalist. His claim is that a Marr-style representationalist account can
usefully be given of the subpersonal processes that enable perception even while we use the
ecological approach to characterise perception’s constitutive features at the personal level. As
Pessoa et al. and Noë (2004) bring to our attention, however, Marr has a faulty view of
representation that prevents this reconciliation from being achieved. The problem arises
because Marr depends too heavily on his representational level framework to inform his
constitutive or task level account of vision. Indeed, he appears to straightforwardly conflate
the enabling with the constitutive features when he claims that: “vision is the process of
discovering from [retinal] images what is present in the world, and where it is” (Marr, 1982, p.
2). The bluntest objection we could make to this is that it commits a straightforward category
mistake. As McDowell has argued, vision is personal level process in which we come into
contact with the world rather than the retinal image. Pessoa et al. are sympathetic to this point,
but their argument does not focus on the bare coherence of claiming that perception is
constituted by a subpersonal process. Their criticism is mainly directed at the danger that a
subpersonal constitutive account invites implausible commitments including, as we saw in
chapter 2, the undue commitment to a subperson, a homunculus, for whose benefit processes
like filling-in need to take place.
Noë (2004), having denied that the personal/subpersonal distinction is important,
has no call to insist that a constitutive account of vision must make reference to the whole
person (or more broadly, agent). His relatively nuanced criticism, reflecting a point originally
made by Nakayama (1994), is that Marr fails to appreciate the difficulty of giving an
appropriate task level (i.e. constitutive) account of vision. As I take it, the problem is that
Marr attempts to give an independently plausible account of perception’s representational (i.e.
enabling) features, and lets his view of the task level be unduly constrained by it, a bias implicit
in his claim that perception is a process in which we use the retinal image to find out about the
world. This is a mistaken order of priority, because our understanding of the processes that
enable perception ought in many cases to be substantially constrained by independently
motivated constitutive claims. Instead of only allowing one-way traffic from the enabling to
the constitutive, or for that matter in the other direction, there should be a two-way interplay
between our understanding of perception and our understanding of the processes that enable
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it (see, McDowell, 1994b; Wheeler, 2013).
The objection is not that Marr’s account, and Marr-style accounts, are framed as if no
possible evidence, in particular empirical evidence, could disprove them. The problem is that
their apparent plausibility as enabling accounts means that should they unduly inform or be
conflated with constitutive accounts, they close off the possibility of more carefully examining
perception’s constitutive features. Re-emphasising neural representation’s rightful place only
as an enabling feature has a useful dual effect. It opens up conceptual space for a better
constitutive account of perception. This, in turn, opens up the possibility that we must
re-evaluate our claims about the processes that enable perceptual consciousness. This could
have various effects, for instance constraining in previously unrecognised ways the kinds of
content or representational vehicle that plausibly enable conscious perception, and, in
principle, making it plausible that representation should be partially or even wholly dispensed
with in favour of appeals to dynamic bodily interaction with the outside environment.
A proper constitutive account of perception ought to draw on a number of distinct
methods and considerations. This includes empirical work. For example, the work on change
blindness and inattentional blindness referred to by O&N is enough to strongly indicate that
the brain does not represent, all at once, a large and richly detailed visual field. A constitutive
account should also pay careful attention to the phenomenology of visual experience, an
aspect of sensorimotor theory most prominent in Noë’s (2004; 2012) accounts. Noë claims
that visual experience does not feel picture-like. This is, as I think, a straightforward and
compelling aspect of Noë’s in some ways enigmatic description of visual experience,
exemplified by his claim that: “A perceptual experience doesn’t analyze or break down into the
experience of atomic elements, or simple features [.] the moment you stop and try to make a
specific feature the sole object of your consideration – this shade of red, for example – it slips
away from you in the sense that it exceeds what you can take in, in completeness, in an
instant” (2004, p. 135).17 The fact that visual phenomenology is not pictorial constrains the
shape that an enabling account ought to take. It offers one reason, for instance, to doubt that
the character of perceptual awareness should be explained by pictorial representations in the
17 I offer a more detailed take on this point in chapter 7.
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brain.
Noë suggests that attending to one’s own visual phenomenology is enough to
demonstrate that perceptual consciousness, instead of being pictorial, is constituted by the
exercise of Sensorimotor Understanding. This claim has some appeal, but is hard to make go
through purely on the basis of attention to one’s own experience. A further argument is made
by Noë (2010), who claims, as we saw earlier (section 4.3), that a perceiver would not be able
to integrate what they consciously see with what they do if conscious vision did not involve
Sensorimotor Understanding, or a similar egocentric understanding of their bodily alignment
with objects in the outside environment. This can be understood as a logical, constitutive
claim about vision, and places downward pressure on our understanding of the processing
carried out in particular by the ventral stream to realise visual awareness. Notice that the point
comes through even more sharply, however, when we think of it as an engineering question,
namely the question of how the ventral stream achieves its function of helping the dorsal
stream produce appropriate skillful bodily behaviour. The idea that the ventral stream must
trade in representations of SMCs is a low-level claim about the processing that enables
perceptual consciousness which we find, it turn, places upward pressure on a high level
account of conscious perception’s constitutive features. This is one case in which the
sensorimotor theory makes productive use of an interplay between explanatory levels.
On the view of Sensorimotor Understanding I endorse, in which it is a feature of the
perceiver’s behavioural capacities, the claim that Sensorimotor Understanding is a constitutive
feature of conscious perception could be supported by the need for ventral stream processing
to integrate with dorsal stream processing too, especially if we endorsed the view that the
ventral stream integrates with dorsal stream activity by representing possibilities for
coarse-grained action (Ward, Roberts and Clark, 2011). Sensorimotor Understanding, on the
behavioural capacity view, also makes a good fit with non-representationalist, dynamical
systems accounts of perception, considering that they already appeal to sensorimotor
capacities (Hurley, 1998; Noë, 2004; Chemero, 2009; Silberstein and Chemero, 2012;
Burhmann, Di Paolo and Barandiaran, 2013).
A constitutive account of vision should also take account, I argue, of philosophically
motivated worries about intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. Noë (2004) attempts
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to do justice to McDowell’s (1994a) claim that the content of perceptual experience is
necessarily conceptual by suggesting that the bodily capacities we draw on in conscious
perception are themselves conceptual. Noë (2012) retracts this claim and instead states that
sensorimotor skills involve a form of nonconceptual content, while occurring on a continuum
with conceptual skills rather than being radically distinct. I will not comment on the debate
between conceptualists like McDowell and his opponents (e.g., Dreyfus, 2013; Evans, 1982),
who claim that action and perception can be intentionally-directed without being fully
conceptual. However, it is important to do justice to the basic insight that perceptual
consciousness must be intentionally directed, and that this requires the perceiver to bring to
bear some kind of skillful, active engagement with the world. It will not do to assume that
content borne by neural representations can play this role, since it has not been convincingly
established that neural representations bear genuine rather than metaphorical content. For
this reason, appealing to neural states alone will not do at all. Accounts featuring
content-bearing neural representations plausibly provide, in some cases, a useful framework
for explaining the role the brain plays in producing behaviour, but it has not been established
that they can, except by reference to behaviour, help account for genuine intentionality.
We might be tempted to deny that a naturalistic account of cognition needs to answer
Hutto and Myin’s metaphysical worries about the ascription of ‘content’, or that it is the job
of a scientifically-oriented account of vision to explain how the capacities appealed to by
non-naturalistic accounts of perception can be accounted for in physicalistic vocabulary.
Consider, however, the purpose of the skill-based approach to phenomenal qualities, endorsed
by Clark (2008) and on Clark’s reading, with which I agree, by the sensorimotor account. The
skill-based approach is meant to avoid the intuition that phenomenal consciousness is
non-physical by identifying phenomenal consciousness with the exercise of skills. Its job is to
avoid the dilemma I mentioned earlier (adapted from Ryle, 1979, by Silberstein and Chemero,
2012) in which phenomenal consciousness is either ‘nothing but’ brain activity or ‘something
else as well’. As I have argued, if the skills appealed to by the skill-based account are not
sensorimotor skills, they depend on internal representation. If that representation is
metaphorical, or a useful fiction (Sprevak, 2013), or anything other than robustly real, it
cannot help answer metaphysically motivated, anti-physicalist intuitions about consciousness
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better than appeals to nothing but brain state. This, in my view, is the biggest problem with
attempts to defuse non-physicalist intuitions about qualia with appeal to representation.
One of the best reasons for taking Sensorimotor Understanding to be constituted by a
capacity for skillful behaviour - rather than merely by knowledge of the sensory consequences
of possible movement - is that it offers a promising way to account naturalistically for the
intentional directedness, and by virtue of this the phenomenal character, of perceptual
consciousness. Giving a proper account of the criteria a repertoire of behavioural capacities
must meet to count as constituting mindedness, and sensorimotor understanding in particular,
is not something I pursue here, and is something that would eventually need to be provided
for this point to be established. However, it is hard to view the outward behaviour of a human
perceiver and resist the intuition that they are intentionally-directed toward the features of
the environment they interact with. This provides one motivation for regarding behavioural
capacities as constitutive features of perceptual consciousness.
If we could be certain that neural representations cannot be genuinely contentful,
then appeal to sensorimotor skills would appear to be the only hope for finding a naturalistic
account of intentionality and so phenomenal character, and the case for regarding them as
constitutive features of perception would be secure. As we have seen, Hutto and Myin offer
strong reasons to doubt that subpersonal content is naturalisable by appeal to covariance or
teleology. A possibility Hutto and Myin endorse, which I also endorsed in section 2.1.2, is that
content could be adequately naturalised by appeal primarily to empirical evidence. In principle,
it might be possible to routinely provide full physicalistic descriptions of the neural processes
that underlie a conscious experience, and use a subpersonal theory that makes essential
explanatory appeal to representation to provide bridging principles which make the relation
between the neural processes and the conscious state intelligible. Without a conceptual
solution to the ‘hard problem’ of content, it would remain hard to robustly justify the claim
that neural states bear genuine rather than make-believe content, or in the language of
McDowell (1994a), to say that the brain is responding in a person-like way to reasons and not
just causes. However, the empirical success of the enterprise just described would provide
strong grounds for abandoning the requirement for a naturalistic theory of perceptual
consciousness to meet these strong metaphysical demands.
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That such an account could be provided is an empirical bet. Although it is possible to
provide representation or content-involving accounts of neural activity that provide an
explanatorily useful framework for understanding brain activity itself, there is no guarantee
that this subpersonal content can correspond reliably to the content or phenomenal character
of perceptual consciousness (Noë and Thompson, 2004). The problem is not the
epistemically-founded worry that it is difficult to intelligibly describe and explain the neural
processes that yield perceptual consciousness unless we make reference to the contribution
they make to sensorimotor coupling. The problem is that there may be no intelligible link
between purely inner processes and perceptual consciousness. This point is evident in
Hurley’s (1998) defence of vehicle externalism, although we could accept the modest
conclusion that an account of perceptual consciousness ought to make explanatory appeal to
sensorimotor coupling without necessarily insisting on ECM, the claim that the substrate of
perceptual consciousness actually includes the body and outside environment.
The question of whether perceptual consciousness depends on internal representation
or a non-representational dynamical system depends on how well the respective approaches
make sense of empirical work. However, there are aprioristically motivated reasons for not
being surprised if it turns out to be impossible to explain perception by attributing content to
brains or parts of brains, namely that intentionalistic vocabulary like ‘believing’ or
‘representing’ are words we apply in the first place to whole persons and not their brains. The
fact that strategies like homuncular decomposition make it conceptually viable to apply these
predicates to brains does not mean that we should expect these strategies to finally allow us to
explain conscious perception by appeal only to contentful states of the brain. A better bet is to
regard bodily capacities as perception’s constitutive features and use these as the starting point
to account for the physical processes that enable perceptual awareness.
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7 - Object Experience as Temporal Experience
This thesis has so far focused largely on defending and clarifying the basic tenets of the
sensorimotor theory. With these tenets shored up, there is as-yet untapped potential for the
sensorimotor theory to explain in much greater detail the distinctive contribution it can make
to accounting for specific perceptual phenomena. For instance, there is much work to be done
on identifying the sensorimotor contingencies involved in colour perception, and the theory
has not yet given much account of sense modalities other than vision. This present chapter
continues the work clarifying and defending the sensorimotor theory, but also sketches out a
novel contribution the sensorimotor theory can make to a long-discussed puzzle concerning
the experience of temporally-extended events. In addition to explaining how the sensorimotor
theory might make sense of event-experience, I will argue that object-experience may itself be a
variety of event-experience, and that this would help make sense of Noë’s appealing but
oblique account of visual phenomenology.
7.1 - The Puzzle of Temporal Experience
The puzzle of temporal experience (Kelly, 2005) concerns perceptual awareness of
temporally-extended phenomena like change, succession and constancy. To illustrate, Kelly
offers the example of an opera singer delivering a sustained note. When you hear it, your
experience incorporates not just the note’s immediate presence, but also, somehow, its
extended temporal duration:
There you are at the opera house. The soprano has just hit her high note – a glass shattering high
C that fills the hall – and she holds it. She holds it. She holds it. She holds it. She holds it. She
holds the note for such a long time that after a while a funny thing happens: you no longer seem
only to hear it, the note as it is currently sounding [...] in addition, you also seem to hear
something more [...] the note now sounds like it has been going on for a very long time [...] What
you hear no longer seems to be limited to the pitch, timbre, loudness and other strictly audible
qualities of the note. You seem in addition to experience, even to hear, something about its
temporal extent. (Kelly, 2005, p. 208)
Vision, too, sometimes comprises the experience of temporally-extended events. Grush (2007)
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offers an example of motion experience. Suppose you are looking at a clock. You could stare at
the hour hand all day, and although you may infer that it is moving, you never visually
experience its motion. When you look at the second hand, however, you seem to perceive its
motion directly as it moves around the clock face. Temporal experience is a puzzle, as Kelly
(2005) puts it, rather than a mere problem, because it involves an apparent paradox: What
you perceive now, at this moment, ought only to be what is present now. Motion, change and
duration are not momentary, but take place over extended periods. Solutions to the puzzle
will differ in their diagnosis of what is happening when you hear the opera singer, or look at
the second hand, but the examples clearly illustrate that there are data to be explained.
Dainton (2010) places proposed solutions into three distinct categories. The
‘cinematic’ approach is the view that perceptual experience is divided into static snapshots,
like a cinema reel. On this approach, what you perceive at a given instant is just what is present
at that instant, meaning you cannot right now literally experience a temporally-extended
event. Temporal experience, here, has to be explained some other way. Crick and Koch
(henceforth C&K) (2003), for example, suggest that you do not experience motion, but “a
series of static snapshots, with motion ‘painted’ on them” (p. 122); they suggest, by analogy,
that the experience of motion has something in common with the motion suggested by a
drawing of a person in mid-stride (p. 122, figure 1). The other two types of explanation, by
contrast, endorse the existence of what James (1890/1981) called the ‘specious present’, an
experiential ‘now’ that really does have duration.
The ‘retention-protention’ approach (Dainton, 2010), of which Husserl (1991) and,
under Husserl’s influence, Varela (1999) were notable exponents, says that the experience of
what is genuinely present at a given instant is accompanied by ‘retentions’ from the immediate
past and/or ‘protentions’ into the future; these can be understood, respectively, as special
perceptual sorts of memory and anticipation. Grush (2007) advocates a retention-protention
account he calls the Trajectory Estimation Model. In support of the approach, he cites
empirical work on a number of illusions, for example the 'cutaneous rabbit' illusion (Geldard
and Sherrick, 1972, cited by Grush, 2007). The study involved subjects being given a sequence
of taps on the arm, five at each position, in three successive positions along the arm. The
subjects reported that instead of feeling the taps in just three different positions, they
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experienced them as travelling in an even trajectory along the arm, ultimately extending
beyond the location of the final tap. Because this trajectory would not have been experienced
had the sequence been confined to the first five taps, Grush's suggestion is that an experience
at a given instant can feature as part of its content prior occurrences (see also the colour-phi
phenomenon, discussed, e.g., Dennett, 1991). Further, because the felt trajectory continued
onward, Grush concludes that protentions – anticipations of future events – also figure in
experiential content.
The ‘extensional’ approach (or ‘extensionalism’) – endorsed, for instance, by Dainton
(2000) – says that the content of the perception (the state of affairs represented by the
experience) temporally tracks the vehicle (the physical state that realises the experience).
Dainton (2010) observes that on this view, since “our episodes of experiencing are themselves
temporally extended, [they] are thus able to incorporate change and persistence in a quite
straightforward way”.
Clark (2006) uses temporal experience – in particular, Kelly’s opera singer example –
to expose what he regards as a general problem with the sensorimotor theory. His argument
asserts that temporal experience poses a problem, in particular, for Noë’s notion of
presence-as-access, the view that you fail to experience the objects of perception as
straightforwardly ‘present’, but instead experience them as ‘accessible’, thanks to your
possession of Sensorimotor Understanding. In targeting presence-as-access, Clark implicitly
targets the claims that perceptual experience depends on Sensorimotor Understanding and
the claim that phenomenal character can be characterised by reference to SMCs. Clark says we
cannot explain the experience of the opera singer’s note “by appeal to any sense of the
potential availability of the missing parts of the temporally-extended sound stream, nor can we
know (indeed, it is barely intelligible to ask) how those missing parts of the soundstream
would vary or come into focus as we move our head or body” (Clark, 2006, p. 23). Since the
past and future are not, in other words, mediated now by laws of sensorimotor contingency, it
cannot be Sensorimotor Understanding that explains the experience of the note’s duration.
Noë (2006) responds by agreeing that Sensorimotor Understanding only explains
object perception, arguing that this does not compromise the sensorimotor theory in general.
He suggests that since event perception is, in any case, a quite different species to object
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perception, the theory is not committed to giving a sensorimotor account of the opera singer
case. He justifies this by reference to the distinct qualitative character of the temporal
experience compared to the experience of an object: “it rides roughshod over the
phenomenology [...] to say that the past sounds [like objects] are now present or that they are
now accessible” (p. 28); instead, he claims, you hear the note “as having a certain trajectory or
arc, as unfolding in accordance with a definite law or pattern” (p. 29).
Noë’s positive account of the opera singer case posits that we have a
(non-sensorimotor) grasp of where the note is coming from, analogous to linguistic
understanding:
When you hear the singer’s sustained note, you do not experience the acoustical properties of the
sound, any more than you experience the acoustical properties of the words you hear when you
understand speech. In the linguistic case, you hear meanings themselves, you hear what is said. In
the case of the singer, what you actually hear is the singer herself, her voice, her vocal action –
what she is doing. It is the fact that the singer is doing something, performing an action, that fixes
the relevant temporal horizon and intentional arc (Noë, 2006, p. 29)
This offers a solution to the temporal experience puzzle akin, in important respect, to C&K’s
cinematic account. Where Noë claims that different kinds of knowledge are responsible for
object experience and temporal experience, C&K, similarly, ascribe these to separate
“mechanisms” (p. 122). Moreover, both C&K and Noë agree that you do not experience
temporally-extended phenomena directly: As with Noë’s invocation of an experienced
trajectory, C&K suggest motion is ‘‘‘painted’’ on" (p. 122) to static snapshots, resulting in
your experiencing moving objects as being in motion, while failing to directly experience that
motion.
However, Noë maintains that even temporal experience involves a coupling with the
environment rather than a representing:
[P]erception is an activity of sensorimotor coupling with the environment [...] experiences are not
acts [...]; they are not representations; they are activities, events themselves; they are temporally
extended patterns of skillful engagement. When you perceive an event unfolding, it is not as if you
occupy a dimensionless point of observation. You live through an event by coupling with it. (Noë,
2006, p. 31)
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This suggests a quite different line of response than the one endorsed by the analogy
with linguistic understanding. Extrapolating from Noë, the thought seems to be that the
physical substrate of the experience is a smoothly continuous activity rather than one which
breaks down into temporally discrete chunks: hence to explain the physical substrate of
perception, one must look at dynamically unfolding interactions, rather than ‘object’-like
structures in the brain. If we appended to this the extensionalist view that the content of an
experience temporally tracks the activity of experiencing, it would mean that the content of
experience is always, itself, temporally-extended. Notably, this does not need to entail that past
and future portions of the note should be experienced as now present. Rather, it suggests that
to experience the world is – as Noë claims – to experience being in the midst of some
trajectory.
7.2 - Coupling andKnowing inTemporal Experience
The argument over temporal experience speaks to a broader tension within the sensorimotor
account. As many commentators have noted, the approach sometimes appears to stipulate
that the temporally-extended bodily exercise of sensorimotor skill is required; at other times,
it apparently suffices that the perceiver possesses sensorimotor skill. Aizawa (2010) describes
these as ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ versions of the theory. Noë’s discussion of temporal experience
betrays a similar tension: while its main claim is that the experience of duration is explained by
your non-bodily understanding of what you are hearing, it indicates a quite different line of
response when it argues that hearing the note involves, in any case, a temporally-extended
coupling with the environment. The tension is particularly stark in the case of event
perception, because it is hard to see why temporal experience should be explained both by
understanding and sensorimotor coupling. In the original story about object perception,
sensorimotor knowledge is sometimes glossed as knowing how to act, for example when O&N
suggest sensorimotor knowledge is comprised of “action recipes” (p. 945) or when Noë says:
“[t]o experience [an object] as on the left is to experience it as necessitating [...] various
possibilities of sense-affecting movements” (2004, pp. 87–88). Here, we can readily grasp that
perception might involve, vitally, a temporally-extended process of bodily coupling, itself
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featuring Sensorimotor Understanding. By contrast, your knowledge of where the opera
singer’s note is coming from may be implicit, but there is no obvious way in which it is
practical, or geared toward action, as sensorimotor mastery might be. If it is not practical, but,
as Noë suggests, more like linguistic comprehension, then it is hard to see why possessing or
exercising this knowledge should entail, in any interesting sense, a coupling with the
environment rather than just a representing of the environment. The sensorimotor theorist,
in the temporal case, no longer has an obvious response to the theorist who maintains that
neural states or structures alone are the interesting, indeed constitutive, features underlying
conscious perceptual experience.
This threatens to undermine the sensorimotor theory, as it means the ‘weak’ variant,
on the current account of temporal experience, can no longer sustain any of the theory’s main
tenets. Vehicle externalism or ECM is ruled out, since bodily movement is not required for
perceptual experience. Sensorimotor Understanding, SMCs and presence-as-access only give
an incomplete account of perceptual experience because they account only for object
experience, not temporal experience. The sensorimotor theorist could respond that although
event perception is non-sensorimotor, it depends for its existence on object perception, which
is sensorimotor. Conceding this much, however, gives the opponent room to deny that
perception is intrinsically sensorimotor at all: Clark (2008), as we have seen, claims that
perception is a matter of sensorimotor summarising – the extraction of information about
sensorimotor contingencies, along with other information, for the construction of
representations that are not themselves finely sensitive to the sensory effects of possible
movements.
Moreover, the distinction made by Noë between events and objects seems tenuous.
Noë (2006) says “objects [unlike events] are timeless in that they exist whole and complete at
a moment in time” (p. 28). The implication is that it is therefore reasonable to suppose that
perception of objects and events are different matters. On this view, perception of a moving
object would seemingly be a matter of perceiving the object (sensorimotor) and perceiving its
trajectory, an event (non-sensorimotor). However, if you perceive an unmoving, unchanging
object, and perceive it to be constant, you expect that it existed moments before, and that it
will continue to exist moments into the future. As a result, it is not enough to tack on some
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kind of non-sensorimotor perception just for some instances. The non-sensorimotor element
would apply to all instances of perception.
The opera singer example is a little misleading in this respect, because the phenomenal
experience of the note's temporal duration seems like an optional extra, a side issue to the
perception of immediately audible qualities like pitch, loudness, and so forth. Temporal
aspects to perception are not usually like this. When you cross a busy road, or catch a ball, the
perception of objects as still or in motion is no side issue, but central to your engagement with
them. For this reason I think it is better to hold that object and event perception are not
different types. The fuzziness of the distinction between object and event perception provides
another reason to prefer a unified picture for objects and events, and conceding that events are
not perceived in sensorimotor fashion provides a reason to believe that objects are not
perceived in such a fashion either. This is one reason why I will argue presently that a unified
sensorimotor model can be offered for both.
The best solution, I suggest, is to drop Noë’s analogy with linguistic understanding
and stick, instead, to an extensionalist story, which says that event experience is explained by a
particular kind of temporally-extended coupling with the environment. This requires
adopting the ‘strong’ sensorimotor theory, in the sense defined above, and accords with my
suggestion in chapter 4 that Sensorimotor Understanding is a criterion that
temporally-extended engagements must meet, rather than an entity that enables the
appropriate engagements to take place. The mere possession of sensorimotor skill would not
be sufficient to explain the experience of duration, since duration is not a matter of
sensorimotor contingency. However, the bodily exercise of Sensorimotor Understanding
takes time anyway: so, if we assume the content of experience temporally tracks the vehicle,
the experience of duration comes for free. This suggestion is not merely a get out clause, but
fits the phenomenology – the experience of trajectory – aptly described by Noë. It explains
why your experience, now, of the opera singer’s note sounds like it is part of something
temporally-extended.
177
7.3 - Object Experience and Skill-Based Access
I have suggested that the best response the sensorimotor theorist can make to Clark’s
objection from temporal experience is to argue that the experience of temporal duration
supervenes on a temporally-extended physical process, comprised of skill-driven bodily
coupling with the environment. This means that the exercise of Sensorimotor Understanding
must be temporally-extended in the case of event experience. The sensorimotor theory could,
conceivably, endorse this, but claim that object experience does not depend on
temporally-extended engagements, merely on the activation of representations of SMCs. In
this case, the debates over temporal experience and what Aizawa calls ‘weak’ and ‘strong’
variants of the sensorimotor theory come apart. My proposed version of extensionalism,
however, accounts for object perception as well as event perception. This results from what I
contend is the most productive way to understand presence-as-access, and it is this thesis I
turn to now.
As we saw earlier, Noë (2004) outlines his notion of skill-based access when he likens
perception to accessing a newspaper via the World Wide Web. He points out that when you
view the online version of the New York Times, your computer does not download the day’s
edition all at once, but downloads, on request, one article at a time. This is sensible, as it limits
the burden placed on your computer and internet connection, and means that should an
article be updated, you get the latest version. Importantly, accessing the paper in this
piecemeal fashion is, for all intents and purposes, just like having the whole issue there at once,
since every article is accessible as needed. The day’s edition is available, as Noë puts it, virtually.
Seeing, he suggests, works in a similar way. You do not experience, all at once, a richly
detailed visual field. Instead, you access, as required, detail available from the outside
environment. The presence of rich detail is also, in this sense, virtual (Noë, 2004, pp. 49–51).
However, in a crucial disanalogy with the computer case, Noë claims that perceptual presence
is “virtual all the way in” (2004, p. 134). The suggestion is apparently that no complete
property is ever present to experience in a local or offline manner: a claim Noë argues is
justified by attention to one’s own experience:
A perceptual experience doesn’t analyze or break down into the experience of atomic elements, or
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simple features [.] the moment you stop and try to make a specific feature the sole object of your
consideration – this shade of red, for example – it slips away from you in the sense that it exceeds
what you can take in, in completeness, in an instant. (2004, p. 135)
This is a puzzling sort of claim. There is (I think – and the reader might accept, at least for the
sake of argument) something in Noë ’s phenomenological claim that you cannot, in a
momentary act, get a visual grasp on any complete property, such as a shade of red. However,
there is certainly something it is like to see a red thing. Noë explains this by claiming that
properties are “present not as represented, but as accessible [...] [t]hanks to my possession of
sensorimotor skills” (2004, p. 215). As he puts it in a later piece, the environment:
[…] shows up as present, but out of view, in so far as I understand that I am now related to it by
familiar patterns of motor-sensory dependence. It is my basic understanding of the way my
movements produce sensory change given my situation that makes it the case, now, even before I
have moved an inch, [emphasis added] that elements outside focus and attention can be
perceptually present. (Noë, 2012, p. 19)
This view is a ‘weak’ position, since it stipulates that no movement or temporal extension is
required. As a result, the perceptual experience described must be the result of an internal
state, perhaps an internal representation specifying what movements the perceiver should
make to bring objects into view. It is not obvious, however, why this sort of Sensorimotor
Understanding should not allow a perceiver at some instant to take in an atomic visual feature,
given visual features are meant to be specifiable by reference to movement-related
contingencies. We could make sense of this by supposing that the sensorimotor mastery made
use of by the perceiver at a given moment fails to correspond, precisely, to any atomic feature,
such as a shade of red. If this were true, however, it would not be clear how we can explain the
fact that perceivers experience shades of red at all. As I result, I contend that the best way to
make sense of the computer metaphor, and the associated phenomenology, is to hold that
object experience, like event experience, depends on a temporally-extended physical process.
Indeed, the extensionalist proposal is useful as a way to characterise both event and object
perception. I elaborate on this in the next section.
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7.4 - ExtensionalismAbout Event andObject Experience
It is beyond my present scope to consider the advantages and disadvantages of various
approaches to temporal experience independent of their relation to sensorimotor theory. I
argue, however, that extensionalism is likely to provide the right conceptual foundation for a
sensorimotor account of temporal experience. Adopting this approach is useful for the
sensorimotor theory, because it allows the theory to respond convincingly to the specific
challenge set by Clark (2006), and thereby save the approach from the danger that it fails
altogether because it is unable to account for temporal experience. More significantly, there is
good reason to endorse the extensionalist claim that perceptual experience temporally tracks a
temporally-extended physical process anyway, since it has the added utility of offering a new
and better way of explicating some of the compelling claims featured in Noë’s account of
presence-as-access. On my proposal, event and object experience are not only explained the
same way, but are aspects of the same phenomenon.
An extensionalist sensorimotor account, in the first place, explains temporal
experience by claiming that perceptual awareness of a temporally-extended event supervenes
on a temporally-extended process of interaction between the perceiver and the environment,
in such a way that the content temporally tracks the vehicle. This is, in principle, compatible
with the view that object experience is explained by the mere activation of a representation
bearing content about SMCs. However, we could plausibly go further and suppose that the
characterisation of object experience found in Noë’s claims about presence-as-access can best
be explained by accounting for object experience in the same way as event experience.
An initial move is to reject any suggestion that knowing the movements you could
make to bring an object into view can amount, by itself, to entertaining perceptual content
about that object. Instead, knowing this might enable, more modestly, a nonspecific feeling
that there is detail available which can be accessed from the environment as needed (as
suggested by Clark, 2008, p. 194). To account for perceptual presence – of an opera singer’s
note, or a shade of red – I suggest we instead point to the perceiver’s skillful coupling with an
environment in which the relevant laws of sensorimotor contingency apply. Suppose, for the
sake of argument, that this is a correct account of object experience. Combined with the
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extensionalist claim that the content of perceptual experience temporally tracks the physical
substrate, it would follow that the content of object experience is itself temporally-extended.
This is counterintuitive, but compelling if you consider the presence-as-access in a particular
light. Recall two of the claims featured in this aspect of the sensorimotor account.
There is a phenomenological claim, concerning a perceiver’s inability to experience, in
a momentary act, any atomic visual features. There is also a claim about the material substrate
of experience, captured by Noë’s discussion of virtuality, which suggests that perception is
entirely beholden to the agent’s online interaction with the environment. Neither of these
claims is indisputable, but they are coherent accounts of how perception may work. If you
think there is something right about the theses, extensionalism about object experience offers
a way to make sense of it. On the view I recommend, one cannot, in a momentary act, take in a
shade of red for the very same reason that one does not experience, at this instant, the past and
future portions of the opera singer’s high C. Perceptual experience, both of objects and events,
supervenes on something that may, essentially, be understandable only by reference to a
temporally-extended, dynamical process.
Noë’s (2004) claim that experience is “virtual all the way in” (p. 134) could suggest
that the spatial size of the visual field is infinitesimally small or even non-existent. This makes
the sensorimotor account sound like it denies perceptual experience altogether. A better gloss
on the claim says that experience is virtual all the way in not, primarily, because the
information processed at one time by the visual system is minimal – although it may be
minimal – but because this information can only be processed in the course of
temporally-extended coupling with the outside environment. To revisit the World Wide Web
analogy: if your access to the online newspaper were virtual all the way in, a faulty
understanding of virtuality would suggest that your computer ‘knows’ how to access the
internet, but has no screen with which it can locally display a web page. According to my gloss,
however, the computer has a screen, but loses its ability to display any web page – even one
you already have open – the instant it loses its connection to the Internet. It is a commonplace
that perception, ordinarily, requires that there is an environment present to perceive.
However, the point of virtuality, as currently understood, is to show that ongoing dynamic
interaction with the environment is a conceptual necessity for perceptual experience.
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An upshot of this view is that perceptual experience can only supervene on a
temporally-extended process, and never on a momentary state. This goes part way to
accounting for the experiential quality that Noë observes accompanies presence-as-access,
namely the inability to fixate, at an instant, on any atomic visual feature. Note, however, that
the content of an experience need not temporally track the material realiser. If it does not, a
temporally-extended process could yield the experience of an instant in time in which you
take in a shade of red. The extensionalist view that the content does temporally track the
vehicle has the benefit of offering an apt way to reformulate the phenomenological account
offered by Noë . The inability to take in a shade of red in what you experience as a durationless
instant is explained by the fact that having an experience of red is, in part, having an
experience of duration. A visual feature never feels phenomenally present at this instant
because, before you have a chance to fixate on it, the relevant detail has lapsed from being
something that you are confronted with now, to something that you have been confronted
with a moment ago. Extensionalism, here, allows that you can experience a shade of red, but
stipulates that this takes place – and is experienced as taking place – over an interval of time.
The process is likely to be assisted if your movements during that time help you gain
information about the patterns of sensorimotor contingency that currently hold between your
body and the environment.
Returning now to the debate between Clark and Noë: Clark’s objection to
presence-as-access is that elapsed portions of the opera singer’s note are not accessible now,
hence your experience of them cannot be explained by means of their accessibility. Noë’s
response denies that object and event experience need to be explained in the same way, on the
grounds that they are different species of awareness: “objects are primary in our experience [...]
experience of events depends on a more basic sensitivity to the presence of objects” (Noë,
2006, p. 31). I earlier argued that Noë's line of response may be inadequate to defend the
central tenets of the sensorimotor theory. This drawback can be avoided, I suggest, precisely
by reversing Noë's claim, and contending that the experience of objects depends on the
ongoing conscious presence of events that have been occurring moments into the past.
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7.5 - Chapter Conclusion
It is a matter of some importance that the sensorimotor approach has the resources to provide
a plausible answer to the puzzle of temporal experience. Noë (2006) offers an ambivalent
response. He suggests, briefly, that it can be explained by temporally-extended ‘coupling’. As I
have argued, however, there are no obvious grounds to endorse this, given his main claim that
the experience of the opera singer’s note is explained by an understanding, akin to linguistic
comprehension, of where the note is coming from. While this latter claim provides an account
of temporal experience, it entails an abandonment of a number of the sensorimotor theory’s
central tenets, as far as event experience goes. In so doing, it renders the theory more
vulnerable to the objection that object perception is not fundamentally sensorimotor either,
expressed, for example, by Clark (2008), when he espouses sensorimotor summarising.
With the aim of defending sensorimotor theory, I have aimed to indicate the
conceptual foundation of a sensorimotor enactivist account of temporal experience. This
involves rejecting the comparison with linguistic understanding and emphasising
temporally-extended activity. Adopting extensionalism as a working hypothesis invites, in
turn, a particular understanding of object experience. This is worth endorsing in its own right
because of the useful gloss it places on Noë’s otherwise compelling ‘virtuality’ metaphor, and
the phenomenology of presence-as-access. This consideration gives the sensorimotor theory
even more reason to pursue extensionalism as an explanation of temporal experience.
Clark’s (2006) critique has the useful effect of forcing the endorser of sensorimotor
theory to evaluate carefully the respective roles of coupling and knowing in the approach. If
my suggestion is right, understanding only plays a role if it is directly implicated in bodily
coupling with the environment. If bodily interaction is key, then temporal extension is also
surely vital. The sensorimotor theory should, therefore, do more than pay lip service to
temporality, and take into serious account the temporally-extended nature both of perceptual
experience and its material substrate.
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8 -Thesis Conclusion
In spite of all the attention the sensorimotor theory has been given since its first official
statement, many of its tenets have continued to be incompletely or ambiguously defined, and
one of my goals in this thesis has been to go some way toward clarifying them. This
undertaking is closely related to the separate project of responding to some of the criticisms
that have been levelled against the theory. I have focused in particular on Clark’s argument
that perceptual experience is likely to depend on the activation of representations which are
not intimately involved in bodily movement and which stand-in for types, categories and
relative locations rather than laws of sensorimotor contingency. To the end both of
responding to Clark’s argument and arguing for a particular understanding of the
sensorimotor theory, I have suggested that there are good reasons to think that perceptual
experience depends on the exercise of behavioural capacities, which may be relatively
coarse-grained. In this final passage, I am going to tie together some key strands from the main
part of the thesis.
Sensorimotor contingency is perhaps the most important concept deployed by the
sensorimotor theory. However, there is sometimes equivocation about what SMCs actually
are. One potential tension, although I do not find it particularly problematic, is the shift of
emphasis in Noë’s sole-author accounts from SMCs governing subdoxastic sense inputs to the
SMCs that respectively define P-properties and objective properties, the latter being
characterised by the ways P-properties change with movement. More could be said about the
relation between these different kinds of property. However, there is nothing obvious to
suggest that a final version of the sensorimotor theory could not refer to a combination of all
these kinds of sensorimotor contingency.
More problematic is the slide many statements of the sensorimotor account make
between describing SMCs as counterfactual conditionals, i.e. the results of merely possible
movements, and as patterns of bidirectional output-input dependence manifest in the agent’s
sensorimotor engagements right now. This distinction is similar to the one suggested by
Burhmann, Di Paolo and Barandiaran’s concepts of ‘sensorimotor environment’ and
‘sensorimotor habitat’. For the sake of conceptual hygiene, I think SMCs should be
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understood only to describe the results of counterfactually possible movements, meaning it
need not be possible to identify them from the agent’s present bodily interactions. SMCs, on
this understanding, describe the properties a subject exhibits an appropriate kind of sensitivity
to if she perceives, but do not presuppose that the subject does perceive. The concept, so
construed, avoids prejudging the means by which subjects exhibit the appropriate sensitivity,
which could involve the activation of representations, the exercise of behavioural capacities, or
both.
Further, adopting the counterfactual conditional understanding of SMCs does justice
to the sensorimotor theory’s central suggestion that perceivers, by virtue of possessing
sensorimotor mastery, experience the presence (in absence) of parts of the environment even
when they are not presently interacting with those features in an outward bodily way. I have
sometimes heard people suggest that SMCs are properties a perceiver can ‘have’. This is
inaccurate. They could be properties a perceiver’s interactions with the environment have. On
the understanding I prefer, they are bodily relations a perceiver stands in to the outside
environment which we describe by specifying what would happen if the subject or objects in
question moved in particular ways. One reason it is important to clearly understand the
concept of sensorimotor contingency is that a next phase for the sensorimotor theory will be
to give detailed descriptions of the SMCs that comprise specific experiential properties, such
as shades of red. Moreover, how one understands the concept of sensorimotor contingency
will have a knock on effect on how one understands the concept of sensorimotor mastery as
well as the physical mechanism implicated in it.
As I suggested earlier in the thesis, sensorimotor mastery admits two possible
directions of fit. It is sometimes glossed as Being Able To Act, which implies a desire-like
direction of fit, and sometimes as Knowing What Would Happen If You Did Act, which
implies a belief-like direction of fit. One proposal is that sensorimotor mastery is essentially
belief-like, and that having an ability to act is merely a trivial consequence of possessing
sensorimotor mastery. Noë offers this interpretation at times, although not consistently. The
construal of sensorimotor mastery in which it is primarily belief-like invites the suggestion
that the exercise of sensorimotor mastery is constituted by the deployment of internal
representations bearing content about SMCs. The representations could take the form, for
185
instance, of the predictive models proposed by Seth (2014). Although this sort of account
could turn out to be correct, I do not think endorsing it is the sensorimotor theorist’s best bet,
since the proposal entails abandoning many of the improvements the sensorimotor theory
otherwise makes on the orthodox approach.
One improvement the sensorimotor theory would otherwise make is to avoid placing
an unsustainable explanatory burden on the concept of internal representation. There are
significant limitations to the explanatory efficacy of appeals to internal representation. Hutto
and Myin (2012) have demonstrated that it is not clear that subpersonal content can ever be
accounted for in a naturalistically respectable way. Even if one were not moved by Hutto and
Myin’s contention that any and all content-talk should therefore be avoided, there are sensible
limits that should be placed on internal representation’s theoretical role. Since it has not been
established that neural states can bear metaphysically real content rather than content we
ascribe as a useful metaphor because it is explanatorily expedient to do so, we should not
appeal to content to account for phenomenal qualities, particularly if we, as physicalists, hope
to respond to those with metaphysically-motivated anti-physicalist intuitions about qualia.
Setting this point to one side, it is not certain, in any case, that appealing solely to the content
and functional role of neural representations will ever be sufficient by itself to make it
intelligible how personal level perceptual content or perceptual phenomenology is connected
to the physical.
These drawbacks also speak against the objection, from Clark (2008), that perceptual
experience depends on the activation in the ventral stream of internal representations geared
towards the exercise of epistemic skills like sorting, sifting and classifying, and that the
sensorimotor theory is therefore implausible. If these skills are not bodily skills, the view ends
up depending on the content of the internal representations to account for phenomenal
qualities and, as I have suggested, internal representations do not appear to be up to this job. If
sorting and sifting are varieties of sensorimotor skill, as is plausible, then Clark’s account of
ventral stream perception does not challenge the sensorimotor theory’s core claim that
perception is constituted by the exercise of sensorimotor skills, which we can allow are likely
to be coarse-grained rather than fine-grained.
Sensorimotor theorists also have a strategic reason not to endorse the claim that the
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exercise of sensorimotor understanding is constituted by the activation of representations,
since doing so makes the theory a hostage to fortune. If the phenomenology of
presence-in-absence and the logical relation between perception and action could be
compellingly accounted for in a way that no longer entails that perceivers master SMCs, then
few of the sensorimotor theory’s core tenets would remain secure. Having said that, if it were
established the perceptual experience does depend on nothing more than the activation of
internal representations, the sensorimotor theory would continue to have promise as an
account of phenomenal qualities. Internal representations, supposing that they do bear
genuine content, could not bear the hyperintensional content required to actively discount
the possibility that representations of types, categories and locations are also representations
of SMCs. Appealing to SMCs rather than types, categories and locations could, however, help
representationalists about phenomenal qualities respond to the Inverted Earth
counterexample.
Although there are problems with tying the sensorimotor theory too heavily to the
concept of internal representation, sensorimotor mastery must, at least in a loose sense,
involve Knowing What Would Happen If You Did Act, since SMCs describe the
consequences of merely possible movements, and perceivers must grasp them in some way. My
suggestion is that sensorimotor mastery nonetheless does not depend essentially on internal
representation, but on behavioural capacities. These capacities, I suggest, implicate Knowing
What Would Happen If You Did Act just in case they meet appropriate criteria. This
approach perhaps comes close to what Noë would say is the behaviourist mistake of conflating
effect (i.e. behaviour) with cause (i.e. knowledge). However, it avoids crude behaviourism.
First, the idea is not simply to abandon sensorimotor mastery as a belief-like capacity and
appeal to behavioural capacities instead. My suggestion is that the relevant behavioural
capacities logically implicate the appropriate understanding, meaning that the understanding
is a real entity even if it is not reified as something like a neural representation. Thus it does
not deny perceptual consciousness, but explains perceptual consciousness by appeal to
sensorimotor mastery. Further, the present view avoids the implausible suggestion that
perceivers must in every case move their bodies in order to perceive, since the behavioural
capacities may be active merely by virtue of a subject’s being prepared to behave. Preparedness
187
to behave could, in principle, be ascribed on the basis of neural and bodily states without
appeal to representations or presently-occurring bodily movements.
Finally, the view I am recommending does not rule out the possibility of giving a
restricted theoretical role to internal representation. In fact, it endorses pluralism about how
the relevant behavioural capacities may be accounted for physicalistically. It is compatible with
an entirely nonrepresentational dynamical systems approach. It is also compatible with an
approach that appeals to information processing, including the deployment of internal
representations, should they prove the most effective way to explain how the appropriate
behavioural capacities are realised. This approach to representation avoids unduly conflating
the relatively innocent suggestion that representation is a useful metaphorical posit for
making sense of the physical processes implicated in perception with the faulty suggestion that
perception just is the activation of an internal representation.
A final thing is to see how the behavioural capacity view can make sense of the
phenomenology of object experience described by Noë, as well as provide a distinctive answer
to the puzzle of temporal experience, which present a specific challenge to the sensorimotor
theory as well as presenting a challenge to accounts of perception more generally. This is my
suggestion: Perception unfolds as a temporally-extended process involving the exercise of
capacities for bodily behaviour. This process frequently involves outwardly observable bodily
movement, although it need not, since behavioural capacities are often exercised merely in the
course of becoming prepared to move our bodies. This process cannot be broken down, in a
principled way, into discrete time slices. Considered at any particular instant, however, a
perceiver is poised to make certain bodily movements. This poise reflects the perceiver’s
understanding of certain SMCs, where SMCs are taken to be characterised by counterfactual
conditionals specifying the results of possible movements. The movements a perceiver is
poised to make at a particular instant are sufficient to account for the perceiver’s experiencing
the presence in absence of certain environmental detail. However the SMCs they are
exercising mastery of at this instant are insufficient to determinately specify any particular
environmental property, for example a shade of red.
The experience of a determinate feature, such as a shade of red, only happens in the
course of the temporally-extended exercise of that behavioural capacity. Over a period of time,
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a perceiver undergoes a continually evolving poise to make skillful bodily movements. Over
the course of this evolution, the perceiver may experience a shade of red, although they can
never fixate on the shade of red, since seeing the shade of red depends on this evolving,
temporally extended, non-atomic process. If it the content of the experience did not
temporally track the vehicle, there need not be any obstacle to seeing the shade of red all at
once, as a non-temporally extended content could supervene on a temporally-extended vehicle.
But we can make sense of Noë’s description of visual phenomenology, which I find compelling,
by supposing that the content temporally tracks the vehicle. This means the experience of the
shade of red is an experience of temporal extension. This is suggestive of a different response
to the opera singer case than the one given by Noë, namely a version of extensionalism rather
than the cinematic approach he endorses. This gives us a way to account for the
phenomenology associated both with event and object experience.
One thing I have not addressed in detail in this thesis is the precise mechanism
implicated in sensorimotor mastery, and this aspect of the sensorimotor theory continues to
be in need of significant development. Further, I have not examined in detail the precise
character of the behavioural capacities that would implicate different forms of sensorimotor
mastery; offering such an account has the potential to be a useful next step for the
sensorimotor theory. A final noteworthy limitation is that I have not resolved the more
general question of how to licence the claim that appropriate behaviours and behavioural
capacities are themselves intentionally-directed. Answering this question might involve
endorsing the biological enactivists’ appeal to autonomy and normativity, although we might
finally decide that notions like these are dispensable. This is a question that the sensorimotor
theory ought to take a stance on. However, I believe that with a clear understanding of the
fundamentals of the sensorimotor theory, and an appreciation of its significant merits, we
ought to be well placed to progress the theory further.
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